Book chapter: "A Frontier Market in the COVID-19 Era: Kazakhstan’s Economic Diversification in the 2020s"

 

"A Frontier Market in the COVID-19 Era: Kazakhstan’s Economic Diversification in the 2020s"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

 Chapter published in: 

Jean-François Caron and Hélène Thibault (Eds), Central Asia and the Covid-19 Pandemic, Springer Link, 2022: 139-170

 

To buy the book please visit: https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-16-7586-7

 

More info on my chapter: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-16-7586-7_7

Abstract

Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the government of Kazakhstan was carrying out a strategy of economic diversification in order to decrease the country’s dependence on its profitable energy industry which constitute the bulk of Kazakhstan’s exports. As part of the diversification of its economy and trading partners, Kazakhstan has a long-term objective: become one of the world’s 30 most developed economics by 2050. The Central Asian nation is classified as a frontier market by global indexes, which means that it is viewed as having less developed political and economic structures, which makes them more volatile. However this label can be misleading as it does not properly demonstrate what Kazakhstan has accomplished in recent years in its quest to attract new trade partners and investors. New entities like the Astana International Financial Centre; the government's plans to become a trilingual nation; and recent initiatives to develop industries like agriculture, banking, manufacturing and tourism; demonstrate what good planning can accomplish. How will the pandemic affect Kazakhstan’s plans and objectives? This essay seeks to demonstrate that the country has handled COVID-19 generally well from an economic point of view. While the informal sector and lack of development in the periphery remain problematic issues, Nur-Sultan has achieved much in its three decades of independence as a frontier market, transforming from a Soviet-style to a Western-style economy. Kazakhstan, thus, is an example of how a global pandemic does not necessarily have to cripple the development plans of a frontier market, if said country has clear short-term as well as long-term goals.

 

 

 

Interviewed / entrevista: EEUU compra gas a Rusia: "Es una de las grandes ironías de la geopolítica mundial"

"EEUU compra gas a Rusia: "Es una de las grandes ironías de la geopolítica mundial"

Telescopio

Sputnik Mundo

14.02.2018 (actualizada a las 16:31 15.02.2018) 

Link original: https://mundo.sputniknews.com/radio_telescopio/201802141076256770-gas-petroleo-comercio/

 

 Audio en espanol/Audio in Spanish: https://mundo.sputniknews.com/popup/radio/?audio_id=80288061

 

¿Por qué, a pesar de las sanciones, Estados Unidos mantiene los lazos comerciales con los gobiernos de Nicolás Maduro en Venezuela o Vladimir Putin en Rusia? La pregunta alude a la reciente compra de gas ruso ordenada por la administración Trump para paliar la ola de frío en su país. El analista Alejandro Sánchez nos explica por qué.
 

"Es una de las grandes ironías de la geopolítica mundial que Estados Unidos siga comprando gas ruso, a pesar de las tensiones y de las investigaciones que el Gobierno estadounidense lleva a cabo con respecto a (NdR: la supuesta injerencia rusa) las elecciones de 2016, a pesar de los conflictos por Siria y Ucrania, y de las sanciones que impuso a oficiales del Gobierno ruso", apuntó el analista internacional Alejandro Sánchez.

Se refería a la primera de dos compras de gas ruso por parte de la administración de Donald Trump, con el objetivo de mantener el flujo del producto ante una ola de frío que ha llevado las temperaturas por debajo de los 20 grados centígrados en algunas zonas del país. La compra se realizó mediante triangulaciones de barcos y de empresas de terceros países para evitar la relación directa con el país sancionado, además de tocar varios puertos antes que el de Boston.

"Se vería muy mal para el gobierno de Trump que un buque con bandera rusa atraque en la ciudad de Boston trayendo gas licuado", señaló Sánchez y agregó: "Por eso tuvo que haber triangulación por Europa… hubiera sido un arma política para los demócratas, que sostienen que su Gobierno está en colusión con el de Rusia", señaló Sánchez.

 

En este mismo sentido, el experto comparó esta situación con lo que ocurre entorno a la construcción del gasoducto Nord Stream 2 desde Rusia hasta Alemania.

"Hay algo de falta de concordancia con las sanciones que Europa y EEUU han impuesto a Rusia y la propia política energética europea, porque tanto Europa como Alemania necesitan del gas ruso para satisfacer el creciente consumo de energía. Mas ahora que Europa está dejando de usar el carbón y en 2022 Alemania cerrará su última central nuclear".

TNI: Russia May Make Another Power Play in South America

"Russia May Make Another Power Play in South America"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
The National Interest
12 November, 2017
Originally published: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/russia-may-make-another-power-play-south-america-23161

"And It's Not Venezuela This Time..."

Russian president Vladimir Putin will travel to Bolivia to attend the fourth Gas Exporting Countries Forum summit, which will take place on November 20–24. This is President Putin’s first trip to the landlocked nation, and while Russia-Bolivia relations are not as researched and discussed as Moscow’s relations with Nicaragua orVenezuela, they are nevertheless worth discussing in depth.

In late October, the Bolivian daily El Deber quoted Russian ambassador to Bolivia Vladimir Sprinchan about a meeting he held with Bolivian authorities regarding President Putin’s upcoming visit. The Russian diplomat explained that “we analyzed different issues as Bolivia is a partner of Russia and we have a lot of common views, we have the same ideology, and that is very important.” Indeed, on 24 October, theRussian Federation used its veto power to block a resolution in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to “extend for one year the work of international inspectors investigating chemical-weapons attacks in Syria.” Bolivia, currently a rotating member of the UNSC, also voted against the resolution.

Apart from diplomatic support, Bolivia-Russia relations revolve around energy initiatives. For example, Russian energy giant Gazprom operates in Bolivia, dating back to a 2007 memorandum of understanding with the Bolivian state-owned petroleum company Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos. Gazprom started production on the Incahuasi field in 2016, has scheduled drilling in the Azero block for 2018 and has expressed interest in expanding its Bolivian operations even further. The Russian energy giant is apparently interested in drilling for hydrocarbons in La Ceiba, Vitiacua and Madidi. Furthermore, a October 6 Gazprom press release notes that the two sides have the “intention to set up a joint venture for gas marketing in Argentina and Brazil.” While it is debatable whether this will actually occur, such ambitious projects stress the close ties between Gazprom and Bolivia these days.

Even more, the Bolivian Nuclear Energy Agency (ABEN) and the Russian energy company (ROSATOM) signed a contract for the construction of a nuclear research and technology center (NRTC) last September. According to a statement by ROSATOM, the NRTC to be located in the Bolivian city of El Alto will comprise of a water-cooled research reactor, a multipurpose experimental gamma-installation center, engineering facilities and various laboratories. Investments in the project will reportedly amount to more than $300 million and the first facilities should be commissioned in 2019. ROSATOM is also increasing ties with Bolivia’s Higher University of San Andres.

As for potential projects that may materialize when President Putin visits, weapons sales are the most likely. According to the renownedJane’s, the commander of the Bolivian air force has recommended that La Paz acquire Russian Yakovlev Yak-130 “Mitten” light-attack aircraft to replace the service’s Lockheed T-33s. While Bolivia’s defense budget is not as large as Venezuela’s, the country is fertile ground for Russian weapons exports. Afterall, President Morales has strived to modernize his nation’s military and has carried out interesting acquisitions recently, including a radar system from Thales and Super Puma helicopters from Airbus. There have not been major Russian-Bolivian weapons sales recently, but the two governments did sign a defense cooperation agreement back in August, which can be seen as the first step by Moscow for larger weapons transfers to Bolivia.

The media coverage of the upcoming Gas Exporting Countries Forum summit will understandably center on the decisions of the twelve-member bloc regarding gas production. Nevertheless, it is also important to monitor meetings between the attending delegations and any potential bilateral projects that could come out of them. So far, in spite of ideological ties, Bolivia-Russia ties have been limited, with a strong focus on energy initiatives, but that also means that there is plenty of space for growth.

W. Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst that focuses on geopolitical and defense related affairs, with a focus on the Western Hemisphere. His analyses have appeared in numerous refereed journals includingSmall Wars and Insurgencies, Defence Studies, the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, European Security, Studies in Conflict and Terrorismand Perspectivas. Follow him on twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez

The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Peru This Week: The Camisea Gas Project: From Peru to the World

"The Camisea Gas Project: From Peru to the World"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Peru This Week
May 19, 2014
Originally published: http://www.peruthisweek.com/news-the-camisea-gas-project-from-peru-to-the-world-102996

On May 21-22, the Institute of the Americas will host the XXIII La Jolla 2014 Energy Conference in La Jolla, California. The two-day event will be a chance for experts to discuss the status, and the future, of energy production and consumption across the hemisphere.

Given the focus of this event, it comes as no surprise that Peru’s energy industry will receive star treatment at this prestigious conference. Namely, on Thursday, May 22, there will be a morning panel entitled “Spotlight on the Camisea Project at 10: Reflections and the outlook for Peru’s: historic natural gas project and the country’s hydrocarbon sector.” Attending will be representatives of Perupetro and Pluspetrol, as well as the CEO of Gran Tierra Energy Inc., a Canadian international oil and gas exploration and production company.

It makes sense that Peru will be discussed at length at La Jolla, and that there will be a special focus on the Camisea gas project. Over the past decade, Peru has enjoyed one of the most vibrant economies in Latin America. The country is a member of the Pacific Alliance as well as the Trans Pacific Partnership, a grandiose attempt at bringing major economies from Latin America and the Asia Pacific region, as well as the U.S., under one free trade area.

The Camisea Gas Project: The gem on the top of the Inca’s crown
The Camisea project stands out as the gem on top of the Inca nation’s crown when it comes to energy-related initiatives. Located in the Peruvian highlands, not far from Cusco, Camisea is an area rich with natural gas.

The gas field in Camisea was first discovered in 1986 and it began producing in 2004. According to the website Hydrocarbons-technology.com, the energy project cost US$2.7billion and made, “Peru a gas-rich nation with royalties of US$34 billion expected over the 30 year duration of the project.” The Camisea gas field is situated in the San Martin reservoir in the Amazon rainforest and is connected to the Port of Pisco via the Camisea pipeline.

In December 2013, the Peruvian Ministry of Energy and Mines reported that it is now believed that there are 2.6 trillion of cubic feet of natural gas in Camisea. The ministry is hopeful that these estimates mean that, apart from being exported, the gas can also be utilized for the Gasoducto Sur Peruano (GSP). The GSP is an ambitious project to build two thermal energy plants that will provide electricity to the southern part of the Andean nation.

Controversy of the Camisea Project
Nevertheless, the Camisea project has not been without controversy. Over the past years, there have been a plethora of protests against it. One major concern is that the gas itself is benefiting consumers abroad while companies are getting rich, but the people around Camisea do not benefit from the natural gas. Moreover, this extractive industry has destroyed part of the local ecosystem around the Camisea River. In 2010, hundreds of people in Quillabamba, in the Cusco region not far from Camisea, protested against the export of the Camisea gas.

Control over the revenue from the Camisea exports is a source of tension as well. In 2013, there were major protests in the province of La Convencion, in the Cuzco region, over congressional proposals that would have altered the budget that the area receives from the income country obtains from the Camisea. Castro Melgarejo, mayor of Quillabamba, where the protests took place, accused Lima of trying to take control of gas export income destined to the nation’s provinces, specifically Cusco.

Finally, this March, a delegation of indigenous Peruvians belonging to the Kirigueti community arrived in Cuzco to protest against the potential expansion of Camisea’s Lot 88. The gas in Lot 88 comes from two gas fields to the north and south of the River Camisea. A February 25 commentary in the renowned British daily The Guardian explains that, “three of the four producing well locations in Lot 88 are in the reserve and, according to the state oil and gas agency Perupetro, Lot 88 accounted for 43% of Peru’s natural gas output in 2012 and 43% between January to November 2013.”

Representatives of the Kirigueti declared to the Peruvian daily La Republica that all 20 thousand of their people are against Camisea’s expansion, as living conditions for them have worsened since the project started a decade ago. Moreover, they declared that the financial wealth that the Peruvian government enjoys attributed to the Camisea has not helped indigenous Peruvians that live around the gas field.

It is debatable to what extent the aforementioned representatives from Perupetro, Pluspetrol, or Gran Tierra Energy will acknowledge the demands of Peruvians that have been affected by the operations of the Camisea gas project. Hopefully, the XXIII La Jolla 2014 Energy Conference will meaningfully address the complex issues surrounding the Camisea project rather than simply praising its accomplishments while ignoring its shortcomings.