"Kazakhstan Should Have a Bigger Role in UN Peace Operations"
W. Alejandro Sanchez
International Policy Digest
25 February 2018
Originally published: https://intpolicydigest.org/2018/02/25/kazakhstan-should-have-a-bigger-role-in-un-peace-operations/
Kazakhstan held the rotating presidency of the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC) throughout January 2018, a significant
accomplishment for the Central Asian country, which has also chaired the
Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
in recent years. While Astana’s seat in the UNSC is certainly
commendable as it is the first Central Asian nation to join this body,
the Kazakh government should take a further step forward as it strives
to promote global stability by having a larger role in United Nations
peacekeeping operations (PKO).
To be clear, Kazakhstan has participated in peace operations and has
carried out non-military operations in other missions, but the author
argues that this presence should be increased. The Central Asian state
first announced that its armed forces would participate in PKOs in 2013. According to January 2018 official data by the UN’s Peacekeeping Operations website, there are currently five Kazakh experts on mission serving in the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).
Apart from the UN, Kazakhstan deployed Army engineers to Iraq after
the 2003 war to provide humanitarian assistance, including carrying out mine-clearing operations.
“In 2003, Kazakhstan sent 27 military engineers to assist operations of
the coalition in Iraq. Over five years, nine contingents totaling 290
Kazakh peacekeeping troops were rotated through Iraq,” the Kazakh government reports. Finally, Kazakh troops have been involved in training foreign troops, such as Afghan border security forces, to help improve internal security in the fellow Central Asia state.
While Kazakhstan’s role in peace operations is praiseworthy, more can, and should,
be done. It is worth remembering that, upon joining the UNSC in 2017,
Kazakhstan stated its priorities, which ranged from “eliminating the
threat of a global war” to “bringing peace to the African continent.”
Tragically, eight of the UN’s 15 PKOs are located precisely in Africa,
such as the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) or the UN Multidimensional Integrated
Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), which
have well over ten thousand peacekeepers each, in an attempt to
strengthen security and the rule of law. In order to keep up with its
noble intentions, the Kazakh government should consider sending
additional troops to more UN peace missions.
Training foreign security forces and sending engineers is an
important component of promoting security and state-building, however,
it has to go hand in hand with improving the security situation on the
ground. Sadly, there are plenty of hot spots of violence that warrant
attention and active participation from the international community,
particularly from capable armed forces. In other words, the UN could use
well-trained Kazakh troops on the ground in countries like the DRC, CAR
among several others. As a final point, it is important to stress that
saying that Central Asian armed forces as “well-trained” is not an
overstatement, as Kazakh defense personnel regularly train with military
powers such as the U.S. Case in point, in September 2017, 35 troops of the country’s peacekeeping battalion
carried out a three-day training course with instructors from the U.S.
Defence Institute for Medical Operations. Also last year British, Kazakh
and U.S. troops carried out Exercise Steppe Eagle – Spring 2017 at the Iliyskiy training centre.
The decision to deploy more troops to UN peace missions should not be
taken lightly, as there is an ever-present possibility for violence
and, sadly, casualties – like the tragic deaths of 15 Tanzanian peacekeepers,
assigned to MONUSCO, in December 2017. Thus, the Kazakh regime should
not commit to deploying additional troops to UN peace missions without a
careful consideration of the potential risks that such a deployment
entails. With that said, instability and violence in the world
continues, and nations like Kazakhstan, which have pledged to promote
global peace, must have a bigger role in helping bring stability to
troubled areas.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone
and do not necessarily reflect those of any institutions with which the
author is associated.
Sunday, February 25, 2018
Tuesday, February 20, 2018
Presentation: The Moscow Connection: Latin America's relations with Russia
"The Moscow Connection: Latin America's relations with Russia"
W. Alejandro Sanchez & Nathan Davis
Forum on International Affairs
11 January, 2018
Washington, DC
Prezi publication available: http://prezi.com/kf7jhphzheaw/?utm_campaign=share&utm_medium=copy&rc=ex0share
Details
• What we'll do: Explore Latin America's relationships with Russia• What to bring: A form of identification (driver's license, passport, student ID, government ID, etc.)
• Summary: During the Cold War, the principle and overriding concern for the United States in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) was the perceived threat of communist, and therefore Russian, influence in the region. America's "backyard" was a geopolitical and actual battlefield between the world's two superpowers and their proxies. Recently, Russia has found common cause with countries such as Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela and others that desire to offset US domination both within their own countries and the region at large. Economically, Russian firms such as Rosneft and Gasprom have made inroads in the Brazilian, Argentine, and Venezuelan oil and gas markets. Politically, Russian President Vladimir Putin and his LAC counterparts have made a series of high profile state visits in recent years. After a retreat from LAC following the collapse of the Soviet Union, it now appears that Russia is again looking to spread its influence in the region. Join the Forum on International Affairs (FIA) as we dig deeper into the foreign affairs of Latin American states, and their strategies for engaging with Russia.
Questions to Consider:
1) What do LAC countries gain from closer relationships with Russia?
2) How does Russian involvement in LAC differ between countries based on country size, political regime, incumbent political party, and geographic location?
3) Given the size of its economy can Russia sustain involvement within LAC outside of the energy sector?
4) Is Russian strategy in LAC characterized by long- or short-term considerations?
5) Can Russia play a meaningful role in LAC given its power vis-a-vis the United States, China, and the European Union?
Interviewed / entrevista: EEUU compra gas a Rusia: "Es una de las grandes ironías de la geopolítica mundial"
"EEUU compra gas a Rusia: "Es una de las grandes ironías de la geopolítica mundial"
Sputnik Mundo
¿Por
qué, a pesar de las sanciones, Estados Unidos mantiene los lazos
comerciales con los gobiernos de Nicolás Maduro en Venezuela o Vladimir
Putin en Rusia? La pregunta alude a la reciente compra de gas ruso
ordenada por la administración Trump para paliar la ola de frío en su
país. El analista Alejandro Sánchez nos explica por qué.
"Es
una de las grandes ironías de la geopolítica mundial que Estados Unidos
siga comprando gas ruso, a pesar de las tensiones y de las
investigaciones que el Gobierno estadounidense lleva a cabo con respecto
a (NdR: la supuesta injerencia rusa) las elecciones de 2016, a pesar de
los conflictos por Siria y Ucrania, y de las sanciones que impuso a
oficiales del Gobierno ruso", apuntó el analista internacional Alejandro
Sánchez.
Se refería a la primera de dos compras de gas ruso por parte de la
administración de Donald Trump, con el objetivo de mantener el flujo del
producto ante una ola de frío que ha llevado las temperaturas por
debajo de los 20 grados centígrados en algunas zonas del país. La compra
se realizó mediante triangulaciones de barcos y de empresas de terceros
países para evitar la relación directa con el país sancionado, además
de tocar varios puertos antes que el de Boston.
"Se vería muy mal para el gobierno de Trump que un buque con bandera
rusa atraque en la ciudad de Boston trayendo gas licuado", señaló
Sánchez y agregó: "Por eso tuvo que haber triangulación por Europa…
hubiera sido un arma política para los demócratas, que sostienen que su
Gobierno está en colusión con el de Rusia", señaló Sánchez.
"Hay algo de falta de concordancia con las sanciones que Europa y EEUU han impuesto a Rusia y la propia política energética europea, porque tanto Europa como Alemania necesitan del gas ruso para satisfacer el creciente consumo de energía. Mas ahora que Europa está dejando de usar el carbón y en 2022 Alemania cerrará su última central nuclear".
Cited in / Citado en: "China, eyeing Bolivia's lithium riches, helps country into space "
By Andrew Wright
21 February, 2018
The Sydney Morning Herald
Originally published: http://www.smh.com.au/world/china-eyeing-bolivia-s-lithium-riches-helps-country-into-space-20180220-p4z0yz.html
Bogota: A space program for Bolivia might seem a low priority given the South American nation's internal challanges of poverty, inequality and lack of infrastructure.
Enter China, with the know-how, launch facilities and an established hunger for Latin American raw materials.
Australia boasts five Optus communications satellites (comsats) and recently launched three other satellites, but Central and South American countries have traditionally lagged behind in this area.
China has been busy building up space contracts with nations in the region. Venezuela launched its third satellite from Chinese soil in October and Bolivia is expected to get a second comsat from China by 2022.
In fact, in recent years, China has started to compete with US and European satellite companies globally. Satellite communications technology makes a lot of sense for a country like Bolivia, a mountainous, landlocked nation of 10.9 million people, Lluc Palerm, a senior analyst at space industry consultancy Northern Sky Research (NSR), told Fairfax Media.
The first satellite, launched from China in 2013, was named Túpac Katari 1 after a Bolivian who led an uprising against the Spanish. The Bolivian Space Agency (Agencia Boliviana Espacial or ABE), said it cost cost $US302 million, with 85 per cent of that financed with a Development Bank of China loan.
The Bolivian media have questioned how long it will take for one of South America’s poorest countries to pay back the loan, W. Alejandro Sanchez, a geopolitics/defence analyst and Latin America specialist said.
“I think Tupac Katari was less of a gamble for China and more of another way to strengthen ties with the Evo Morales administration in the landlocked country,” Sanchez said.
In early February 2018, Liang Yu, the Chinese Ambassador to Bolivia was frank about China’s interest in Bolivia, a country with one of the world’s biggest and more accessible reserves of lithium.
“China is the country with the largest number of vehicles in the world and, therefore, it will be the largest market for the use of lithium batteries. One of the four consortia that presented their technical and economic proposals for the assembly and commissioning of the plant to industrialise lithium is Chinese,” he told Bolivia’s La Razon newspaper.
China is Bolivia’s second largest trading partner and Sanchez says there are some 60 Chinese companies there, some of which have built over 1300 kilometres of roads across the country.
Bolivia may just be the tip of the iceberg. A February 2018 report from NSR found the Chinese satellite industry was primed to take a larger share of the global satcom market “through attractive one-stop-shop offerings, aggressive growth plans and enhanced exports”.
Chinese influence has recently entered into Australia’s national discourse, after Labor Senator Sam Dastyari was eventually forced to resigned for supporting Beijing's position on the South China Sea after receiving political donation from a donor linked to the Chinese Communist party.
Bolivia has also seen its share of political scandals relating to Chinese companies.
Gabriela Zapata, the alleged ex-lover of Bolivian President of Bolivia Evo Morales was arrested in February of 2016, when she was the commercial manager of the Chinese engineering and infrastructure giant China CAMC Engineering, which had been awarded millions of dollars worth of contracts with the Bolivian state. She was sentenced to 10 years in prison in May 2017 for crimes including money laundering, illegitimate contributions and inappropriate use of public goods and services.
There is another angle to China's softpower push.
According to Sanchez that many of the countries that maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan (the Republic of China) are located in Central America and the Caribbean.
“Last year, Panama switched recognition from Taiwan to Beijing, and it is likely that other countries will follow this year as Beijing ‘purchases’ recognition via investments, financial aid and trade agreements,” Sanchez said.
Analysts told Fairfax Media Nicaragua was both a potential “Taiwan swing” and posible Chinese satellite customer.
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