Showing posts with label elections. Show all posts
Showing posts with label elections. Show all posts

Monday, July 6, 2026

Modern Diplomacy: "The (domestic) problem with Armenia’s recent elections"

 

 


"The (domestic) problem with Armenia’s recent elections"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez 

Modern Diplomacy 

5 July 2026

Published: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2026/07/06/the-domestic-problem-with-armenias-recent-elections/ 

 

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has been re-elected to another term after being victorious in his country’s 7 June elections. His re-election is a relief for Washington and Europe, given Pashinyan’s foreign policy ideologies and objectives. However, his domestic policies are very problematic; the repression and crackdown on freedom of speech leading up to the elections could signal a period of hardship for the Armenian population in the foreseeable future.

The elections in Armenia were closely monitored internationally, as much was at stake at a regional level. The obvious primary foreign policy issue for Armenia is the future of the peace process between Yerevan and the Azerbaijani government; Pashinyan’s re-election was critical to keeping the negotiations between the two neighbors alive. Moreover, given its location in the Caucasus, Armenia could become a critical transportation zone in regional trade networks such as the Middle Corridor; however, to achieve this goal, the Armenian government must be willing to engage and cooperate with neighbors like Azerbaijan, Georgia, and, yes, Türkiye.

Monday, November 11, 2024

NE Global: "Maia Sandu’s slim win: Moldova struggles between Europe and tradition"

 


 

"Maia Sandu’s slim win: Moldova struggles between Europe and tradition"

 Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

NE Global

11 November 2024

Originally published: https://www.neglobal.eu/maia-sandus-slim-win-moldova-struggles-between-europe-and-tradition/

The results of Moldova’s recent presidential elections and referendum are final. President Maia Sandu won a re-election bid, while a referendum to cement the country’s European Union (EU) aspirations was also (barely) approved.

In a tight race, President Sandu obtained 42 percent of the vote during the first round on October 20. Her opponent, former prosecutor general Alexandr Stoianoglo, from the Socialist Party (Partidul Socialiștilor din Republica Moldova, PSRM), received 26 percent of the vote; he is generally regarded as being Moscow-friendly. The run-off occurred on 3 November, with Sandu winning 55.41 percent against Stoianoglo’s 44.59 percent.

 

Monday, September 23, 2024

E-IR: "Omens for Uruguay’s Presidential Elections"

 

"Omens for Uruguay’s Presidential Elections"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez and Caleb Mills

Opinion

E-International Relations

23 September 2024

Originally published: https://www.e-ir.info/2024/09/23/opinion-omens-for-uruguays-presidential-elections/

Uruguay will hold general elections on 27 October. As South American politics remain turbulent, Uruguay is one of the few remaining islands of stability and progressive thinking. Nevertheless, the situation remains complex as the country has several challenges. There are three main presidential candidates to replace President Luis Lacalle Pou (2020-present): Yamandú Orsi (Broad Front or Frente Amplio); Álvaro Delgado (National Party or Partido Nacional); and Andrés Ojeda (Colorado Party or Partido Colorado). Recent polls show that Orsi has over 40% of the vote, with Delgado in second with around 20%. If no candidate achieves over 50% of the votes in the first round, the two candidates with the most votes will have a run-off on 24 November.

 

Wednesday, July 31, 2024

Golos Ameriki: " Эксперты в США: «Венесуэла – это в реальности новая Куба»" / "Venezuela in reality is the new Cuba"

 

"Эксперты в США: «Венесуэла – это в реальности новая Куба»" / "Venezuela in reality is the new Cuba"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Golos Ameriki / Voice of America (Russian language service)

31 July 2024

Originally published: https://www.golosameriki.com/a/us-experts-venezuela-elections/7719450.html

«Термин “мадуризмо” – это не только сам Николас Мадуро. Это и круг его сторонников: членов Национальной ассамблеи, министров, руководителей государственной нефтяной компании и военачальников Вооруженных сил, начиная с министра обороны Владимира Лопеса. Их материальное благополучие, их власть, от которых они не откажутся, зависят от присутствия Мадуро на президентском посту, – пояснил в интервью Русской службе «Голоса Америки» Вильдер Алехандро Санчес, глава компании Second Floor Strategies, политолог вашингтонского Центра стратегических и международных исследований (Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, CSIS).

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Monday, June 17, 2024

Diplomatic Courier: "Moldova’s EU ambitions rest on Sandu’s shoulders"

 

"Moldova’s EU ambitions rest on Sandu’s shoulders"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Diplomatic Courier

17 June 2024

Originally published: https://www.diplomaticourier.com/posts/moldovas-eu-ambitions-rest-sandus-shoulders

Moldova’s EU membership will ideally end the Moldovan identity and reunification debate. But the road to get there is a complicated one, writes Wilder Alejandro Sanchez.

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Saturday, February 24, 2024

NE Global: Moldova’s 2024 elections: Why it matters

 

"Moldova’s 2024 elections: Why it matters"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

NE Global

24 February, 2024

Originally published: https://www.neglobal.eu/moldovas-2024-elections-why-it-matters/

President Sandu has announced her intention to hold a referendum this autumn about Moldova’s EU membership
 

 

Monday, December 12, 2022

E-IR "Energy Security: Moldova’s Quest for New Suppliers"

 

"Energy Security: Moldova’s Quest for New Suppliers"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Opinion

e-International Relations

12 December, 2022

Originally published: https://www.e-ir.info/2022/12/12/opinion-energy-security-moldovas-quest-for-new-suppliers/

Moldovan President Maia Sandu has conducted various international visits and hosted leaders from multiple states in recent months. Due to the war in Ukraine and tense relations with Moscow, Chisinau is focused on reducing its dependency on Russian gas while simultaneously securing alternative suppliers. Hence, we are witnessing the creation of Moldova’s new energy security strategy based on energy diplomacy.

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Thursday, August 4, 2022

National Interest: Can Blinken Reset Washington’s Relationship With the DRC?

 


"Can Blinken Reset Washington’s Relationship With the DRC?"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

The Buzz

National Interest

4 August 2022

Originally published: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/can-blinken-reset-washington%E2%80%99s-relationship-drc-203977

Washington must develop a blueprint for a more comprehensive presence in the region, apart from defense relations or humanitarian assistance.

U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken will take a five-nation tour across Africa and Asia from August 2-11. The senior official’s visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) occurs at a critical time as the country experiences a new wave of internal violence and inter-state tensions while seeking to improve its investment climate.

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Sunday, April 5, 2020

The National Interest: The Western Hemisphere’s Latest Slow-Motion Catastrophe Isn't the Pandemic


"The Western Hemisphere’s Latest Slow-Motion Catastrophe Isn't the Pandemic"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez & Ryan Berg
The National Interest
April 5, 2020
Originally published: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/western-hemisphere%E2%80%99s-latest-slow-motion-catastrophe-isnt-pandemic-140692


A slow-motion catastrophe is playing out in the Western Hemisphere. No, it’s not the coronavirus pandemic or the alarming collapse of Venezuela’s healthcare system, which will be overrun by coronavirus victims. It’s the world’s newest oil power, Guyana, and its still-disputed results from the country’s general elections in early March.  
 

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Wednesday, February 26, 2020

Geopolitical Monitor: US-Azerbaijan Relations: Forging Ahead in a Tough Neighborhood


"US-Azerbaijan Relations: Forging Ahead in a Tough Neighborhood"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Geopolitical Monitor
Opinion
February 26, 2020
Originally published: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/us-azerbaijan-relations-forging-ahead-in-a-tough-neighborhood/


The Republic of Azerbaijan is a strategic US partner in the Caucasus due to its proximity to Iran, its strong ties with Israel, and its role in Caspian Sea-related energy projects. Hence, the country’s snap parliamentary elections that took place on February 9 must be placed in the proper geopolitical context.


The author would like to thank Lucia Scripcari, a LLM candidate at Koc University (Istanbul), for her editorial and research assistance.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com or any institutions with which the authors are associated.
 

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Wednesday, January 15, 2020

Providence: 2020 Forecast: What Could Happen in Latin America and the Caribbean?



"2020 Forecast: What Could Happen in Latin America and the Caribbean?"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Providence
January 15, 2020
Originally published: https://providencemag.com/2020/01/2020-forecast-latin-america-caribbean/

As the new year commences, there are several developments taking place in Latin America and the Caribbean that will likely make international headlines in 2020. In this commentary, we will briefly discuss some issues to keep in mind:

1. An Ongoing Lack of a Comprehensive US Foreign Policy: Needless to say, the Trump administration never had a grand strategy toward Latin America and the Caribbean.



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Thursday, July 18, 2019

IPD: After the Elections, Here are Kazakhstani President Tokayev’s Priorities

"After the Elections, Here are Kazakhstani President Tokayev’s Priorities

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
International Policy Digest
July 15, 2019
Originally published: https://intpolicydigest.org/2019/07/15/after-the-elections-here-are-kazakhstani-president-tokayev-s-priorities/


In a late June interview, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev stated that “I never forget that I am the president of this country.” The June 9 elections in Kazakhstan, where he obtained 70% of the vote, are now ancient history and the new president of the Central Asian nation is looking forward, and given recent tragic developments, that is where his focus should be.



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Providence:Kazakhstan’s June 9 Elections and the Future of Tolerance and Diversity


"Kazakhstan’s June 9 Elections and the Future of Tolerance and Diversity"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Providence
18 July, 2019 Originally published: https://providencemag.com/2019/07/kazakhstan-june-9-elections-future-tolerance-diversity/

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev won Kazakhstan’s June 9 elections with 70 percent of the vote, while his closest challenger, Amirzhan Kosanov, obtained around 16 percent. With the Central Asian nation’s transition of power now complete, policymakers in the capital Nur-Sultan can focus on improving the lives of 18 million Kazakhstanis. Part of their work is maintaining respect and tolerance toward the country’s minorities and religious diversity.

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Saturday, May 11, 2019

IPD: Kazakhstan: New President, New Diversified-Economy?

"Kazakhstan: New President, New Diversified-Economy?"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
International Policy Digest
May 11, 2019
Originally published: https://intpolicydigest.org/2019/05/11/kazakhstan-new-president-new-diversified-economy/


President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev is expected to emerge victorious in Kazakhstan’s upcoming elections on June 9, after the former long-time president, Nursultan Nazarbayev openly endorsed him on April 23. With the next president of the Central Asian country clear, the government can now focus on addressing the country’s priorities and challenges, which includes the continuous expansion and development of its economy, for the benefit of Kazakhstani citizens.

While Kazakhstan has made strides to diversify its economy, raw materials (such as uranium) continue to be the cornerstone of its economy. This diversification strategy will likely continue under the next administration, and it should be pursued even more aggressively.

Diversifying the Economy
When we talk about Kazakhstani exports to the world, uranium comes to mind. After all the Central Asian country is the world’s largest producer of this heavy metal. Kazakhstan also exports various raw materials, such as copper, gold, oil and natural gas. According to WorldTopExports.com, around 70% of exports in 2018 were mineral fuels, like oil, followed by iron, steel, and copper. Non-fuel or mineral exports, such as cereals, constituted barely 2% (other sources provide similar statistics.) For a country that wants to be one of the top 30 most developed nations by 2050, this one-sided economy is problematic.

To remedy this, in recent years Nursultan has pushed to diversify the country’s economy by developing other industries and also partially via the partial privatization some state-owned companies such as Kazatomprom. “If Kazatomprom becomes a public company, it will be only the second major uranium miner in the world, after Canada’s Cameco, to obtain such a status,” noted the Jamestown Foundation back in November 2018. Other companies that will become privatized are Samruk Kazyna, KazMunaiGas, and Kazaktelecom.
The government is also focusing on expanding industries like livestock, crop, and grain production. For example, The South Korean company, K2AT, will reportedly produce organic fertilizers and carry out smart-farming projects in the Aral Sea – this package of deals was announced as part of the Kazakh-Korea Investment Summit on April 22.

Similarly, Kazakhstan will reportedly open “three new vehicle assembling plants jointly with Hyundai, KAMAZ, and Kirovets as part of its plan to double domestic production of automobiles to meet demand within the Eurasian Economic Union,” the Caspian Sea Center reports. This is supported by Minister of Economy Ruslan Dalenov, who reported in mid-April that “in the January-March period, gross domestic product growth increased to 3.8 percent. In the January-February period, it was 3.5 percent. Accelerated growth has been achieved by increased output in the manufacturing industry, as well as by increased growth in construction and investment.”

Certainly, Kazakhstan could continue to rely on its uranium industry, as the IPO of Kazatomprom has brought about renewed interest of international investors in this sector, and nuclear reactors still use uranium for energy production – India is apparently interested in acquiring more Kazakhstani uranium. Similarly, “Russia’s oil major Lukoil and Kazakhstan’s KazMunayGas have set up a joint venture to conduct exploration at the Zhenis block in the Caspian Sea,” explained the Washington DC-based Caspian Center in a March 19 newsletter, mentioning a statement by Kazakhstan’s Energy Minister Kanat Bozumbayev. However, these two industries are not enough to improve the lives of 18 million Kazakhstani citizens, particularly as not all of them work in these sectors.

Attracting Investment and Extra-Regional Trade
Kazakhstan’s major trading partners are Russia ($18 billion in 2018) and China (around $11 billion last year), and while no regional or extra-regional nation can realistically compete with those numbers, Nursultan has striven to diversify its pool of partners and investors. To this end, the Central Asian state has created entities like the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC), which was launched last year, and Kazakh Invest to bring foreign investment into the country and to make Kazakhstan the financial hub of Central Asia.

The country has been successful in attracting more extra-regional trade, as trade with India reached $1.2 billion in 2018. In early April, a Kazakhstani delegation visited New Delhi to attract the interest of Indian businesses to the AIFC. “We need to make sure that AIFC is well-connected to other financial centres, including Dubai, Frankfurt, Mumbai, Singapore, and Shanghai…It will be very profitable for India and should be part of our long-term strategy,” said Kazakhstani political scientist Sultan Akimbekov to The Wire -India, in an interview about the visit. The AIFC also recently appointed Sheikh Bilal Khan as the Chief Islamic Finance Officer in order to further attract Islamic markers. Similarly, the Cyprus-based precious metals mining group, Polymetal, has become the first foreign issuer to list on the AIFC’s Astana International Exchange, according to an AIFC press release on April 17.

As for other extra-regional trade partners, South Korean President Moon Jae-in met on 22 April as part of the Asian head of state’s Central Asia tour. The two governments have enjoyed cordial relations and trade reached “$3.9 billion in 2018, including $2.9 billion in exports and $922 million in imports.” South Korean companies like Hyundai, LG, Samsung, Lotte Confectionery, SK, Highvill already operate in the Central Asian nation.

Discussion
Back in 2014, a report by Ernst & Young, titled “Kazakhstan 2014: The Brand Paves The Way,” explained that: “This survey reveals that Kazakhstan’s ‘brand perception’ is at its strongest compared with previous years. Investor awareness, among both established and non-established investors, has increased.” The report went on to explain that “Investor confidence in Kazakhstan’s future prospects is also high — 47.3% of our respondents believe that the country’s attractiveness will improve in the next three years.” Nevertheless, “over 50% of the investors surveyed still do not have any immediate plans to invest in the country. And the plans of investors already established in Kazakhstan vary significantly from those not yet established.”
This is a good summary of Kazakhstan’s financial situation nowadays. Generally speaking, the country is doing quite well and has a generally positive relationship with foreign markets. Hence, it is no surprise that Kazakhstan joined the WTO in 2015 and the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises in 2017.

However, the country has yet to move away from its oil and mineral-focused economy. Moreover, the US State Department mentions how foreign investors would like to see “improved transport and logistics infrastructure, a more open and flexible trade policy, and a more favorable work-permit regime.” Hopefully, the AIFC and Kazakh Invest will be successful in addressing some of these concerns so that investors receive the necessary guarantees, such as full protection of rights and interests, in order to continue investing in the Central Asian state.

Similarly, according to MENAFN, “in 2018 FDI amounted to 14.2 percent (12.9 percent in 2017) instead of targeted 16.5. In 2022 FDI is to reach 19 percent of GDP.” This data suggests that there is still a strong interest by external investors in the Central Asian state, but much needs to be done still to increase investment even more. The aforementioned agencies, plans for the partial privatization of some key state-owned industries and a new president will hopefully renew investor interest.

Final Thoughts
With former President Nazarbayev backing him, it is all but certain that President Tokayev will remain in power after June 9. Tokayev is no stranger to foreign policy as he served as minister of foreign affairs for around a decade, but now he will have all of Kazakhstan’s affairs, domestic and external, to deal with. It is generally expected that Tokayev will follow his predecessor’s foreign policy, hence Nursultan will continue to focus on attracting foreign investors and diversify its pool of partners as well as a list of exports.

Kazakhstan’s economy is globally known as a producer of oil and uranium, but the country’s other industries must continue to expand in order to achieve the government’s ambitious agenda and objectives. The new president of Kazakhstan will hopefully bring with him a more diverse economy for the 2020s.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Friday, March 1, 2019

Geopolitical Monitor: Moldova’s February Elections and Regional Geopolitics

"Moldova’s February Elections and Regional Geopolitics"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Geopolitical Monitor
Opinion
1 March, 2019
Originally published: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/moldovas-february-elections-and-regional-geopolitics/

The Republic of Moldova held parliamentary elections on February 24 with the goal of electing a new government that will, ideally, not be either corrupt or incompetent. Moreover, given the country’s geographical location, between Romania and Ukraine in southeastern Europe, these elections are important as Western governments and the Russian Federation aim at strengthening their influence in Chisinau.

The elections provided no clear winner, which means that both domestically and geopolitically, Moldova remains in limbo.

The Elections
Moldova is a parliamentary representative democracy; the president is head of state, and the prime minister is head of government. Several prime ministers over the past decade, including the incumbent Pavel Filip, have maintained a pro-Europe stance. Examples of pro-European initiatives include Moldova joining “the European Union’s Eastern Partnership in 2009 [while] the EU-Moldova Association Agreement entered into force on 1 July 2016.” On the other hand, President Igor Dodon is openly pro-Russian, as exemplified by his regular trips to Moscow. In 2018, the country obtained observer status in the Eurasian Economic Union, which President Dodon praised.

Just under 1.5 million Moldovan citizens voted on February 24, which is only 49% of the total number of voters, or about 200,000 fewer votes compared to 2014. The elections left no clear winner: the pro-Russia Socialist Party (PSRM) won 35 out of 101 seats, well short of a majority. On the other hand, the pro-European Democratic party obtained 30 seats. Meanwhile a new bloc, whose pledge was to fight corruption, the ACUM DA PAS, obtained 26 seats. Due to space issues we will not address the country’s  controversial new electoral law or widespread reports of voting irregularities.

Hence, Moldova will have a “deeply divided parliament without a clear majority that could have trouble agreeing on a new government.” Snap elections may be called again for later this year if no government is formed. The landlocked nation’s challenges have been well-analyzed over the past years, such as the infamous theft of around USD$1 billion from local banks, political corruption, and other issues.

At a February 22 event titled “Russia Abroad,” held at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank in Washington DC,  Professor Anna Ohanyan of Stonehill College discussed Russia’s attempts at capitalizing on the divides and fractures within post-Soviet and other nations to increase Moscow’s influence. In response to a question by the author of this commentary, Professor Ohanyan explained that when it comes to Moldova’s elections “it probably matters less as to who comes to power but as to whether the institutions and elections remain clean.” The professor also added that the Transnistrian people will have to decide as to whether they “might see value in staying with Moldova or if Moldova becomes so fully integrated regionally that Transnistria [Moldova’s separatist region] negotiates a deal so it can dip into both sides.”

It will be interesting to monitor if the 24 February elections affect in any way Chisinau-Tiraspol relations.

Moldova in The New Great Game
The future of Moldova will have repercussions on regional geopolitics as well, including from a defense point of view. Let us briefly summarize recent developments:

Apart from the association agreement with the European Union, “a civilian NATO Liaison Office in Chisinau was established in December 2017 [in Moldova] to promote practical cooperation and facilitate support for the country’s reforms.” Moldovan troops have also regularly participated in multinational maneuvers, such as Rapid Trident 2017 and Platinum Eagle. Moreover, the US military is reportedly planning to establish a presence at the Buboaca training base, and, according to Jane’s Defence Weekly, US military aircraft have been spotted by open-source networks to be flying out of Constanta airport, Romania, and over Transnistria and the Transnistria-Ukraine border.

Meanwhile, Russia continues to maintain a military presence in Transnistria in the form of the Operative Group of Russian Troops (OGRT) and via peacekeepers. Moreover, Russian troops regularly carry out exercises with the separatist regime’s local forces. Also, President Dodon has stated his support for Russian peacekeepers in the country, stating “we confirmed the importance of keeping the peacekeeping mission there as a factor of stability in the Security Zone,” TASS news agency reported in late December 2018.
In other words, both Washington/Europe and Moscow have a presence and interest in the future of Moldova as it will affect geopolitics in southeastern Europe.

At this point, it is necessary to mention that Moldova’s constitution stresses the country’s neutrality, hence Chisinau cannot join military blocs like NATO and, given the fractured state of Moldovan politics, it is highly unlikely that the constitution could be modified in order to achieve NATO membership in any case.

Final Thoughts
Ideally, the February 24 elections would have ended in a clear winner, and this would have provided an idea of what we could expect regarding Moldova’s foreign policy in the near future. Unfortunately, the controversial and inconclusive result means that the status quo will remain. In theory the Socialist Party could assemble a coalition which, combined with President Dodon, would orient the country’s foreign policy in favor of Moscow; however, we will have to wait and see if indeed a government is formed.

Moldova has plenty of internal political and economic challenges. Its geographical location, right in the middle of this new Cold War, will not help it attain political stability or meaningful socio-economic development anytime soon.

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cybersecurity issues.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of Geopoliticalmonitor.com or any institutions with which the author is associated.

Friday, February 1, 2019

Providence: How Should the US Deal with the Congo’s President Tshisekedi?

"How Should the US Deal with the Congo’s President Tshisekedi?"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Providence Magazine
1 February, 2019
Originally published: https://providencemag.com/2019/02/how-should-the-us-deal-with-the-congos-president-tshisekedi/


President Félix Tshisekedi was sworn in as the new president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) on January 24, days after the country’s Constitutional Court rejected an appeal against the results of the controversial December 30 elections. Though not free of controversy, this marks the first peaceful transfer of power in the DRC and should also mark the end of the Kabila dynasty.

While originally silent about the electoral results, the US government ultimately congratulated the new Congolese government. It will be important to monitor the future of Kinshasa-Washington relations in the post-Kabila era.

Results and Responses
After many delays, the DRC held elections on December 30—they were originally supposed to occur in 2016 and most recently on December 23, 2018. According to the Independent National Election Commission, Tshisekedi received 38.5 percent of the vote, compared with Martin Fayulu’s 34.7 percent and ruling coalition candidate Emmanuel Shadary’s 23.8 percent, the BBC explains. Fayulu protested the results, stating that he is the rightful winner and that President Tshisekedi’s victory was the result of an agreement between him and now former-President Joseph Kabila so that the latter can maintain his influence over the Congolese government.

Fayulu appealed against the election’s results, claiming that they were rigged, while the influential Catholic Church in the DRC stated that its own electoral observers made it clear that Tshisekedi was not the winner. There were also protests against President Tshisekedi’s victory, though not as widespread and violent as in previous years. In any case, the protests, accusations, and allegations did not stop the swear-in ceremony, and President Tshisekedi is now in control of the massive and resource-rich African nation.

What Should Washington Do Now?
A US State Department press release published on January 23 congratulated President Tshisekedi’s victory, saluting a peaceful and democratic transfer of power and even congratulated former-President Kabila for ceding power. Nevertheless, there was a small caveat to the statement, as the communiqué encouraged “the government to include a broad representation of Congo’s political stakeholders and to address reports of electoral irregularities.” This sentence can be regarded as a continuation of a January 16 press release, which declared that “the United States will hold accountable those who perpetrate election violence or undermine democratic processes.” It goes without saying that the government has little interest to review the results of the elections.

With President Tshisekedi now in power, the question is what will Washington’s policy be toward the new regime. Trade between the two countries is quite limited: according to the US Office of the Trade Representative, US goods exports to the DRC in 2017 were $76 million, while US goods imports from the country totaled $86 million. Foreign direct investment is similarly low, at around $76 million.

The real problem was that the lengthy Kabila regime was well known for its corrupt practices. This prompted the US Department of the Treasury and its Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to impose sanctions on various Congolese individuals, ranging from policymakers to senior security officers. Of course, these sanctions did not deter the Kabila regime from staying in power for over a decade and a half.

Thus, the election of a new president gives Washington and Kinshasa an opportunity to restart. The Congolese leader has promised to release all political prisoners, which would be a positive first step at improving relations. Also important is that any cabinet members in the Tshisekedi administration are not under OFAC sanctions. Experts on the DRC whom the author interviewed highlighted that they are hopeful Washington will get along well with the new government, particularly as the new president is from the opposition and was not the Kabila-supported candidate. While this is true, we will have to see how President Tshisekedi deals with the former regime, particularly as Kabila’s Common Front for Congo (FCC) coalition has a parliamentary majority, meaning the next prime minister will come from the pro-Kabila coalition, as AfricaNews explains.

Final Thoughts
The Democratic Republic of Congo is a complicated country, not just because of the recent elections but also due to the nation’s other challenges, such as violence in the eastern provinces and a deadly outbreak of Ebola, not to mention the ever-present poverty and corruption.

After delayed and controversial elections and a less than ideal inauguration ceremony, there is a head of state in the DRC whose last name is not Kabila. This is a historic milestone in itself. The international community, in particular the US government, which has placed many sanctions on Congolese officials, will be closely monitoring whether this change of the guard in the African nation is anything to be hopeful about.

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, military. and cybersecurity issues. @W_Alex_Sanchez. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Monday, January 21, 2019

Geopolitical Monitor: DRC Elections and the Fate of the UN MONUSCO Mission

"DRC Elections and the Fate of the UN MONUSCO Mission"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Geopolitical Monitor
Opinion
21 January 2019
Originally published: https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/drc-elections-and-the-fate-of-the-un-monusco-mission/


The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) held long-awaited general elections on 30 December to replace President Joseph Kabila, who has ruled the country for almost two decades. The results were controversial: opposition candidate Felix Tshisekedi was declared the winner, but another candidate, Martin Fayulu, has cried foul, stating that he is the rightful winner and that Tshisekedi’s victory is a result of a pact between him and Kabila. At the time of this writing the Constitutional Court has reportedly confirmed Tshisekedi’s victory.

While this new political crisis hits the African nation, one question that should be asked: What will be the future of the UN mission to the DRC, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO)?

The Elections
The population of the DRC and the international community in general have waited for fair presidential elections in the African nation for a long time, not to mention a peaceful transfer of power. President Kabila took control of the country when his father, President Laurent Kabila, was assassinated in 2001. The young Kabila would then rule until today, presiding over a transitional government when the Second Congo War ended, and winning elections in 2006 and 2011, which were marked by controversy. The country was supposed to hold new elections in 2016 and Kabila was constitutionally barred from running again, but the polls were ultimately postponed, as Kinshasa argued that ongoing violence in the East, a lack of funds to organize the elections, and insufficient time to update the voter registry prevented the government from holding them. 

Elections were then supposed to occur on 23 December 2018, only to be postponed once again, and they finally took place on 30 December.
According to election officials, “Mr Tshisekedi received 38.5% of the vote, compared with 34.7% for Mr Fayulu. Ruling coalition candidate Emmanuel Shadary took 23.8%,” the BBC explains. “Fayulu has alleged that Tshisekedi’s win was the result of a backroom deal between Tshisekedi and Kabila that allows Kabila to maintain control over important ministries and the security services,” Al Jazeera reports.

There is widespread concern about the elections and the future of the country, with entities like the Southern African Development Community and other international organizations either requesting a recount or calling for calm in the African nation. The African Union has requested Kinshasa to suspend the announcement of final election results, which the DRC government has denied, insisting that the Constitutional Court’s assessment of the vote’s legality is impartial. It remains to be seen whether the international community will recognize Tshisekedi’s apparent victory – analysts that follow African affairs should monitor which heads of state and diplomatic delegations attend his swearing-in ceremony, which is “scheduled for Tuesday, January 22, according to the latest calendar of the National Independent Electoral Commission (Céni),” AfricaNews reports.

Discussing MONUSCO’s Future
It is in this scenario that MONUSCO continues to operate in the DRC. The UN Security Council, via Resolution 2409 (2018), extended MONUSCO’s mandate until 31 March of 2019, with a ceiling of “16,215 military personnel, 660 military observers and staff officers, 391 police personnel, and 1,050 personnel of formed police units,” including an Intervention Brigade. According to data provided by UN Peacekeeping, as of 31 December 2018, MONUSCO has 15,366 UN contingent troops; 1,364 UN police officers; and 263 staff officers, making it the largest UN peacekeeping operation in the world. As for the mission’s mandate, Article 31 of Resolution 2409 explains that MONUSCO’s priorities are 1) protecting civilians; and 2) supporting the implementation of the 31 December 2016 agreement to hold elections.

The critical question that must be addressed is: What is MONUSCO’s future? Should it commence a withdrawal from the country or continue operating there?
There is no consensus on MONUSCO’s future among experts as the situation in the DRC is so complex. On the one hand, the country did hold elections, which fulfills one of the mandate’s objectives; however, the polls were controversial to say the least, and violence has already occurred as the population takes to the streets. Scott Morgan, a long-time analyst of African affairs, argued to me that “the uncertainty of the presidential polls could lead to violence regardless of which candidate is declared the winner. Having the mission remain to monitor the situation is crucial at this time.”  Moreover, violence in the Eastern part of the country continues, and the “situation in Burundi is not expected to show any improvement in the near future. The repatriation of FDLR fighters to Rwanda is another issue that needs to be addressed.” To make things even worse, as if that were possible, there is a new Ebola outbreak to deal with, and there have been over 600 reported cases and 368 deaths as of early January.

UN peacekeepers could be a key player in handling these challenges, particularly as the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) “either lack the capacity or the will to address these issues,” Morgan concludes, not to mention that the national police and the FARDC are guilty of plenty of crimes themselves. “Women and children are often kidnapped, frequently for the purpose of sexual exploitation, with rapes and gang rapes committed both by armed groups and sometimes by the army,” a UN report explains.

Alas, the mission’s own record so far is hardly ideal, considering widespread evidence of peacekeepers involvement in sexual abuse, human rights violations, corruption, or failing to protect Congolese civilians even though they are mandated to do so.

In a co-authored article entitled “Yes, MONUSCO Needs To Stay in the DRC,” published by the International Policy Digest in May 2017, Scott Morgan and I argued that, in spite of MONUSCO’s many, many shortcomings and flaws, it should stay in the DRC. Moreover, the mission’s troops should receive clearer mandates and orders about supporting and protecting Congolese civilians from violence and abuse. When I asked an African expert whether MONUSCO should stay in the DRC, the blunt reply I received was: “to do what? They do not protect civilians right now, so why should they stay?” The expert also argued that MONUSCO’s mandate needs to be more forcefully implemented by the blue helmets in the ground.

Other experts have argued that it is time for MONUSCO to leave, but in an orderly, well-planned, and structured fashion. This may have to occur anyways, as, given its size, MONUSCO is an expensive operation and the United States, among many other countries, are not paying their dues to the UN. One possibility is that the mission can be transformed into a political mission or a police one – akin to the UN mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH, which became MINUJUSTH.

Finally, it is important to mention that a key factor that will influence the future of MONUSCO is the attitude of the new president toward implementing rule of law, transparency and security in the country. Relations between MONUSCO and Kabila were often tense, so we will similarly have to monitor the new government’s attitude toward the UN mission.

MONUSCO Is Trying
To be fair, MONUSCO has attempted to improve the situation in the DRC. For example in May 2018, the UN mission inaugurated “several projects in support of victims of sexual exploitation and abuse” in the North Kivu area. On 17 January, a vocational training center project for ex-combatants and young people at risk was launched, which was funded by the UN mission. Additionally, “MONUSCO has provided support to the Ebola response since the beginning of the outbreak through the provision of logistical support, office facilities, transportation, communication, and security,” the World Health Organization explains.

Even more, MONUSCO personnel have lost their lives trying to make the African nation a better place. According to UN data, the mission has suffered 167 fatalities; in one incident this past November 2018, six Malawian and one Tanzanian peacekeepers, in addition to several FARDC troops, were killed in Beni territory, North Kivu, while carrying out joint operations against a rebel movement called Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).

Final Thoughts
It goes without saying that the UN Security Council will renew MONUSCO’s mandate for another year, however what is debatable is whether the UNSC will order a downsizing of the mission as a sign that it is time for MONUSCO to leave. Tragically, the country continues to face several challenges, including political instability. Thus, the weeks ahead will provide an idea of whether the DRC can have a peaceful transition of power and what this means for the future of the UN mission in the African nation.

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez is an analyst who focuses on geopolitical, military and cyber security issues. @W_Alex_Sanchez.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

Sunday, March 4, 2018

IPD: Venezuela’s Elections Re-scheduled, but Maduro To Remain in Power

"Venezuela’s Elections Re-scheduled, but Maduro To Remain in Power"
W. Alejandro Sanchez and Scott Morgan
International Policy Digest
4 March, 2018
Originally published: https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/03/04/venezuela-s-elections-re-scheduled-but-maduro-to-remain-in-power/


Venezuela’s national electoral commission, surprisingly announced on 1 March that the country’s general elections will now take place on 20 May, a month after their controversial original date: 22 April.

The original date had been critiqued for its alarmingly short 90-day window for participating political parties to prepare, which bore the hallmarks of an attempt to cement power by the Nicolas Maduro regime and a continuation of the “chavista” ideology that has been in power for almost two decades.

The decision to delay the elections was due to an agreement, between the Venezuelan government and a number of opposition parties, but not the main one – Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD), which had already declared that it would not participate. While in theory the extra month gives the participating opposition, parties-broadly speaking, more time to organize, the reality of the situation is that this development demonstrates the fractured Venezuelan opposition coalition.

According to El Mundo, there are right now six presidential candidates: President Maduro, four candidates that have ties with the government and the only true “opposition” candidate. Henri Falcon, of Unidad Democrática who has been shunned by other opposition parties for breaking rank. Thus, the affirming the overall consensus is that President Maduro will “win” another six-year term as President of Venezuela.

So one key question to be determined is: what happens on 21 May? Will President Maduro be emboldened to further consolidate power or will he make a gesture of conciliation to the opposition? And how will the international community, especially Venezuela’s neighbors, react?

Since he ascended to the Presidency after the passing of former President Hugo Chavez (March 2013), President Maduro has made several moves to consolidate power among his loyalists. These include eroding the power of the Congress not only so that he couldn’t be removed from office, and create a National Constituent Assembly to act as a Rubber Stamp for his policy initiatives. which body was installed to replace the opposition-controlled National Assembly. The Venezuelan government is also accused of forcing Opposition Mayors and Governors out of office (or coming up with reasons to prevent them from taking office).

Using this as some criteria there is no logical reason to expect any new round of talks that have taken place in the Dominican Republic will bear fruit. The postponement of the elections is a major development, no doubt, and Caracas has reportedly requested that the United Nations send a team of observers to monitor the elections. Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine that under current conditions any opposition presidential candidate has a real chance of emerging victorious. Likewise the President currently feels that he is in no position to formally make a gesture (i.e. dissolving the controversial National Constituent Assembly) that could end the impasse and begin the process of restoring Venezuela to political and economic stability.

Latin American and Caribbean countries remain somewhat split regarding what to do with Venezuela. On the one hand, Caracas does enjoy allies among the governments of Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua. On the other, the Lima Group (Grupo de Lima) is a loose union of several regional states that have met to consistently condemn the Maduro regime. In mid-February, the foreign affairs ministers of the Lima Group decided to withdraw president Maduro’s invitation to attend the VIII Summit of the Americas, which will take place in Lima in mid-April (a month before the elections in Venezuela, one may note).

US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson visited several Latin American nations in early February in order to gather hemispheric support against Venezuela, but the tour did not yield the desired outcome. Withdrawing President Maduro’s invitation to the Summit is an important diplomatic move, but the region in general does not want to see another war – for example a U.S. military intervention in Venezuela, a subject of a plethora of rumors in the region. It’s similarly unclear if regional states would want to also carry out some kind of sanctions against Venezuela. Colombia has closed its border with Venezuela in the past, only to reopen it.

Amid this internal and hemispheric catastrophe is a growing humanitarian one. As previously mentioned, the number of Venezuelan citizens (whether they should be called migrants or refugees is still up for debate) that are fleeing to Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Spain or the U.S. is now well over a million. Countries like Peru are giving temporary residency cards and validating university degrees so these individual can get jobs, but what of Venezuelans living in isolated border areas in Brazil and Colombia? If the exodus of Venezuelans continues, this will create a massive diaspora as well as a humanitarian crisis.

It has become virtually impossible to be optimistic about the future of Venezuela.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the authors are associated.


Tuesday, April 19, 2016

Living in Peru: Peruvian foreign policy will not change under next president


"Peruvian Foreign policy will not change under next President"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Opinion
Living in Peru
March 21, 2016
Originally published: http://www.peruthisweek.com/blogs-foreign-policy-elections-opinion-109088

The April 10 elections in Peru will not significantly alter the foreign policy of the Andean state, regardless of which candidate wins the presidency or which party (or coalition of parties) gains control of congress. Peruvian foreign policy for the past couple of decades has been fairly predictable and these elections will most likely not bring about major surprises.
Peru’s relations with the rest of the world are not a major issue to the Peruvian electorate; the hot topics of this election are improving internal security and the economy. Obviously, the latter issue has a lot to do with international commerce as the cornerstone of Peru’s growing economy over the past two decades has been the export of its natural resources (such as natural gas, minerals, oil and agricultural goods). Hence, it comes as no surprise that the main candidates have made similar promises, namely to maintain the current trade model. This will include cementing Peru’s role in the Pacific Alliance, a regional free trade bloc (along with Chile, Colombia and Mexico) as well as pushing for new free trade agreements, probably with India and Turkey. Additionally, the next congress will likely ratify the Trans Pacific Partnership which will open Asia Pacific markets to Peruvian goods.
When it comes to foreign policy itself, Peru is not a Latin American powerhouse, and it enjoys cordial relations with most of its neighbors. The only outstanding issue may be the future of the territorial dispute with Chile. Lima already had some success in a maritime dispute with its Southern neighbor via the 2014 ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Hence, the next head of state may see the ICJ as an option to solve this dispute as well.
Ultimately, while the Andean nation has witnessed its fair share of internal turmoil over the past decades, its foreign policy has remained generally constant. Arguably, Peru’s internal problems, such as terrorism in the 1980s or political instability in the 1990s due to the Fujimori dictatorship, did not allow the Andean country to focus on the outside world. Nevertheless, some foreign policy stances have been constant and will remain so. For example, Lima has been a close ally of Washington, and this will not change, particularly as the Peruvian government and security forces will look for U.S. support to combat drug trafficking.
It is worth noting that of the remaining presidential candidates, only a few have an extreme-left ideology. In theory, if one of them is elected, we could see a radical foreign policy change. This is already happening in Argentina, as new President Mauricio Macri is approaching Washington; this is an almost 180 degree turn when compared to the foreign policy of his predecessor, President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who was known to be a close friend of Russian President Vladimir Putin. As for Peru, in the 2006 elections then-candidate Ollanta Humala was defeated, in part, because he was regarded as a close friend of the late President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela and a follower of his socialist ideology. Nevertheless, the “extreme left” candidates are fairly down on the polls so unless a major surprise occurs in April, Peru’s relations with the global powers will generally remain unaltered. (The next head of state will likely continue to purchase Russian military equipment, which the Peruvian military is used to utilizing, but we will not see Russian bombers landing in Peru à la Venezuela in 2013).
On a personal note, I would like to see Peruvian presidential candidates address foreign policy. International commerce is an obvious issue, but there are other parts of the country’s foreign policy that should be discussed, such as the future of the Andean Community (which is headquartered in Lima), having a Peruvian citizen elected to head a major international organization (like UNASUR), the significance of Peru’s recent ratification of the Arms Trade Treaty or the future role of the Peruvian military in UN peacekeeping missions.
For over a decade, Peru has enjoyed significant economic growth. Unfortunately, this has not prompted Lima to have a more ambitious foreign policy – coincidentally, I discuss the steps that the Andean country can take to be more influential in regional geopolitics in a working paper for the Argentine think tank Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales entitled, Pax Inca: Why Peru is not a Regional Powerhouse in Latin America.
Hopefully Peru’s next president, whoever he or she may be, will be interested in boosting the country’s foreign policy.
You can follow W. Alejandro on Twiter @W_Alex_Sanchez

Interview: Peru’s election shake-up

"Peru's Election Shake-Up"
The Stream - Al Jazeera
March 14, 2016
Originally published: http://stream.aljazeera.com/story/201603111507-0025170





On Monday, March 14 at 19:30 GMT:

Julio Guzman and Cesar Acuna, two of Peru’s main presidential candidates, have been barred from participating in next month’s election after weeks of back and forth between various electoral boards. Guzman’s candidacy has been ruled ‘inadmissible’ because it was not registered in accordance with electoral procedures, while Acuna has been banned because of vote buying.

But it is the ruling on Guzman that is particularly controversial. Guzman, a relatively unknown economist until recently, emerged as the main challenger to frontrunner Keiko Fujimori in past few months. Many feel his removal from the race was political. Guzman himself slammed the decision, calling it “flagrantly illegal and unconstitutional.” But the National Jury of Elections struck down his candidacy on the grounds that he was not selected by his party, Everyone for Peru, through a legitimate internal election. Guzman plans to launch one last “extraordinary” appeal, but few expect it to be successful.

For Peruvians, this is the latest twist in an election where around 70 percent of voters were already dissatisfied with the candidates running. Guzman, on the other hand, appealed to 63 percent of voters who wanted a new figure, having cast himself as an outsider in a race full of familiar faces. Despite leading in the polls, Fujimori is opposed by many others who associate her with her father, a former president found guilty of human rights abuses in 2009. She has also been accused of vote buying. Other remaining candidates face controversies ranging from plagiarism to being on trial for murder.

So what’s next for Peru’s election, and how will the shake-up affect the race?

Joining this conversation:

Alejandro Sanchez @W_Alex_Sanchez
International Security Expert
wasanchez.blogspot.com

Francisco Sagasti @FSagasti
Everyone For Peru Party (Todos Por El Peru)
franciscosagasti.com

Raul Benavides @DiarioAltavoz
Co-Director, Diario Altavoz
altavoz.pe

Miklos Lukacs @mlukacs
Professor, Esan Graduate School of Business 
en.esan.edu.pe