FPIF: Beyond Drug Trafficking: Toward Genuine Security in the Caribbean

Beyond Drug Trafficking: Toward Genuine Security in the Caribbean

W. Alejandro Sanchez
Foreign Policy in Focus
August 13, 2013

Originally published: http://fpif.org/beyond-drug-trafficking-toward-genuine-security-in-the-caribbean/

Drug trafficking is, by many accounts, a major security challenge in the Caribbean region.

Due in part to aggressive counter-drug trafficking operations in Central America, drug traffickers based in Mexico and Colombia increasingly use the Caribbean as an alternative path for drugs en route to the United States.

To transport this volume of traffic, a growing number of boats—including the infamous narco subs—cross Caribbean waters carrying contraband. Many pass without being stopped, because most regional security forces lack sufficient coast guard personnel or equipment to properly monitor their territorial waters.

With large quantities of drugs smuggled across Caribbean waters each year, other countries have stepped in to stem the flow. For example,Operation Lionfish, a multinational law enforcement initiative, brought police agencies from multiple nations in the Caribbean and Central America into coordination with the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). The operation, which ran from May 27 to June 10, captured 142 suspects and seized up to 30 tons of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. In mid-July, the U.S. Coast Guard stopped a speedboat that was carrying 2,300 pounds of cocaine in the Central Caribbean.

But the hemisphere’s preoccupation with the drug war may be sapping resources that could be better employed to meet other security challenges. A recent report by the Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS), an arm of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), offers several recommendations. Presented at a February 2013 CARICOM summit in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, the report identifies major challenges for Caribbean nations and provides policy recommendations for a wide range of security issues.

Disaster management surfaces as a priority because the region is continually vulnerable to earthquakes (like the devastating one that hit Haiti in 2010) and hurricanes (like Hurricane Ivan in 2004 and Hurricane Emily in 2005, which hit Grenada). As the report makes clear, natural disasters have a “negative impact on [local economies], health, environment, and the Region’s vital tourism industry, [and such] catastrophes tend to exacerbate pre-existing problems and inequalities.”

Caribbean nations themselves are carrying out high-level meetings to improve regional responses to disasters. For example, in mid-July, theCaribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) hosted a meeting in Barbados to plan regional responses to climate change. A CDEMA press release about the meeting stressed the importance of such summits, as they serve to create “a resilient Caribbean as the projections for extreme hydro-meteorological events show an increase in their frequency and severity.”

The trafficking of weapons is another urgent issue. The report notes that “illegal weapons are responsible for more than 70 percent of murders in the Caribbean.” It adds that the illegal trafficking of weapons has become “both the currency and commodity of the drug trade, having evolved into a major independent criminal activity.” In 2012, the government of Jamaica and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs established a program to address this issue. The initiative included the training of 60 Jamaican security officials to better combat the trafficking of illegal weapons, as well as the subsequent destruction of seized, obsolete, and surplus firearms.

The fact that most Caribbean states outside Cuba have Washington-friendly governments assures bilateral and multilateral security cooperation initiatives for the immediate future. Even Caribbean states like Belize, Saint Lucia, and Suriname that have joined Petrocaribe—a bloc founded in 2005 by the late Hugo Chavez to expand Venezuelan influence throughout the Caribbean by using his country’s oil reserves as diplomatic leverage—have maintained cordial ties with the United States.

Thanks to these amicable relations, the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) has been able to arrange joint security operations through accords like “shiprider agreements,” which essentially allow U.S. Navy and Coast Guard vessels to enter the territorial waters of Caribbean states in pursuit of suspicious vessels. Moreover, SOUTHCOM officials regularly meet with their Caribbean counterparts, as exemplified by last September’s meeting at the IMPACS headquarters in Port-of-Spain.

Future U.S. military intervention in the region, however, may be hindered by decreases in the U.S. military budget, so it would behoove Washington to consider non-militarized alternatives.

It’s plenty appropriate for the United States to help its Caribbean partners combat regional crime, should they desire it. But in focusing on drug trafficking, Washington has prioritized its own agenda over the issues that matter most to Caribbean communities. Improving intelligence sharing, creating more effective disaster management strategies, and devising a strategy to contain the arms trade and human trafficking, as proposed by IMPACS, would do worlds more for regional security than sinking more resources into drug busts and other short-term victories in the decades-long drug war.

W. Alejandro Sanchez is a Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs. Follow Alejandro via Twitter.

VOXXI: Political instability and security concerns in Honduras

Political Instability and Security Concerns in Honduras
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
August 9, 2013
Originally published: http://www.voxxi.com/political-concerns-in-honduras/

Around midnight on Thursday, August 1, a small bomb went off 100 meters from the residency of Honduran President Porfirio Lobo. Latin America has a long history of violence, including armed coups, but even by Latin American standards, throwing a bomb at the house of a head of state is an uncommon and worrisome development. The attack, combined with the country’s numerous security and political challenges, raises the question of how Honduras should be regarded by the international community.

Honduras’ problems

What little is known about the explosion is that the device was homemade and not particularly powerful. More worrisome is the fact that it is unclear how the perpetrator got away, especially since the president’s residence is heavily guarded.

Even though no one was injured in the attack, the attack can be placed amongst a growing number of recent incidents that demonstrate the country’s instability, which targets not just the general population, but even the highest elected officials.

Days after the attack took place, the Honduran media reported a shootout between a Nicaraguan drug trafficker, alias, Juan Carlos Villalobos Quiroz (alias “El Muco”) and his  Honduran partner, Fredy Avila, over a shipment of up to 700 kilos of cocaine. Overall, 17 criminals were killed in the crossfire, which occurred along the country’s isolated Caribbean coast, La Mosquitia.

Additionally, days after the shootout, inter-gang violence erupted in the Marco Aurelio Soto National Prison, forcing an army deployment to restore peace.

Three prisoners were killed and twelve others were injured when members of the Barrio 18 and MS-13 opened fire within prison walls.

The situation in Honduran prisons is dire, with pavilions normally run by gangs instead of wardens and security officers – though the same can be said of the penitentiary system of several nations across the hemisphere, which are run by criminal entities such as the PCC gang in Brazil and the narcos in Mexico.

Apart from violence, the country’s economy will likely suffer significantly from a fungus that is currently attacking coffee bean crop fields.

Coffee bean production is a cornerstone of several Central American economies, and regional governments are attempting to control the spread of the fungus, known as roya, or coffee-leaf rust. Moreover, there is a deadly dengue fever epidemic spreading across Central America – 17 infected people have died so far in Honduras.

The Honduran government has been attempting to address these issues. The country’s air force is planning to upgrade its Tucano aircraft and Bell 412 helicopters to better combat drug trafficking. Additionally, General John Kelly, head of the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) visited Honduras in January, which including a meeting with President Lobo.

The general discussed with the Honduran leader the possibility of improving military cooperation in areas such as humanitarian assistance after natural disasters.

Regarding political instability, the country is recovering from the very controversial June 2009 overthrow of then-President Manuel Zelaya.

In spite of the overthrow and subsequent political instability, Honduras managed to hold elections in November 2009, with Porfirio Lobo emerging as the country’s new president.

When states (almost ) fail…

Honduras’ dire security situation serves to spark a scholarly discussion about the nations that are (or should be) labeled as “failed states.”

The term is usually reserved for countries that have major internal insecurity and governments that are either non-existent or very limited in power projection—to the point that they cannot control their own territory.

According to the Failed States Index 2013, a project run by the Fund for Peace research center, the countries ranking at the bottom are Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan.

Honduras ranks near the middle – 75 out of 178, which places it above other Western Hemisphere nations like Ecuador (74), Bolivia (67), Colombia (57), and, unsurprisingly, Haiti (8).

At this time it is unclear whether or not Honduras deserves to score at such a middling point in the FSI index, or if the country should have ranked worse.

Due to space issues, we cannot discuss every issue of Honduran security, economic capacity, governmental instability, and other standard aspects that are looked at when judging a country’s governance, it would be informative to briefly examine internal security.

When it comes to internal security, criminal networks and gangs arguably run rampant within certain areas of the country. That said, the Honduran security forces have had (some) successes in tackling them. It can be argued that Honduran security forces still have general control of their nation’s territory and that the country is not breaking apart like Somalia.

Nor has it seen the emergence of territories controlled by criminal movements like in Colombia or Mexico.

Many scholars would argue that a developing country is “at a crossroads,” if there is still some probability that it will be able to resolve internal concerns regarding security threats or political instability.

Although Honduras may currently be at a crossroads, a bomb thrown at the president’s home signalizes a potential setback before a noticeable improvement of the troubling situation. Maybe “troubled” or “borderline failed” state would be a better label to apply to Honduras rather than “failed,” but that discussion may ultimately just come down to semantics.

Read more: http://www.voxxi.com/political-concerns-in-honduras/#ixzz2bbHqE6nL

Blouin Beat World: Rowhani’s fraught Latin American situation

Rowhani's fraught Latin American situation
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Blouin Beat: World
August 7, 2013
Originally published: http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatworld/2013/08/07/rowhanis-fraught-latin-american-situation/

On Sunday, August 4, Hassan Rowhani was sworn in as Iran’s new president. The U.S. government has shown cautious optimism over this change in leadership, an optimism centered on the hope that his administration will allow real movement on the nuke question. But there are other nations in the Western Hemisphere, and they too deal diplomatically with Iran.

The inauguration of a new president does not render such relations totally uncomplicated: no Latin American head of state went to Tehran for it, though high-level officials traveled to the ceremony in abundance. These included Cuban Vice President Ricardo Cabrisas, Nicaraguan Vice President Moisés Omar Halleslevens Acevedo, the President of the Venezuelan National Assembly Diosdado Cabello, as well as the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonio Patriota and his Ecuadorian counterpart, Ricardo Patiño. No shock in all this: the U.S. is keeping a weather eye on the semiotics of power at play here. Remember that Secretary of State John Kerry stated that Latin America is the “back yard” of the U.S. in April. Remember that the close relations between Caracas and Tehran during the Chavez and Ahmadinejad administrations prompted allegations that Venezuela was providing uranium to Iran for its controversial nuclear program. Remember that when Tehran and Managua began increasing diplomatic ties, there were rumors that the Iranian diplomatic mission in Nicaragua served a covert purpose as a regional intelligence hub.  The situation for Rowhani is fraught, to say the least.

This is due in large part to the fact that recent Iran-Latin American rapprochement derives far more from ideological considerations than economic ones. The officials that attended the inauguration in Tehran come (unsurprisingly) from nations known for having governments that are unfriendly to Washington, to put it diplomatically. Brazil’s interest in Iran, for example, is more than partially predicated on this. Iran’s Ambassador to Brazil, Mohammad Ali Qanezadeh, values the current trade between the two countries at around $3.2 billion and recently called for an expansion of bilateral ties. It is debatable how much it can grow given Iran’s economic situation. And any discussion of such ideological ties also lead inevitably toArgentina. Tehran and Buenos Aires have had a complicated relationship since the terrorist attacks in Buenos Aires in the 1990s — a March 1992 attack at the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires and a July 1994 attack at a Jewish community center — that killed over 100 people. The Iranian government has long been accused of being the mastermind of the attacks, and there is broad speculation that the new Iranian president had a role in the ‘94 attack. Rowhani will likely support an agreement made by Ahmadinejad in January 2013 (the Argentine Congress ratified it in February) that sets up a binational commission to investigate the ‘94 attack. Its findings, should they ever see daylight, will wash away any blame from Iran.

So what’s Rowhani’s next step here? In his first official press conference, the moderate cleric stated that he wanted to maintain relations with Latin America. He expressed similar sentiments during his one-on-one meetings with the senior policymakers that attended Tehran for his inauguration. Given Iran’s near-pariah status, there is a long road to travel from ambitious declarations to actions. A key factor of Iran’s successful recent regional policy was the personal friendship between Ahmadinejad and the late President Chavez. And it is it is worth stressing that the Latin American nations that have so far shown interest in maintaining close Iran ties are those whose leaders were close to Ahmadinejad. So Rowhani needs to build up his working relationships in the region, and win another such high-profile ally as a centerpiece for them. Argentina’s Christina de Kirchner is an unlikely option given the pressure she received over the deal on the ’94 bombing attack, while Brazil’s Dilma Rousseff seems wary of further increasing ties with Tehran due to human rights concerns. Given the current geopolitical situation of Iran and Latin America, Rowhani’s only options may be the “usual suspects,” namely Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro or Ecuador’s Rafael Correa, both of whose foreign policies are underpinned by ideological considerations far more than realpolitik.

VOXXI:Russian warships visit Cuba: geopolitical considerations

Russian Warships visit Cuba: Geopolitical Considerations
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
August 6, 2013
Originally published:http://www.voxxi.com/russian-warships-cuba-considerations/

On Saturday, August 3rd, the “Moskva,” a guide-missile cruiser that forms part of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, along with additional supporting vessels, docked in Havana, Cuba. The arrival of the Russian Warships has been labeled as a “friendly visit” by the Russian Navy to Moscow’s once-close ally in the Western Hemisphere.

But as symbolically important this event may be (as it conjures memories of the close military ties between Havana and Moscow during the Cold War), it is doubtful that such a move is part of a greater push by the Russian government to increase once again its presence in the Western Hemisphere.

Moreover, the recent visit of the warships did not occur with the same fanfare to a November 2008 visit of Russian warships to the Caribbean. During that deployment, the Russian ships carried out military exercises with the Venezuelan Navy, and then visited other Moscow-friendly Latin American nations, including Cuba.

The maritime exercises involving the Russian and Venezuelan fleets coincided with a visit by then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to Caracas, where he met with the late-President Hugo Chavez.

Presence of Russian warships

The 2008 deployment of Russian ships to the Caribbean was the first time Russian warships had flown the Russian flag in the region since the end of the Cold War.

Therefore, the presence of Russian warships in the Caribbean Sea provoked great media attention and speculation, particularly regarding the future of Russian-Venezuelan relations (throughout his presidency, Chavez spent billions of petro-dollars on Russian military equipment), and whether some kind of security-related rapprochement could occur.

However, with Chavez’s passing and Vladimir Putin returning to the Russian presidency, initiatives between Caracas and Moscow have arguably begun to cool down (apart from the aforementioned arms sales).

As for Moscow-Havana relations today, they are barely a shadow of the close relations between the two governments during the Cold War, which included massive financial assistance from the then-Soviet government to the Fidel Castro regime. Within the past decade, Russia has carried out initiatives to renew and increase its influence in Latin America and the Caribbean, particularly in nations such as Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua and Venezuela.

However, when Russian Prime Minister Medvedev carried out a brief tour of Latin America this past February 2013 in which he visited Brazil and Cuba, he skipped Venezuela.

This was likely due to the fact that Chavez had still been alive and in extremely dire health at the time, and there was widespread speculation regarding factions within the upper echelons of Venezuelan leadership who wanted to succeed the dying leader.

Hence, if Medvedev had visited Caracas, he might have been pressured into taking sides in internal Venezuela politics, a situation Moscow certainly wanted to avoid.

Moreover, the August 2013 port call made by the Russian warships came at an interesting time for Cuba, as President Raul Castro has stated that he will step down from power in 2017, marking the end of a long era of Castro family leadership.

The Cuban government is also undergoing negotiations to improve relations with the U.S. (Washington has historically decided to extend non-immigrant visas for Cubans from six months to five years).

Meanwhile, the Russian military is feeling strengthened and empowered after it carried out major military exercises this past mid-July, the biggest since the fall of the Soviet Union. According to reports, up to 160,000 troops and about 5,000 tanks were utilized in military maneuvers in Russia’s Siberian and far eastern regions.

Is Moscow returning to Latin America?

Given the recent geopolitical development among these two post-Cold War allies, it is uncertain how the deployment of the Russian warships to Cuba should be interpreted. The timing suggests that the Russian government wants to continue showing the rest of the world its renewed military might, particularly after the recent military exercises in Siberia.

Hence, a visit of one of the Russian Navy’s top vessels to a friendly government in the Western hemisphere is a logical next step.

Even so, while the deployment of the warships and Medvedev’s February visit are symbolically significant, there is little evidence to suggest that Moscow has either interests to militarily-strengthen relations with the Cuban government, or, more broadly speaking, if it has a doctrine or long-term vision regarding the most appropriate methods to approach Latin America and the Caribbean.

Nevertheless, the deployment of a Russian warships like the “Moskva” to Caribbean waters, so geographically close to the U.S., is certainly an interesting development that, at the very least, demonstrates that the Russian military can still preserve its presence in its traditional area of influence in Eurasia, while also further extending its reach to the nations of the Western Hemisphere.

Read more: http://www.voxxi.com/russian-warships-cuba-considerations/#ixzz2bEb1kwac