E-IR: ‘Hail, Caesar!’ and the Red Menace

"'Hail, Caesar!' and the Red Menace"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Movie Review
E-International Relations
March 23, 2016
Originally published: http://www.e-ir.info/2016/03/23/movie-review-hail-caesar-and-the-red-menace/

Hail, Caesar!
Feb. 2016
Universal Pictures

‘Hail, Caesar!’ is a 2016 comedy film by Joel and Ethan Coen which has enjoyed financial and critical success since its February 5 release. For IR scholars, the film showcases a tense period of U.S. history: the 1950s. This decade was marked by growing tensions and incidents as part of the Cold War, the fear of a Soviet takeover of the U.S. government and the rise of McCarthyism. In view of the tense relations between the U.S. and the Russian Federation today, which Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev recently described as a “new Cold War,” ‘Hail, Caesar!’ becomes, unfortunately, very topical.

A brief synopsis of ‘Hail, Caesar!’ is necessary: The movie takes place in 1951, when a famous actor, Baird Whitlock (George Clooney), is kidnapped from a studio set in a fictitious Hollywood film company. Whitlock is taken to a beach house in Malibu, California, in which he meets his kidnappers, a group of screenwriters that call themselves The Future. They turn out to be a Communist faction who explain Whitlock their ideology in order to convince him to join them. At one point in the film, another actor, Burt Gurney (Channing Tatum), is revealed to also be a Communist. He and the other members of  The Future row a boat a few miles off the coast of Malibu where they encounter a Soviet submarine. Gurney (along with his dog) boards it as he defects to the USSR. His Future comrades suffer a different fate as they are arrested by the police, who also free Whitlock.

Red Hollywood

‘Hail, Caesar!’ provides a glimpse of what Hollywood was like in the 1950s. At the time, Washington feared that the Soviet Union was infiltrating all echelons of American society (i.e. the government, Hollywood, labor unions etc), with the goal of taking over the country. This paranoia prompted the rise of McCarthyism, named after U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy who was known for his extreme anti-Communist endeavors. Communist witch hunts took place during the 1950s as thousands of Americans, thought to be Communists, were investigated and sometimes even imprisoned. The House of Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), which operated from 1938 to 1975, took a prominent role throughout this period.

The Coen Brothers address the Red Menace head on as Hollywood was a major target of Washington’s surveillance operations. There was even a “Hollywood blacklist” – a name applied to the Hollywood workers (like screenwriters and producers) that the HUAC investigated because they were believed to be Communist spies or sympathizers who were implanting Communist ideologies in Hollywood productions.  A Slate.com analysis of ‘Hail, Caesar!’ does a good job comparing some of the members of the fictitious Future to real life individuals: “the group leader, played by Max Baker, is named John Howard Hermann, after the Hollywood 10’s John Howard Lawson, the leader of the Hollywood section of the Communist party during the early 1950s. Eagle-eyed viewers will also notice a dog named Engels, whose namesake is more obvious [as in Friedrich Engels].”

Another important issue worth discussing is the appearance of a Soviet submarine off the coast of California, well within U.S. territorial waters. I do not know of any submarines operating so close to the U.S. mainland during that decade, though there were incidents in which Soviet vessels entered the Western Hemisphere and came close to the U.S. Case in point: the Soviet vessels off the coast of Cuba during the  missile crisis. Another memorable incident was the loss of K-219 in 1986. This was a Soviet submarine that suffered an explosion and sank in the North Atlantic close to Bermuda.

Even though ‘Hail, Caesar!’ is set in the early 1950s, not much seems to have changed in Washington-Moscow relations, given the renewed tensions between the two global powers. Currently there are no suspicions that Hollywood, broadly speaking, has been infiltrated by Russian sympathizers. Nevertheless, I will acknowledge that conservative commentators routinely label the entertainment industry as “the liberal left.” Case in point, in his book Primetime Propaganda Ben Shapiro has accused Hollywood of trying to “shape America in their own leftist image.” Moreover, there have been recent cases of alleged espionage. One memorable case was that of Anna Chapman, a Russian national who lived in New York and who was arrested, along with nine other individuals, in 2010 as they were suspected of working for the SVR, a Russian intelligence agency.  She was sent back to Moscow that same year as part of a spy swap.

The Soviet/Russian Navy

The possibility of a Russian submarine entering U.S. territorial waters nowadays, portrayed in “Hail, Caesar!” deserves a greater discussion. In recent years, the Russian Federation has sought to increase its military might, which includes opening new bases (like in the Russian Arctic) and manufacturing new vessels for its Navy. In fact, the Russian Navy’s Pacific Fleet recently received a new submarine, theVladimir Monomakh. Moreover, there have already been instances of Moscow displaying its renewed strength in the Western Hemisphere. In 2008, Russian warships visited the Caribbean, docking in Caracas, Venezuela, and carrying out exercises with the local Navy. More recently, in January 2015, theViktor Leonov, a Russian intelligence vessel, docked in Havana, Cuba.

With that said, it is important to stress that there have been no, at least from what I can gather via open sources, incidents of Russian warships or submarines entering U.S. territorial waters, though it is true that Cuba is only 90 miles away from the Straits of Florida. Doing so would signify an escalation of tensions between Moscow and Washington, akin to if the U.S. opened a military base in Ukraine next to Crimea. Moreover, should a Russian submarine manage to reach Malibu, California, this would mean that it successfully evaded U.S. security systems (i.e. warships and Coast Guard vessels monitoring coastal waters, satellites, radars and intelligence operations). The implications of such an incident would prompt a major revision of the U.S. defense establishment.

Even though it is beyond the scope of this movie review, it is important to mention that in February, the Russian government filed a request to the U.S. to fly a surveillance plane over U.S. airspace as part of the 1992 Open Skies Treaty. The difference between this request and ‘Hail, Caesar!’ is that it is doubtful that Moscow requested Washington permission to pick up a defector via a submarine in California. Nevertheless, the point stands that nowadays there are (very limited) occasions in which the Russian military is allowed to enter the U.S.

Final Thoughts

“Hail, Caesar!” has enjoyed success at the box office.  The film has some entertaining comedic moments, however, its major contribution to the IR field is to remind us that the current tensions between the two global powers are nothing new. Accusations of Russian espionage have occurred for decades, though the 1950s paranoia of Hollywood implanting Communist ideas in films has morphed into the more traditional “learning state secrets” type of intelligence operations. Moreover, when Channing Tatum’s character boarded a Soviet submarine off the Californian coast, while fun to watch, this can be utilized to discuss Soviet/Russian naval technology in the 1950s and today.

As Prime Minister Medvedev declared, we are witnessing the start of a new Cold War, and the events of six decades ago are being recreated, albeit slightly different, today.

—
The author would like to thank Erica Illingworth, who is pursuing an M.A. in International Relations at the University of San Diego, for her helpful suggestions throughout the preparation of this review.

VOXXI: Russia gives Cuba debt bailout

Russia Gives Cuba Debt Bailout
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
December 13, 2013
Originally published: http://voxxi.com/2013/12/13/russia-gives-cuba-debt-bailout/

In a major development in Cuban foreign affairs (more meaningful than the recent feature story of a handshake between President Obama and President Castro), the Russian Federation has forgiven 90% of Cuba’s debt with Moscow. The agreement, which was announced this past Tuesday, December 10, means that the debt has been reduced from $32 billion to $3.2 billion.

Moscow-Havana Relation

Throughout the Cold War, the Cuban regime (then under the rule of the iconic Fidel Castro) was the Soviet Union’s closest ally in the Western Hemisphere, which translated into Moscow providing significant amounts of economic and military assistance to the Castro Regime.

Nevertheless, the dissolution of the USSR and its economic meltdown meant that Havana could no longer support the Cuban economy. Unsurprisingly, the Cuban economy collapsed and a harsh period of austerity followed. The 1990s are known in Cuba as the “lost decade.”

In recent years, Cuba’s economy has slowly improved while the Castro brothers, particularly Raul, have made timid attempts at liberalizing the economy, allowing for the growth of a middle class and the private ownership of businesses.

In 2007, this author published a comprehensive analysis in the academic journal Cuban Affairs, in which Cuban-Russian relations were discussed in the post-Cold War era. In the article, I argued that Russia’s relations with Cuba in modern times resembled a capitalist relationship more than an ideological one.

In other words, Russia will gladly provide Cuba with whatever goods and services it needs, so long as Havana has the finances to pay for them. The era of major financial assistance based on grounds of a common political ideology between the two countries is over.

Russian President Vladimir Putin spelled out as much in his July 2012 meeting with President Castro in Moscow.

Putin stated that “our relations have gone through various periods […] Today, they are becoming more pragmatic [...]” The lack of a common ideology notwithstanding, friendliness between the two governments does exist. Moreover, Russia wants to capitalize in the near future off the still Moscow-friendly (and Washington-indifferent) government in Havana.

This is perhaps best exemplified by the diplomatic meetings that Russian officials routinely make to the Caribbean island; take, for example, Putin’s visit to Cuba in 2001. This trip was memorable because the Russian leader closed Russia’s radar base in Lourdes, which had been a beacon of USSR espionage operations on the U.S. during the Cold War.

More recently, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev visited the island this past February, in which the debt deal was discussed.

Additionally, two Russian warships, the “Moskva” and the “Vice Admiral Kulakov,” docked in Havana’s port this past August as part of a mission to improve bilateral security ties.

As for trade initiatives, the Russian news agencyRussia Today praised bilateral ties, stating “Cuba remains a strong ally of Russia, with trade between the two countries at about $200 million last year.”

In other words, while Cuban-Russian relations over the past decade can at most be described as “modest,” as no major initiatives have been orchestrated (apart from the debt deal), Havana has not been fully forgotten by Moscow.

Future Expectations

The question now becomes: how should the Russian-Cuban agreement be interpreted? Cuba now has a decade to pay off the remaining three billion. Under the new debt deal, Cuba will have to pay $320 million annually for the next decade.

This amount is still quite significant for the Cuban economy. The country’s 2012 GDP was estimated at around $121 billion (according to the CIA Factbook), so this new debt is much more manageable.

To be fair, it should be noted that Cuba still owes billions in foreign debt to other nations and the Cuban government is trying to improve its international financial credibility by re-structuring its debt.

If Raul Castro does leave the Cuban presidency in 2018, thanks to these deals, he will leave the next generation of Cuban leaders a country in a better economic situation.

The Russian legislative will now have to vote on the deal, probably early in 2014. Given that President Putin seems to approve it, there is no reason to believe that Putin’s Duma will not follow suit.

With that said, it is necessary to wonder if this deal has additional elements that have not been made public. Offshore oil exploration is the first thing that comes to mind.

For years, several companies, including Russia’s Zarubezhneft, have been searching for oil in Cuba’s waters, but nothing has been found so far. It is widely regarded that if major quantities of oil are found, this could be a game changer for the Cuban economy and will make the company in charge of extraction very rich.

Russia’s pardoning of most of Cuba’s debt could be a sign of greater things to come and a more lasting Russian influence in the Caribbean state, apart from dollars and cents in debt.

COHA: REMEMBERING OCTOBER 25: THE THIRTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE U.S. INTERVENTION IN GRENADA (AND THE LEBANON BOMBINGS)

Remembering October 25: The Thirtieth Anniversary of the U.S. intervention in Grenada (and the Lebanon Bombings)
W. Alejandro Sanchez with COHA Research Associate Thomas Abbot
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
October 25, 2013
Originally published: http://www.coha.org/remembering-october-25-the-thirtieth-anniversary-of-the-u-s-intervention-in-grenada-and-the-lebanon-bombings/

Today, Friday, October 25, marks the 30^th anniversary of the U.S. intervention in Grenada. While this American military deployment is but a brief footnote in U.S. military history during the Cold War (and the premise of a 1986 Clint Eastwood film,Heartbreak Ridge), the operation, codenamed Urgent Fury, is a milestone in the Caribbean island’s history. The way in which the events of October 25 are remembered in Grenada, the rest of the Caribbean, and in the United States couldn’t vary more. While the intervention in Grenada arguably never represented a direct security threat to the U.S., it did help to divert attention from the Beirut barrack bombings, which had occurred two days earlier and which killed 241 U.S. and 58 French military personnel. Given the large degree of disagreement throughout the world about the legitimacy of the invasion and the nature of the threat it represented at the time, the anniversary marks a very useful opportunity to bring together different strands and perspectives on the event.

A Brief Summary

Maurice Bishop, the charismatic leader of the Marxist “New Jewel Movement,” led a coup against the Grenadian government in 1979, and ruled until 1983, when Deputy Minister Benjamin Coard seized power, putting Bishop under house arrest and eventually presiding over his execution. [1] The government was then instantly dissolved and was replaced by a military junta, which implemented such draconian policies as a “shoot on sight” curfew and a shutdown of the country’s airport. [2] At the time, there were some 1,000 American citizens living on the island, many of them students at St. George’s School of Medicine. Reportedly, the Reagan Administration had become concerned that these citizens would likely be harmed or used as hostages, and had also expressed concern about the construction of an airbase on the island, which, in the words of Reagan, “looked suspiciously suitable for military aircraft, including Soviet-built long-range bombers.” [3] An October 2003 commentary by Stephen Zunes, then-associate professor of Politics at the University of San Francisco, explains that a reason for Reagan’s portrayal of the airport was because it had been built with Cuban assistance. Zunes points out that many construction workers were Cuban, but the contractor was British. Moreover, as Zunes correctly highlights, the airport could not have been used for military purposes because it lacked crucial infrastructure, such as “bomb-resistant underground fuel tanks, sheltering bays for parked aircraft, or fortified control towers.” [4]

The buildup, both in military readiness and in public relations, occurred in the context of a worsening situation for U.S. interests in Lebanon. On October 23, 1983, two trucks exploded at a Marine base in Beirut, ultimately killing 241 U.S. military personnel and 58 French soldiers, the worst attack sustained by the Marines since 1945. [5] The climate of anger and uncertainty created by these, in Reagan’s words, “hideous and insane attacks,” seems to have instilled a hunger for military victory at any cost in the American people. [6] Reagan’s justification for action in Lebanon, namely that “we are a nation with global responsibilities,” was just as easily applied to Grenada. [7]

The United States mobilized its military and on October 25, invaded the island with 1900 Marines  that did battle with Grenadian and Cuban forces. The total number of U.S. troops eventually reached 7,000.  The U.S. military suffered 18 casualties, the Cubans 24 (Fidel Castro had deployed Cuban military personnel to the island, but the exact number is unclear), and the Grenadians 45.  The result was a total defeat for Grenada, after which authority over the island was awarded to the former British Governor General of the island, Paul Scoon.

The backlash was immediate both internationally and, to a lesser extent, domestically. While the decision to invade was on the whole popular among the American public, it was lambasted in the U.N. and other international forums. [8] The U.N. General Assembly said that it “deeply deplores the armed intervention in Grenada, which constitutes a flagrant violation of international law and of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of that state.” [9] Many nations, including Vietnam, Poland, and Algeria, said that the claimed U.S. motivations for invasion were merely a pretext. [10]

The invasion ultimately resulted in reform in the United States military, which had a “glaring lack of advance intelligence about Grenada,” and reportedly made numerous errors in the operation, including unnecessary troop movements that warned the defenders of Grenada of the invasion, and a lack of intelligence that the students they were rescuing were located on two different campuses. [11]

How Grenada and the Caribbean Remember 1983

The 30^th anniversary of the U.S. intervention has understandably stirred emotions in Grenada. Over the past several days a number of commentaries have been published in the Caribbean media discussing the intervention, often issuing interpretations quite different from those found in the U.S. The difference between perceptions in the U.S. and those in Grenada primarily rests on the fact that U.S. scholars often situate the operation in the wider context of Cold War geopolitics at the time, including serving as a reason for critiquing then-U.S. foreign policies as well as domino-theory in the Caribbean—meaning whether Cuba and Grenada could have been the beginnings of an expansion of Soviet satellite-states in the region.

But for Grenadians and citizens of the Caribbean in general, the operation has a more personal significance. For example, the journalist Lincoln Depradine published a commentary in the news agency Caribbean News Now on October 21 discussing whether the “truth” will ever be known about how many individuals died during the U.S. operation in Grenada. [12] Depradine also muses that, “For the Americans, they call it an invasion. Grenadians’ reference swings from invasion, to intervention, to rescue mission. The more creative among us coined new descriptors, such as ‘intervasion’ and ‘rescuvasion’.” [13]

Also recently published to commemorate the 1983 events is a book by House of Nehesi Publishers. It is the work of two authors, “Maroon Lives – Tribute to Maurice Bishop & Grenadian Freedom Fighters” by Lasana M. Sekou and “Revolution As Poetic Inspiration: Grenada in ‘Maroon Lives” by Fabian Adekunle Badejo. [14]  The first part of the book is a collection of poems by Sekou, in which he touches on the Bishop assassination, the U.S. invasion, and tensions generated by revolutionary struggles and the search for justice; while Badejo contributes with an in-depth study of the critical relationship between literature, revolution, and the transformation of societies. [15]

Unsurprisingly, many analyses of the U.S. intervention in Grenada are not kind to Washington. For example, an October 19 op-ed by author Jai Parasram for Caribbean News Now began by arguing, “I am deeply offended by American writers who, after 30 years, continue to push the propaganda that America saved the Grenadians and that the people welcomed the invasion of their island.” [16] Parasram goes on to argue,

The Americans who subsequently invaded the island were not the angels they claim to be. They were an invasion force acting on behalf of their government to crush what Washington viewed as a dangerous threat to “democracy” in the Caribbean and the Americas. It was part of a plot that was hatched long before Bernard Coard moved against Maurice. [17]

U.S. and 1983

The U.S. military operation in Grenada was a part of a series of plots that Washington carried out in liaison with others in the the region in order to prevent the spread of potential Moscow-friendly governments across the Caribbean. After the 1959 Cuban Revolution, the Castro government tried to promote regime change in the Caribbean and Latin America (i.e. via the iconic revolutionary Ernesto “Che” Guevara’s attempt to carry out his “foco” insurgency in Bolivia). Due to the successful Cuban revolution and the failure of the U.S.-sponsored Bay of Pigs invasion, Washington then carried out military interventions in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and then Grenada in order to prevent Soviet satellites from spreading throughout its “historical backyard.”

Moreover, as previously mentioned, the Reagan administration and the U.S. intelligence community had suffered a huge blow in the form of massive attacks against U.S. military personnel in Lebanon during that Middle Eastern nation’s civil war. The fact that only two days passed between the attack in Lebanon and the invasion of Grenada is not necessarily a coincidence. Larry Birns, director of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, argues that the invasion of Grenada was “a military operation that was not meant to do what it said it would do.”

Ergo, given the plethora of (mostly infamous) military operations that the United States carried out throughout the Cold War, it is understandable that the brief intervention in Grenada occupies only a remote footnote in the history of U.S. military and international affairs during the Cold War.

Conclusions

At the time of this writing, neither the website of the U.S. embassy in Grenada, nor Grenada’s embassy in Washington, DC, have issued press statements regarding the upcoming anniversary.  As for how the three-island Caribbean nation is doing in 2013, as an October 21 op-ed by Lloyd Noel published by the news agency Now Grenadastated,

“We have had a variety of leaders, and their party machinery in control of the Nation’s affairs over the years – and here we are in the thirtieth year, with a leader and his team who had been in control for thirteen of those years, and for the second time winning all the seats in Parliament, and therefore no one in opposition in the Lower House.” [18]

The leader that Noel refers to is Prime Minister Mitchell. Incidentally, and to highlight currentU.S. – Grenada relations, Prime Minister Keith Mitchell was in Washington in early October [19] to participate in the annual meetings at the World Bank and the IMF in Washington. He had previously visited Washington and New York in July. [20]

In his October 21 commentary, the journalist Depradine wrote: “was it an invasion by invitation or an invasion by coercion?” [21] The final ruling is still out on how to accurately remember the events that led to October 25, 1983, and what happened on that fateful day and after.

W. Alejandro Sanchez, Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs and Thomas Abbot, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

[1] Wheeler, Laura K. “The Grenada Invasion: Expanding the Scope of Humanitarian Intervention.” 8 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 413 (1985). Accessed October 23, 2013. http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol8/iss2/5

[2] Rubner, Michael. “The Reagan Administration, the 1973 War Powers Resolution, and the Invasion of Grenada.” Political Science Quarterly. Volume 100, No. 4. Winter 1985-1986.

[3]  “Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada.” October 27, 1983. Accessed October 23, 2013. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/102783b.htm

[4] Zunes, Stephen. “The US invasion of Grenada.” Global Policy Forum. October 2003. Accessed October 24, 2013. http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/155/25966.html

[5]  “Beirut Marine Barracks Bombing Fast Facts.” CNN Library. June 13, 2013. Accessed October 23, 2013. http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/13/world/meast/beirut-marine-barracks-bombing-fast-facts/index.html

[6]  “Address to the Nation on Events in Lebanon and Grenada.” October 27, 1983. Accessed October 22, 2013. http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/102783b.htm

[7] Ibid

[8] Ibid: Wheeler. 1985

[9]  “The Situation in Grenada.” UN Resolution 38/7. November 2, 1983. 43^rd plenary meeting.

[10] Ibid: Wheeler. 1985

[11] Magnuson, Ed. “Getting Back to Normal.” Time. November 21, 1983. ; Drummand Ayres Jr. B., “Grenada Invasion: A Series of Surprises.” The New York Times. November 14, 1983

[12] Depradine, Lincoln. “Reaching a convergence of truths and facts on the 1983 ‘intervasion.’” Caribbean News Now! Commentary. October 21, 2013. Accessed October 22, 2013  http://www.caribbeannewsnow.com/topstory-Commentary%3A-Reaching-a-convergence-of-truths-and-facts-on-the-1983-%27intervasion%27-18232.html

[13] Depradine, Lincoln. “Reaching a convergence of truths and facts on the 1983 ‘intervasion.’” Caribbean News Now! Commentary. October 21, 2013.  Accessed October 23, 2013. http://www.caribbeannewsnow.com/topstory-Commentary%3A-Reaching-a-convergence-of-truths-and-facts-on-the-1983-%27intervasion%27-18232.html

[14] SMN News Team. “Sekou and Badejo’s new book tribute on 30th anniversary of Maurice Bishop’s assassination and US invasion of Grenada.” St. Martin News Network.  October 21, 2013. Accessed October 25, 2013. http://www.smn-news.com/st-maarten-st-martin-news/13548-sekou-and-badejo-s-new-book-tribute-on-30th-anniversary-of-maurice-bishop-s-assassination-and-us-invasion-of-grenada.html

[15] SMN News Team. “Sekou and Badejo’s new book tribute on 30th anniversary of Maurice Bishop’s assassination and US invasion of Grenada.” St. Martin News Network.  October 21, 2013. Accessed October 23, 2013. http://www.smn-news.com/st-maarten-st-martin-news/13548-sekou-and-badejo-s-new-book-tribute-on-30th-anniversary-of-maurice-bishop-s-assassination-and-us-invasion-of-grenada.html

[16] Parasram, Jai. “Maurice Bishop was my friend and I know the Grenada Story.” Caribbean News Now! Commentary. October 19, 2013.  Accessed October 22, 2013. http://www.caribbeannewsnow.com/topstory-Commentary%3A-Maurice-Bishop-was-my-friend-and-I-know-the-Grenada-story-18223.html

[17] Parasram, Jai. “Maurice Bishop was my friend and I know the Grenada Story.” Caribbean News Now! Commentary. October 19, 2013.  Accessed October 23, 2013. http://www.caribbeannewsnow.com/topstory-Commentary%3A-Maurice-Bishop-was-my-friend-and-I-know-the-Grenada-story-18223.html

[18] Noel, Lloyd. “We must remember 25 October 83.”  Now Grenada. October 21, 2013. Accessed October 24, 2013. http://nowgrenada.com/2013/10/must-remember-25-october-83/

[19] Caribbean Journal Staff. “Grenada PM heads to Washington.” Caribbean Journal. October 10, 2013. Accessed October 24, 2013. http://www.caribjournal.com/2013/10/10/grenada-pm-heads-to-washington/

[20]  “Prime Minister to visit New York and Washington DC: Minister Nimrod to Act.” Official Website of the Government of Grenada. July 19, 2013. Accessed October 23, 2013. http://www.gov.gd/egov/news/2013/jul13/19_07_13/item_2/pm_visit_ny_washington_nimrod_act.html

[21] Depradine, Lincoln. “Reaching a convergence of truths and facts on the 1983 ‘intervasion.’” Caribbean News Now. Commentary. October 21, 2013. Accessed October 22, 2013.  http://www.caribbeannewsnow.com/topstory-Commentary%3A-Reaching-a-convergence-of-truths-and-facts-on-the-1983-%27intervasion%27-18232.html

Blouin Beat: Politics:The less-than-glorious Che Guevara

The Less-than-Glorious Che Guevara
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Blouin Beat: Politics
October 8, 2013
Originally published: http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatpolitics/2013/10/08/the-less-than-glorious-che-guevara/

October 8 marks the 46th anniversary of the death of Ernesto “Che” Guevara. The Argentine, a symbol of Latin America’s revolutionary movements in the Cold War, met his end in 1967 in the Bolivian highlands, where he was trying to jumpstart a popular revolution as part of his “foco” insurgency theory: creating a successful insurgent movement in one country would foment similar ones throughout Latin America).

Much has been written about Guevara’s life, partially because he was a prolific writer and extroverted individual himself. For example, his essays on guerrilla combat tactics were published as a single volume in 1969 called Guerrilla Warfare. The popular obsession with his life helped the The Motorcycle Diaries, become a success when it was released in 2004. Needless to say, Guevara has been a symbol of revolutionary idealism for the past decades, and even today new generations of Latin Americans (and others around the world) faithfully read his work and wear clothing bearing his image.

His accomplishments in the Cuban Revolution have been widely glorified, particularly his successes with Fidel Castro’s guerrillas in the Sierra Maestra Mountains, as well as the high-level status that he enjoyed in the Cuban government (i.e. as Minister of Industry and President of the National Bank). And it is precisely his decision to leave the Cuban government, where he could have enjoyed a comfortable (and probably well-paid) lifestyle in revolutionary Havana to go spread his vision of Communism throughout Latin America and the rest of the world that made him an icon to the masses at the time and for generations to come.

It is probably this glorification of Guevara that has concealed some of his other less-than-glorious moments. When discussing Che’s accomplishments, his supporters do not usually bring up the executions that he carried out when Fidel Castro’s guerrillas took control of the country and began punishing the supporters of the former regime of Fulgencio Batista. Moreover, as idealistic as Guevara was in his desire to go fight for the oppressed masses elsewhere, he never achieved the success that he had in Cuba. His time fighting alongside a guerrilla movement in the Congo in 1965 was a total failure. And, in spite of a somewhat promising start, his attempts to start an insurgency in Bolivia to overthrow then-President René Barrientos were similarly unsuccessful.

In the years after his death, several documentaries and scholarly works have appeared, explaining that Che’s guerrilla fighters in Bolivia were little more than a starving mob when the Bolivian soldiers of the U.S.-trained Second Ranger Battalion encountered them in 1967. (Published on July 2013, Hunting Che is a well-documented book that discussed the decisive role the U.S. military and intelligence services played in aiding the Bolivian military against Che — a review of the book by this author can be found here). Even though Barrientos and the U.S. government had fears that Guevara had an army of hundreds of Bolivian and Cuban fighters hiding in the highlands, and that Guevara was behind the major protests rocking Bolivia suffered at the time, considered on the evidence Guevara’s chances of success in the landlocked nation were always quite slim.

Upon being taken prisoner in 1967, Guevara was shot by Bolivian soldiers, as the government in La Paz saw him as too dangerous to keep behind bars and wanted to make an example out of him. In 1995, Bolivian General Mario Vargas finally revealed the location of Guevara’s remains which, along with those of six fellow guerrillas, were then taken to Cuba, where a mausoleum was built for him in the city of Santa Clara (the site of his most famous victory during the Cuban Revolution). Whether one sees this is a fitting symbol of the revolutionary glory or a reminder of the hollower parts of his legacy will depend, of course, on whether one owns the now-classic Guevara t-shirt (available the world over, thanks to globalized capitalism).

Book Review: Hunting Che

Hunting Che: How A U.S. Special Forces Team Helped Capture The World's Most Famous Revolutionary
Book Review
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Book review published in War Studies Publications
October 3, 2013
Originally published: http://warstudiespublications.wordpress.com/2013/10/03/hunting-che-how-a-u-s-special-forces-team-helped-capture-the-worlds-most-famous-revolutionary/

Reading Maurer and Weiss’s book was a pleasure, with its in-depth research, its enjoyable writing style, and spy-novel tone. Fans of Mark Bowden’s famous books Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War and Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World’s Greatest Outlaw will enjoy the style of writing that Maurer and Weiss utilize.

The Plot

As the title entails, the book revolves around the hunt for the iconic Argentine revolutionary, Ernesto “Che” Guevara in the Bolivian highlands in 1967. Specifically, this work focuses on the role that the U.S. military (and intelligence operatives) played in aiding the Bolivian government and security forces in tracking down Che. Over the decades, there have been a plethora of conspiracy theories regarding just how involved the U.S. was in this endeavor. Investigative works as well as the release of classified documents confirm that, indeed, Washington had an important role to play: a number of U.S. Rangers trained Bolivian soldiers, transforming them, via an intensive training course, into a Ranger battalion in its own right. It is these Bolivian soldiers who were ultimately deployed to the area where Che’s guerrilla forces operated and were successful in tracking and eliminating them.

Part of what makes this book so fun to read is that it provides various points of view. This is not just a discussion of what role the U.S. had to play. The authors took the extra effort of trying to paint a picture of what Bolivia’s domestic situation was at the time of Che’s arrival, as well as delving into the contemporary state of  global geopolitics. For example, the authors explain how Bolivian President Barrientos was concerned that Che’s guerrilla movement could isolate towns and foment protests that could overthrow his government. When Barrientos went to the U.S. for aid, he related the gravity of the situation by saying that if Bolivia fell, Che’s “foco” insurgency could expand to other South American countries. For its part, the U.S. government wanted to avoid another Vietnam, but at the same time they did not want to send military personnel that would be actively fighting Che’s forces. The training of Bolivian troops was essentially a compromise.

Moreover, the book portrays differing points of views of Bolivian and American policymakers, military officers, rank-and-file troops, intelligence officers and even Bolivian peasants. The book is generally organized in a chronological order, beginning with the first ambushes Che carried out against Bolivian army patrols, the deployment of the U.S. Rangers, the training of the new Bolivian Second Ranger Batallion and Che’s ultimate defeat (and execution). However the book includes a good number of flashbacks in order to explain why a certain policymaker or soldier thought the way he did. In other words,Hunting Che provides an emphasis on the personal, not focusing on casualty statistics but instead on relating the stories of the individuals involved.

Not An Academic Book

Although Maurer and Weiss researched exhaustively, it must be stressed that this should not be regarded as a standard academic book. As previously mentioned, it reads more like a spy-action novel. For example, when discussing a shootout by Che’s guerrillas and a Bolivian army patrol, the authors write how “rounds sliced through the brush, wood slivers and mud flew upward and perfumed the air” (p. 12).

Moreover, Che is discussed throughout most of the book as almost an omnipresent and omnipotent figure, which is how he probably was viewed in 1967 Bolivia. No one (including the CIA) knew if he was in Bolivia or how many troops he had at his disposal (it was believed that he had hundreds of heavily trained guerrillas, both Bolivian and Cuban) – for some time it was not even clear if he was alive. The sporadic discussions of Che’s life throughout the book add to his omnipresence, and the iconic guerrilla only makes a grand entrance briefly towards the end of the book, when he’s captured.

Furthermore, the authors  also provide a strong background on the situation within Bolivia, Latin America and U.S. interests in the region, all placed in the wider context of the Cold War and U.S.-USSR (via Cuba) proxy wars. Nevertheless, the analysis is not put in a linear way. Moreover, there is not an introductory chapter that explains who was Che Guevara. There are paragraphs about his life and the actions he carried out during his time in Cuba scattered throughout the book, but Hunting Che almost assumes that the reader will have a general idea of who Guevara was before reading it. There is a memorable discussion between Guevara and his captors (U.S. and Bolivian) towards the end of the book (Chapters 22 and 23), but his background story does not read as easily unless the reader already knows some facts about his life (i.e. his role in the Cuban government).

Nevertheless, the authors excel when it comes to discussing Bolivian domestic issues and regional geopolitics in the 1960s, a daunting task for any historian. Maurer and Weiss correctly describe the highlights of Bolivian history, including the importance of the 1952 coup as well as the concerns for President Barrientos regarding the future of his presidency.

Moreover, while the authors try to be objective, readers will notice quickly that U.S. Rangers are slightly glorified (i.e. carrying out civic projects like rebuilding  a school besides training Bolivian soldiers, p. 96), while some U.S. diplomats are portrayed in a negative light. At the same time, the Bolivian military pre-U.S. training is constantly portrayed as backward, with its officers not being capable to adjust to a new style of war (from the traditional inter-state warfare to counterinsurgency), and its soldiers receiving poor training. Certainly, some Bolivian officers and soldiers (who were trained by the U.S. Rangers) are portrayed positively, with background stories which explained that they valued patriotism and honor, but these are exceptions to the rule.

The negative portrayal of the Bolivian military in the 1960s, while arguably true, still hints at a larger issue which the authors do not address head on: Could the Bolivian military have successfully defeated Che without having received training by the U.S. Rangers? This question would need another book to be properly answered.

 One Factual Issue

While the book is well researched, there is one issue that must be highlighted. While giving a quick overview of Bolivian military history, the authors explain that “a hundred years before, a fight with Chile […] had cost Bolivia its entire coastline. Thirty years later, Bolivia and Paraguay had sacrificed a generation of their young men in “the Chaco War.” (p. 20).

The first conflict that the authors refer to is known as the War of the Pacific, which pinned Peru and Bolivia against Chile (which had military aid from the British Empire). This war took place from 1879 to 1883. Meanwhile, the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay occurred from 1932 to1935. In other words, there is actually a difference between these two conflicts of roughly fifty years, not thirty as the authors of Hunting Che explain. While this is a minor issue in the wider scope of the book, it should be noted.

Research Methods

While in graduate school, a professor once told me that the first thing a scholar should do when browsing through a new book (an academic/scholarly one), is to check its reference list in order to see what works the author(s) of the book consulted. Hunting Che has a good bibliography, which includes works by Fidel Castro, Gary Prado (a Bolivian military officer trained by the U.S. Rangers and who was ultimately responsible for capturing Che, making him a national hero) as well as one of Che’s publications.

Nevertheless, I will admit that at first glance, I was confounded as the reference list hints at works and document that are nearly all in English. However, the epilogue of Hunting Che explains how the authors interviewed individuals (Bolivian and American) who actually took part in the training of the Bolivian Rangers as well as Che’s capture. This exemplary use of both primary and secondary sources should be applauded by scholars and fans of Latin American history.