"Is heavy armour obsolete? The view from Latin America"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez and Samuel Casey
Defence iQ
7 February, 2019
Originally published:
https://www.defenceiq.com/armoured-vehicles/articles/is-heavy-armour-obsolete-the-view-from-latin-america
Defence iQ has recently hosted the International Armored Vehicle
event and one of the big takeaways was the focus on mobility and
modularity for tomorrows armoured vehicles. So, we ask: “
Is the tank becoming obsolete for today's battlefields?”
For
the U.S, military planners will have to reconsider their procurement
needs in the near future in the context of U.S. security concerns and
the likelihood that urban warfare will become more common over the next
decade. However, what is the view from the Latin American perspective?
Latin American nations are decommissioning outdated models and
replacing them with more modern machines. For example, Brazil is
undergoing a
modernisation program,
which includes the revitalization of M60 combat vehicles, Leopard 1A1
and M113 armoured vehicles, greatly enhancing the effectiveness of its
two tank battalions.
Furthermore, Brazil recently donated a number of tanks to Uruguay.
Future acquisitions also need to take into account regional geopolitics,
the likelihood of war and the technology of armoured vehicles itself.
What is the future of heavy armour in Latin America?
Lessons from recent conflicts in Latin America
The last inter-state war between two Latin American states was the
short 1995 border conflict between Ecuador and Peru. Other regional
conflicts in the post-World War II era were the Falklands/Malvinas war
between Argentina and the United Kingdom in 1982; the 1981 border
conflict between Ecuador and Peru; and the 1969 Soccer War between El
Salvador and Honduras.
Meanwhile, the U.S. military’s most recent interventions in the
region were in Haiti in 1994 (Operation Uphold Democracy) and in Panama
in 1989 (Operation Just Cause).
While there are ongoing border disputes (e.g. Bolivia and Chile or
Guyana and Venezuela) and tensions (mostly coming out of Venezuela these
days), security threats in the region are generally insurgent in
nature. For example, terrorist movements like Colombia’s ELN and EPL,
Peru’s Shining Path, or Paraguay’s EPP; narco-cartels in Mexico; or
organised gangs such as the Maras in Central America or the Primero
Comando da Capital in Brazil. These entities are highly mobile and
operate in isolated regions or in urban areas.
Recent Tank Acquisitions in Latin America
Latin American governments continue to acquire new (or used)
platforms for their armed forces, but heavy armour is not purchased
particularly often. Some recent deals worth noting are:
- In December 2018, the Brazilian Army completed the transfer of 25
M41C light tanks to the Uruguayan army. “Of the 25 vehicles, 15 were
completely refurbished by Brazil while the remaining 10 will be used for
parts. Those that will remain intact will be assigned to armoured
infantry units, which currently use M24 light tanks,” Jane’s explains.
- In 2016, Russia delivered 50 T-72B1 tanks to Nicaragua. The platforms are “an upgrade of the 1970s-era main battle tank and feature explosive reactive armour and thermal weapon sights, among other improvements.”
- Venezuela has received a plethora of Russian weaponry over the past
couple of decades, though these deals have been quite scarce in recent
years due to Caracas’ financial crisis. Amongst the acquisitions are
T-72 tanks, as well as infantry fighting vehicles like the BMP-3M, and an array of transport vehicles.
"Latin American governments
continue to acquire new (or used) platforms for their armed forces, but
heavy armour is not purchased particularly often"
As for other nations, while no other major sales have occurred, there
are ongoing reports about armoured vehicles in need of modernization or
replacement. For example, Chile possesses
Leopard 2A4 tanks, and it will be interesting if they will be upgraded anytime soon, given that the Chilean government is
replacing the famous Copper Law,
which helps fund the Ministry of Defence. Meanwhile, Peru has yet to
find a replacement for its old T-55 tanks, while Ecuador recently
upgraded several
AML and M113 A2 Plus armoured vehicles, as the country does not possess heavy armour.
As for Mexico, its fleet consists of light and medium armoured
vehicles. Finally, Colombia also possesses light armoured vehicles; for
example,
media reports published in late January
show vehicles that appear to be the EE-09 Cascavel, a 6x6 light tank,
on patrol in urban areas close to the border with Venezuela.
Latin American Armoured Vehicle Requirements
The intrastate conflict that has plagued many Latin American
countries is one of the strongest drivers for defence spending. Many
countries continue to acquire new (or refurbished) platforms, such as
Brazil’s new carrier Atlantico, Chile’s new
Sikorsky S-70i Blackhawk helicopters, Argentina’s
used AB-206 helicopters, or Mexico’s new
patrol vessel Reformador. As for Peru, the Andean state has commenced the construction of a
second landing platform vessel, BAP Paita. However, when it comes to heavy armour (or even medium armour) new contracts have been quite scarce in recent years.
One argument in favour of procuring heavy armour is so that nations
can maintain minimal deterrence capabilities. While interstate warfare
is
very unlikely, it does not mean that the scenario is
impossible. The Venezuelan government’s behaviour, particularly during the
2008 crisis in the Andes is
an example of this ever-present possibility. Nevertheless, given the
region’s current peaceful status, limited defence budgets and other
security threats, it is understandable that regional governments have
other priorities. Moreover, the focus for Latin American governments is
the acquisition of multipurpose platforms, which can be utilized not
solely for war.
This is exemplified by the new vessels the region is acquiring (or
domestically manufacturing) which can be utilized for military and
peaceful operations, such as combating maritime crimes (like illegal
fishing) and transporting supplies to areas affected by natural
disasters. Helicopters can similarly be utilized to transport medical
personnel and supplies to remote areas after disasters occur, not just
troops.
As for armour, personnel carriers have been recently utilized in
Brazil and Peru as part of emergency and support operations to help
civilian populations. It is their flexibility to have multiple uses that
makes them attractive to civilian and military leaders alike. The
problem with heavy armour is that it is difficult for the main battle
tank to have another use other than what it was designed for.
“A tank cannot carry humanitarian assistance, so it is difficult for us
to convince our civilian leaders of the need to buy new ones in times of
peace,” explained a Latin American military officer interviewed by the
authors.
Nevertheless, when it comes to armoured vehicles, just like any other
system, it is important to have a vision of the future and to carry out
a cost-benefit analysis regarding weapons acquisition. In terms of
life-cycle cost, it is more expensive and difficult to maintain heavy
tanks that were designed in the 1950s-1970s, than to repair more modern
equipment. Purchasing a tank is not a one-time payment, as this platform
demands continual upgrades of its systems, armour, chassis, and
weapons. This can often spiral and stakeholders become politically and
financially tethered to projects making them hard to abandon.
A great example of this is the modernization process of the
M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks for the US and the
Challenger 2
for the UK. However, vehicles that were designed in the 1950s and
1960s have incredibly low survivability compared to modern assets. Even
though Latin American governments may not want to upgrade their heavy
armour, it may be financially advisable.
Geography is also an issue that influences the procurement of heavy
weaponry. In spite of technological advances that make modern tanks able
to operate in harsher conditions, it is difficult to justify the use of
the main battle tank in insurgency operations. Brazilian, Colombian or
Peruvian policymakers would traditionally use a combined force of
infantry, light armoured vehicles and helicopters.
As for urban warfare, light armour seems to be the norm, and, as previously mentioned, the Colombian army sent
6x6 light armoured vehicles in a routine operation through a Colombian town in late January.
Light 8x8 armoured personnel carriers
were also utilized in Rio de Janeiro as part of the Brazilian armed
forces’ operations to combat criminal gangs in the city’s shantytowns
(known as favelas). In these instances, The authors have been unable to
find any incidents of explosives, such as rocket-propelled grenades,
that were utilized against these platforms, however, this is an obvious
concern. Theoretically heavy armoured could have been utilized in some
of the wider streets though.
Lastly, we must remember that mobility has become a key requirement.
If a tank is utilized in a cavalry role, it must be fast to deploy and
able to pry open the enemy lines.
However, in a "rapid action response" scenarios that often faces many
Latin American states, the main battle tank is unable to give
commanders the ability to react to crises in remote areas with a
flexible set of capabilities that can be tailored to the situation.
Similarly, a command vehicle must be able to move about relatively
unnoticed so as to not draw fire. Finally, if a tank is used to
strengthen a position, it must be tough enough and hit hard enough to
win the fight. If a vehicle can’t manoeuvre because it is highly
visible, or too slow to break contact then the effect is the same: your
opponents locate you and bad things happen. Designing your system to be
mobile enough to accomplish your mission is an absolute necessity.
Final Thoughts
Armour can be versatile, but going forward in the Latin American
theatre, given the region’s clear-and-present dangers, it is difficult
to make case for the acquisition of heavy armour in comparison to light
platforms. Platforms with higher tactical and strategic mobility can be
deployed in constrictive urban areas, or other assets that have
multipurpose uses, such as personnel carriers, helicopters or ships.
Latin American countries need armoured vehicles that fit their own
unique requirements. As financial and political will is often scarce,
investing in new main battle tanks can be hard to justify as a more pop
allocation of resources on a system that is singular in use and cannot
adequately combat the most pressing threats.
While military cautions about being prepared to protect sovereignty
against a country or group of countries, it rightfully remains primarily
focused on more realistic security challenges, and to meet these challenges a mobile that is able to engage in non-traditional conflicts is needed.
About the Authors:
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, military and cybersecurity issues.
Samuel Casey has been an enlisted soldier in the South Carolina
Army National Guard for eight years. He has his undergraduate degree in
Intelligence and National Security Studies from Coastal Carolina
University and works as a Contractor in Charleston, SC.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors
alone and do not reflect those of any institutions with which the author
are associated.
