"Atlantico: Brazil's New Carrier"
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
The Southern Tide
Center for International Maritime Security
16 October, 2018
Originally published: http://cimsec.org/atlantico-brazils-new-carrier/38351
Written by W. Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses
maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It
discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense
budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also
examines how these challenges influence current and future defense
strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.
“The
security environment in Latin America and the Caribbean is
characterized by complex, diverse, and non-traditional challenges to
U.S. interests.” –Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, U.S. Southern
Command, before the 114th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 10 March 2016.
By Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Brazil’s new helicopter carrier, PHM Atlantico (A 140), docked in Rio de Janeiro on 25 August 2018 after sailing across the Atlantic Ocean from Plymouth,
United Kingdom, its former home. The vessel is the new pride and joy of
the Brazilian Navy. However, apart from possessing an imposing
appearance, how is this vessel useful to Brazil?
The New Ship
Atlantico was formerly known as HMS Ocean (L 12), an amphibious assault ship that belonged to the British Royal Navy. It was commissioned in 1998 and decommissioned earlier this year. The Brazilian government purchased it for 84 million British pounds.
Among its characteristics the vessel displaces 21,000 tons, has a
length of 203 meters, a max speed of 21 knots, and a range of up to
8,000 miles. According to the Brazilian Navy, the vessel is equipped with four 30mm DS30M Mk2 guns, two 1007 radars, one 1008 radar, and one Artisan 3D 997 radar. Atlantico transports a crew of 303 with only one female naval officer, Captain Márcia Freitas, chief of the vessel’s medical department. The ship can also transport as many as 800 marines.
“It’s a new ship, in good condition. It can be operational for 20 to 30
years,” declared Brazilian Admiral Luiz Roberto Valicente to the Brazilian daily Estadao.
Atlantico
can transport as many as 18 helicopters, but it is still unclear which
type of aircraft the Brazilian Navy will deploy aboard its new vessel.
On 5 September, the Brazilian aerospace company Helibras, a division of
Airbus, tweeted a photo of H225M helicopters landing on the deck of Atlantico, hinting that these types of aircraft could be deployed on the new carrier. Additionally, the Estadao article declared that the carrier is compatible with all the models of helicopters currently operated by the Brazilian Navy.
It is worth noting that this is the third carrier that the Brazilian Navy has operated. Atlantico replaces the Clemencau-class carrier Sao Paulo (A 12), which was decommissioned in 2017. Previously, Brazil operated a Colossus-class aircraft carrier Minas Gerais (A 11), which was decommissioned in 2001.
Why Does Brazil Need a Carrier?
The
standard explanation out of Brasilia for the purchase of the helicopter
carrier is that it will help protect Brazil’s exclusive economic zone,
which is rich with maritime resources such as fish and oil deposits. Moreover, in an interview with the Brazilian defense news website Defesanet, Capitan Giovani Corrêa, commander of Atlantico,
explained that with the addition of the carrier, “the Navy will have a
platform with dissuasive capabilities [which will help the] control of
vast maritime areas…will help maintain security in the South Atlantic
and…will protect Brazil at the international level.”
The
statement about “dissuasive capabilities” raises the question of which
nation could possibly attack Brazil in the first place. The country last
fought an inter-state war when it deployed an expeditionary force to
Europe to fight alongside the Allies during World War II. Even more,
when it comes to conflicts with neighboring states, the last war that
Brazil participated in was the Acre War (1899-1903) with Bolivia.
Additionally,
it is important to mention that Latin American geopolitics are fairly
stable these days (the situation in Venezuela notwithstanding), which
means that the rest of the region does not view Brazil’s recent
acquisition, or its similarly ambitious submarine and corvette programs,
with concern. In other words, there have been no apparent moves by
regional navies to upgrade their own defenses in response to the
acquisition of Atlantico. Latin America is not experiencing an
arms race these days and Brasilia’s relations with its neighbors are
fairly cordial, which effectively rules out the hypothesis of a regional
state attempting to obtain control of Brazilian waters by force.
Thus,
apart from patrolling Brazil’s territorial waters looking for
non-traditional threats (such as illegal fishing, drug trafficking, or
piracy), what other duties will Atlantico perform? In the aforementioned
interview, Captain Corrêa suggested the carrier could be used to support humanitarian operations and as a command and control center
for a task force. This raises the hypothesis that the ship could be
deployed to United Nations peacekeeping operations. One likely candidate
is the UN Interim Force in Lebanon, which has a naval component, the
Maritime Task Force. Brazil regularly deploys a vessel to this naval
force – the current ship there is the frigate Liberal (F 43). Hence, Atlantico
could similarly be deployed to the Mediterranean to serve as a command
center, should the task force attempt to carry out a major operation
there.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for Brasilia, Atlantico will give the Brazilian Navy true blue water capability. That was the main purpose of the previous carrier, Sao Paulo, but the vessel spent more time docked and undergoing repairs than at sea, so hopefully for Brazil, Atlantico will perform much better.
Final Thoughts
The acquisition of the helicopter carrier Atlantico, alongside the PROSUB submarine program and the Tamandare corvette program, are examples of the Brazilian Navy aiming to become a true blue water navy in the 21st century.
Domestically speaking, Brazil has little to fear about a conflict with a neighboring state, but Atlantico, should it perform better than its predecessor Sao Paulo, will be of great help to project the image of the marinha do Brasil well past the South Atlantic.
Wilder
Alejandro Sanchez is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military
and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on
Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez.
The
views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do
not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author
is associated.
Showing posts with label carrier. Show all posts
Showing posts with label carrier. Show all posts
Wednesday, October 17, 2018
Tuesday, April 11, 2017
CIMSEC: THE DEMOBILIZATION OF LATIN AMERICA’S ONLY CARRIER: BRAZIL’S NAE SAO PAULO
"The Demobilization of Latin America's Only Carrier: Brazil's NAE Sao Paulo"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
The Southern Tide
Center for International Maritime Security
April 3, 2017http://cimsec.org/demobilization-latin-americas-carrier-brazils-nae-sao-paulo/31365
W. Alejandro Sanchez
The Southern Tide
Center for International Maritime Security
April 3, 2017http://cimsec.org/demobilization-latin-americas-carrier-brazils-nae-sao-paulo/31365
The Southern Tide
Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.
“The security environment in Latin America and the Caribbean is characterized by complex, diverse, and non-traditional challenges to U.S. interests.” Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the 114th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 10 March 2016.
By W. Alejandro Sanchez
On 14 February, the Brazilian Navy announced that it will suspend the modernization of carrier NAe Sao Paulo (A12) and commence its demobilization and subsequent decommissioning. Oddly, the news is simultaneously surprising and unsurprising at the same time. The Brazilian Navy regarded the extension of the carrier’s operational life as one of its priorities, however, ongoing technical difficulties and rising costs have made it more feasible to get rid of it than to extend its service life. As Brazil is the only Latin American country that possesses an aircraft carrier, its decommissioning must be properly discussed in terms of regional geopolitics.
A Brief History
Brazil has possessed two carriers: the first one was NAe Minas Gerais (A11), a Colossus-class vessel that served in the Brazilian Navy from 1960 to 2001. The vessel, formerly known as HMSVengeance (R71), was constructed by the United Kingdom during World War II and sold to the South American nation in 1956.
Minas Gerais was replaced by Sao Paulo, a Clemencau-type French carrier formerly known as Foch (F99). The vessel was constructed in the late 1950s and Brazil purchased it in 2000 in a deal reportedly worth USD 12 million; it arrived in the country in 2001.Sao Paulo reportedly displaces 32,800 thousand tons, is 265 meters in length, and its air wing is constituted of A-4 Skyhawk aircraft. Sao Paulo was an important component in the training of Brazil’s naval pilots, and it also participated in exercises with countries like Argentina. However, it also spent time docked undergoing repairs and upgrades.
The French shipyard Direction dês Constructions Navales et Services (DCNS) announced in December 2013 that it had “performed a ship check on the forward catapult” of Sao Paulo. On November 2015, IHS Jane’s reported that cracks had been found in the hull of the carrier, but the Brazilian Navy denied the report. Unfortunately, there were also deadly accidents aboard the platform: a May 2004 fire in the engine room killed three crew members. A second fire on February 2012 killed sailor Carlos Alexandre dos Santos Oliveira.
Demobilization Plans
The Navy’s decision to demobilize the platform is a slight surprise to the author of this commentary, who just this past Septemberquoted the Brazilian Navy’s commander saying otherwise. At the time, the author asked Admiral Eduardo Leal Ferreira, commander of the Brazilian Navy, a question about Sao Paulo’s future at an on-the-record event at the National Bureau of Asian Research on 26 September, 2016. The Admiral explained that “we are working with DCNS to find a technical solution to have its propulsion system renewed.” Moreover, the Admiral listed the carrier as the third of the navy’s priorities, after the submarine program (PROSUB) and the construction of the Tamandare-class corvettes. What a difference a few months can make.
The Brazilian Navy’s communiqué explains the reasoning behind the decision to demobilize the carrier: upgrading it signifies “a high financial investment, there are technical issues and [the process will] require an extended period [of time].” The modernization process apparently could have taken a decade, by which time the AF-1 group would have to be retired, making it necessary to buy a new air wing suitable for the old ship. In an e-mail interview with this author, Professor Mauricio Santoro, a political scientist and assistant professor at the department of international relations of the State University of Rio de Janeiro, adds that “the explanation for this decision is the deep financial crisis that the Brazilian government is facing, with austerity measures being implemented as well as the expense cuts in many public policies.” In other words, given the scarce use of Sao Paulo and the expensive requirements needed to extend its operational life into the late 2030s, it is not surprising that the platform is being scrapped. According to the Navy, the process will require three years.
With that said, the Brazilian Navy is already looking past Sao Pauloand maintains the aim of having a carrier in its fleet. Theaforementioned 14 February communiqué explains that a new carrier remains the Navy’s third priority after PROSUB and the corvettes as “obtaining a new carrier will be substantially cheaper than modernizing Sao Paulo.”
This statement raises questions like: will Brasilia once again acquired a used platform, or will it embark on the more ambitious, but probably more costly, goal of manufacturing a new one? In recent years there have been occasional reports that DCNS has offered its PA2/CVF carrier project to Brazil to eventually replaceSao Paulo. We will have to wait and see how the Navy’s medium- and long-term plans are affected by recent developments. It is likely that Sao Paulo will be replaced eventually since, as Professor Santoro explains, “the importance of a carrier to Brazil has been highlighted in every major policy document of the Armed Forces, such as the National Defence Strategy.”
A Carrier-less Brazil and Latin America?
In previous CIMSEC analyses (e.g. How Peaceful is the South Atlantic?) the author discussed the generally calm South Atlantic geopolitics, which can be expanded to calm Latin American and Caribbean in general. There certainly are still some maritime border disputes and occasional incidents, but the region has been free of inter-state warfare for decades (the last regional war with a maritime theater of operations was the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War). Moreover, Brazil enjoys cordial relations with its neighbors, hence the Brazilian Navy probably does not require a carrier to protect its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
Nevertheless, the Brazilian Navy and several scholars and experts do believe in the necessity of having an aircraft carrier. “Brazil has thousands of miles of coastline, major offshore oil reserves, and more of 90 percent of its foreign trade comes from the sea, hence a carrier is an important tool for naval and foreign policy, as it serves both as a deterrent and helps naval forces in the open sea, among other activities,” Professor Santoro notes. Additionally, a carrier would help Brazil’s power projection, demonstrating to the world that it has a blue water navy.
The Sao Paulo’s usefulness would likely be different if it had proved to be a global asset. For example, Sao Paulo could have been deployed to peacekeeping missions that Brazil participates in, such as the UN mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) or the UN mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The platform would have been a welcomed addition to the multinational humanitarian operations in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake and the aftermath of Hurricane Matthew in 2016.

As previously mentioned, Brazil is the only Latin American that has a carrier nowadays. The only other regional country to possess one was neighboring Argentina: the ARA Independencia (V1) and then the ARA 25 de Mayo (V2), a Colossus-class carrier decommissioned in 1997. In fact, other Latin American navies are turning to smaller platforms, particularly oceanic patrol vessels (OPVs) given their maritime security challenges.
Should Brazil eventually acquire a new carrier, this will hardly affect regional geopolitics. Brasilia enjoys cordial relations with its immediate neighbors and the Western Hemisphere in general. This is best exemplified by the fact that the PROSUB project, which includes constructing a nuclear-powered submarine, has not triggered a regional arms race to deter an “imperialist” Brazil.
Final Thoughts
By the end of the decade, carrier Sao Paulo’s time in the Brazilian Navy will come to an end, leaving behind a lackluster record. The vessel spent too much time in port undergoing repairs, and when it was out at sea, it was for standard training missions, never participating in a defining operation that validated its acquisition. Moreover, Brazil likely does not need a carrier to protect its EEZ from neighboring nations, Latin American geopolitics being what they are, as compared to a large fleet of OPVs (the Tamandare corvettes will probably fulfill this role). Nevertheless, Brazilian experts, as well as the Navy, do regard the carrier as an important component of their maritime defense system as well as a critical platform to project Brazilian naval power.
Should Brazil eventually obtain a new carrier, this hypothetical platform should participate in multinational naval operations, such as Operation Atalanta in the Horn of Africa to combat piracy. The carrier could be utilized as a launching pad and an at-sea command center for humanitarian missions akin to the Operation Unified Assistance, in which the Carrier Strike Group Nine, led by U.S. carrier Abraham Lincoln, helped Asia Pacific nations after the2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. In other words, if the Brazilian Navy continues to regard a new carrier as a priority, while arguably unnecessary for traditional defense purposes, such a platform can be utilized for various helpful initiatives around the globe.
Alejandro Sanchez Nieto is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez
The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.
Thursday, June 4, 2015
Blouin: World: Brazil eyes open seas with new carrier
"Brazil eyes open seas with new carrier"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Blouin Beat: World
June 4, 2015
Originally published: http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatworld/2015/06/04/brazil-eyes-open-seas-with-new-carrier/
Without a doubt, a prime example of obscure Latin American military hardware has to be the Sao Paulo (A-12), Brazil’s carrier. The vessel originally served in the French Navy under the name Foch from 1960 until 2000, when it was acquired by the Brazilians. The Clemencau-type carrier can hold “up to 37 fixed-wing aircraft” in addition to helicopters.
That’s correct: Brazil has a carrier in its navy, but the vessel appears to have spent more time in a dock being repaired than in the open seas flying the Brazilian flag. However, luck may be finally changing for the aging vessel. The Brazilian Navy is renovating the carrier in order to extend its operational life – a measure spurred in large part by the Texas-based company, Zentech.
In early May, Zentech was contracted to aid in the carrier’s repair, including “the creation of 3D models to accurately map the results of the vessel’s hull gauging for further detailed analytical work, and ultimately providing recommendations regarding steel replacement.” According toZentech’s website, it has signed a five-year maintenance support program with Brazil. Another company contracted to repair the carrier is the French shipbuilding company DCNS, which was hired a couple of years ago to inspect the carrier’s forward catapult.
The Brazilian Navy is focused on maintaining the carrier as its flagship, and its current goal is to expand the Sao Paulo’s operational life until the mid-2020s, when a new carrier will be acquired. In recent years, there have been numerous reports about Brazil’s next carrier (the third in the country’s history), many of which hint that Brasilia may obtain a carrier from the aforementionedDCNS, dubbed Project PA2. This would be a logical decision as the Brazilian Navy has developed a close relationship with France, best exemplified by the French assisting in the construction of Brazil’s nuclear-powered submarine.
That said, the remaining question is evident — what does Brazil needs a carrier for? The usual argument by Brazilian defense officials is that the country’s navy needs a strong fleet (led by a carrier and/or a nuclear-powered submarine) in order to protect the country’s maritime resources, particularly its off-shore oil fields. But the problem with this argument is that it is difficult to imagine any Latin American country posing a plausible national security threat to Brazil in the immediate future.
Another possibility is that once the Sao Paulo is operational again, it may be deployed to participate in multinational operations overseas. This would not only add pedigree to the Brazilian Navy but also put the carrier to good use.
This is not a far-fetched scenario as, at the time of this writing, the Spanish-based defense news agency Infodefensa.com has reported that the Chilean Navy could send a warship to the Horn of Africa to help the European Union Naval Force’s Operation Atalanta. Its objective is to crack down on piracy off the coast of Somalia. The author of this analysis has not been able to find other sources that confirm this rumor; nevertheless, the idea that a Latin American warship could operate off the African coast is an intriguing scenario.
When the Sao Paulo is up and running, the Brazilian Navy will need a clear plan of how it is going to be utilized for the decade or so that will remain of its operational life. Here, deploying the vessel on multinational operations to combat transnational crimes is a valid option that merits further discussion. But for now, we will have to wait and see how the Brazilian Navy, along with companies like France’s DCNS and the recently hired Zentech, advance in repairing the Sao Paulo for its final tour of duty.
Friday, February 14, 2014
Blouin Beat: Politics - Brazil’s left rises as USS Forrestal nears the end
Brazil's left rises as USS Forrestal nears the end
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Blouin Beat: Politics
February 13, 2014
Originally published: http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatpolitics/2014/02/13/brazils-left-rises-as-uss-forrestal-nears-the-end/
The aircraft supercarrier USS Forrestal departed Feb. 4 from Philadelphia for Texas, a trip that will take approximately 17 days. This is to be the vessel’s final voyage: it will be dismantled upon arriving in Brownsville, after 38 years of service in the U.S. Navy. A Texas scrap company, All Star Metals, reportedly bought the supercarrier from the Navy for one cent (not a typo).
The legacy of the Forrestal will be felt in Latin America, as the carrier was part of a fleet sent by the U.S. government to support a military coup in Brazil in 1964. At the time, then-President Lyndon B. Johnson deployed the Forrestal off the coast of Brazil as part of Operation Brother Sam. The goal was to support a military coup against then-President Joao Goulart. (The military officers who staged Goulart’s overthrow suspected the Brazilian leader of having communist sympathies.) The coup occurred on March 31 of that year and was successful and largely bloodless — though it also initiated a military regime in the Portuguese-speaking giant that lasted from 1964 until 1985.
Upon coming to power, the military began a brutal crackdown on left-leaning entities. One group worth noting was the Comando de Liberacao Nacional (COLINA; National Liberation Command), a small militant movement that had branches in the Brazilian states of Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro. When the group was disbanded under the pressure of the clampdown, various members fled into the arms of a bigger guerrilla group, the VAR Palmares. One member of both movements was a young woman named Dilma Rousseff, Brazil’s current president, and in 1970, while a member of VAR Palmares, she was arrested (and tortured) by the Brazilian military .
Predictably, U.S. media have focused on the more palatable aspects of the Forrestal’s history. It was in standby mode during the Suez Canal crisis of 1956. The warship also aided in evacuatingU.S. citizens from Cyprus during a 1974 conflict between Turkish and Greek Cypriot forces in the Mediterranean island. Tragedy struck the Forrestal in July 1967 when it was operating in the Gulf of Tonkin, off Vietnam’s coast. An accident started a fire that killed 132 sailors and injured over a hundred more. Coincidentally, Lt. Cmdr John McCain, Republican Senator from Arizona and the 2008 GOP presidential nominee, was aboard at the time. (That last fact has been a real sop to the American press corps.) In Brazil, as might be imagined, the coverage is sparser and darker. Consider this opening sentence of a January 7 article in the website of the Brazilian news agency Folha de Sao Paulo: “…the major symbol of Washington’s support for the 1964 coup, the [Forrestal] will be scrapped.”
The Forrestal’s role in Brazilian history may be a small anecdote in the warship’s distinguished decades of service. But 40 years ago this supercarrier and its support vessels were a larger-than-life demonstration of American military might and how far Washington was willing to go to protect its interests in the Western Hemisphere. The fact that the warship will now be scrapped as a left-wing “ex-guerrilla” (as Rousseff was first labeled when she came to power in 2010) sits in office as (and will likely be re-elected) Brazil’s president reveals how substantially power dynamics in the region have shifted since then.
Sunday, February 2, 2014
COHA: Brazil Upgrades its Sao Paulo Carrier
Brazil Upgrades its Sao Paulo Carrier
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Research
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
January 31, 2014
Originally published: http://www.coha.org/coha-research-brazil-upgrades-its-sao-paulo-carrier/
An obscure fact of Latin American military affairs is that the Brazilian Navy possesses its own aircraft carrier. The vessel, now five decades old, is currently undergoing repairs so that it can serve for at least a decade more. Nevertheless, given the fast pace of South American geopolitics and geosecurity affairs, serious questions should be raised whether or not Brazil actually needs a carrier in its fleet.
The Carrier
Brazil acquired its carrier from France in November 2000: the vessel is a non-nuclear, 36,000 ton, Clemenceau-type carrier, which was constructed in the early 1960s.The carrier, originally known as the Foch while it flew the French flag, “entered the dry-dock stage in Saint-Nazaire in 1957 and was launched three years later. It was towed to the Brest arsenal for completion. It entered active service in 1963 and ceased to be armed by the French Navy in 2000, when the Charles de Gaulle CVN came into service.” [1]
When it was sold to Brazil, the Foch was renamed as Sao Paulo. It is worth noting that the Sao Paulo replaced Brazil’s other carrier, the Minas Gerais, which was launched by England during World War II (then known as the HMS Vengeance). The Minas Gerais served for 41 years in the Brazilian Navy starting in 1960 until it was decommissioned in 2001. [2]
The website MilitaryFactory.com provides some additional details about the Sao Paulo, explaining that it “showcases a typical Western aircraft profile with a flat, unobstructed flight deck and starboard, … her deck allows for the launching of two fixed-wing aircraft simultaneously.” [3] The massive vessel has an overall length of 869 feet and is able to make headway at a top speed of 32 knots. According to details that have been released, the carrier has a crew of over 1,900 sailors. [4] As for the aircraft that it transports, a December 2013 press release by the French shipbuilder DCNS, which is currently upgrading the Sao Paulo, says that the Brazilian warship has 18 Douglas A-4 Sky Hawk warplanes. [5] Meanwhile, a December 2012 note in Brazilian news agency R7 explains that the carrier also has Super Puma transport helicopters and Esquilo light helicopters. [6] Tragically, the Sao Paulo has not served in the Brazilian Navy without incidents, as on-board fires in 2005 and 2012 killed and injured a number of sailors. [7]
The Sao Paulo is the only carrier currently in use by a Latin American Navy. Nevertheless, COHA has been unable to unearth information on the types of operations this carrier has been involved in during the decade that it has been flying the Brazilian flag. An analysis in the website WarisBoring.com explains that the Sao Paulo has participated in naval exercises, such as sailing with a U.S. carrier, the USS Ronald Reagan. [8] Additionally Argentine warplanes have occasionally landed on the Brazilian carrier, which serves as a confidence-building initiative between the naval forces of the two neighboring states. [9]
Upgrade
It would appear that the Brazilian Navy has plans for the aging Sao Paulo. In early January 2014, the Spanish news agency Infodefensa.com reported that the French shipbuilding company DCNS had been asked by the Brazilian Navy to inspect the Sao Paulo’s forward catapult. The repairs to the Sao Paulo began in November 2013 at a naval base in Rio de Janeiro. [10]
Regarding the rehabilitation of the Brazilian warship, a December 2013 press release by DCNS explains that “the steam catapult, which already performed over 5000 launches, is a key element for the aircraft carrier capability.” [11] The French company has praised itself for its work on modernizing the Sao Paulo as it also reported that “after the team’s intervention, the catapult was dry-fired twice, demonstrating the expected performance. The Brazilian authorities expressed satisfaction.” [12]
Brazil’s Evolving Military and Geopolitics
Thanks to its strong economy over the past decade, the Brazilian armed forces are carrying out important arms purchases which will help the Portuguese-speaking giant consolidate itself as Latin America’s foremost military power.
Throughout the past decades, COHA has written several comprehensive reports on Brazil’s military and its arms acquisitions – we will enumerate just a few of the more prominent examples here. Apart from the Sao Paulo’s upgrades, the Brazilian Navy is constructing a nuclear-powered submarine, with French aid. The submarine has been a dream of the Navy since the country’s 1964-1985 military regime. [13] Paris is also helping Brazil to build four diesel-electric submarines, variants of the French Scorpene design. [14]
Meanwhile, the Brazilian Air Force is getting a revamp as Brasilia has already selected, after several years of negotiations, the Gripen (produced by the Swedish company Saab) as its new warplane. For years, analysts such as those posted at COHA believed that the Brazilian government would choose the Rafale warplane produced by the Swedish Dassault. But in December 2013 Brasilia ultimately chose the Swedish model. [15] Brazil will purchase 36 Gripen warplanes in a deal reported to be worth around $4.5 billion USD. As for the Brazilian Army, it has purchased Shorad missiles to upgrade its arsenal. The missiles will be used to protect the skies of the cities that will host the upcoming 2014 FIFA World Cup. [16]
It is worth noting that defense-related foreign dignitaries regularly travel to Brazil to lobby the Dilma Rousseff government in an effort to persuade it to buy more weaponry. For example, the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu travelled to Brasilia in October 2013 to discuss the sales of the Pantsir-S1 and Igla missile system, a deal which if agreed upon in the coming months, could be worth up to $1 billion. [17] Meanwhile, French President Francois Hollande visited Brazil this past December 2013 to convince the Brazilian government to purchase the Dassault warplanes – an unsuccessful visit as Brasilia chose the Swedish Gripen.
This is not to say that other nations in the Western Hemisphere have not also acquired new military equipment over the past decade. For example, the Venezuelan military has also spent billions of dollars to upgrade its own military, mostly by turning to Russia as a major weapons supplier. [18] Nevertheless, as the Russian media even admits, Russia-Venezuela military relations in the post-Hugo Chávez have not been particularly ideal for business. An October 2013 commentary in the Russian news agency Pravda explains, “All major contracts were tied to late president Hugo Chávez . After his death, against the backdrop of complications of the socio-economic situation in the country, defense cooperation with Russia actually came to a standstill … new Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro is not ready to agree on new [contracts].” [19]
Threats?
The aforementioned article by MilitaryFactory.com concludes, “the Sao Paulo remains a critical cog to Brazilian Navy operations in the region, both for stability and in power across Atlantic-facing South American and Latin American waters. For any modern naval power, the aircraft carrier is the heart and soul of the fleet.” [20]
But does Brazil actually need a carrier? Certainly such a vessel is an example of a naval power as it helps Brazil’s Navy increase its power projection or powers. Rising global powers such as China acquire carriers in order to assert themselves as global naval powers. [21] On the other hand, other nations that already possess these gigantic warships are suffering from an economic crunch and are re-organizing their armed forces. An example of this is the British military, which plans to eliminate some 20 thousand military personnel across the three branches over the next years, including 6,000 sailors. [22] The British Navy is developing two new carriers, the HMS Queen Elizabeth and the HMS Prince of Wales, but they have stirred controversy because of high costs and the reduction of naval personnel.
As for Brazil, the country is largely devoid of any major security threats that would make a compelling case for its Navy to have a carrier (or plan for a new one within the coming decade). Relations between Brazil and Venezuela during the Hugo Chávez presidency were rarely troubling and commerce was a strong confidence building mechanism to prevent tensions from escalating. [23] Furthermore, in late 2013, there was a major air force exercise in northern Brazil in which several Western Hemisphere air forces participated, including the U.S. and Venezuela. [24]
Moreover, it would be bizarre to believe that a carrier is needed for protection against some of Brazil’s smaller neighbors like Guyana, Suriname or Uruguay. Likewise, relations with Peru and Colombia are generally cordial, with this being reflected in the inter-agency cooperation against transnational criminal activity like drug trafficking. [25] Furthermore, while Argentina was once a serious contender to Brazil’s military role in Latin America, today the Argentine armed forces is a fragment of what it once was. (We do not count Bolivia and Paraguay in this analysis since, even though both nations border Brazil, neither possesses sea access).
One argument for a naval build up could be that the carrier and nuclear-powered submarine will help safeguard Brazil’s coast, specially its off-shore oil platforms. The government has sold oil blocs to international oil companies, a move that Brazilian oil workers protested against in 2013. [26] It should be noted that also in 2013 the Brazilian Navy has also acquired three Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) for protecting its ports and oil platforms from the British manufacturing giant BAE Systems. [27] Certainly, an argument can be made that the Brazilian Navy needs even more vessels to protect its coastal and off-shore installations; but which country or criminal network will want to attack them is far from clear.
As a final point, it is true that a carrier helps a nation’s naval stature, but the vessel also needs to take part in some kind of naval maneuver in order to showcase that it is operational and helpful. Military exercises with other navies are a good example of this. But one could wonder if the Sao Paulo, once it is operational again and before it is retired, could end up being used as a support vessel for some multinational security operation, either as part of the United Nations or some international coalition combating piracy off the coast of Somalia.
Conclusions
Reporting on the Gripen warplane deal this past December 19, 2013 the defense news website Defense Industry Daily explained that the Brazilian Navy “intends to buy 24 fighters of its own, to operate from the carrier that replaces Nae Sao Paulo beginning in 2025.” [28] Both an April 29, 2013 article in Defense Industry Daily as well as an April 2013 article a Brazilian website called Defesa Aerea & Naval also mention rumors that a new aircraft carrier currently being developed by the aforementioned DCNS (the project is called PA 2) may be sold to Brazil as France is no longer interested in acquiring it. [29]
It is likely that the Sao Paulo will retire within the next decade. This is logical since the vessel is already over 50 years old and it may prove to be more costly to constantly upgrade and repair it instead of buying a new one. Whether Brazil actually needs a carrier, be it the Sao Paulo or a new one ten years from now, remains a highly debatable issue. A case can be made that the carrier can help protect Brazil’s extensive maritime interests, but it is doubtful that the country will face any conceivable major security threats, i.e. a war with another nation, in the near future. Brazil’s carrier may be one of the least well known and used strategic assets in Latin American military history and in the future.
W. Alejandro Sanchez, Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs.
Please accept this article as a free contribution from COHA, but if re-posting, please afford authorial and institutional attribution. Exclusive rights can be negotiated.
For additional news and analysis on Latin America, please go to: LatinNews.com and Rights Action
References
[1] “Sao Paulo catapult: A DCNS team on the bridge of the Brazilian aircraft carrier.” DCNS Group. Press Release. December 20, 2013.http://en.dcnsgroup.com/2013/12/20/catapulte-du-porte-avions-s%C3%A3o-paulo-les-%C3%A9quipes-de-dcns-sur-le-pont-du-porte-avions-br%C3%A9silien/
[2] Rob Schleiffert and CorneRodenburg. “Sao Paulo rules the Waves.” Naval AviationNews. September-October 2003. P. 14 -19.http://www.history.Navy.mil/nan/backissues/2000s/2003/so03/brazil.pdf
[3] “NAe Sao Paulo (A12) Conventionally-Powered Aircraft Carrier.”MilitaryFactory.com. January 15, 2014. http://www.militaryfactory.com/ships/detail.asp?ship_id=NAe-Sao-Paulo
[4] “NAe Sao Paulo (A12) Conventionally-Powered Aircraft Carrier.”MilitaryFactory.com. January 15, 2014. http://www.militaryfactory.com/ships/detail.asp?ship_id=NAe-Sao-Paulo
[5] “Sao Paulo catapult: A DCNS team on the bridge of the Brazilian aircraft carrier.” DCNS Group. Press Release. December 20, 2013.http://en.dcnsgroup.com/2013/12/20/catapulte-du-porte-avions-s%C3%A3o-paulo-les-%C3%A9quipes-de-dcns-sur-le-pont-du-porte-avions-br%C3%A9silien/ Also see: Alexandre Galante. “DCNS realize verificacao da catapulta de vante do porta-avioes ‘Sao Paulo.’” Poder Naval. December 26, 2013.http://www.naval.com.br/blog/2013/12/26/dcns-realiza-verificacao-da-catapulta-de-vante-do-porta-avioes-sao-paulo/
[6] “Marinha do Brasil tem porta-avioes, submarino e ate tanque de guerra que vira barco.” R7 Noticias. Forcas Armadas. September 5, 2012.http://noticias.r7.com/brasil/fotos/marinha-do-brasil-tem-porta-avioes-submarino-e-ate-tanque-de-guerra-que-vira-barco-20120905-14.html#fotos
[7]“Explosion kills one in Brazilian aircraft carrier.” Xinhua.net. May 18, 2005. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-05/18/content_2968613.htm Also see: Michael Hone. “Aircraft Sao Paulo hit by Fire.” BrazilDispatch.com. February 22, 2012.http://www.brazildispatch.com/2012/02/aircraft-carrier-sao-paulo-hit-by-fire.html
[8]David Axe. “Your Aircraft is a piece of Crap.” WarIsBoring.com (Medium.org). October 24, 2013. https://medium.com/war-is-boring/f3f52d299588
[9] David Axe. “Your Aircraft is a piece of Crap.” WarIsBoring.com (Medium.org). October 24, 2013. https://medium.com/war-is-boring/f3f52d299588
[10]“DCNS prueba el estado de la catapulta del portaaviones brasileno Sao Paulo.”Infodefensa.com. January 2, 2014.http://www.infodefensa.com/latam/2014/01/02/noticia-prueba-estado-catapulta-portaaviones-brasileno-paulo.html
[11]“Sao Paulo catapult: A DCNS team on the bridge of the Brazilian aircraft carrier.” DCNS Group. Press Release. December 20, 2013.http://en.dcnsgroup.com/2013/12/20/catapulte-du-porte-avions-s%C3%A3o-paulo-les-%C3%A9quipes-de-dcns-sur-le-pont-du-porte-avions-br%C3%A9silien/
[12] “Sao Paulo catapult: A DCNS team on the bridge of the Brazilian aircraft carrier.” DCNS Group. Press Release. December 20, 2013.http://en.dcnsgroup.com/2013/12/20/catapulte-du-porte-avions-s%C3%A3o-paulo-les-%C3%A9quipes-de-dcns-sur-le-pont-du-porte-avions-br%C3%A9silien/
[13]W. Alejandro Sanchez. “Lula wants his yellow submarine.” Report. Council on Hemispheric Affairs. October 26, 2007. http://www.coha.org/lula-wants-his-yellow-submarine/
[14] “Brazil & France in Deal for SSKs, SSN.” Defense Industry Daily. April 11, 2013.http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/brazil-france-in-deal-for-ssks-ssn-05217/
[15] W. Alejandro Sanchez. “Brazil’s warplane of choice not a Saab story for France.”Blouin Beat: Politics. December 19, 2013.
[16] “Brasil compra sistemas antiaereos Shorad para proteger el Mundial de Futbol.”Infodefensa.com. January 3, 2014.http://www.infodefensa.com/latam/2014/01/03/noticia-brasil-compra-sistemas-antiaereos-shorad-proteger-mundial-futbol.html
[17] W. Alejandro Sanchez and Ian Kowalski. “Weapons Diplomacy: Russian Defense Minister skips Venezuela during Latin American tour.” Research. Council on Hemispheric Affairs. November 11, 2013. http://www.coha.org/weapons-diplomacy-russian-defense-minister-skips-venezuela-during-latin-american-tour/
[18] “Venezuela ranked top importer of Russian arms.” RIA Novosti. December 27, 2011. http://en.ria.ru/world/20111227/170519145.html
[19] “Russia continues to conquer arms market of South America.” Pravda. October 9, 2013. http://english.pravda.ru/business/companies/09-10-2013/125848-russia_south_america-0/
[20] “NAe Sao Paulo (A12) Conventionally-Powered Aircraft Carrier.”MilitaryFactory.com. January 15, 2014. http://www.militaryfactory.com/ships/detail.asp?ship_id=NAe-Sao-Paulo
[21] “China building second aircraft carrier: reports.” Reuters. January 18, 2014.http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/19/us-china-carrier-idUSBREA0I02C20140119
[22] Patrick Wintour. “Defense cuts ‘threaten UK military partnership with the U.S.’” Defense Policy. The Guardian (UK). January 16, 2014.http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/jan/16/defence-cuts-uk-military-partnership-us-robert-gates Also see: Nick Hopkins. “Royal Navy says huge size of its new aircraft carrier will be a deterrent.” Royal Navy. The Guardian (UK). September 19, 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/sep/19/royal-Navy-aircraft-carrier-deterrent
[23] “Global Insider: Brazil-Venezuela relations.” World Politics Review. March 9, 2011.http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/8135/global-insider-brazil-venezuela-relations
[24] “South America’s major military air exercise takes off in north Brazil.”Mercopress.com. November 5, 2013. http://en.mercopress.com/2013/11/05/south-america-s-major-military-air-exercise-takes-off-in-the-north-of-brazil
[25] “Peru, Bolivia y Brazil reforzaran cooperacion anti-drogas.” Andina (Peru). November 14, 2012. http://www.andina.com.pe/espanol/noticia-peru-bolivia-y-brasil-reforzaran-cooperacion-antidrogas-435912.aspx#.Ut6b9c4o5QI
[26] Jeb Blount. “Protests, strike against big Brazil oil auction expand.” Reuters. October 18, 2013. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/18/brazil-oil-protests-idUKL1N0I80V620131018
[27] Grant Turnbull. “Rethinking Defense: Naval modernization in Latin America.”Naval-Technology.com. October 28, 2013. http://www.naval-technology.com/features/feature-rethinking-defence-naval-modernisation-south-america/
[28] “F-X2: Brazil Picks Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen-NG over Rafale, Super Hornet.”Defense Industry Daily. December 19, 2013.http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/brazil-embarking-upon-f-x2-fighter-program-04179/
[29] “France’s PA2/CVF Carrier Project: Stalled in the Water.” Defense Industry Daily. April 29, 2013. http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/france-steaming-ahead-on-pa2cvf-carrier-project-01621/ . Also see: Luiz Padilha. “PA2: Projeto de porta avioes frances parado na Agua.” Defesa Aerea & Naval. April 30, 2013.http://www.defesaaereanaval.com.br/?p=18863
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