Hispan TV: U.S. Presidential Debates

Interview: U.S. Presidential Debates
Hispan TV
October 2, 2012

COHA: The Rise of the Latino E-Politician

The Rise of the Latino E-Politician
W. Alex Sanchez
Research Fellow
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
October 2, 2012
Originally published: http://www.coha.org/the-rise-of-the-latino-e-politician-2/

The internet has taken Latin America by storm as a growing percentage of the region’s population has become linked and connected to the virtual world. Latin American politicians and people of substance are not far behind as a growing number of them have their own social media accounts, such as Twitter and Youtube, in order to connect with more of their constituents. Like elsewhere in the world, Latin America is witnessing an exponential rise in internet usage by politicians and governments, aside from the rapidly growing role it plays in finance and commerce.

 Online World

According to a comprehensive June 2011 report by the Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center entitled “The Internet in Latin America: Online Publics, Social Media Use and the Impact of Diffusion,”  as much as 34 percent of Latin America’s population in 2011 had internet access. The report highlights how the quickest growth of internet users in the region is found among the middle and lower classes. “In Argentina and Brazil, more than one-half of the population now belongs to this new ‘digital middle class’ […] These families perceive digital literacy and internet access as a way to complement a poor and rather ineffective public education system,” (P. 16) the report argues. Nevertheless, there are glaring exceptions to this assumption regarding the growth of e-users. For example, “Costa Rica is one such case where patterns of socio-economic inequality still prevail when it comes to connectivity rates: more than one-half of all Internet users in the Central American nation belong to upper or middle income families, and 47 percent have a college education” (P. 17).  In any case, it is clear that every year we will see growing numbers of Latinos becoming users. Brazil is a good case study of this growing trend; a recent study made by a company called Ibope Nilsen reported that 83 million Brazilians were online during 2012, revealing a 7 percent increase compared to the first three months of 2011.

 The percentage mentioned above will only grow in the coming years, not just because of expected income growth, but also thanks to technological improvements. As wireless communications improve, new technologies will become cheaper to mass produce, which inevitably will drive down the price of obtaining wireless hardware (such as mobile phones and laptops with internet connection). In addition, we will see better reception and stronger internet signals reaching more isolated geographical areas in Latin America, such as the Amazon. For example, members of one of Peru’s indigenous groups in the Amazon, the Boras, already have internet access, including Facebook and Twitter accounts, demonstrating how the virtual world is already reaching even the most remote Latin American areas.

Rise of E-Politics

In recent years, the world has witnessed how national leaders use social media in order to reach more of their citizens and reach out to improve their means of communication. One of the best examples of this is U.S. President Barack Obama, who held the first ever online town hall at the White House on March 2009. According to the Associated Press, over 10,000 questions were submitted. The current U.S. leader also held the first ever Twitter town hall on July 2011. Afterward, in January 2012, he held another online town hall,  where he answered questions while in a live web chat room; users were able to watch and submit queries to the American head of state via Google and YouTube. The Obama White House also has unveiled a mobile app. Not to be outdone, the Republican Party held a Twitter town hall of its own on July 2011.

 Latin America is not lagging that much behind when it comes to e-politics. In fact, several Latin presidents have their own Twitter accounts which are frequently updated. Some of the most prolific Twitter account users include Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Colombia’s Juan Manuel Santos and Peru’s Ollanta Humala.  But this fondness for constantly using social media like Twitter is not always the case; for example, Brazilian President Dilma Rouseff’s account has not been updated since December 2010. Most tweets by heads of state are fairly generic, such as Santos praising the capture of a guerrilla leader, or Chávez congratulating a Venezuelan Olympian winning a medal during the past London Olympics, both of which could have been written by a staffer. Nevertheless, there has been at least one incident in which the Twitter-sphere took on a more personal nature. In recent months there has been an increasingly nasty fallout between Santos and former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, which started after Santos and some of his cabinet members attempted to improve relations between Caracas and Bogotá. The arguments between the one-time allies spilled over to the virtual world as Uribe tweeted his opinions regarding some of Santos’ decisions. The current Colombian head of state once tweeted “Yo no lo llamo cada vez que manda un tweet, no lo puedo llamar porque si no, no podria gobernar yo” (I don’t call him whenever he tweets, I can’t call him as then I wouldn’t be able to govern).

 Latin American politicians have also slowly begun to utilize other virtual outlets to reach a wider audience. For example, A 2009 commentary by the Center for American Progress, a Washington DC think tank, explains how Chile experienced an internet revolution regarding its style of political campaigning leading up to the 2008 municipal elections and the 2009 presidential elections. More recently, in May 2012, Youtube aired a debate between the Mexican presidential candidates. When it comes to Mexico, media reports regarding the recent presidential elections have touched on the candidates’ ages and their knowledge of technology. For example, a January 30, 2012 article in Mexico’s newspaper La Jornada reported how several young presidential candidates are known for utilizing their Blackberry phones in order to be online (such as Ernesto Cordero, 43, or the eventual winner of the Mexican elections, Enrique Peña Nieto, 45).

  In addition, in June 2012, the Colombian political party MIRA organized its first virtual conference, bringing together over 500 party delegates, connected from 42 different geographical areas around the country. Meanwhile, in Argentina, numerous political parties and candidates have created their own Facebook and Flickr accounts and have been trying, at the same time, to attract “cyber volunteers” who will spread their party’s ideas and goals through blogs and other social media forums.

 Nevertheless, experts have argued that Latin politicians are simply utilizing the internet in the same way they would use a TV, as an outlet for their message.  For example, prior to the recent Mexican presidential elections, a Mexican reporter for Revista Mexicana de Comunicacion mused that “for some politicians, having a digital campaign means to simply hire a team that will publish in social media outlets the next event or interview […] or [use the internet] to attack his opponents.”

 E-Savvy Politicians and E-Laws

It is clear that more Latinos will gain internet access in the coming years, and that politicians will increasingly resort to the virtual world to gain the popularity that they covet. Furthermore, governments will be able to better communicate and interact with their citizens. The U.S. seems to be in the vanguard of this trend, considering that besides the aforementioned White House app, the State Department created an office of eDiplomacy in 2003.

Nevertheless, it is debatable to what extent government officials both in the U.S. and in the rest of the Western Hemisphere are able to fully understand the internet, how it operates, and its possibilities. During the 2008 elections, former Republican candidate John McCain famously admitted that he was computer illiterate and that “I use the Blackberry, but I don’t e-mail, I’ve never felt the particular need to e-mail.” However, McCain did state that he was learning how to surf the net and that he visited a number of websites, including news outlets and blogs.  Furthermore, regarding heads of state who appear computer literate and who are known tweeters , the question remains as to how many of them write their own tweets and how many delegate such activities to their public relations team. As previously mentioned, besides the Uribe vs. Santos argument that took over Twitter, most Tweets by heads of state are fairly generic.

 It will be important for the next generation of Latin America politicians to be more aware of internet-related issues, particularly as topics ranging from cyber crimes to online copyright laws and online freedom of expression become more prevalent in the region. Furthermore, e-commerce and ways of e-communication coming from other regions  are advancing in Latin America at a rapid pace. At a recent meeting dubbed Festival of Media Latam 2012 recently held in Miami Beach, in which some 600 media and marketing professionals attended, a representative of internet giant Google highlighted how Latin Americans were rapidly embracing the four screens (namely PC, tablet, smart phone, and television). Furthermore, studies show that the e-commerce industry in Latin America doubled from $22 billion USD in 2009 to $43 billion USD in 2011. Given this developing reality, it becomes critical that future Latin American policymakers are capable of drafting comprehensive and intelligent laws to protect cyberspace and its users.

 Will Internet Savvy  Become Mainstream?

Will we reach the point in the near future when government leaders in Latin America will be expected to be computer literate? It may be too demanding to expect politicians to be able to write the code for a piece of software or even maintain their own daily blog. However, it may become self-evident in a decade or two that the new generation of politicians across the Western Hemisphere who grew up during the Web 2.0 era will be able to personally service social media outlets like Twitter, Facebook, and Youtube.

 A basic knowledge regarding information technology among policymakers in Latin America will become even more crucial as cyber crimes become more prevalent and more damaging. The next generation of Latino political leaders would be well advised to know more about how the internet works apart from knowing how to log in to their personal email or how it can help to record votes during the campaign season.

 W. Alex Sánchez, Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs.

VOXXI: Hugo Chavez, healthy democracies and Latin American ‘continuismo’

Hugo Chavez, healthy democracies and Latin American 'continuismo'
W. Alex Sanchez
VOXXI
October 1, 2012
Originally published: http://www.voxxi.com/hugo-chavez-latin-american-continuismo/

As Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez campaigns for his third term, he falls in the category of Latin American leaders who want to remain in power– known as continuismo. 

Venezuela will hold presidential elections this coming October 7, with the primary contenders being incumbent President Hugo Chavez and Henrique Capriles Radonski, leader of a coalition of several opposition political parties known as the Mesa de la Unidad Democrática. Chavez is running for his third re-election, and, should he win, will govern until 2018. Such an outcome would result in a full two decades in power for the Venezuelan leader after first gaining the presidency in 1998. Given Venezuela’s problematic relationship with the United States during Chavez’s time in power so far, Washington has a strong interest in the outcome of the elections.

There have been a string of conferences in Washington, D.C. and numerous analyses regarding the possible outcomes of the Venezuelan elections. One major concern that constantly receives discussion is the possibility of voter fraud on behalf of the government. Other analyses on Chavez’s already long tenure in power discusses whether his initiatives, such as social programs aimed at the country’s poor (known in Venezuela as misiones), have been beneficial to the population. Moreover, a critical issue that is continuously raised is what the country’s foreign policy will be like if Chavez remains in power, particularly regarding Caracas’ relations with states like Iran and Syria. Finally, as a nation blessed with vast natural resources, there is also the question of which companies and nations will benefit from Venezuela’s vast natural resources, such as oil fields (in spite of recent accidents) and gold deposits.

Outside of the international media’s chatter on the aforementioned topics, an important issue is whether Chavez’s remaining in power for a long period of time is healthy for Venezuelan democracy, in spite of the leader’s popularity. Should we label the Venezuelan leader as a member of the new wave of Latin American heads of state who have maintained themselves in power, commonly known as Continuismo?

The new wave of continuismo

Ecuadoran President Rafael Correa. More modern members of this Continuismo trend include Ecuador’s Rafael Correa. (Photo/ InfoSur)

Continuismo is a phrase that refers to heads of state who hold a vicegrip on their power, often through efficiently changing national laws.  The first wave of such heads of state occurred in the first decades of the 20^th century, including Augusto Leguía, who ruled Peru from 1919-1930. Leguía’s period in power is commonly referred to as “el oncenio de Leguía,” which literally refers to the eleven years that he was in power. During this time the Peruvian dictator dissolved Congress, changed the constitution and created a cult of personality around his image.

Latin American analysts in the past years have raised the issue of a new wave of Continuismo among modern-day heads of state. Recent embodiments of continuismo are Peru’s Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), Argentina’s Carlos Menem (1989-1999) and Brazil’s Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2003). More modern members of this Continuismo trend include Colombia’s Alvaro Uribe, Ecuador’s Rafael Correa, and Venezuela’s Chavez. Furthermore, there is the issue of Continuismo running along family lines. In Argentina, President Nestor Kirchner (2003-2007) was succeeded by his wife, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, who was elected in 2007 and reelected in 2011. Meanwhile, a September poll in Peru showed that 33 percent of Peruvians would vote for Nadine Heredia, President Humala’s wife, if she ran for the presidency in 2016.

Without taking into account political ideologies, Hugo Chavez can be placed among a growing number of Latin American heads of state that have sought to continue being in power, oftentimes by changing their national constitutions. Leaders like Chavez, Uribe, and Correa enjoyed enough popularity among their respective citizenry that allowed for constitutional changes to be put forward—all enacted so that they could remain in office. Whether this trend has been beneficial or not should be analyzed on a country by country basis.

Chavez’s history in power

After ascending to the presidency, Chavez managed to install a new constitution in 1999, replacing the 1961 constitution of the Punto Fijo regime. This constitution called for new presidential elections, which Chavez won in July 2000. He maintained his popularity throughout a second term that stretched from 2000 to 2006, when he was re-elected again with more than 60 percent of the vote. Yet, in 2009, Chavez lost a national referendum which was meant to amend certain aspects of the 1999 Constitution. This embarrassment did not prevent him from calling for a second referendum in 2010, which did in fact pass. This measure allowed the confirmation of a number of amendments, including one that allowed for infinite reelections to government positions ranging from governor to president. Due to this success, and thanks to his ongoing popularity among the masses (particularly the lower classes), President Chavez is constitutionally allowed to run again for a new presidential term in 2012 and continues to be regarded as a major contender to win (though in some polls Capriles is not far away from the incumbent leader).

How the Western hemisphere avoids continuismo

Governments have long created different types of laws that address presidential re-elections. Some relevant examples include in the U.S., for example, where a president can run for only one direct re-election. The last two American presidents (Bill Clinton and George W. Bush) managed to secure re-election, and incumbent President Barack Obama is himself competing for a second presidency in the upcoming November elections. Nevertheless, a May report in The Daily Beast mentions that, “of the 42 men who served as president before the current incumbent, only 15 won two consecutive elections.” Then again this figure includes popular leaders like John F. Kennedy, who, had he not been assassinated, likely would have been re-elected if he had run again.

In Latin America, there are also various examples of presidential election laws. In Peru, a president cannot run for direct re-election: for example, Alan Garcia Perez has been president on two occasions (1985-1990 and 2006-2011), but is constitutionally barred from running until the 2016 elections. An exception to this trend was Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), who changed the country’s constitution to allow for direct re-election. Nevertheless, Fujimori was overthrown, and the law was again reversed.

As for other countries, the popularity of certain heads of state has allowed them to push for similar attempts to change their constitutions and allow for re-elections. Alvaro Uribe’s (2002-2010) popularity allowed his supporters to change the Colombian constitution in 2004. His supporters largely rallied around his tough stance regarding the country’s narco-guerrillas. He was easily re-elected in the 2006 elections. Moreover, there was momentum among Uribe’s supporters to amend the constitution again so he could run for a second re-election, but Colombia’s Constitutional Court voided it. Meanwhile,Ecuador’s Rafael Correa (first elected in 2007) has changed his country’s constitution, which called for elections in 2009. Here, the head of state won. Thanks to the new constitution, Correa is eligible to run in the 2013 presidential elections and could govern until 2017. An August 2009 Mercopress analysis highlights how 13 of 18 Latin American democracies allow some kind of presidential re-election, while only three nations fully ban it (Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico).

Popularity and democratic health

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez remain popular leading many to belive he may win his third term, further instilling continuismo in Latin America . (AP Photo/Ariana Cubillos,File)

Daniel Zovatto, regional director for Latin America and the Caribbean of the International Institute for the Democracy and the Electoral Assistance, wrote an essay in September 2011 on presidential re-elections in Latin America. Zovatto argues in his analysis that “immediate re-election but with limits seems appropriate for countries with strong institutions, but instead may be counterproductive in countries with weak institutions.”

Regarding Chavez’s continuismo, the head of state remains vastly popular but the question remains whether it is time for a new leader to emerge. For a country to maintain the same leader generally signifies a perpetuation of the same type of initiatives and ideologies and does not necessarily give space for new ideas and leaders. In addition, a head of state that remains in power tends to create a court of allies around him (for example, individuals loyal to Chavez himself control the military, the Supreme Court of Justice, and the elections commission, among others), hurting the independency of governmental institutions.

Latin America has been historically known for its weak governmental institutions, and, while the region as a whole has generally enjoyed significant economic growth over the past decade, it is doubtful whether governmental institutions and civil society have been strengthened at the same pace in order to withstand the potential negative effects a new wave of Continuismo would most likely bring.

Read more: http://www.voxxi.com/hugo-chavez-latin-american-continuismo/#ixzz28BGvjj92

EIR: The End of Ideologically-Motivated Violent Movements in Latin America?

The end of Ideologically-Motivated Violent Movements in Latin America
W. Alex Sanchez
E-International Relations
September 24, 2012
Originally published: http://bit.ly/QecoZJ

Violence continues to flourish in Latin America, perpetuated by a variety of ongoing criminal trends ranging from gruesome murders in Mexicoto deadly ambushes by guerrillas against security forces in Peru. While the crimes themselves are not new, the collective profile of the perpetrators has changed. In major cities like Caracas in Venezuela, Juarez in Mexico, and in the favelas (shantytowns) of Brazil, there seems to have been a shift in their goals and raison d’etre.

 The era of insurgent movements that fought governments in order to carry out regime change and install leftist-style governments seems to be coming to an end. Only a few movements remain, as compared to their heyday in the 1980’s, like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The new wave of violent organized movements is made up of international criminal networks, such as Mexican cartels or criminal gangs in Central America, who have gained power through the lucrative drug trade but lack a political ideology or objective. Does the change that we have witnessed in the past two decades signify the end of ideologically-motivated violent organizations in Latin America?

A Brief History of Ideological Terrorism in Latin America

Insurgent movements spread throughout Latin America at the height of the Cold War as a combination of proxy wars between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and as a way for masses to attempt regime change and alter social orders that, for the most part, essentially labeled poor and indigenous groups as second-class citizens. While few of those groups remain today, they had the numbers, strength, and support to make an impact in Latin America throughout the 1980’s. An incomplete list would include Peru’s Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), Colombia’s 19^th of April Movement (M19) and Popular Liberation Army (EPL), the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) – which had factions active in Chile and Bolivia among other countries – Argentina’s Montonero Peronist Movement (MPM), Uruguay’s Tupamaros National Liberation Movement and Nicaragua’s Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN).

Several insurgent movements ceased to exist between the end of the 1980’s and the mid-1990’s. Some of them went peacefully, as in the case of the Central America regional peace accords, which saw the end of insurgent movements like the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) in Guatemala.  Other groups, like the MIR and the Tupamaros, were defeated via military operations, such as the Washington-orchestrated Plan Condor. Such initiatives, known for their abuses of human rights, were carried out by the military governments that ruled much of South America from the 1960’s to late 1980’s. In Peru, the MRTA became severely weakened after the capture of its major leaders, including its founder, Victor Polay Campos, which brought their operations to an end in the mid-1990’s. The group’s last major operation occurred in 1996-1997.

As part of demobilization initiatives, there were instances where some guerrilla movements attempted to become part of their countries’ political systems, with mixed results. For instance, the FMLN won the presidential elections of El Salvador in 2009 with Mauricio Funes as its candidate. On the other hand, Carlos Pizarro, leader of the M-19 Movement, was not so lucky.  In 1989, M-19 disbanded as an insurgent force and became a political party known as the M-19 Democratic Alliance. Pizarro ran for president of Colombia in the 1990 elections but wasassassinated on April of that year. Pizarro’s murder was allegedly ordered by Pablo Escobar—head of the infamous Medellin Cartel.[1] Another example of violent groups trying to become part of a political process is going on right now in Peru. In the Andean country, there is a political party known as Patria Roja, which has alleged ties with the Shining Path. In addition, Alfredo Crespo, lawyer of incarcerated Shining Path leader Abimael Guzman, has created an NGO called the Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Rights (MOVADEF). MOVADEF’s goal is to free Guzman and other individuals accused of terrorism, whom MOVADEF considers to be “political prisoners.” The group has twice attempted to register as a political party, but the Peruvian government has rejected it each time, leading Crespo to denounce the government’s “antidemocratic tendencies.” The attempts by demobilized insurgent movements to join legitimate political processes throughout Latin America are controversial, to say the least, but do exemplify that such organizations had, arguably, some kind of political objectives which they chose to pursue via non-violent, legal means.

By 2012, only a handful of groups forged in the ideological crucibles of the 1960’s-1980’s continue to be operational. The biggest of these movements are the Colombian FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN) as well as Peru’s Shining Path. While all three are weaker and more disorganized than they were decades ago – the FARC, for example, allegedly has around 9,000 troops, down from 16,000 in the 1990’s – they continue to carry out deadly operations. A major reason for the weakening of these groups has to do with successful military operations carried out by local security forces. As another example, the Shining Path’s last major leader, Florindo Flores, was captured on February 2012; effectively dividing the remaining insurgent groups into two separate factions. Meanwhile, the FARC has been weakened since losing its major leaders in recent years, such as Manuel Marulanda (AKA Tirofijo), Manuel Reyes, and Jorge Briceno (AKA Mono Jojoy). At the time of this writing, there are negotiations underway between the Colombian government and the FARC, though it is uncertain that these will be successful considering that the guerrillas are known for having broken previous ceasefires and other similar agreements.

The Rise of Narco-Violence

As insurgent movements backed up by political ideologies come to an end, major criminal cartels that lack political objectives and are centered on profiting from illegal activities have begun to rise. This isn’t to say that criminal groups did not exist in the 1970’s and 1980
’s, during the period of ideological civil wars. For example, during the 1980
’s and early 1990
’s, Colombia became notorious for the drug-related wealth and violence of the Medellin Cartel as well as the Cali Cartel.

Major drug trafficking cartels, such as the Sinaloa, Zetas, and Gulf Cartel have appeared throughout Mexico, and are slowly expanding their influence to Central America, like in Guatemala, and there are troubling reports that they have a growing presence in South America as well. Unlike the FARC or Shining Path, the Mexican cartels lack any kind of ideology or objectives beyond profit from lucrative crimes. Their goal is not to overthrow the Mexican government, but rather to create expanding spheres of influence where they govern parallel to central governments as a kind of narco-fiefdom.

There are also groups like the Maras Salvatrucha, an international gang based in Central America.[2] It is necessary to stress that the Maras do not have the same origins as the cartels; the Maras are a Hispanic gang that originated in cities like Los Angeles and whose members were deported to their countries of origin. A 2008 Time article reported that
, “[t]iny El Salvador has over 55,000 gang members, including some 10,000 deportees.” While the Maras’ reason for existence arguably was not drug trafficking, being involved in illicit activities like robbery and extortion has allowed it to gain considerable amounts of power.  The Maras have become particularly influential in El Salvador, to the point that theSalvadoran government recently brokered a peace agreement between them and one of its major rivals, the Barrio 18, in order to cut the level of violence in the country.

Other groups include the drug cartels in Brazil, which have brought violence to several major cities. The Washington Times reported in 2009, “In Brazil, 35,000 people were fatally shot in 2007, and most of the deaths were drug-related. According to the government’s public safety secretariat, there are nearly 23,000 drug-related homicides a year.” Confrontations between the Brazilian police and criminal organizations have escalated as the government tries to pacify the favelas in preparation for the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro. A June 2011 operation between Brazilian Special Forces and armed naval personnel in a favela in Rio ended in a confrontation with local drug traffickers; a total of eight people were killed in the shootout. In addition, in order for Brazil to achieve greater internal security in the country, it will have to deal with the infamous First Command of the Capital (PCC).[3] The PCC is a criminal group that originated in Brazil’s prisons in the 1990
’s and today has a strong influence around the country. Unlike other criminal groups, the PCC claims that its goal is to fight “injustice and oppression in the prison system under the banner ‘Liberty, Justice, and Peace.’
It is debatable to what extent the PCC members actually believe in bringing peace and justice to the country’s prisons and streets, particularly considering the 2006 PCC-orchestrated violence that Sao Paulo suffered in 2006. Rather than demanding political goals, the violence was more as a ways for the PCC to showcase its power.

Finally, it is important to highlight that the FARC, ELN, and Shining Path all have morphed into criminal entities that finance themselves from drug trafficking, but continue to claim that they are fighting for a political ideology and some kind of ultimate goal (such as installing a new regime in their countries). It is highly debatable how many rank-and-file troops of the aforementioned movements actually believe in the group’s ideologies anymore. In an interview with the author, a security consultant who wished to remain anonymous and who has done extensive work regarding the FARC explained how years ago, new members were supposed to attend indoctrination classes that could last as many as six months, so they would learn the organization’s ideological origins and goals. Nowadays, he quipped, such “classes” last two weeks at the most.[4]
Arguably, only a few older members within any of the aforementioned guerrilla groups remain faithful to the ideological origins of their movement. In other words, the morphing of the old-guard groups into narco-insurgent movements, combined with the rise of non-ideological entities like the cartels and international gangs, seems to stress the fact that the ideologically-motivated violence in Latin America may be ending.

The EPP: A return to the Past?

The Paraguayan People’s Army (EPP) presents a fascinating case study as it may arguably be the first violent guerilla movement to appear in Latin America with a political ideology since the end of the Cold War. A 2011 report by the Council on Hemispheric Affairs explains the different origins attributed to the group. According to Jane’s Defense, the EPP was created in 1992 when a group of training priests, who were expelled from a Catholic seminary for their radical political views, established the Movimiento Monseñor Romero with the aim of plotting a socialist revolution. Meanwhile, a 2008 article in Paraguayan daily ABC defines the EPP as a group comprised of criminals who have murdered police officers and attacked police and military outposts, without attributing ideological objectives to it.  One of the group’s most well-known operations was the 2005 murder of Cecilia Cubas, daughter of former Paraguayan president Raul Cubas.

To justify its violent operations, the EPP argues that it is a group made up of peasant communities armed to fight for social justice and denies Asuncion’s accusations that it is a group of criminals or has any affiliation with criminal organizations like the Colombian FARC. Carmen Villalba, a self-declared spokeswoman of the EPP, has stated that the group’s support comes from “the Paraguayan people, the people who eternally feel that they have been ridiculed, discriminated against and stepped on.”  The EPP has said that it is influenced by Cold War heroes like Che Guevara and Regis Debray, as well as Paraguayan heroes like Mariscal Francisco Solano Lopez. Fidel Zavala, a former hostage of the EPP, has declared that the EPP also looks up to leftist-statesmen and ideologues like Fidel Castro, Hugo Chavez, and Karl Marx.  It is important to note that even though the EPP arguably has a Marxist-Leninist ideology, prominent individuals such as Luis Casabianca, leader of the Paraguayan Communist Party and a guerrilla member in the 1960
’s (as part of the Frente Unido de Liberación Nacional – Fulna) have condemned the Zavala kidnapping. In 2009 Casabianca stated that the EPP “is not revolutionary, rather, terrorist.”

On September 21, 2010, then-Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo allegedly received a threatening letter from the EPP, calling him a “walking cadaver” and calling Minister of the Interior Rafael Filizzola and his wife, Congresswoman Desire Masi, “oligarch bullies” and “money wasters.” Such terminology is similar to statements made by groups like Shining Path and the FARC during their heyday in the 1980s. The now deposed Fernando Lugo government pursued a tough policy to crush the EPP. In late April 2010, the Paraguayan leader ordered the deployment of 3,300 troops and police officers to the country’s northern provinces to crack down on the insurgents, an operation which was ultimately unsuccessful.

The June 2012 constitutional coup in Paraguay that overthrew Lugo from the presidency and installed his vice president, Federico Franco, has not seen any major changes in the EPP’s attitude towards the government. In late July, EPP guerrillas attacked an outpost in the Azote region. The attackers left a note identifying themselves as EPP members and blaming the oligarchy for the country’s poverty, illegal deforestation, and pollution of the environment, including water sources. Earlier in July, the EPP sent an email to a Paraguayan radio station in which it declared war against Franco’s government, which the group described as “extreme right” and a continuation of corruption and pro-oligarchy politics in the country. Franco has labeled the EPP as an extension of Colombia’s FARC (an accusation made also during Lugos’ government), and recently created a new security council to fight the insurgent group. From its public declarations, the EPP appears to be fighting for political objectives, though greater analyses will be necessary to confirm whether its members actually believe in installing a communist government in Asuncion or they are simply criminals using political ideologies as an excuse for their crimes.

Chaos with a Cause

In an interview by the author, a retired Colombian Army general was asked whether the era of ideologically-motivated violent insurgent movements in Latin America had come to an end. The officer stated that there continues to be a romantic perception of leftist Socialist ideology in the region, as well as a fascination of Cold War-era regional heroes, such as Fidel Castro and Ernesto “Che” Guevara.[5] An example of this can be seen in the rise of democratically-elected left-leaning governments in the region in the past decade, like Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, Bolivia’s Evo Morales or Ecuador’s Rafael Correa. Meanwhile, young Peruvians who did not live throughout the extreme violence of the 1980
’s are joining the pro-Shining Path NGO known as MOVADEF. A July 2012 report in the British daily The Guardian quotes a young MOVADEF member saying that “the only man in the world who can solve our problems [is] Abimael Guzman.”

Regarding insurgent movements still active in the hemisphere, namely the FARC, ELN and the Shining Path, many seem to have become narco-terrorist organizations, with, arguably, only a few of their members maintaining some kind of loyalty to their founding ideologies. Greater in-depth analysis of the Paraguayan EPP will be necessary to fully state whether this new movement is true to its public declarations regarding its leftist ideology and political objectives, as this group could prove to be the exception to the rule regarding whether ideologically-motivated violence in Latin America has come to an end. Within a forthcoming article the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN),  will be specially discussed. Like the EPP, the Zapatistas claim to have an ideology; in this case, protecting the rights of indigenous Mexicans, though it does not have as an objective to overthrow the government.  It is debatable whether the Zapatistas should be labeled as an insurgent movement due to their goals and actions, which included both military operations as well as non-violent initiatives.

The rise of groups like the Mexican cartels, gangs like the Maras, criminal entities like the PCC and the reformation and rebranding of narco-terrorist movements like the Shining Path arguably indicates that we have witnessed the end of ideologically-motivated violence in the region, the debatable cases of the EPP and Zapatistas notwithstanding. Unfortunately, this does not mean that violence has ended and Latin America is finally at peace. Rather, it means that the motivations for the violence have slowly mutated from ideological collectives fighting for social change to more loosely aligned individuals fighting for personal and financial gains. A more complete analysis regarding the motivation of why individuals choose to join violent movements like the FARC and or a cartel like the Zetas, will require interviews with both current and former members, in order to make it clearer to what extent political ideologies and financial wealth play a factor when it comes to recruiting, and if this has changed over the years.

Like the aforementioned Colombian general said, there is still a certain romanticism associated with leftist ideologies, especially since, in spite of major economic growth in Latin America within the past decade
, there are still large economic disparities which are often aggravated by ethnic and racial factors. In a worst-case scenario, the kind that Latin America seems to have an affinity for, this might mean that we will see the eventual return of ideologically-motivated violence.

—

W. Alex Sanchez is a Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) where he focuses on geopolitics, military and cyber security issues. He regularly appears in different media outlets like Al Jazeera, VOXXI, BBC, El Comercio (Peru), New Internationalist, among others. His analyses have appeared in numerous refereed journals including Small Wars and Insurgencies, Defence Studies, the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, European Security, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism and Cuban Affairs. Follow Alex on Twitter here.

---

[1] Bowden, Mark. “Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World’s Greatest Outlaw.” Atlantic  Monthly Press. April 2001.

[2] Logan, Samuel. “This is for the Mara Salvatrucha: Inside the MS-13, America’s Most Violent Gang.” Hyperion. 2009.

[3]Garzon, Juan Carlos. “Mafia & Co.: The Criminal Networks in Mexico, Brazil and Colombia.” Latin America Program.Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. June 2008.

[4]Author interview with security consultant. June 2012.

[5] Author interview with Colombian  Army General (ret). June, 2012.