Citado en: "¿Qué opinan expertos del fallo de La Haya sobre disputa marítima entre Colombia y Nicaragua?"

 

"¿Qué opinan expertos del fallo de La Haya sobre disputa marítima entre Colombia y Nicaragua"

Por: Alejandra Arredondo, Jairo Chacon, Houston Castillo Vado

Voz de America

22 de Abril, 2022

Publicado: https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/reacciones-encontradas-a-fallo-de-la-haya-en-disputa-entre-colombia-y-nicaragua/6540312.html 

Para el experto en temas de defensa y geopolítica basado en Washington DC Wilder Alejandro Sánchez, el veredicto es una “derrota para Colombia”, ya que estipula que el país ha violado los derechos soberanos de Nicaragua.

Geopolitical Monitor: "ICJ to Rule on Colombia-Nicaragua Maritime Dispute"

"ICJ to Rule on Colombia-Nicaragua Maritime Dispute"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Situation Report

Geopolitical Monitor

12 April, 2022

Originally published: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/icj-to-rule-on-colombia-nicaragua-maritime-dispute/

On 21 April, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) will deliver its verdict on a case between Colombia and Nicaragua over contested waters in the Caribbean. While the possibility of inter-state war between the two countries is minimal, it is nevertheless important for this conflict to be resolved and for international law to be both respected and impartial.

The Case

The case in question concerns “Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v. Colombia).” The Court has reported that a verdict will be delivered at the Peace Palace, The Hague, at 10 AM (Netherlands time) on the aforementioned date.

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Quoted in: "India–Pakistan Border Draws Attention as US Adjusts Indo–Pacific Strategy, Experts Say"

"India–Pakistan Border Draws Attention as US Adjusts Indo–Pacific Strategy, Experts Say"
By: Venus Upadhayayaya
The Epoch Times 
February 19, 2020
Originally published: https://www.theepochtimes.com/india-pakistan-border-under-spotlight-as-us-adjusts-indo-pacific-strategy-experts_3234449.html



The importance of the India–Pakistan border has remained low for the United States for many decades, but experts say it is gaining new strategic meaning as part of its emerging Indo-Pacific strategy, which redefines U.S. resources and partnerships in the region.

The historically conflicted boundary between India and Pakistan also forms the territorial demarcation line between the U.S. military’s Central Command and its Indo-Pacific command and thus, places India and Pakistan into two separate strategic military zones, according to Kashish Parpiani, a Mumbai-based expert with the Observer Research Foundation.



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Defence iQ: Is heavy armour obsolete? The view from Latin America

"Is heavy armour obsolete? The view from Latin America"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez and Samuel Casey
Defence iQ
7 February, 2019
 Originally published: https://www.defenceiq.com/armoured-vehicles/articles/is-heavy-armour-obsolete-the-view-from-latin-america

Defence iQ has recently hosted the International Armored Vehicle event and one of the big takeaways was the focus on mobility and modularity for tomorrows armoured vehicles. So, we ask: “Is the tank becoming obsolete for today's battlefields?”

For the U.S, military planners will have to reconsider their procurement needs in the near future in the context of U.S. security concerns and the likelihood that urban warfare will become more common over the next decade. However, what is the view from the Latin American perspective?

Latin American nations are decommissioning outdated models and replacing them with more modern machines. For example, Brazil is undergoing a modernisation program, which includes the revitalization of M60 combat vehicles, Leopard 1A1 and M113 armoured vehicles, greatly enhancing the effectiveness of its two tank battalions. 

Furthermore, Brazil recently donated a number of tanks to Uruguay.  Future acquisitions also need to take into account regional geopolitics, the likelihood of war and the technology of armoured vehicles itself. What is the future of heavy armour in Latin America?

Lessons from recent conflicts in Latin America

The last inter-state war between two Latin American states was the short 1995 border conflict between Ecuador and Peru. Other regional conflicts in the post-World War II era were the Falklands/Malvinas war between Argentina and the United Kingdom in 1982; the 1981 border conflict between Ecuador and Peru; and the 1969 Soccer War between El Salvador and Honduras.

Meanwhile, the U.S. military’s most recent interventions in the region were in Haiti in 1994 (Operation Uphold Democracy) and in Panama in 1989 (Operation Just Cause).

While there are ongoing border disputes (e.g. Bolivia and Chile or Guyana and Venezuela) and tensions (mostly coming out of Venezuela these days), security threats in the region are generally insurgent in nature. For example, terrorist movements like Colombia’s ELN and EPL, Peru’s Shining Path, or Paraguay’s EPP; narco-cartels in Mexico; or organised gangs such as the Maras in Central America or the Primero Comando da Capital in Brazil. These entities are highly mobile and operate in isolated regions or in urban areas.

Recent Tank Acquisitions in Latin America

Latin American governments continue to acquire new (or used) platforms for their armed forces, but heavy armour is not purchased particularly often.  Some recent deals worth noting are:

• In December 2018, the Brazilian Army completed the transfer of 25 M41C light tanks to the Uruguayan army. “Of the 25 vehicles, 15 were completely refurbished by Brazil while the remaining 10 will be used for parts. Those that will remain intact will be assigned to armoured infantry units, which currently use M24 light tanks,” Jane’s explains.
  
• In 2016, Russia delivered 50 T-72B1 tanks to Nicaragua. The platforms are “an upgrade of the 1970s-era main battle tank and feature explosive reactive armour and thermal weapon sights, among other improvements.”
  
• Venezuela has received a plethora of Russian weaponry over the past couple of decades, though these deals have been quite scarce in recent years due to Caracas’ financial crisis. Amongst the acquisitions are T-72 tanks, as well as infantry fighting vehicles like the BMP-3M, and an array of transport vehicles.

"Latin American governments continue to acquire new (or used) platforms for their armed forces, but heavy armour is not purchased particularly often"

As for other nations, while no other major sales have occurred, there are ongoing reports about armoured vehicles in need of modernization or replacement. For example, Chile possesses Leopard 2A4 tanks, and it will be interesting if they will be upgraded anytime soon, given that the Chilean government is replacing the famous Copper Law, which helps fund the Ministry of Defence. Meanwhile, Peru has yet to find a replacement for its old T-55 tanks, while Ecuador recently upgraded several AML and M113 A2 Plus armoured vehicles, as the country does not possess heavy armour.

As for Mexico, its fleet consists of light and medium armoured vehicles. Finally, Colombia also possesses light armoured vehicles; for example, media reports published in late January show vehicles that appear to be the EE-09 Cascavel, a 6x6 light tank, on patrol in urban areas close to the border with Venezuela.

Latin American Armoured Vehicle Requirements 

The intrastate conflict that has plagued many Latin American countries is one of the strongest drivers for defence spending.  Many countries continue to acquire new (or refurbished) platforms, such as Brazil’s new carrier Atlantico, Chile’s new Sikorsky S-70i Blackhawk helicopters, Argentina’s used AB-206 helicopters, or Mexico’s new patrol vessel Reformador. As for Peru, the Andean state has commenced the construction of a second landing platform vessel, BAP Paita. However, when it comes to heavy armour (or even medium armour) new contracts have been quite scarce in recent years.

One argument in favour of procuring heavy armour is so that nations can maintain minimal deterrence capabilities. While interstate warfare is very unlikely, it does not mean that the scenario is impossible. The Venezuelan government’s behaviour, particularly during the 2008 crisis in the Andes is an example of this ever-present possibility. Nevertheless, given the region’s current peaceful status, limited defence budgets and other security threats, it is understandable that regional governments have other priorities. Moreover, the focus for Latin American governments is the acquisition of multipurpose platforms, which can be utilized not solely for war.

This is exemplified by the new vessels the region is acquiring (or domestically manufacturing) which can be utilized for military and peaceful operations, such as combating maritime crimes (like illegal fishing) and transporting supplies to areas affected by natural disasters. Helicopters can similarly be utilized to transport medical personnel and supplies to remote areas after disasters occur, not just troops.

As for armour, personnel carriers have been recently utilized in Brazil and Peru as part of emergency and support operations to help civilian populations. It is their flexibility to have multiple uses that makes them attractive to civilian and military leaders alike. The problem with heavy armour is that it is difficult for the main battle tank to have another use other than what it was designed for. “A tank cannot carry humanitarian assistance, so it is difficult for us to convince our civilian leaders of the need to buy new ones in times of peace,” explained a Latin American military officer interviewed by the authors.

Nevertheless, when it comes to armoured vehicles, just like any other system, it is important to have a vision of the future and to carry out a cost-benefit analysis regarding weapons acquisition. In terms of life-cycle cost, it is more expensive and difficult to maintain heavy tanks that were designed in the 1950s-1970s, than to repair more modern equipment. Purchasing a tank is not a one-time payment, as this platform demands continual upgrades of its systems, armour, chassis, and weapons. This can often spiral and stakeholders become politically and financially tethered to projects making them hard to abandon. 

A great example of this is the modernization process of the M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks for the US and the Challenger 2 for the UK.  However, vehicles that were designed in the 1950s and 1960s have incredibly low survivability compared to modern assets. Even though Latin American governments may not want to upgrade their heavy armour, it may be financially advisable.

Geography is also an issue that influences the procurement of heavy weaponry. In spite of technological advances that make modern tanks able to operate in harsher conditions, it is difficult to justify the use of the main battle tank in insurgency operations. Brazilian, Colombian or Peruvian policymakers would traditionally use a combined force of infantry, light armoured vehicles and helicopters. 

As for urban warfare, light armour seems to be the norm, and, as previously mentioned, the Colombian army sent 6x6 light armoured vehicles in a routine operation through a Colombian town in late January. Light 8x8 armoured personnel carriers were also utilized in Rio de Janeiro as part of the Brazilian armed forces’ operations to combat criminal gangs in the city’s shantytowns (known as favelas). In these instances, The authors have been unable to find any incidents of explosives, such as rocket-propelled grenades, that were utilized against these platforms, however, this is an obvious concern. Theoretically heavy armoured could have been utilized in some of the wider streets though.

Lastly, we must remember that mobility has become a key requirement. If a tank is utilized in a cavalry role, it must be fast to deploy and able to pry open the enemy lines.

However, in a "rapid action response" scenarios that often faces many Latin American states, the main battle tank is unable to give commanders the ability to react to crises in remote areas with a flexible set of capabilities that can be tailored to the situation.

Similarly,  a command vehicle must be able to move about relatively unnoticed so as to not draw fire. Finally,  if a tank is used to strengthen a position, it must be tough enough and hit hard enough to win the fight. If a vehicle can’t manoeuvre because it is highly visible, or too slow to break contact then the effect is the same: your opponents locate you and bad things happen. Designing your system to be mobile enough to accomplish your mission is an absolute necessity.

Final Thoughts

Armour can be versatile, but going forward in the Latin American theatre, given the region’s clear-and-present dangers, it is difficult to make case for the acquisition of heavy armour in comparison to light platforms. Platforms with higher tactical and strategic mobility can be deployed in constrictive urban areas, or other assets that have multipurpose uses, such as personnel carriers, helicopters or ships.

Latin American countries need armoured vehicles that fit their own unique requirements. As financial and political will is often scarce, investing in new main battle tanks can be hard to justify as a more pop allocation of resources on a system that is singular in use and cannot adequately combat the most pressing threats.

While military cautions about being prepared to protect sovereignty against a country or group of countries, it rightfully remains primarily focused on more realistic security challenges, and to meet these challenges a mobile that is able to engage in non-traditional conflicts is needed.

About the Authors:
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, military and cybersecurity issues. 

Samuel Casey has been an enlisted soldier in the South Carolina Army National Guard for eight years. He has his undergraduate degree in Intelligence and National Security Studies from Coastal Carolina University and works as a Contractor in Charleston, SC.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not reflect those of any institutions with which the author are associated.

EIR: The ICJ As An Effective Conflict Prevention Tool in Latin America

"The ICJ as an effective conflict prevention tool in Latin America"
W. Alejandro Sanchez and Brittney J. Figueroa
E-International Relations
April 4, 2017
http://www.e-ir.info/2017/04/04/the-icj-as-an-effective-conflict-prevention-tool-in-latin-america/


The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has made a name for itself as various governments across the world resort to it to rule on inter-state disagreements. There are certainly valid criticisms about how the ICJ, the chief judicial body of the United Nations, operates, particularly as African governments have accused it of imposing Eurocentric international law. Some of its rulings on controversial cases have even been denounced as ‘step[s] backwards’.

Despite these criticisms, Latin American governments have regularly turned to ICJ rulings on border disputes and other inter-state disagreements.  Over the past decades, the Court has ruled on numerous cases between Latin American states and enjoys a positive record so far in this region, given the generally peaceful compliance of Latin American states to the Court’s rulings. Nevertheless, the complexity of one particular case, ‘Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean’, a historically-charged territorial dispute between Bolivia and Chile, may prove to challenge the credibility of the ICJ in Latin America in the near future.

The ICJ in Latin America

Since commencing its operations in 1946, after the 1945 San Francisco Conference and the dissolution of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the ICJ has had an important and constant role in Latin American geopolitical affairs. For example, the ICJ’s first case in the region was Colombia v. Peru in 1949 regarding the interpretation of an asylum treaty. Honduras and Nicaragua similarly turned to the Court in 1958 after the latter claimed that the Arbitral Award that delineates the borders between the two countries, made by the King of Spain in 1906, was not binding. Ultimately, Nicaragua lost the case, as judges voted 14 to 1 in favor of Honduras.In other words, the ICJ has ruled not solely on cases relating to territorial disputes, but also diplomatic disagreements.

In the 21st century, the Court has been actively involved in border disputes. For example, The ICJ has passed rulings on cases between Costa Rica and Nicaragua over navigational rights in 2009; Argentina and Uruguay over a pulp mill in the Uruguay River in 2010;Colombia and Nicaragua  over a territorial and maritime dispute in 2012; a maritime dispute between Chile and Peru in 2014; and a ping-ponged dispute between Costa Rica and Nicaragua over both the rights to wetlands on the River San Juan, and the construction of a road along the San Juan River in 2015. Most recently, in March 2016, the court passed a new judgment over the delimitation of the continental shelf between Colombia and Nicaragua(a follow up of the aforementioned ruling).

At the time of this writing, March 2017, out of the Court’s 14 pending cases, seven involve Latin American states: three cases between Costa Rica and Nicaragua; two involving Nicaragua and Colombia; and two between Bolivia and Chile.

Discussion

How does the ICJ fit into Latin American geopolitics? The obvious answer is that it is a positive development that regional states are looking for non-violent means to solve their outstanding border disputes, including seeking third party mediation (and rulings).

Moreover, the governments that have gone to the Court have generally respected the ICJ’s decisions, though there have been occasions in which states return to the Court for additional clarification (and arguably to revisit the previous decision in order to obtain a more favorable ruling). The back-to-back rulings between Colombia and Nicaragua regarding their maritime dispute illustrates this situation. Additionally, there is the question of whether an ICJ ruling will be beneficial or detrimental to bilateral relations. For brevity, we are not able to provide an in-depth discussion about this issue, however it is worth noting that Peru and Chile have respected the Court’s decision over their maritime borders, and have strong bilateral ties, particularly when it comes to trade due to their membership in the Pacific Alliance, a regional trade bloc. With that said, the two countries have a history of “bad blood” and distrust dating back to the 19th century War of the Pacific, and while they will likely continue to respect the Court’s 2014 ruling, this does not necessarily mean that distrust will decrease in the short term. It is also worth noting that there is still a disagreement over the interpretation of the ICJ ruling regarding how it affects the territorial border between the two countries. For the moment, neither government appears interested in returning to the ICJ as the main goal is to improve bilateral relations rather than provoke more controversy, however this could happen at some point given the precedents set by other governments.

The numerous judicial procedures between San Jose and Managua require additional discussion as they exemplify how the ICJ is utilized. In 2010, Costa Rica went to the Court and asked that it investigate the legality of Nicaragua’s excavation of three channels of the River San Juan, as well as Nicaraguan military presence on Costa Rican territory. Very soon after, Managua submitted a counter claim to the court in 2011 stating that San Jose had failed to perform environmental impact assessments prior to the construction of a highway that runs close to the river. In December 2015, the Court ruled that Nicaragua pay damages to its neighbor, as its actions violated Costa Rica’s territorial sovereignty, the 1858 Treaty of Limits, and the ICJ Order of 8 March 2011 (“Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area”) outlining provisional measures issued by the court. On the other hand, Costa Rica was found guilty of the allegations in the counter claim, but was not ordered to compensate Nicaragua.

Although complex, this trial had a positive diplomatic end, as made clear by Nicaragua’s ambassador to the Netherlands, Carlos Argüello Gómez’s statement that ‘[The] ruling will help ties between our two countries. When things are cleared up, then problems go away and that is the most important thing.’ This positive outlook, however, is fragile when the tensions between the parties involved are already high. Moreover on 16 January the ICJ announced that Costa Rica had commenced proceedings against Nicaragua, making it the third case between the two sides currently in the ICJ’s docket. Clearly, diplomatic relations between the two remain tense, however violence continues to be avoided.

A Pivotal Case

The intention of the authors is to propose that the Court’s ultimate challenge, including the question whether parties will respect its ruling, has to do with the Bolivia and Chile cases. There are currently not one, but two cases under deliberation, the most controversial regarding a border issue that is over a century old and the foundation of patriotic sentiments in the landlocked nation as La Paz has sued Santiago in an effort to have access to the Pacific Ocean.

Bolivia lost its coastal territories to Chile during the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), making it a landlocked nation. The state has subsequently attempted to regain some sort of permanent corridor back to the Pacific. This is a very complicated and sensitive issue: should the Court award sovereignty to Bolivia to territory currently controlled by Chile, it would effectively cut Chile geographically in two. The case is still in its preliminary hearings and presentation of arguments and counter arguments; hence we will have to wait some years before the ICJ passes its decision.

Nevertheless, even at this early stage, tensions are already high. For decades, diplomatic relations between the two countries have been limited. In April 2013, the Evo Morales government filed an application at the ICJ against Chile due to the failure, from the Bolivian point of view, of “Chile’s obligation to negotiate in good faith and effectively with Bolivia in order to reach an agreement granting Bolivia a fully sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.” While Bolivia is utilizing  the Court to force negotiations over  access to the Ocean, Chile claims that the existence of a 1904 peace treaty has settled the account between the two nations, and hence does not see the need to negotiate further, thuscalling into question the jurisdictional boundaries of the Court. Santiago’s lack of intention to enter negotiations with La Paz over the past decades regarding the sea access is arguably the main reason why President Morales decided to go to an international judicial body for a favorable ruling to force Chile negotiate.

While the case is proceeding, in late March Bolivia filed new paperwork at the ICJ, and Santiago has also opened a case against La Paz over the Silala River. The authors would argue that the Silala case is a countermove by Santiago over the sea access issue, a sort of legal tit-for-tat akin to the Costa Rica and Nicaragua proceedings. Due to space considerations, we cannot provide an in-depth discussion about the Silala case, which centers on Chile stating that the river is an international watercourse, therefore making Santiago “entitled to the equitable and reasonable use of the waters of the Silala River system in accordance with customary international law.” While Santiago may have a valid claim to the river, the timing of the case suggests that more than interest in the river, Chile wants to “punish” Bolivia for commencing proceedings over the sea access issue.

It is important to note that the ICJ’s role in the sea access case is a bit different than its usual role. The Court is currently being used as a tool, rather than as an explicit decider, in the case. This is exemplified in its most recent declaration, aptly named ‘Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean’. Rather than deciding on which of the two countries is granted access to the ocean, the ruling makes it mandatory that Santiago peacefully negotiates with La Paz regarding the coveted corridor to the Pacific. However, Chile’s president was quick to remark that, even though the court has ruled so that Chile is forced to negotiate, “Bolivia hasn’t won anything” and that the ruling “does not affect the territorial integrity of Chile”. These comments regarding the heated, historically-charged case bring to light concerns about related future rulings. While it is uncommon for States to go against ICJ rulings, if they feel that the Court lacks jurisdiction over a particular matter, they may contend. This possibility then raises important questions. If the two countries cannot come to an agreement on their own, will the Court issue an umbrella decision, and if it does, will Chile comply?

The ICJ may attempt to go for a Solomon-like ruling, with La Paz gaining joint control, but not sovereignty, over a narrow corridor to the ocean. If both sides choose to respect the ICJ’s ruling on such a complex and controversial issue, this will provide the Court with further credibility of a near-perfect record in the region.

Final Thoughts

Since its inception, the International Court of Justice has been involved in Latin American affairs. While critics deem international courts fundamentally ineffective, and wrestle with the idea whether compliance with international law may be a top priority for a state, the ICJ’s rulings in the region prove otherwise, as they have affected Latin American diplomatic relations over the past decades, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Indeed, this analysis mentions how eight nations in recent years have gone to the ICJ to peacefully resolve various differences that range from territorial disputes to even navigational rights. In fact, half of the Court’s pending cases deal directly with Latin America, demonstrating how the region is eager for resolutions to inter-state conflicts that no longer require violence. This statement is supported by the fact that the last inter-state war was more than 20 years ago: the 1995 conflict between Peru and Ecuador, and prior to that, the 1982 Faklands/Malvinas War between Argentina and the United Kingdom.

Ultimately, while Latin American countries have generally respected the Court’s decisions, it will be important to monitor how countries involved in more controversial disputes, namely the Bolivia-Chile sea access case, will react to future ICJ rulings. Hopefully, the two parties will choose to continue in the peaceful steps of their fellow Latin American nations regarding the Court, and respect the ICJ’s ruling.

The authors wish it to be known that the views presented in this essay are their sole responsibility do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the authors are associated.

W. Alejandro Sanchez Nieto and Brittney J. Figueroa.
Alejandro is an analyst who focuses on international security and geopolitics. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez. Brittney is a recent graduate from the University of California, Santa Barbara with a Bachelors degree in Global Studies, and a Minor in Latin American Iberian Studies.

Book Chapter: 2008: The Andean Great War

2008: The Andean Great War - 

How A South American Conflict Could Have Erupted in 2008

W. Alejandro Sanchez

Book Chapter to be published in Future Wars: Storia della distopia militare

Virgilio Ilari - Editor

Societa di Storia Militare / Acies Edizioni Milani (2016)

Forthcoming

PDF Available: https://www.academia.edu/21268162/2016_Wilder_Alejandro_Sanchez_2008_The_Andean_Great_War_How_a_South_American_conflict_could_have_erupted_in_2008

CIMSEC: The Colombian Navy: South America's Powerhouse?

"The Colombian Navy: South America's Powerhouse?"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Center for International Maritime Security
December 10, 2015

This past August, tensions flared up between Colombia and Venezuela after three Venezuelan soldiers were injured in an incident along their common border. The situation worsened as Caracas started deporting undocumented Colombians that live in Venezuela. Thankfully, diplomacy prevailed and the incident did not escalate. Nevertheless, this is not the first time that the two South American countries have been at odds with each other.  The two states had confronted one and other before, specifically at sea in 1987 and more recently in 2008.

The focus of this analysis is not to theoretically discuss what would happen if Colombia and Venezuela went to war. Rather, we aim to take this possible inter-state conflict as a point of departure to discuss the status of the modern Colombian Navy. For decades, the Colombian Navy’s security operations have revolved around combating maritime crimes like drug trafficking. Nevertheless, a Navy’s raison d’être is to protect a country’s waterways from internal and external threats. Given recent acquisitions, including two German submarines, Colombia’s Navy can certainly be cataloged as a regional powerhouse with a strong deterrent capability.

Lack of Warfare: A Brief History

There is an obscure but also amusing fact about Latin American navies in general: they have not participated in inter-state warfare in decades. As I have discussed in previous analyses, the last time two Latin American countries went to war with each other was the land-based conflict Peru and Ecuador in 1995. Moreover, the last time a Latin American warship fired a missile at another warship was during the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War between Argentina and the United Kingdom.

Colombia is well known for the internal conflict that has plagued the country for decades. When it comes to inter-state wars, Colombian Army units and Navy vessels participated in the Korean War, via the UN, while the last conflict Colombia fought with a neighboring state was the 1932-1933 war with Peru, which was centered in the Amazon. In the past few decades, there have been isolated incidents which brought Colombia to an inter-state war. Most recently in 2008, there was a bizarre incident in which Colombian troops attacked a FARC insurgent base in Ecuador without requesting Quito’s permission. Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez deployed his troops to the Colombian border, declaring that he would go to war with Colombia to protect its ally Ecuador. Prior to that, there was the aforementioned 1987 incident in which theARC Caldas, a Colombian corvette, entered waters that Venezuela claims as its own. Both countries deployed troops to their borders, and Venezuelan F-16 warplanes flew over the ARC Caldas and other Colombian vessels in the disputed area. As was the case with this most recent incident, the crises in 1987 and 2008 ultimately did not escalate.

This leads to one conclusion: there is no one in service in the Colombian Navy that has experience in an inter-state conflict. Moreover, no missile or torpedo has been launched from a Colombian warship or submarine in generations. Certainly, this fact does not minimize the capabilities, bravery, and overall professionalism of Colombian sailors who have plenty of experience in combating insurgents, drug traffickers, and other criminals in the country’s territorial waters and throughout the country’s numerous rivers. If anything, Colombia’s success at stopping maritime crimes (in April, it seized 1.3 tons of cocaine in Pacific waters) highlights how this service has adapted and transformed itself into a force that can face both traditional and asymmetric security threats. Nevertheless, it is an amusing factoid that, as powerful as the Colombian Navy is, experience in inter-state conflicts is beyond scarce among its personnel (though the same can be said of other regional navies).

A Force to be Reckoned With

Unlike its neighbor Brazil, Colombia does not possess a carrier, nor is it constructing a nuclear-powered submarine. Nevertheless, its Navy has carried out acquisitions in recent years to modernize its fleet. The most important was the 2012 acquisition of two German-made submarines, class U-206A. The submarines have been upgraded (they served in the German Navy for over three decades and were decommissioned in 2010) and, at the time of this writing, are been transported from Germany to Colombia via the freighter BBC Saphire.

As for other acquisitions, Bogota has purchased a “fast ferry” transport vessel, the ARC Juanchaco, from the Dutch shipbuilding company Damen. Moreover, Colombia has also acquired a 76mm gun, an Oto Melara 76/62 Super Rapid (SR) Gun Mount, from the Italian company Finmeccanica. It will be placed aboard anoffshore patrol vessel that the country is currently constructing. Finally, the Colombian Navy’s official website offers a detailed list of acquisitions and upgrades for 2015; due to space issues we will not discuss them here, but it is worth noting that these include modernizing the country’s frigates and upgrading bases like ARC Bolivar and ARC Malaga.

Additionally, the country’s naval military industry is rapidly evolving. Case in point, the Colombian state-owned shipyard COCTEMAR recently delivered to the Navy the amphibious landing vessel BDA Golfo de Uraba, which can transport supplies to coastal and fluvial areas. This is the second of six vessels of this class that COCTEMAR is constructing for the Navy.

In terms of training, Colombia carries out military exercises with its neighbors and allies – Colombian warships are currently involved in the UNITAS 2015 exercises with U.S. and other Latin American vessels. Furthermore, the Colombian Navy participated in RIMPAC 2014 and carried out naval exercises withEcuador in August. Finally, a crew of Colombian sailors is getting some first-hand experience in combat operations as the patrol vessel ARC 7 de Agosto has been deployed to the horn of Africa to participate in Operation Atalanta.

Issues and Challenges

While the Colombian Navy has carried out important acquisitions and modernization of its vessels, there are problems among its personnel. Just this past May, Bogota revealed a massive fraud operation among the country’s armed forces in which some 160 million Colombian pesos (around $52 thousand USD) were stolen from the military’s coffers. Among those arrested as part of this criminal ring were three naval personnel and one civilian that also worked for the Navy. The criminals utilized online transactions,using fake documents to wire money from the naval cadet school Almirante Padilla, to personal bank accounts.

Moreover, the education that Colombian naval cadets are receiving may be called into question. The research group Sapiens Researchpublishes reports of Colombia’s best universities: in 2014, the best military university was the Universidad Militar Nueva Granada, which came at a respectable number 25. As for the navy’s cadet school, the Escuela Naval de Cadetes Almirante Padilla came at a dismal number 90, just above the Air Force’s postgraduate school. Colombian naval cadets receive  good training at sea – this is best exemplified by how its flagship and training vessel, the ARC Gloria, has travelled around the world to provide aspiring naval officers with hands-on experience. Nevertheless, the education they receive on land at their university can greatly be improved if it wants to compete with some of Colombia’s best universities.

Another worrisome development is the training that Colombian marines are receiving. Earlier this year, the Colombian news agency La F.m. uploaded a video showing marines being threatened and physically beaten by their trainers as part of an advanced training course. The marines were punched and kicked by their supervisors, even when they fell to the ground, all the while being verbally insulted. (Click here for the graphic video, in Spanish).

The video sparked a debate on whether such training methods are acceptable (arguably to train the marines to deal with extreme pain in case they are captured by insurgents) or if they should be regarded as humiliating and unnecessary. As a response to the video, Admiral Hernando Wills, commander of the Navy, announced that the officers that beat up the marines had been kicked out of the service. The naval officer explained that “military training is demanding, but under no circumstance does it justify physical abuse.”

Finally, as part of my research, I was unable to find reports of accidents regarding Colombian vessels. This is certainly a positive development, particularly as other branches have suffered accidents in the recent past (one of the Air Force’s Kfir warplanescrashed in December 2014 during a training exercise). With that said, problems among naval personnel, from corruption cases to controversial training, or lack of good education among cadets, must be dealt with in order to continue optimizing the country’s maritime force.

Analysis

While the Colombian Navy has acquired some major equipment, particularly two submarines and new landing vessels, it would be wrong to assume that it is partaking some kind of aggressive weapons-purchase spree. Rather, the Colombian Navy is going through a modernization process to maintain its ability to carry out operations, such as combating maritime crimes, as well as maintaining a deterrent capability from outside threats.

Ultimately, the operations of the Colombian Navy rest on its personnel and its equipment. As previously mentioned, there have not been any major accidents regarding warships or submarines while the recent acquisitions and modernization of vessels leads me argue that the Colombian Navy is in ideal shape to continue its operations and deal with any foreseeable conflict. As for the personnel itself, the corruption case is a problematic incident but has not affected the overall status of the Navy. Of more concern are the (videotaped) cases of physical and psychological abuse against marines during training courses.

The Caracas Question

This analysis would not be complete without discussing Venezuela-Colombia tensions. The two governments have a long history, including been part of the same country in the 19thcentury. However, tensions have regularly escalated, particularly as they both claim the oil-rich Gulf of Venezuela, which prompted the 1987 maritime crisis. Tensions increased during the presidencies of Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and Colombia’s Alvaro Uribe, which culminated in the 2008 incident. Sadly, even after the two leaders left power, occasional flare-ups continued, such as this past August.

It is important to note that under Chavez, Caracas spent billions of dollars on Russian and Chinese equipment for the Venezuelan armed forces, but the main beneficiaries were the Army and Air Force. Recent open-source reports hint that the Venezuelan Navy is doing the best with what it has, which means repairing old vessels, like the submarine Caribe, S-32, and its Lupo-class frigates. The country’s acquisitions program can be regarded as modest – one recent example is the purchase of Damen-built patrol vessels.

While it is not my goal to discuss a theoretical Colombia-Venezuela conflict, the information currently available regarding both navies provides a strong advantage to the Colombian Navy, as it has seasoned personnel with combat experience due to their anti-drug trafficking operations and the ARC 7 de Agosto vessel operating in the Horn of Africa. Of course, the caveat here is that the Colombian Navy has not participated in an actual inter-state conflict in decades (but then again, neither has the Venezuelan Navy), which means Colombian naval personnel lack that particular kind of combat-experience. As far as the equipment  goes, the current purchases provide the Colombians a formidable force, particularly when it comes to its submarine fleet.

Furthermore, the Colombian Navy enjoys strong relations with regional navies, which means that it participates in valuable multinational training exercises. For example, the ongoingUNITAS 2015 exercises have warships from Colombia, Peru, Mexico, the U.S. among others. On the other hand, the Venezuelan Navy carried out exercises with the country’s Air Force in June. Inter-agency exercises are important, but the Venezuelans are at a disadvantage as the Colombian Navy learns tactics and techniques from other navies.

Regarding the U.S., close Bogota-Washington relations are no secret, both at the political and military level. When it comes to navies, apart from participating in joint maritime exercises, there are often meetings between the senior naval command of both countries. Case in point, this past January, Admiral John Greenert, Chief of Naval Operations of the U.S. Navy, traveled to Colombia to meet with Defense Minister Juan Carlos Pinzon and the commander of the Navy, Admiral Hernando Wills.

Given the plethora of current analyses discussing how far the U.S. government (and military) will go to support their allies (i.e. via NATO in Europe or to protect Taiwan in the Asia Pacific), it is necessary to briefly discuss U.S.-Colombia relations if the South American state went to war; a Colombia-Venezuela conflict being the most plausible scenario. It is safe to say that the U.S. will notgo to war over Colombia. Nevertheless, we can deduce that the U.S. would support to its ally, particularly if it is in a war against Venezuela, which has been a thorn in Washington’s side since the dawn of the Chavez era. Specifically, I would argue that Washington would focus provide intelligence to Bogota – a precedent would be the U.S. supplying intel to the UK against Argentina during the Falklands War.

Ultimately, the question is: Is a war between Colombia and Venezuela inevitable? The fact that the crises of 1987, 2008 and 2015 did not result in conflict speaks well of how both governments preferred dialogue over war. Even more, just this past October, senior naval officers from both countries met inMaracaibo, Venezuela to discuss bilateral cooperation to combat crimes, including drug trafficking, along their common border. Such meetings are important confidence-building mechanisms to improve military relations.

Nevertheless, a maritime border in the Gulf of Venezuela has yet to be agreed upon by both governments, which will probably lead to another 1987-type incident in the future. Moreover, the Venezuelan economy remains in a dire state, and the Venezuelan government has turned to constantly accusing foreign actors, namely the U.S., of trying to destabilize it. Even more, Caracas has also accused Bogota of trying to destabilize its economy and fomenting the mega-inflation that Venezuela is currently experiencing. The bottom line here is that accusations over economic warfare and/or unresolved border issues will likely bring about a new round of incidents in the near future. Hopefully these will not end up in a conflict but, in this author’s personal opinion, the Colombian military may be wondering if Venezuela may try to ignite a conflict in order to divert attention from its internal problems (a la Argentina during the Falklands War).

Conclusions

When discussing maritime strength among military powers, it makes sense to focus on navies with either nuclear-powered vessels or in terms of modern equipment. When it comes to Latin America, assessing a navy’s strength is somewhat different as all tend to possess a mix of (sometimes very) old equipment, sprinkled with the occasional new vessel. The Colombian Navy has such a mix of warships and submarines – it has brand-new, domestically-manufactured, landing ships while its “new” German submarines are already over three decades old. Nevertheless, this author would conclude that it enjoys a high level of readiness (best exemplified by successful operations against maritime crimes). While nobody wants war, if it does occur, Colombia’s Navy is certainly a powerhouse to be reckoned with.