Shephard Media: Metal Shark makes programme progress for Caribbean navies

 

"Metal Shark makes programme progress for Caribbean navies"

Wilder Alejandro Sanchez

Naval Warfare

Shephard Media

3 February, 2023

Originally published: https://www.shephardmedia.com/news/naval-warfare/metal-shark-makes-programme-progress-for-caribbean-navies/

US shipbuilder Metal Shark has delivered a new patrol vessel to Costa Rica and achieved a major milestone on a project for Guyana.

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The Space Review: Latin America’s space programs: an update

"Latin America’s space programs: an update"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
22 January, 2018
The Space Review
Originally published: http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3413/1



Latin American space programs have continued to develop and expand in recent years, with countries like Bolivia and Peru achieving major victories after the successful launches of new satellites. While there has been the occasional loss, like the 2015 destruction of a Mexican satellite aboard a Russian rocket, regional space programs have in general continued to grow, with additional launches planned for the near future.

This commentary is an update to the author’s 2012 article on the subject (see “Latin America’s space programs in 2012”, The Space Review, August 27, 2012), aimed at discussing new developments among Latin America’s programs and what they signal for the future.

Recent successes

This article will not attempt to enumerate every single test and initiative that Latin American space programs have carried out in the past five years. Rather, this will focus on highlighting particular accomplishments by different nations to provide a broad overview of recent developments.

As mentioned in the introduction, two successful launches that occurred in recent years were part of Peru’s and Bolivia’s growing programs. In the case of Peru, its high-resolution Earth observation satellite, Peru-Sat1, was constructed by Airbus Defense and Space and launched from French Guiana in September 2016. The Airbus-Peru deal included the construction of a center (Centro Nacional de Operaciones de Imágenes Satelitales: CNOIS) outside Lima so the Peruvians can control their satellite. The project has generally been regarded as a success, as the Peruvian government has declared that “the investment it has made into the satellite programme has already been recouped,” according to a December 2017 Airbus press statement that also explained that in its first year of operations, the satellite has delivered more than 71,000 images. Peru-Sat1 was also praised for helping monitor the damage caused by floods that affected the country’s northern regions in early 2017.

Meanwhile, Bolivia’s new telecommunications satellite, Tupac Katari (TK-1), was constructed by China and launched in 2013. Bolivia’s space agency (Agencia Boliviana Espacial: ABE) manages the satellite, which is aimed at improving access of Bolivian citizens to telecommunications and media services. It is worth noting that the project has not been without criticism, as an August 20, 2017, article by the Bolivian daily El Deber explained that ABE’s high prices deter some Bolivian telecommunications companies from utilizing the satellite’s broadband services. In spite of price issues, agencies like Bolivia’s customs service (Aduana Nacional) and the state-owned oil company (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos: YPFB) already utilize the satellite, in addition to numerous radio and television stations. The telecommunication company Viva has stated that thanks to the satellite, it can provide better broadband services to customers in rural and isolated areas.

As for Colombia, the country’s domestically-manufactured satellite UAPSAT was put into orbit in January 2014 after being launched from Wallops Island, Virginia. The Colombian daily El Colombiano has described UAPSAT as the “first satellite manufactured with Colombian parts and systems,” albeit with support from the Peruvian university Alas Peruanas.
 
These examples highlight the different types of services new satellites are rendering for Latin American countries, ranging from better access to communication services to helping monitor their territories, particularly after extreme weather events. Colombia’s UAPSAT satellite is also worth noting, as this was a domestically manufactured platform, demonstrating how more countries want to develop their own satellite-building capabilities (more on this later).

In spite of these recent successes, there has been one loss, though not a direct cause of Latin American programs themselves: in May 2015, a Russian Proton-M rocket launched from the Baikonur space center (Kazakhstan) failed, causing the loss of a Mexican telecommunications satellite called Centenario.

The Latin American-Kazakh connection

One aspect to keep in mind is the different launch centers that Latin American countries utilize to deploy their new satellites, such as include China, French Guiana, and the United States. It is also noteworthy that Kazakhstan’s Baikonur Cosmodrome has been utilized by several Latin American nations for launches in recent years.

For example, back in 2007, Colombia’s Libertad 1 cubesat was launched from Baikonur. Four years later, in 2011, a Russian-built Proton rocket launched Mexico’s QuetzSat-1. More recently, in 2014, Chasqui-1, a nanosatellite constructed by a Peruvian state university (Universidad Nacional de Ingenieria: UNI), was launched aboard a Russian rocket. Finally, in July 2017, a Russian Soyuz rocket left Baikonur with a payload of dozens of satellites, including a nanosatellite manufactured by an Ecuadorian university (Universidad Tecnológica Equinoccial) with Russian assistance. A June 15, 2017, article by Russian government news service Sputnik Mundo highlighted that this successful launch meant that for the first time Ecuador had a satellite in orbit that was constructed by one of its universities.

The reason why Kazakhstan is singled out as a launch center is because Kazakh-Latin American relations are fairly limited (see the author’s December 2017 commentary, “The Eurasian Economic Union and Latin America: What could 2018 Bring?”). Hence one strategy that Astana could utilize to approach Latin America is to provide potential customers from the region more cost-efficient launch services.

What will the future bring?

As for future initiatives, Chile is arguably the nation is most need to launch a new satellite, as Fasat Charlie has been in orbit since 2011. Back in 2016, the Chilean media was already discussing when will the government order a replacement for the satellite, but so far no new project has been announced. Even more, a January 2 op-ed in the Chilean daily El Mostrador, which discussed the country’s natural security challenges, called out the lack of progress regarding a replacement for Fasat Charlie. The argues that “so far there is no new information regarding a final decision, even though Chile requires satellites to strengthen its telecommunications industry and to monitor its territory in order anticipate possible natural disasters.” It will be interesting to see if president-elect Sebastian Piñera will make the acquisition of a new satellite a priority when he returns to power this March (he was previously president from 2010 to 2014.)

As for Brazil, in October, the Brazilian Ministry of Defense announced the drafting of a new blueprint to revamp the country’s space program. This proposal includes establishing a national council for space affairs (Conselho Nacional do Espaço: CNE) and an executive committee for space (Comitê Executivo do Espaço: CEE). It is unclear if current President Michel Temer will be able to make this proposal become law, given the year he has left in office, or if a decision will be made by the next president: Brazil will carry out general elections this October and the next head of state takes office on January 1, 2019. The South American giant is well known for its ambitious space program, exemplified by the Alcântara center (Centro de Lançamento de Alcântara: CLA), so hopefully the blueprint helps create a new momentum so it continues to grow. It is also worth noting that there are also plans to expand the CLA’s facilities, but this goal has encountered resistance from the communities that live in the area. Coincidentally, also in October, Paraguay held its first ever conference on space issues at the country’s Central Bank. The landlocked nation’s space agency (Agencia Especial del Paraguay: AEP) organized the event, and brought renowned special guests like Brazilian astronaut Marcos Pontes, to develop interest among the audience members to support AEP.

As for upcoming launches, one country that will have a new satellite in orbit this year is Argentina, as the country’s space commission (Comision Nacional de Actividades Espaciales: CONAE) is finishing the construction of its SAOCOM 1A satellite. The platform is part of an ambitious project between Argentina and Italy to establish a satellite network (Sistema Italo-Argentino de Satelites para la Gestion de Emergencias: SIASGE), and will reportedly be launched out of Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, in August. Similarly, in October, Costa Rica announced the successful construction of Proyecto Irazú, Central America’s first domestically-manufactured satellite. The satellite, a joint project by Central America’s aerospace association (Asociación Centroamericana de Aeronáutica y del Espacio: ACAE) and a Costa Rican university (Instituto Tecnológico de Costa Rica: TEC), is a cubesat that will be utilized to measure carbon gas emissions. The satellite will now be sent to Japan for final tests before it is launched.
Brazil’s blueprint, as well as Costa Rica’s and Argentina’s new satellites, demonstrate the ongoing interest of Latin American nations to develop their space programs. While these countries do not yet have the capability to launch crewed spacecraft, the fact that several countries are domestically manufacturing satellites is a promising step that should be praised, and also deserves the support of the international community.

Final thoughts

Latin American space programs have enjoyed significant accomplishments in recent years as countries like Bolivia and Peru have modern new satellites in orbit that support telecommunications and surveillance projects, while Argentina, Central America, Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico have domestically constructed their own platforms. There have even been bureaucratic developments, as Brazil is looking to revamp its new space program while Paraguay is attempting to jumpstart its own. Recent years have brought more successes than failures, notwithstanding the loss of a Mexican satellite and the delay in replacing Chile’s Fasat Charlie.
Earth’s orbit is increasingly cluttered with space debris, but hopefully there is still space for Latin America’s ambitious programs.

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W. Alejandro Sanchez (@W_Alex_Sanchez) is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cybersecurity issues in the Western Hemisphere. The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

 

CIMSEC: Narco Submarines: A Problem That Will Not Sink

Narco Submarines: A Problem that will not Sink
W. Alejandro Sanchez
"The Southern Tide"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
24 August, 2017

Originally published: http://cimsec.org/narco-submarines-problem-will-not-sink/33819

Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

“The security environment in Latin America and the Caribbean is characterized by complex, diverse, and non-traditional challenges to U.S. interests.” Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the 114th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 10 March 2016.

By Alejandro Sanchez

In the past year a number of narco submarines have been seized in several Latin American states. Narco submarines continue to be a problem as hemispheric security forces combat drug trafficking. Unfortunately for every narco sub that is seized, another is under construction. While recent successful operations should be applauded, combating narco subs needs a regional strategy of its own.

This commentary is a continuation of previous articles published by CIMSEC on this issue: “An Update on Narco Submarines and Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies’ Efforts to Thwart their Operational Effectiveness,” “Narco submarines: Drug Cartels’ Innovative Technology,” as well as the author’s “U.S. Southcom vs Caribbean Narco Pirates.” The incidents mentioned in this commentary will focus on events that have occurred over the past year. (The colloquial term “narco sub” will be utilized for these platforms, though we will later do a more thorough analysis of their characteristics.)

Recent Narco Sub Incidents

In recent months, several narco submarines have been seized in various Latin American states. For example, on 5 August, Ecuadoran marines located one in the Las Delicias area, close to the border with Colombia. For Colombia, a narco sub was seized in an operation by army and naval personnel in the San Juan and Baudó Rivers in the Choco department in late July. The platform, which was carrying approximately four tons of cocaine, was apparently manufactured by ELN rebels. The Colombian Navy explained that this was the first time a narco sub was operating in a river, and that it probably took some five to six months to be constructed. Not long after, in mid-August, the Colombian Navy located yet another narco sub, this time in the Nariño department and with the capacity to transport up to four tons of drugs. This one measured 14 meters, with a diesel motor and propellers, the Navy explained in a communiqué.

Narco subs have also been located in Central America. For example, a narco sub, reportedly 16 meters in length and capable of transporting up to five tons of drugs, was found inGuatemala in mid-April. Months later, in late July, the Costa Rican Coast Guard found a similar illegal platform on a beach. Local authorities believe that the vessel, with the capacity to transport up to four tons of drugs, had a motor problem and was discarded by the crew, until it washed ashore and got stuck in the sand.

Catching Them At Sea

The aforementioned examples highlight one fact. So far, the vast majority of narco-platforms are captured in the mainland (meaning either on dry land or “docked” in some body of water), either before they depart or upon arriving to their destination.

As far as the author has been able to find, in the past couple of years, there have only been a couple of narco subs intercepted in open waters. One was in July 2015, when during a “joint operation, the U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, and assets from the Customs and Border Protection Office of Air and Marine, intercepted a “narco submarine” off the coast of El Salvador,”Business Insider explains. The platform was carrying over 16,000 pounds of cocaine.

More recently, in early September 2016, the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Waesche intercepted a narco sub in the Pacific Ocean off the Central American coast. The Cutter reportedly launched two vessels and an armed helicopter in pursuit. U.S. personnel caught up with the sub, apprehended five suspects, and thwarted a scuttling attempt by pumping water out of the interior of the sub.” By preventing the sinking of the sub, the USCG seized more than 5,600 pounds of cocaine, with an estimated value of USD$73 million.

Who Finds The Narco Subs?

Nowadays, several Latin American and Caribbean navies and coast guards are undergoing a modernization process, which includes the acquisition of new platforms. For example,Colombia and Mexico are domestically manufacturing new fleets of patrol vessels. Christian Ehrlich, a director of intelligence for Riskop, a Mexican Strategic intelligence and risk control company explained to the author that  the Mexican Navy is in the process of adding Damen Sigma 10514 frigates to its fleet, “this will provide a decisive boost to Mexico’s Maritime Domain Awareness but unfortunately it will be some time before this system has an acceptable operational level” (construction for the first of the new frigates commenced in mid-August). Meanwhile The Bahamas is in the final stretch of its ambitious Sandy Bottom Project, via which it is obtaining a fleet of different patrol boats from Damen Group. Similarly, in late June IHS Jane’s reported that Louisiana-based shipbuilder Metal Shark and Damen will construct near coastal patrol vessels (NCPVs) for regional U.S. partners like “the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala.” It is worth noting that Mr. Ehrlich, remarked how Mexico possesses aircraft like CASA CN—235 and Beechcraft King Air 350ER for ISR; Colombia also possesses similar assets.

Nevertheless, in spite of more modern navies and coast guards, locating narco subs at sea continues to be a problem. In an interview with the author, Gustavo Fallas, a journalist for the Costa Rican daily La Nacion, explained that “[Costa Rica] depends on the Americans to combat [narco submarines]. In 2006 we detained a submersible with three tons [of drugs] and it was thanks to an American frigate. In 2012 we chased another one in the Caribbean, and it was also after the Americans alerted us. For those reasons it is vital to have U.S. aid to locate these platforms.” Mr. Fallas added that Costa Rica must create a shield (meaning more vessels, radars, personnel) to prevent drug traffickers from using the country as a warehouse or transit path for drugs.

Unfortunately, Randy Pestana, a policy analyst at Florida International University’s Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy, has a gloomy assessment about regional naval forces vis-à-vis narco subs. Mr. Pestana explained to the author how “relying on partner nations to stop, slow, or detain these shipments is difficult in itself as they do not have the necessary tools to do so unless provided by the U.S.” Of a similar opinion is Mr. Ehrlich, who stated to the author that “there isn’t a navy or coast guard in Central America with the [necessary platforms] to detect, follow and interdict [narco submarines].” 

In other words, Central American navies will continue to rely on the U.S. (be it SOUTCHOM or the Coast Guard) to monitor maritime areas in order to combat, among other threats, narco submarines. This is problematic, since, as Mr. Pestana remarked, even U.S. security agencies have limits to their abilities, particularly nowadays when the U.S. has other security operations and geopolitical concerns around the globe. Furthermore, there is the problematic and ever-present red tape, namely, “the inability of the U.S. to respond to an identified narco submarine without permission from higher leadership. This often led to the narco submarine to either get away, or move out of the U.S. areas of operation,” the FIU expert explained.

How To Find A Narco Sub

Locating a narco submarine at sea is a tricky business. In an interview with the author, Mario Pedreros, a retired Chilean Naval officer and an expert in airborne maritime patrol, provided an excellent analysis on this problem.

As previously mentioned, the term narco submarine is commonly utilized for these vessels, however they are not really submarines. As Mr. Pedreros explains, these platforms are semi-submersibles, meaning that they cannot go completely underwater, and if they can do so, it is for brief periods of time. (“Narco submarine” is still a catchier name than “narco-semi-submersible” though). However, even if these vessels cannot fully dive, they are nonetheless difficult to locate at sea. Mr. Pedreros explained how some of these platforms have electronic motors, which makes them more silent than diesel engines, making them harder to find with passive sonar. “When it comes to semi-submersibles, utilizing  sonar is not very efficient,” Mr. Pedreros concludes. Adding to the problem is that the vessel is pretty small, and “once at sea, the submersibles have 20 percent of their structure above the surface,” making them hard to pinpoint by radar.

Mr. Pedreros recommended maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) as an ideal tool to combat narco submarines at sea, as these aircraft possess superior sensors and radars for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Obviously, locating the target is only part of the solution, because then it has to be intercepted. “The aircraft must work with together with a vessel to capture the submersible. In other words, there are three components in this process: an aircraft (MPA), a vessel, and a light boat that can board the submersible and detain the crew,” the retired Chilean Naval officer explained. As previously discussed, various Latin American and Caribbean navies are acquiring OPVs with attached light boats, while Colombia and Mexico have platforms for maritime patrol, fulfilling the requirements by Mr. Pedreros; what is needed is greater multinational support, apart from additional platforms. 

The Future of the Narco Sub

It would be naïve to assume that recent successful operations by regional security forces will convince drug traffickers to stop investing in narco submarines. There is simply too much money to be made in drugs, and the subs cost only around USD$1 million to manufacture. Even if five narco subs are stopped, drug traffickers only need one or two successful deliveries to make up for their losses.

Moreover, recently seized narco subs show they are becoming more technologically advanced, including bigger in size so they can transport greater quantities of contraband. The narco sub seized in mid-July in Choco had space for a crew of four, measured 9 meters in length by 4 wide, had radars, stabilizers, ballast weights and was powered by over 100 batteries, according to the Colombian daily El Colombiano.

Indeed, the (brief) history of narco subs shows a trend towards modernization, particularly as drug lords are always looking for new methods to transport drugs, from Cessna aircraft and go-fast boats during the Pablo Escobar era to drones and narco subs nowadays (though of course, narcos continue to utilize the former as well). Mr. Pestana drives this home remarking how “top drug traffickers are relatively smart and have a good grasp on technology and history.” Moreover, the attractive wages narco-organizations can afford to pay means that they can hire “former engineers or other trade workers,” as Mr. Pestana explains, to continuously improve previous designs.

Final Thoughts

From a scholarly point of view, the appearance of the narco sub is a fascinating development as it highlights drug traffickers’ ingenuity as they continuously think of new ways of transporting their contraband. Unfortunately, this represents an ongoing problem for regional security forces, as new narco subs become more technologically advanced. Unfortunately, even though many narco subs have been stopped, it only takes one successful trip to make a large profit.

In spite of several successful operations, combating narco submarines requires both a multiagency and multinational strategy of its own. Mr. Ehlrich stresses the necessity to disrupt the construction of these platforms (which requires cooperation between police and military units). As for when narco submarines are at sea, the Greater Central American region requires united front, such as a regional anti-narco submarine task force. By combining resources, in which member states can contribute platforms to create the three-platform interception teams that Mr. Pedreros described, this unit would ideally be more successful at locating narco subs at sea, and not just in inland waterways. This will decrease the region’s dependency on the U.S., which Mr. Pestana and Mr. Fallas highlighted.

Unfortunately, narco submarines are a problem that will not sink, hence new strategies are needed in order to combat them more efficiently.

 Alejandro Sanchez Nieto is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez

The author would like to thank the various experts that contributed to this commentary:

Christian J. Ehrlich, Director of Intelligence, Riskop; External Analyst, Mexican Navy

Gustavo Fallas, Journalist, La Nacion (Costa Rica)

Mario Pedreros, a retired Chilean Navy Officer, expert in aero-maritime patrol. He participated as a Tactical Coordinator Officer (TACCO) in different missions overseas onboard Chilean Navy P-3 Orion aircrafts. Missions include Anti Submarine Warfare, Anti Surface Warfare, Anti Terrorism missions and Search and Rescue operations. He is currently based in Washington, DC. doing consulting for several Defense and Security companies.

Randy Pestana, Policy Analyst, Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy, Florida International University

The views presented in this essay are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the author is associated.

CIMSEC: Sea Shepherd in Latin America

"Sea Shepherd in Latin America"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
The Southern Tide
Center for International Maritime Security
September 21, 2016
Originally published: http://cimsec.org/sea-shepherd-latin-america/28147

Written by Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, The Southern Tide addresses maritime security issues throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. It discusses the challenges regional navies face including limited defense budgets, inter-state tensions, and transnational crimes. It also examines how these challenges influence current and future defense strategies, platform acquisitions, and relations with global powers.

“The security environment in Latin America and the Caribbean is characterized by complex, diverse, and non-traditional challenges to U.S. interests.” Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the 114th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 10 March 2016.

By Alejandro Sanchez

Nowadays, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private military companies (PMCs) are deploying their own vessels to the open seas in order to have a greater role in protecting maritime traffic or the maritime ecosystem. When it comes to Latin America, one NGO in particular has made a name for itself in the past decade and a half: the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society.

Activities

Sea Shepherd is arguably most well-known for Whale Wars, a television show broadcasted by Animal Planet documenting activities by the organization’s vessels as they attempt to stop Japanese whale hunters in the Antarctic. However, Sea Shepherd also carries out operations around the world. When it comes to Latin America, the organization has been active throughout region, especially in Central America, Ecuador, and Mexico.

Regarding Central America, Sea Shepherd was first active in Guatemala in 2002, when the Ocean Warrior, commanded by the famous Paul Watson (founder and president of Sea Shepherd), attempted to crack down on illegal fishing in the Caribbean. The operation ended with an incident between Watson and the Costa Rican government that has had repercussions to this day (we will discuss it in the following section).

Sea Shepherd returned to Guatemala the following decade: in 2014 the organization’s 35 meter interceptor, the Brigitte Bardot, helped crack down on marlin poachers. A 2014 article in the Tico Timesexplains how “for the next several weeks, the Brigitte Bardot will be based out of Port San José, on Guatemala’s southern Pacific coast in the department of Escuíntla, with eight Sea Shepherd crew on board, along with Guatemalan Naval and police officers.” The presence of local security officials aboard the vessel is an important fact as they are ultimately in charge of arresting suspects.

As for Ecuador, Sea Shepherd has been in the South Pacific for over a decade to protect the Galapagos Islands. As early as 2002, the organization’s Sirenean was active in the Galapagos against illegal fishing. Years later in 2007, Sea Shepherd’s activists worked with Ecuadorean law enforcement to crack down on sea cucumber poachers. The bilateral relationship took a leap forward this past March, when Sea Shepherd signed an agreement with Quito to support the protection of the islands for the next four years. AMarch 11 press release explains,

“Sea Shepherd has previously used an innovative approach to conservation needs that have been used in cooperation with public institutions such as the Galapagos National Park, the National Police and the legal system…Sea Shepherd’s previous conservation work in the Galapagos includes the installation of an AIS system, donation of a patrol vessel, police communications equipment, a legal reform and capacity building program and a marine conservation book.”

There already appear to be quick results, as in May Sea Shepherd and Ecuadorean authorities presented a new environmental penal code.

Concerning Mexico, the organization’s sailing ketch Martin Sheenparticipated in 2015’s Operation Milagro, which focused on “protecting the endangered vaquita in Mexico’s Sea of Cortez.” The operation occurred as part of an agreement between Sea Shepherd and Mexico’s National Commission of Natural Protected Areas (CONANP) and the Federal Attorney for Environmental Protection (PROFEPA) to protect the vaquita (a porpoise) and other marine fauna. The apparent success of Operation Milagro prompted a new initiative this year: Operation Angel de la Guarda, via which Sea Shepherd’s “anti-poaching vessel, the M/V Farley Mowat, is partnering with the Mexican Navy and environmental protection agency PROFEPA to patrol against totoaba poaching.”

Finally, it is worth mentioning that Sea Shepherd also participates in regional conferences that address environmental crimes. For example, in 2013, the organization presented a video on shark fishing at the Fifth Latin-American Congress of Environmental Prosecutors, held in Bogotá, Colombia.

The Costa Rica Incident

In spite of successful partnerships and initiatives with various Western Hemisphere nations, it is important to stress that Sea Shepherd’s relationship with the region has not been trouble-free. Namely the organization’s founder Paul Watson is wanted by the Costa Rican government.

A brief summary of the 2002 incident should suffice: the Ocean Warrior, commanded by Paul Watson, patrolled Guatemalan waters looking for vessels engaged in shark fishing. It was in this mission that Watson located a Costa Rican vessel, the Varadero I. There are conflicting reports on what happened afterwards: theOcean Warrior detained the Varadero I, and either the fishing vessel managed to flee, or Guatemalan authorities requested Watson to release the fishing boat. Watson then docked the Ocean Warrior in Costa Rica, where local authorities arrested him and charged him with attempted murder and shipwrecking. The charges were ultimately dropped, but because of Watson’s failure to appear in court for subsequent hearings, “Costa Rica court declared Watson as a rebel and issued a warrant of arrest for violation of ship traffic.”

To this day there is a request for Watson’s extradition by the Costa Rican government. He was detained in Germany in 2012 asINTERPOL posted a Red Notice, or international wanted person alert, for him (he is also wanted by Japan) but he was later freed. Watson filed a petition of his own against San Jose in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in 2015.

The Future of NGOs and Maritime Security

Several NGOs, both international and domestic, operate in Latin America to address maritime affairs; however, Sea Shepherd appears to be the only entity that has vessels helping Latin American governments. The one arguable exception would be Greenpeace as its vessel, Arctic Sunrise, docked in Argentina in thelate 1990s and early 2000s to protest river pollution and promote wind energy. Nevertheless, the difference is that Greenpeace’s vessel was utilized as a publicity stunt to bring attention to an issue, while Sea Shepherd has deployed its vessels to Latin American waters to actively combat illegal fishing.

Thus, Sea Shepherd serves as an important precedent for future partnerships, as states may request maritime conservation support not just from other governments and multinational organizations, but also from NGOs. A key issue for future agreements will probably be that local security officers must be aboard any NGO vessels to carry out arrests. For example, Sea Shepherd’s Brigitte Bardot embarked Guatemalan law enforcement in 2014, probably to avoid another Costa Rica-type incident. A similar situation occurred in Ecuador in 2003 when the Sirenean, with Galapagos National Park Rangers and Ecuadorian Naval crew aboard, stopped a poaching ship.

Another issue that may hinder future agreements is whether governmental objectives are in harmony with those of Sea Shepherd or other organizations. Without a doubt, there is always the possibility of an incident derailing a partnership.For example, while the Quito-Sea Shepherd alliance appears strong, there was at least one incident between them in 2007 when Sea Shepherd representative Sean O’Hearn was deported from Ecuador.

Final Thoughts

In the 21st century, maritime enforcement affairs are no longer confined to governments and their maritime forces, be they navies or coast guards. Economic and technological development as well as vibrant civic societies have helped create global NGOs that do more than organize mailing campaigns or protests ashore, they are also acquiring platforms to take their activities to the open seas.

In spite of the Costa Rican incident and the legal limitations this places on Sea Shepherd founder Paul Watson, his organization has managed to make a positive name for itself among governments in Ecuador, Guatemala, and Mexico. Case in point, a 2015 press release by the Mexican Ministry of Natural Resources announcing the partnership with Sea Shepherd to protect the vaquita explains that “[Sea Shepherd] has great experience regarding the protection of maritime resources, it has recently collaborated with Ecuador to stop illegal fishing.” In other words, Sea Shepherd’s success in Ecuador is helping it gain new allies in the region, the problem with Costa Rica notwithstanding.

Partnerships akin to what Sea Shepherd has accomplished in these nations may become a model for other Latin American and extra-hemispheric governments to imitate in the near future, if they can find NGOs with appropriate naval platforms, acceptable modus operandi, and similar objectives.

*The author contacted Sea Shepherd Conservation Society for input to this analysis but has not yet received a response at time of publication.

**The idea for this analysis came from a discussion entitled “A New Role for Non-State Actors in the Growing Competition for Strategic Marine Resources,” co-hosted by the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC).

Alejandro Sanchez Nieto is a researcher who focuses on geopolitical, military, and cyber security issues in the Western Hemisphere. Follow him on Twitter: @W_Alex_Sanchez. The views presented in this essay are his sole responsibility and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which he is associated.

Looking Ahead: Latin America and the Caribbean shaping the future of the ATT

"Latin America and the Caribbean shaping the future of the ATT"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Looking Ahead-blog
Forum on the Arms Trade
June 8, 2015
Originally published: http://www.forumarmstrade.org/looking-ahead-blog/latin-american-and-the-caribbean-shaping-the-future-of-the-att


On August 24-27, Mexico will host the First Conference of the State Parties (CSP) to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). This is an important high-profile meeting aimed at establishing the permanent headquarters and a secretariat for the ATT. It is noteworthy that a Latin American nation will host the event. While not major weapons expenders a la the United States or Russia, in recent years Latin American and Caribbean nations have earmarked significant portions of their defense budgets for new acquisitions. Hence, it is important that these two regions are taking a pro-active stance on the future of the global arms trade by helping to shape the ATT’s future.

Just this past February, Trinidad and Tobago hosted the First Preparatory Meeting Towards The First Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty. According to a press release by Mexico’s Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, the meeting in Port of Spain addressed issues like “the format, mandate and configuration of the future Secretariat,” as well as financial regulations.  Security expert Rachel Stohl from the Stimson Center noted, however, that the “only matter of substance agreed to … was that the first annual report on authorized arms exports and imports will cover calendar year 2015 with a submission deadline of May 31, 2016.” More meetings have since occurred and others are scheduled with the goal of seeing the August meeting bring momentum to the process.

For the time being, Mexico City has praised itself for having been chosen to host the CSP. In December, Mexican Ambassador Jorge Lomónaco declared that “[Mexico’s election] is, without a doubt, an example of trust and a form of recognizing our country as an important player of the international community; [we are] reliable [and] neutral.” Such self-praise is understandable, and it will hopefully be validated in a few months.

Apart from hosting major meetings, the Caribbean states are a major pillar of the ATT, Europe’s support notwithstanding. Several countries in that region have ratified it, like Dominica, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Meanwhile, Latin American states that have also ratified it include Argentina, El Salvador, Panama, Paraguay, and the CSP’s hosting nation, Mexico. In fact, Costa Rica, known for being a military-less nation in a violence-prone Central America, has not only ratified the ATT but was one of its original sponsors. Meanwhile, Brazil, with its strong military industry (i.e. EMBRAER), and other significant spenders like Chile, Colombia and Peru have only signed the treaty.

At this point, it is necessary to stress that Latin America is by no means undergoing a disarmament process. In recent years, we have seen a variety of major weapons sales by countries that have ratified or signed the ATT. For example, in 2013 Brazil signed a multi-billion deal for Swedish Gripen warplanes. Meanwhile, Peru has purchased FN Scar rifles and Gatling M-134D machine guns for its armed forces to crack down on narco-insurgency in the Peruvian Andes. As for Mexico, the U.S. has authorized the sale of Blackhawk helicopters to its southern partner. In addition, the region’s military industries remain vibrant and are looking to export their domestically made weapons. The prime example is Brazil, as it sold unarmed drones to an unnamed African nation in 2014.

Hence, it will be interesting to hear more detailed information about the concerns, priorities, and interests of Latin American states when they present at the CSP, as they will essentially be supporting an ATT regime, while also trying not to affect weapons sales sought by Latin American governments. Although support for the ATT is strong among these governments, national security threats, particularly drug trafficking and narco-insurgency, remain priorities for these regions and will continue to influence future arms procurement strategies.

The selection of Trinidad and Tobago as well as Mexico to host conferences that determine the future for this vital piece of global legislation is a big honor that stresses the nations’ support for the ATT’s success. Certainly, there are many challenges that the ATT must address before it becomes a relevant regime that regulates the arms trade. Hence, it is important that the ATT enjoys the support of violence-prone regions like Latin America and the Caribbean. Hopefully this momentum will translate into positive news out of Mexico City.


Alejandro Sanchez is Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs.