Geopolitical Monitor: "ICJ to Rule on Colombia-Nicaragua Maritime Dispute"

"ICJ to Rule on Colombia-Nicaragua Maritime Dispute"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Situation Report

Geopolitical Monitor

12 April, 2022

Originally published: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/icj-to-rule-on-colombia-nicaragua-maritime-dispute/

On 21 April, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) will deliver its verdict on a case between Colombia and Nicaragua over contested waters in the Caribbean. While the possibility of inter-state war between the two countries is minimal, it is nevertheless important for this conflict to be resolved and for international law to be both respected and impartial.

The Case

The case in question concerns “Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia).” The Court has reported that a verdict will be delivered at the Peace Palace, The Hague, at 10 AM (Netherlands time) on the aforementioned date.

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Journal: Argentina, Chile and the Joint Antarctic Naval Patrol: a successful confidence building mechanism

"Argentina, Chile and the Joint Antarctic Naval Patrol: a successful confidence building mechanism"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
The Polar Journal
Published online: 11 April, 2017
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/2154896X.2017.1310488

Abstract

Established in the late 1990s, the Joint Antarctic Naval Patrol (PANC) is a defence initiative that brings together naval platforms from Argentina and Chile to monitor Antarctic waters and territory. After almost 20 annual campaigns, Patrol vessels have helped numerous vessels in need, as well as having carried out an emergency extraction from a Brazilian base in 2012. The success of the PANC is even more commendable given the occasionally tense relations between Argentina and Chile, which include overlapping Antarctic claims. The PANC is likely to continue operating for the immediate future particularly since climate change, which translates into a longer Antarctic summer, and greater maritime traffic has already prompted recent campaigns to extend operations for an additional two weeks. Nevertheless, one factor that hinders the Patrol and its capabilities is that it is made up of a few ageing vessels, and neither Argentina nor Chile have recently obtained modern platforms for Antarctic operations. In spite of this limitation, the activities carried out by these two navies make the PANC an example of how military cooperation to protect the Antarctic and human activities there is possible.

Keywords: Argentina, Chile, Navy, confidence building mechanism, Antarctica, military

EIR: The ICJ As An Effective Conflict Prevention Tool in Latin America

"The ICJ as an effective conflict prevention tool in Latin America"
W. Alejandro Sanchez and Brittney J. Figueroa
E-International Relations
April 4, 2017
http://www.e-ir.info/2017/04/04/the-icj-as-an-effective-conflict-prevention-tool-in-latin-america/


The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has made a name for itself as various governments across the world resort to it to rule on inter-state disagreements. There are certainly valid criticisms about how the ICJ, the chief judicial body of the United Nations, operates, particularly as African governments have accused it of imposing Eurocentric international law. Some of its rulings on controversial cases have even been denounced as ‘step[s] backwards’.

Despite these criticisms, Latin American governments have regularly turned to ICJ rulings on border disputes and other inter-state disagreements.  Over the past decades, the Court has ruled on numerous cases between Latin American states and enjoys a positive record so far in this region, given the generally peaceful compliance of Latin American states to the Court’s rulings. Nevertheless, the complexity of one particular case, ‘Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean’, a historically-charged territorial dispute between Bolivia and Chile, may prove to challenge the credibility of the ICJ in Latin America in the near future.

The ICJ in Latin America

Since commencing its operations in 1946, after the 1945 San Francisco Conference and the dissolution of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the ICJ has had an important and constant role in Latin American geopolitical affairs. For example, the ICJ’s first case in the region was Colombia v. Peru in 1949 regarding the interpretation of an asylum treaty. Honduras and Nicaragua similarly turned to the Court in 1958 after the latter claimed that the Arbitral Award that delineates the borders between the two countries, made by the King of Spain in 1906, was not binding. Ultimately, Nicaragua lost the case, as judges voted 14 to 1 in favor of Honduras.In other words, the ICJ has ruled not solely on cases relating to territorial disputes, but also diplomatic disagreements.

In the 21st century, the Court has been actively involved in border disputes. For example, The ICJ has passed rulings on cases between Costa Rica and Nicaragua over navigational rights in 2009; Argentina and Uruguay over a pulp mill in the Uruguay River in 2010;Colombia and Nicaragua  over a territorial and maritime dispute in 2012; a maritime dispute between Chile and Peru in 2014; and a ping-ponged dispute between Costa Rica and Nicaragua over both the rights to wetlands on the River San Juan, and the construction of a road along the San Juan River in 2015. Most recently, in March 2016, the court passed a new judgment over the delimitation of the continental shelf between Colombia and Nicaragua(a follow up of the aforementioned ruling).

At the time of this writing, March 2017, out of the Court’s 14 pending cases, seven involve Latin American states: three cases between Costa Rica and Nicaragua; two involving Nicaragua and Colombia; and two between Bolivia and Chile.

Discussion

How does the ICJ fit into Latin American geopolitics? The obvious answer is that it is a positive development that regional states are looking for non-violent means to solve their outstanding border disputes, including seeking third party mediation (and rulings).

Moreover, the governments that have gone to the Court have generally respected the ICJ’s decisions, though there have been occasions in which states return to the Court for additional clarification (and arguably to revisit the previous decision in order to obtain a more favorable ruling). The back-to-back rulings between Colombia and Nicaragua regarding their maritime dispute illustrates this situation. Additionally, there is the question of whether an ICJ ruling will be beneficial or detrimental to bilateral relations. For brevity, we are not able to provide an in-depth discussion about this issue, however it is worth noting that Peru and Chile have respected the Court’s decision over their maritime borders, and have strong bilateral ties, particularly when it comes to trade due to their membership in the Pacific Alliance, a regional trade bloc. With that said, the two countries have a history of “bad blood” and distrust dating back to the 19th century War of the Pacific, and while they will likely continue to respect the Court’s 2014 ruling, this does not necessarily mean that distrust will decrease in the short term. It is also worth noting that there is still a disagreement over the interpretation of the ICJ ruling regarding how it affects the territorial border between the two countries. For the moment, neither government appears interested in returning to the ICJ as the main goal is to improve bilateral relations rather than provoke more controversy, however this could happen at some point given the precedents set by other governments.

The numerous judicial procedures between San Jose and Managua require additional discussion as they exemplify how the ICJ is utilized. In 2010, Costa Rica went to the Court and asked that it investigate the legality of Nicaragua’s excavation of three channels of the River San Juan, as well as Nicaraguan military presence on Costa Rican territory. Very soon after, Managua submitted a counter claim to the court in 2011 stating that San Jose had failed to perform environmental impact assessments prior to the construction of a highway that runs close to the river. In December 2015, the Court ruled that Nicaragua pay damages to its neighbor, as its actions violated Costa Rica’s territorial sovereignty, the 1858 Treaty of Limits, and the ICJ Order of 8 March 2011 (“Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area”) outlining provisional measures issued by the court. On the other hand, Costa Rica was found guilty of the allegations in the counter claim, but was not ordered to compensate Nicaragua.

Although complex, this trial had a positive diplomatic end, as made clear by Nicaragua’s ambassador to the Netherlands, Carlos Argüello Gómez’s statement that ‘[The] ruling will help ties between our two countries. When things are cleared up, then problems go away and that is the most important thing.’ This positive outlook, however, is fragile when the tensions between the parties involved are already high. Moreover on 16 January the ICJ announced that Costa Rica had commenced proceedings against Nicaragua, making it the third case between the two sides currently in the ICJ’s docket. Clearly, diplomatic relations between the two remain tense, however violence continues to be avoided.

A Pivotal Case

The intention of the authors is to propose that the Court’s ultimate challenge, including the question whether parties will respect its ruling, has to do with the Bolivia and Chile cases. There are currently not one, but two cases under deliberation, the most controversial regarding a border issue that is over a century old and the foundation of patriotic sentiments in the landlocked nation as La Paz has sued Santiago in an effort to have access to the Pacific Ocean.

Bolivia lost its coastal territories to Chile during the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), making it a landlocked nation. The state has subsequently attempted to regain some sort of permanent corridor back to the Pacific. This is a very complicated and sensitive issue: should the Court award sovereignty to Bolivia to territory currently controlled by Chile, it would effectively cut Chile geographically in two. The case is still in its preliminary hearings and presentation of arguments and counter arguments; hence we will have to wait some years before the ICJ passes its decision.

Nevertheless, even at this early stage, tensions are already high. For decades, diplomatic relations between the two countries have been limited. In April 2013, the Evo Morales government filed an application at the ICJ against Chile due to the failure, from the Bolivian point of view, of “Chile’s obligation to negotiate in good faith and effectively with Bolivia in order to reach an agreement granting Bolivia a fully sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.” While Bolivia is utilizing  the Court to force negotiations over  access to the Ocean, Chile claims that the existence of a 1904 peace treaty has settled the account between the two nations, and hence does not see the need to negotiate further, thuscalling into question the jurisdictional boundaries of the Court. Santiago’s lack of intention to enter negotiations with La Paz over the past decades regarding the sea access is arguably the main reason why President Morales decided to go to an international judicial body for a favorable ruling to force Chile negotiate.

While the case is proceeding, in late March Bolivia filed new paperwork at the ICJ, and Santiago has also opened a case against La Paz over the Silala River. The authors would argue that the Silala case is a countermove by Santiago over the sea access issue, a sort of legal tit-for-tat akin to the Costa Rica and Nicaragua proceedings. Due to space considerations, we cannot provide an in-depth discussion about the Silala case, which centers on Chile stating that the river is an international watercourse, therefore making Santiago “entitled to the equitable and reasonable use of the waters of the Silala River system in accordance with customary international law.” While Santiago may have a valid claim to the river, the timing of the case suggests that more than interest in the river, Chile wants to “punish” Bolivia for commencing proceedings over the sea access issue.

It is important to note that the ICJ’s role in the sea access case is a bit different than its usual role. The Court is currently being used as a tool, rather than as an explicit decider, in the case. This is exemplified in its most recent declaration, aptly named ‘Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean’. Rather than deciding on which of the two countries is granted access to the ocean, the ruling makes it mandatory that Santiago peacefully negotiates with La Paz regarding the coveted corridor to the Pacific. However, Chile’s president was quick to remark that, even though the court has ruled so that Chile is forced to negotiate, “Bolivia hasn’t won anything” and that the ruling “does not affect the territorial integrity of Chile”. These comments regarding the heated, historically-charged case bring to light concerns about related future rulings. While it is uncommon for States to go against ICJ rulings, if they feel that the Court lacks jurisdiction over a particular matter, they may contend. This possibility then raises important questions. If the two countries cannot come to an agreement on their own, will the Court issue an umbrella decision, and if it does, will Chile comply?

The ICJ may attempt to go for a Solomon-like ruling, with La Paz gaining joint control, but not sovereignty, over a narrow corridor to the ocean. If both sides choose to respect the ICJ’s ruling on such a complex and controversial issue, this will provide the Court with further credibility of a near-perfect record in the region.

Final Thoughts

Since its inception, the International Court of Justice has been involved in Latin American affairs. While critics deem international courts fundamentally ineffective, and wrestle with the idea whether compliance with international law may be a top priority for a state, the ICJ’s rulings in the region prove otherwise, as they have affected Latin American diplomatic relations over the past decades, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Indeed, this analysis mentions how eight nations in recent years have gone to the ICJ to peacefully resolve various differences that range from territorial disputes to even navigational rights. In fact, half of the Court’s pending cases deal directly with Latin America, demonstrating how the region is eager for resolutions to inter-state conflicts that no longer require violence. This statement is supported by the fact that the last inter-state war was more than 20 years ago: the 1995 conflict between Peru and Ecuador, and prior to that, the 1982 Faklands/Malvinas War between Argentina and the United Kingdom.

Ultimately, while Latin American countries have generally respected the Court’s decisions, it will be important to monitor how countries involved in more controversial disputes, namely the Bolivia-Chile sea access case, will react to future ICJ rulings. Hopefully, the two parties will choose to continue in the peaceful steps of their fellow Latin American nations regarding the Court, and respect the ICJ’s ruling.

The authors wish it to be known that the views presented in this essay are their sole responsibility do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the authors are associated.

W. Alejandro Sanchez Nieto and Brittney J. Figueroa.
Alejandro is an analyst who focuses on international security and geopolitics. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez. Brittney is a recent graduate from the University of California, Santa Barbara with a Bachelors degree in Global Studies, and a Minor in Latin American Iberian Studies.

Presentation: CIMSEC CFAR: Neither Side Appears Ready for War, Falklands Malvinas Islands Analysis

"Neither Side Appears Ready for War, Falklands/Malvinas Islands Analysis"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Presentation
CIMSEC - 2016 CFAR Conference
March 24, 2016

W. Alejandro Sanchez presents at the 2016 CFAR Conference, presented by the Center for International Maritime Security and hosted by the Center for Naval Analyses.

CIMSEC: How Peaceful is the South Atlantic?

"How Peaceful is the South Atlantic?"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Center for International Maritime Security
February 17, 2016
Originally published: http://cimsec.org/21903-2/21903

Admiral Eduardo Bacellar Leal Ferreira, commander of the Brazilian Navy, gave an interview to the Uruguayan daily El Paísthis past December 2015. The Admiral optimistically declared that “today there is no ocean more peaceful than the South Atlantic, there are no tensions that cannot be solved. We have problems in the Malvinas [Falklands] or in the Gulf of Guinea, but there are no wars. This is the only ocean where the major powers do not have warships.” This statement is an ideal starting point for an in-depth discussion of South Atlantic geopolitics.

A Conflict-Less Ocean?

Due to space issues, we cannot discuss in detail every South Atlantic maritime conflict. Nevertheless, the Brazilian Admiral is incorrect to declare that the only regional disputes are the Falklands/Malvinas and the Gulf of Guinea. A total list includes:

• The Falklands/Malvinas: Argentina claims these islands, currently controlled by the United Kingdom (the two countries had a brief war in 1982). In 2013, the inhabitants of theFalklands held a referendum in which they voted to remain part of the UK – Argentina does not recognize the ballot.
• Ghana and Ivory Coast: The two countries have a dispute over offshore oil drilling along their border. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) gave an interim ruling in 2015 but a final decision is not expected until 2017.
• Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo: In 2014, the Angolan government attempted to redraw the maritime border with the DRC in order to gain control of some 200 additional miles. The two countries have contested their border since the 1970s.
• Equatorial Guinea and Gabon: The two countries claim theMbanie, Cocotiers and Congas islands since the early 1970s. It is believed that there are underwater oil reserves around those islands.

Preventing War

In spite of the aforementioned maritime disputes, Admiral Ferreira is generally correct when he praises the peacefulness of the South Atlantic. After all, the last confrontation in the region was the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War.

Even more, war has been successfully prevented in other disputes: in 1978 Papal mediation helped avoid a war between Argentina and Chile in the Beagle Channel, where the Pacific and Atlantic oceans meet. Moreover, the dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria over the Bakassi Peninsula was solved via international ruling – in 2006 the two governments signed the “UN-backed Greentree Agreement[which set] the terms and timeframe for the implementation of the 2002 ruling of the [International Court of Justice], which transferred the Bakassi Peninsula from Nigeria to Cameroon.” The list of successfully mediated disputes could grow if ITLOS manages to resolve the Ghana-Ivory Coast issue or if the UN’s current mediation efforts between Equatorial Guinea and Gabon are fruitful. In other words there are plenty of examples that highlight the peacefulness of the South Atlantic.

Certainly, there is always the possibility of an unforeseen “X factor” that could jump-start a war. The battle over precious resources like oil is a likely reason as most of these conflicts have to do with control of maritime areas where large deposits of oil are believed to be located. In the case of Argentina, there is a high degree of patriotism over the Falklands/Malvinas themselves, but the recent discovery of new oil deposits by Rockhopper is another reason for Buenos Aires to desire control over them. This scenario is also plausible on the African side of the Atlantic. An October 2015 report by the Institute for Security Studies entitled “Why Africa must resolve its Maritime Boundary Disputes,” argues that “the location of oil fields and natural resources deposits can result in considerable complications when states unilaterally determine and apportion exploration blocks that infringe upon areas of disputed ownership by a neighboring state.”

Should other sources of state-revenue dry up, governments may become more willing to engage in a war, or at least aggressively push for negotiations, over any of the aforementioned maritime disputes.

New Navies But For What?

In a 2011 essay for Small Wars & Insurgencies, I argued that South America was involved in an arms race. The situation has changed in 2016, particularly among the South Atlantic states. For example, the Brazilian Navy continues with its ambitious programs, in spite of its economic woes, which include the construction of a nuclear-powered submarine, four Scorpene subs, and repairing its Sao Paulo carrier. Furthermore, in late 2015 Brazil purchased the multipurpose vessel TCD Siroco from France – it has been renamed the G-40 Bahia. Nevertheless, these purchases have not made Brazil’s neighbors perceive it as a security threat, as Uruguay’s Navy has not carried out major purchases in years while Argentina has only repaired the submarine ARA San Juan and purchased four Russian vessels that will be utilized for search and rescue operations and Antarctic research. Neither Montevideo nor Buenos Aires appear to expect an invasion from the Portuguese-speaking giant.

As for the African South Atlantic states, Equatorial Guinea commissioned a frigate, the Wle Nzas, in June 2014. “This warship is the flagship of the Equatorial Guinea Navy and it will [help] to ensure security in the Gulf of Guinea,” said President Teodoro Obiang Nguema. Meanwhile Gabon has ordered two offshore patrol vessels from KERSHIP, a joint-initiatives of PIRIOU and DCNS (though a January report by DefenceWeb argues that the contract may have been deferred). As for Nigeria, it constructed the NNS Andoni in 2012; “with a speed of up to 25 knots (46km/h), this can quickly go to intercept the pirates,” said Commanding Officer Adepegba. The country also acquired a patrol vessel from China in 2014. Finally, the Angolan government announced in late 2015 that it will purchase “two fast-attack naval craft and several coastal radar and repeater station systems worth €122 million from two subsidiaries of Italy’s Finmeccanica.”

As has been discussed in various analyses, due to the general inter-state tranquility of the South Atlantic, regional navies are looking for a new raison d’etre. Protecting natural resources and non-traditional security threats are the standard reasons. Without a doubt, Africa’s West coast continues to have a major problem with piracy, including the hijacking of transport ships, so it is in the interest of regional governments to have strong navies to monitor their waters. As for protecting natural resources within a country’s Exclusive Economic Zone, this includes both oil exploration as well as combating crimes like illegal fishing. Nevertheless, while African states have valid reasons to upgrade their naval forces, Brazil has a more difficult case regarding its projects. Without addressing the nuclear submarine or carrier by name, in his interview with El País, Admiral Ferreira argues that Brazil must maintain a deterrent force to protect its natural resources, “we have [offshore] oil fields, and if there is an energy crisis it is necessary to deter anyone from coming to Brazil to take our resources.” While there is an obvious logic to the Brazilian Admiral’s statement, it is unclear exactly who is this enemy that requires a nuclear-powered submarine to defeat.

Global Powers

Finally, Admiral Ferreira argued that no world power has vessels in the South Atlantic. That is generally true, particularly since 1986, when the United Nations created the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone, which declares that the South Atlantic is a nuclear weapons-free zone.

Nevertheless, warships from the global powers routinely cross the South Atlantic; just this past April 2015, the USS Spearhead arrived in Gabon and carried out exercises with the local navy as part of theAfrica Partnership Station. “During our visit, we’ll conduct marine-to-marine training along with medical subject matter expert exchanges, thus helping build a stronger Global Network of Navies,” said Commander Matthew Flemming. In May of the same year, the French offshore patrol vessel L’Adroit docked in Cape Town. As for the other side of the Atlantic, the USS America visited Brazil in 2014 while the aforementioned French OPV L’Adroit docked in Uruguay in mid-February 2016. Furthermore, apart from the Falklands, London also controls South Georgia and the Sandwich Islands. Moreover, the British-controlled Ascension Island was a strategically important stopover for British warships and transport vessels during the Falklands War.

Hence, Admiral Ferreira’s declaration is a slight overstatement. While there are no British battle groups patrolling the Falklands nor does the U.S. Navy have a fleet stationed in Ascension Island (though the U.S. Air Force does utilize an auxiliary field there), global powers do have a constant presence in the South Atlantic’s waters.

A South Atlantic NATO?

Even though Admiral Ferreira did not discuss South Atlantic integration, it is important to mention that that the two sides of the Atlantic have increased defense ties in recent years. For example the ATLASUR naval exercises bring South American and African navies together, while Brazil and South Africa (along with India) have carried out the IBSAMAR exercises.

Nevertheless, calls for greater South-South cooperation have not ended in some grand new maritime defense initiative. The aforementioned exercises are important, but neither Brazil nor South Africa, the two powerhouses of the South Atlantic, have taken major steps to bring together all these navies towards some common objective (i.e. forming a trans-oceanic task-force to combat maritime crimes). The region already came together in 1986 with the SAPCZ and there is already a modern precedent for various countries attempting to deal with maritime affairs – namely, the African Union’s “2050 Africa’s Integration Maritime Strategy,” which will address (and ideally solve) the continent’s maritime issues, such as border disputes. We have yet to see the South Atlantic capitalize on its general peacefulness to address non-traditional defense problems.

Final Thoughts

Brazilian Admiral Ferreira is generally correct by praising the peacefulness of the South Atlantic. Of course, an unforeseen incident could occur or a series of decisions within a government that prompts it to decide to start a war with a neighboring state. The possibility of petro-money is an enticing reason to engage in violence, particularly as this non-renewable commodity becomes scarcer in the near future or, as the aforementioned ISS report explains, “maritime boundary disputes, many long dormant, are increasingly exacerbated by a growing interest in exploring and exploiting natural resources.” Nevertheless, the region can praise itself for having avoided inter-state war in spite of several border disputes.

Currently, the South Atlantic’s maritime security issues revolve around cracking down on piracy, drug trafficking and protecting natural resources (like oil deposits and the maritime ecosystem). Robust navies, including coast guards, are an obvious requirement, but there is a thin line that separates obtaining equipment that is needed (like Argentina purchasing search-and-rescue vessels or Angola buying crafts) to other whose usage is questionable (i.e.,  Brazil’s acquisition of a nuclear submarine).

CIMSEC: NEITHER SIDE APPEARS READY FOR WAR: FALKLANDS/MALVINAS ISLANDS ANALYSIS

"Neither Side Appears Ready for War: Falklands/Malvinas Islands"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Center for International Maritime Security
Analysis
January 19, 2016
Originally published: http://cimsec.org/neither-side-appears-ready-for-war-falklandsmalvinas-islands-analysis/21163

Argentina has requested that the United Kingdom engage indiplomatic talks regarding control of the Falkland Islands, or Islas Malvinas, depending on which side you support. As the islands will not change hands anytime soon, with London citing a2013 referendum as proof of the Falklanders’ desire to remain in the UK, the dispute will continue. Nevertheless, in spite of occasional aggressive statements or alarmist media reports from either London or Buenos Aires, it is important to highlight that neither side has significantly increased their defense spending vis-à-vis the islands.

The War

In 1982, Argentina launched an invasion of the islands, as the military government in Buenos Aires wanted to distract the Argentine population from the country’s crumbling economy and unite the citizenry behind the junta. The Falklands War has been extensively analyzed (see such essays as “Delayed Reaction: UK Maritime Expeditionary Capabilities and the Lessons of the Falklands Conflict,” and “Facts Influencing the Defeat of the Argentine Air Power in the Falklands War”) but a word must still be said about the conflict. The war is significant because, as Dr. Ian Speller explains, it “was the first time since 1945 that a major western navy had come under sustained air attack at sea [and] it was the first time that a nuclear-powered hunter killer submarine conducted a successful attack on enemy surface units.”

The navies and air forces from both sides were actively engaged in the battle to control the Falklands. As for successful attacks, aircraft from the Argentine Air Force and Navy managed to sink British vessels like the warships HMS Sheffield and HMS Ardent, and the supply ship MV Atlantic Conveyor, among others. Meanwhile, a British nuclear submarine, the HMS Conqueror, sank the Argentine Navy’s flagship, the ARA General Belgrano.

Official Statements

To this day, Argentina continues to claim ownership of the islands. Case in point, now former-President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, declared this past April that she foresaw that one day the islands would be under Argentine control. A month earlier, UK Defence Secretary Michael Fallon announced that “we are going to beef up the defence of Falkland Islands,” the obvious assumption being that the islands need protection from a possible Argentine attack. These statements come to no surprise, as over the past years Buenos Aires and London claim that the “other side” is taking aggressive steps regarding the islands.

The islands, particularly after the war, are a key part of Argentine nationalism, hence it should not be surprising that Argentina’s new head of state, President Mauricio Macri, will give the occasional nationalistic statement over the islands or call for negotiations. Nevertheless he also wants U.S. and European investment to jump start the country’s economy, so he may not be overly aggressive (after his electoral victory in November,Macri and Prime Minister David Cameron held a telephone discussion in which they agreed on forging closer commercial ties). I would argue that nationalistic statements or calls for dialogue with London from Buenos Aires are mostly for internal consumption, as a way for President Macri to show his people that he has not forgotten about the islands. After all, it would be political suicide for any Argentine president to not make the occasional patriotic declaration regarding the Falklands.

Defense Realities

Provocative calls for negotiations aside, the Argentine Navy is in no particular shape to engage in a new conflict over the islands. The Navy’s biggest acquisition in recent years was that of four Russian multipurpose ships (Aviso/Neftegaz-class), which will be utilized for search and rescue operations and scientific projects around the Antarctic. The vessels arrived to the South American nation this past December. Theoretically, the Navy could install weapons systems aboard the vessels, but it is unlikely that this will happen due to budgetary limitations. Regarding submarines the only new development is that in 2014 the ARA San Juan (a diesel TR-1700-class) was finally returned to the Navy after it underwent repairs that had taken several years to complete.

As for the Air Force, which was a critical factor in Argentina’s victories at sea during the Falklands War, just this past November it decommissioned its aging Mirage warplane fleet.The problem is that the Air Force does not have a new warplane to replace the Mirage. Over the past years there were rumors that Buenos Aires would acquire Russian Sukhoi warplanes (hence the need for London to “beef up” the defense of the islands) but this deal never materialized. Similarly, a recent deal for Israeli Kfir warplanes has been put on hold. For the time being, Argentina will have to rely on trainers, such as the Pampa III,and various, also aging, aircraft to protect its airspace.

The Air Force’s situation is so dismal that during the December 2015 inauguration ceremony of President Macri, Argentina requested that Uruguay have three of its own Cessna Dragonfly planes on alert, ready to support Buenos Aires if some crisis occurred. While this request speaks well of Argentina-Uruguay defense relations, it highlights that the Argentine military is hardly in any shape to attempt a renewed operation to take over the Falklands.

As for the UK Navy, the big news is that it is constructing two new carriers, one of which, the HMS Queen Elizabeth, should be operational by 2020. The new vessels are part of a push for greater defense spending by London. Just this past December,Secretary Fallon declared that “we have said we will maintain a minimum fleet of 19 destroyers and frigates, but as the older frigates are retired we also hope to add a lighter frigate between the offshore patrol vessel and Type 26 and to build more of those as well.” Additionally, the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy will benefit from having the new F-35 warplanes in their inventory, as “the Lightning II will be the backbone of Britain’s future carrier operations.” (Of course, how long it will take for the F-35 to be delivered is another question).

Regarding the Falklands themselves, the Royal Navy maintains the HMS Clyde stationed there as part of its South Atlantic Patrol program (in November 2015, the HMS Clyde assisted in rescuing tourists trapped in a sinking cruise ship close to the Falklands). Additionally, the British daily Express reported that this past April British troops carried out exercises in the Falklands which simulated an invasion of the islands. As for new equipment, the only major ongoing acquisition program seems to be additionalGiraffe AMB radars, manufactured by Saab.

One could argue that the British military is suffering from exhaustion due to the multiple operations it carries out around the world, from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to security operations in the Mediterranean and the Horn of Africa. Just this past December, the destroyer HMS Defender was deployed to the Mediterranean to support the French carrier Charles de Gaulle. Given its multiple ongoing operations, it’s difficult to say how long it would take London to organize a new expeditionary force that would be sent to the Falklands, should another conflict occur. (Daniel Gibran’s The Falklands War, 1998, provides a great summary of the logistical success of deploying over 50 warships, over 50 support vessels, aircraft, troops, ammo and other supplies to the South Atlantic – p. 80-83).

Conspiracy Theories/Exaggerations

Finally, a word must be said about accusations originating in both London and Buenos Aires concerning the other’s intentions regarding the Falklands. As previously mentioned, while there has not been another war over the islands since the early 1980s, just about every year there are accusations that either the Argentine or British government are behaving in an aggressive manner. For example, in 2012 Argentina accused the UK of “militarizing” the South Atlantic. Moreover, the Argentine mediawidely reproduced the March 2015 comments by Secretary Fallon about “beefing up” of the defenses in the Falklands. In particular the Argentine media quoted and discussed a March 23, 2015, report by the British tabloid The Sun that London feared an imminent attack by Argentina, with Russian support. At the time, the ongoing theory in the British media was that, due to the close relations between Moscow and Buenos Aires (largely due to the friendship between President Vladimir Putin with then-President Kirchner), Russia would somehow support Argentina’s military in the islands.

Final Thoughts

As a reminder, Argentina did not purchase the Russian or Israeli planes while, apart from one military exercise and new radars, the British have yet to significantly beef up their security of the islands. Thus, I would argue that currently the possibility of a renewed war remains extremely low, particularly now that the new Argentine President Macri is actually trying to approach the West (meaning the U.S. and Europe) for investment in order to improve the country’s economy. The British government seems to have a similar assessment of the situation as the Strategic Defense and Security Review 2015 explains that “we judge the risk of a military attack [against the Falklands] to be low, but we will retain a deterrence posture, with sufficient military forces in the region, including Royal Navy warships, Army units and RAF Typhoon aircraft.”

The information presented in this analysis argues that in spite of the occasional alarmist report, neither side has actually carried out major military-related initiatives that could be labeled as aggressive. Argentina has not acquired significant military equipment aside from four Russian research vessels and its repaired old submarine, while the UK, apart from one military exercise, does not seem to have sent additional troops or vessels to the islands. While diplomatic tensions will remain for the immediate future, as Buenos Aires will not give up its claim to the islands and London will not negotiate their fate, hopefully we will not witness another war over the Falklands. Then again, as Gibran states “predicting state behavior is not an exact science, especially in conflict situations. The assumption of a rational behavior on the part of a country, however desirable this idea may appear, is not a given state of affairs” (The Falklands War, p. 89).

As a corollary to this analysis, in early January the oil and gas company Rockhopper announced that it had discovered oil in its Isobel Deep well in the Falklands. The potential of big oil reserves is another reason for Argentina’s claim on the islands, and the recent discovery will give new impetus for calling for negotiations. If nothing else, we can be thankful that both militaries, particularly their navies, are hardly in a position to participate in another war just yet.

W. Alejandro Sanchez Nieto is a researcher who focuses on geopolitics, military and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. His research interests include inter-state tensions, narco-insurgent movements and drug cartels, arms sales, the development of Latin American military industries, UN peacekeeping operations, as well as the rising use of drones in Latin America. The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated. Follow him on Twitter @W_Alex_Sanchez