South America’s northern Andean region (Peru, Colombia, Venezuela & Ecuador) continues to be a flea-market for the trafficking of small arms. In an egregious non-sequitur, the lack of inter-state warfare in the hemisphere for the last several decades (since the 1982 Falklands War) has failed to stop the various South American militaries from upgrading their military power, particularly in recent years. In addition, small weaponry, such as rifles, pistols and grenades are becoming dangerously common in much of Andean South America, especially due to the proliferation of guerilla movements, and criminal organizations. Common street criminality is also on the rise in major cities like Lima, as criminals have access to light arms to carry out their illicit activities, prompting citizens to acquire guns to protect themselves and their families. The proliferation of small arms from the “grassroots” level to major arm purchases by a country’s security forces, is an important factor that needs to be taken into account to understand the current micro and macro geo-security landscape of Andean South America.
Inter- vs. Intra- state warfare
As aforementioned, an important aspect to mention about the contemporary security landscape of South America is that, aside from the Falklands conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom in 1982, the region has not witnessed an inter-state warfare for decades. Even though tensions still exist, and often countries have been on the verge confrontation (like between Peru’s Juan Velasco Alvarado and Chile’s Augusto Pinochet in 1975, or the Caldas incident between Venezuela and Colombia in 1987), bellicose face-offs have been relatively rare. Peru and Ecuador had a number of non-declared borders wars in 1981 and 1995; however both were very localized and short-lived.
Nevertheless, today South America is in a new arms race: Venezuela is buying staggering amounts of weaponry from Russia and China, Peru is upgrading its air fleet and purchasing frigates from Italy (Lupo class), and Chile has acquired Leopard tanks and American F-16 fighter jets. Not to mention Brazil’s plans for a nuclear-powered submarine.
However it is the different levels of intra-state strife and crime that is the dominating security factor in Andean South America, due in large measure to the threats posed by the Colombian guerrilla body, the FARC, and Peru’s resurgent Shining Path. Other sources of internal instability, which are linked to the proliferation of small weapons, are drug cartels and multinational and local criminal gangs.
Light Weaponry Distributors and Buyers
A number of countries have become the exporters of light weaponry to South America, particularly the Andean nations. This is not meant to be a comprehensive list:
Russia
Moscow is regaining its international status in the Western Hemisphere as a major arms dealer. Concerning light weaponry, the sale that has made attracted the most coverage was Caracas’ decision to build, in Venezuelan territory, a Kalashnikov rifle factory, in addition to a plant to produce the AK-103’s ammo. The goal was to have the company operational by 2009-2010 and capable of producing up to 30,000 automatic rifles per year. It's unclear the current status of the plant due to a lack of information from the Venezuelan government. Chavez has also purchased 100,000 AK rifles and 5,000 Dragunov rifles from Russia. Colombian policymakers have, at times, expressed apprehension that some of these Kalashnikovs may unintentionally (or even intentionally), end up in the hands of the Colombian FARC rebels.
Belgium/Argentina
The Fusil Automatique Léger (Light Automatic Rifle – FAL) is the standard weapon used by a number of military forces, like for example Peru. The FAL is a 7.62mm NATO self-loading, selective fire rifle produced by the Belgian armaments manufacturer Fabrique Nationale de Herstal (FN). The Argentine Armed Forces officially adopted the FN FAL in 1955. The FALs were produced by the Argentine state-owned manufacturing industry FM (Fabricaciones Militares) at the Fabrica Militar de Armas Portatiles "Domingo Matheu" (FMAP "DM") in Fray Luis Beltrán, located north of Rosario.
Argentina’s possession of the Belgian FAL license becomes relevant today because of Venezuela’s purchases of different types of rifles, including the AK rifle factory, to be set up in the latter country. On December 14, 2005 the Associated Press ran a story by Fabiola Sanchez, which explained that Caracas was considering sending its 30,000 FAL rifles to Argentina for repair. According to the article, the plan would be to give the restored FALs to the Venezuelan army reserve, while the new AK assault rifles would be given to active troops.
United Kingdom
London is not a major exporter of small arms to South America. According to the Annual Report on Strategic Export Control, published by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, the British government has sold limited quantities of light weapons to Andean nations. The 2006 report mentions that Peru purchased gun silencers; Ecuador obtained pistols as well as technology relating to the use of pistols; and Venezuela purchased heavy machine guns and components for general purpose machine guns. The report for the first quarter of 2007 mentions that Colombia acquired heavy machine guns and other equipment for a total value of one million pounds. In all cases, the official reports do not provide major specifications about the weaponry or components that were purchased.
The U.S.
American small arms in the northern Andes are a mix of both legal and illegal trade. It is relatively easy to find American-made pistols in a number of black markets in downtown Lima for example. The key, yet unclear, issue is the number of legally sold small arms to regional countries, particularly Colombia. Much has been written regarding the amount of economic and high-tech weaponry sold by Washington to Bogota, like the UH-60L Black Hawk helicopters; however it is unclear the level of trade regarding small arms, like assault rifles and pistols that may have been purchased for the Colombian army, some of which may have even found their way to right-wing, military supported, paramilitary groups.
It should be added that Colombia produces the Israeli Galil rifles. An example of home-built weaponry is Peru's MGP submachine gun.
Illegal Producers of Small Arms
Weaponry, like small arms, can also be obtained from illegal manufacturers that make copies of rifles and ammo, some of which are highly accurate in appearance and performance. This is a particularly profitable and booming business as criminals (not to mention terrorists) will want to acquire such weapons to carry out their attacks or other criminal activities, while citizens will purchase these guns for protection, leading to the proliferation of illegally-produced small arms. For example, in late November 2007, the Peruvian police arrested a family (a mother and her two sons) in their house in the district of Lince, Lima and accused them of illegally manufacturing guns and ammo. In the course of the raid, police officers came upon thousands of different magazines of ammo, including the infamous “dum dum” bullets. The commander of the VII police region, General Octavio Salazar Miranda, declared that “we do not know if [the guns and ammo] were going to go to the hands of terrorists, drug cartels or to the Colombian FARC guerrillas.”
What do Insurgents fight with?
Insurgent groups tend not to make public the type and quantities of weaponry they utilize; nevertheless, from a variety of sources, it is possible to gain some kind of insight on the current situation.
Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) – Peru
Shining Path does not appear to have a coordinated plan to increase their firepower from one particular source. Instead, they are likely to resort to robbing weapons, ammo and equipment from wounded or dead soldiers and police officers that they manage to ambush. Hence, their current arsenal consists of a variety of weapons, like FALs, AK-47s and a variety of revolvers and pistols.
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) – Colombia
The FARC, because of the millions that the group receives from a variety of illicit activities (i.e. drug trafficking, money laundering and kidnapping for ransom), has the monetary resources to obtain weaponry and ammo as needed. For several years the Peruvian media has reported the use of Peruvian territory as a corridor for illegal weapons trafficking into Colombia. According to a September 26, 2002 article in the Peruvian magazine Caretas, traffickers transport weapons from Recife (Brazil) via air to the Peruvian jungle, namely Puerto Arica in the Putumayo, and from there the illegal goods are transported across the numerous rivers along the Peruvian-Colombian border to the FARC.
The FARC tactics of using drug money to purchase has become normal procedure. In the 1990s, it was revealed that Vladimiro Montesinos (intelligence service chief of former-Peruvian dictator Alberto Fujimori) had sold weaponry to the FARC. As far as facts are known, in 1998-1999 Montesinos sent individuals (disguised as Peruvian military officers) to Jordan, where they purchased around 60,000 AK-47 rifles. Of those rifles, 10,000 were sent via plane to the FARC in Colombia. The assault rifles were dropped off in parachutes over Barrancominas in Colombia, controlled by the FARC’s Frente 16 which was under the control of FARC commander Medina Caracas (AKA “El Negro Acacio”). The FARC gained the monetary resources to pay for this transaction by selling drugs to Brazilian drug traffickers, namely the Brazilian drug dealer Fernando Da Costa (AKA “Fernandinho”). Montesinos was paid millions for brokering the transaction. Deals like this exemplify the links between drugs and weapons trafficking.
The FARC also uses routes in Central America to obtain weaponry. A March 21, 2005 article in the Mexican daily El Universal mentions the existence of an arms cartel trafficking AK-47 rifles to Colombia from Nicaragua, via Honduras.
Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN) – / Colombia
In October 2006 , the Colombian armed forces carried out a number of military operations against ELN bases. Reports after the raids mention that a major operation was carried out in the town of Aguadas in the northeastern department of Caldas by the Colombian army’s Eighth Brigade. Among the weapons seized were AK-47 semi-automatic rifles, an M-60 automatic rifle, an M-79 grenade launcher, seven grenades and assorted munitions belonging to the ELN’S Carlos Alirio Buitrago front.
Attempts at stopping small arms proliferation
A significant event occurred in July 2007, during a celebration of International Gun Destruction Day, when almost 14,000 small arms were destroyed in Colombia. An article by the Inter Press Service quotes Ambassador Claudia Blum as saying that the weapons destroyed in the July celebration did not come from the armed forces. “There were 13,778 weapons destroyed, which included machine guns, handguns, rifles and mortars," she said. “Out of these, the vast majority -77 percent- were confiscated from criminal organizations and illegally armed groups throughout the national territory. The rest were legally owned weapons turned in by private citizens committed to security and nonviolent coexistence,” the ambassador concluded.
The report “Violencia, Crimen y Trafico Ilegal de Armas en Colombia,” published by the United Nations’ Oficina contra la Droga y el Delito explains that small arms found during raids on insurgent movements and criminal cartels had originated from a variety of sources, including: Belgium, France, Spain, Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, China and North Korea. The report’s sources explain that none of these governments authorized the sales or validated that the ultimate destination of the weapons would be Colombian insurgent movements.
Meanwhile, reports in June 2007 show that the Ecuadorian government has taken steps to control the illegal possession of weapons, in order to boost the safety of its citizenry. Ecuador’s Interior Minister Gustavo Larrea has declared that, “illegally bearing arms is a crime carrying a sentence of up to five years in jail.” The crackdown on illegal weapons came after as many as six minors were killed in Guayaquil during the first half of the year as a result of gun fights. This prompted Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa to launch his “Ecuador Without Weapons” program.
The Incan Weapons Market
The case of Peru is a good example of how the trafficking of small arms can spread throughout different levels of a country’s government, security forces and civil society. For years there have been reports of trafficking mafias in that country’s military and police. This illicit practice is carried out by both retired and active duty officers. For example, the aforementioned Montesinos-FARC deal over AK rifles (known as “Operation Siberia”) had as main middle man a retired army lieutenant, Jose Aybar Cancho.
In April 2007, an article published on the webpage of the Colombian Air Force highlighted the link between weapons sales from Peru to the FARC. The article explained that in September 2006, Peruvian authorities detained a group of Peruvian weapons traffickers and a load of contraband which included: 25 thousand magazines and five surface-to-air rockets that belonged to the Peruvian armed forces. The article went on to explain that the individuals who were detained for allegedly belonging to this group included Peruvian lower rank army officers, who had easy access to military ammo warehouses.
Investigations were made public in May 2007 that showed that there was a group of arms traffickers that moved weaponry and ammo from Peru to Colombia, via Ecuador. A report pinpointed Luis Pijo Angulo, a retired Peruvian police lieutenant, as the head of the group. Regarding the multiple illegal arms dealers with ties to the country’s military and police forces, the vice-president of the Defense Committee of the Peruvian Congress, David Waisman (also a former defense minister), said “I very much doubt that the high leadership [of the military]does not know about this [the illegal arms trafficking]. I suspect everyone right now as we are talking about very large quantities [of weaponry and ammo].”
The proliferation of small arms in Peru is shown by its blooming black market which makes small arms readily available to citizens. Any individual that visits street markets like Tacora or Las Malvinas in Lima can purchase with ease a Glock for $390 (including two clips of ammo), or a Browning for $400. There is no set price for these weapons; they are sold at whatever the merchant decides. A June 5, 2005 article in La República quotes a Peruvian small arms merchant saying “aquí el precio lo ponemos según la cara de pavo” (“the price [on weapons] is based on the [prospective] buyer’s appearance). Other weaponry (new and used) that can also be easily purchased in such markets include the Brazilian Taurus or the Italian Beretta.
The Caracas Connection
In June 2007, during a visit by Hugo Chavez to Moscow, an agreement was reached between the Venezuelan leader and the Kremlin to construct two plants in Venezuela. The original objective was to have the two plants operational by the end of 2009 or beginning of 2010. However there have been issues regarding this, particularly when it comes to the Russians not moving forward with the construction unless the Venezuelans pay their fees first. One of the plants will produce the AK-103 rifle, while the other facility will produce 7.62mm caliber bullets. At the time it's unclear when and if the facilities will be fully operational, particularly as Caracas is not providing much information about it.
This becomes a security issue when combined with the 100,000 rifles the Chavez government has already purchased from Russia. Furthermore, Caracas has also purchased 5,000 Dragunov sniper rifles. An August 16, 2007 article in the International Herald Tribune explains that: “because sniper rifles are specialized infantry weapons and not typically issued to large numbers of [foot] soldiers, diplomats and military officers and analysts said, a purchase of several thousand Dragunovs would not seem to have a conventional military use for Venezuela's armed forces.” In addition, as stated before, Russia is building a Kalashnikov-rifle factory in Venezuela.
Combining the AK rifles, the Dragunovs, in addition to the weapons already in the arsenal of the country’s security forces, the question then becomes why does Venezuela need AK manufacturing facilities? A possible answer will be that Chavez is seeking to arm his entire nation in order to repel a possible attack from a foreign power (meaning the U.S.) In November 2005, the Associated Press reported that Chavez, during his weekly radio program “Alo Presidente,” had stated “we will do what we can to avoid (a war), but I've told the generals and admirals ... that we must have the rifles ready because, who knows, if a president later has to go prepared into the mountains ... we must be prepared.” Venezuela has about 130,000 troops in its military, in addition to a Chavez-created militia Territorial Guard and the Military Reserves, they are said to number more than 1 million, though only about 10,000 have received arms and training.
It would seem that Chavez is prepared to transform his nation into a military establishment. Unfortunately, his plans could backfire, giving way to growing criminal violence within the country, in part due to the easy availability of stolen weapons. Another fear is that the AK rifles will find their way into the hands of criminal organizations or rebel groups like the FARC or Shining Path.
What (and who) is killing people?
The strategies used in guerrilla warfare consist mostly of ambushes and hit-and-run attacks, which greatly diminish the relevancy of jet fighters or frigates, used for conventional warfare. Examples of attacks that have effectively utilized light weaponry include, for example, a November 2005 attack in Bogota – a hand grenade was thrown in a shop in the neighborhood of Fontibon, in Bogota’s northwest. The explosion killed 3 people, including two children.
In Brazil, a gun fight between rival gangs in June 2006, wounded six children by stray bullets, while eleven more were wounded due to shrapnel. The attack occurred in Rio de Janerio, in the Henrique Foreis school located in a shantytown. A September 9, 2006 Associated Press article by Harold Olmos explained that: “with their labyrinthine webs of narrow alleys, favelas offer easy hideouts to traffickers, and the slums' misery makes it easy to recruit young people into the narcotics trade. A study by the non-governmental group Viva Rio says the city has about 5,000 armed children soldiers in the battle for control of lucrative drug-dealing spots.”
Finally, the rise in criminal violence in Peru, particularly in major cities like Lima, has prompted civilians to purchase small arms in order to protect themselves and their homes, which could easily result in deadly accidents, aside from planned assaults.
A catastrophe could be in the making as Venezuela goes on with the scheduled plan of an AK factory, unless production was under vigorous control. This would almost certainly end up on the black market, or even legally, which could provoke more accidents if children come across ill-stored weapons in their homes.
The Grim Future
As South America becomes more involved in an arms race, there is no reason not to expect that an increase in violence will not follow. Inter-state warfare still remains unlikely; however intra-state warfare as well as widespread acts of ad hoc violence are every-day events in the region. Nations like Colombia and Ecuador have taken some steps to quell the spread of light arms to insurgent groups, as well as to criminal organizations and gangs, but much more needs to be done.
South America may not have witnessed an inter-state ware since the 1995 Peru – Ecuador border dispute; however, a day seldom passes without some new report of deaths or injuries as a result of small arms. The lack of conventional warfare does not mean that South America, the northern Andean region in particular, can be considered an entirely safe zone. Violence occurs using other types of weaponry, not necessarily tanks or fighter planes, but AK rifles, hand grenades and pistols. The future looks very grim for the northern Andean countries as small arms claims the lives of scores of their citizens on a weekly basis. The reality of the northern Andes is that the region is involved in a silent, never-ending cycle of internal violence, a human catastrophe going on before the world’s eyes.
W. Alejandro Sánchez
March, 2010
Wednesday, March 17, 2010
Friday, March 12, 2010
Commentary – The Voice of the People: Tyrannies of the Majority, Re-elections and Healthy Democracies in Latin America
A popular Latin American saying reads, “la voz del pueblo es la voz de Dios,” which translates to “the voice of the people is the voice of God.” This expression can be regarded as a metaphor for one form of the Latin American version of democracy, which essentially means that if the majority of the “people” want an action carried out, it is the duty of the government to do so in some suitable form. The discussions by Colombia’s Constitutional Court regarding whether popular President Alvaro Uribe could run once again for re-election posed a test of what “democracy” means for Latin Americans. If Uribe had been able to run again, it is almost certain he would have been victorious. Nevertheless, can a democracy remain stable and healthy even though a bunch of obstreperous and repeated constitutional referendums aimed at perpetuating even a very popular leader’s stay in office?
The challenges posed by what could have been a possible re-election of Uribe can be compared to the electoral standing of another archly popular statesman who has a popular if contentious figure, and whose popularity that has thrown the constitutional order of his country into a conundrum-- Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. Venezuela’s conservative bloc loathes him while the new suffering poor and parts of the youth are beginning to distance themselves from him, to which could eventually bring down his government. If Chavez’ version of democracy deserves to be heard over time, he would do well to lower the sense of a outrage being felt by both his backers and defamers or else he will clash with the voice and will of the people.
Turning back the clock on Presidential re-elections
The surge of presidential elections over the past couple of decades has had a significant side-effect, the altering of constitutions to allow for the immediate re-election of incumbent presidents. Indeed, several South American countries, until relatively recently, had constitutions that barred this privilege, but a number of sitting presidents have managed to override them. In a March 2009 entry in his blog Politika, renowned Peruvian sociologist and political analyst Fernando Tuesta Soldevilla explains that “in many countries – particularly those with ‘re-electionist’ or dictatorial pasts – the principle of no re-election was installed as a constitutional norm for democracy.” Strongman rulers like Mexico’s Porfirio Diaz (re-elected seven times and in power a total of 27 years), Paraguay’s Alfredo Strossner or the Dominican Republic’s Joaquin Balaguer, all used re-election as an authorizing device to remain almost indefinitely in power.
More recently, Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori spearheaded a re-election trend in his own country via an “auto golpe (self-coup) in April 1992, through which he dissolved the Peruvian parliament and called for new legislative elections from which his party emerged as winner. This strategy allowed Fujimori to write a new constitution in 1993 and provided for an immediate re-election that ultimately led to 1995 victory at the polls. With him serving as head of state, his party, Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoria, then passed a new law, dubbed ley de interpretación auténtica, to allow Fujimori to run for a second re-election (from the government’s point of view, the first re-election under the new 1993 constitution), but accusations of massive corruption and nationwide protests put an end to the Fujimori regime. It should be added that in both the Peruvian Constitutions of 1933 and 1979, there were articles barring immediate re-election by sitting presidents. When Fujimori eventually left power, transitional president Valentín Paniagua re-instated the article barring immediate presidential re-elections Interestingly, article 142 of Peru’s 1933 Constitution states that both immediate re-election is forbidden and any public official who supports a law revoking this, directly or indirectly, will have to cease his public duties and would be barred from holding any public office. It need not be stressed that any lawmakers during Fujimori’s time lost their duties for supporting any form of electionist scheme.
Following on Fujimori’s success at changing the constitution, Carlos Saul Menem, a then popular president of Argentina, altered his country’s constitution in 1993 so he could run for re-election. The reform of the Argentine constitution was passed in 1994 and Menem was re-elected in 1995, ruling until 2000. Likewise Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1994-2002) changed Brazil’s constitution to try for re-election in 1998, which resulted in his victory. Following the success of these leaders, a new generation of Latin American presidents followed suit, re-writing their own constitutions to allow for immediate re-election, like Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and Colombia’s Alvaro Uribe. A January 2009 referendum in Bolivia was approved by more than 60% of the population, allowing the popular President Morales to revise the constitution so he could seek another term, which he won easily in December of that year. On the other hand, another popular president, Lula da Silva of Brazil, respected the two term provisions by rejecting any notion he would seek a constitutional resolution to allow him to run for a third term. He was first elected in 2002 and easily re-elected in 2006.
An example of an unsuccessful self-coup is the May 1993 attempt by Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano. A 1998 journal article by Professor Maxwell Cameron ( Third World Quarterly, 19.2) provides a comparison between Fujimori’s and Serrano’s attempts, mentioning how Serrano was not notably popular at the time of the attempted auto-golpe. Another unsuccessful referendum to change a re-election clause in a constitution came from Panama’s Ernesto Perez Balladares in 1998. Regarding Balladares’ referendum attempt, Marco Gandasegui Jr., professor at the University of Panama, wrote a journal article with a title that summarized the reasons for the president’s loss: “The 1998 Referendum in Panama: A Popular Vote against Neoliberalism” (Latin American Perspectives, 26.2). Again, a president’s popularity may determine what the people were prepared to allow him to do as opposed to what the constitution allows him to do. In such cases, the “voice of the people” was that their leaders not succeed in changing their states’ constitutions, and it was heard.
What is a healthy democracy in Latin America?
Without conducting an in-depth discussion about contemporary democratic history in Latin America, it is safe to say that since its independent history began, the region during its modern period, has been a mixed bag of successes and failures, including periods of military governments and civil wars throughout the 1960s to 1980s. There have been long periods of civilian rule in some countries, involves even these have tended to re-define what a Latin American democracy precisely means, which usually involves re-shaping the rule of law to perpetuate a government’s stay in power. For example, Mexico’s PRI party ruled the country for over seven decades. In Chile, the coalition party that was in power since the fall of the Augusto Pinochet regime in 1990 was Concertación, a union of parties that ruled the country until the recent election of Sebastian Piñera. Even though it has been a series of different leaders in power, the fact that a o party could rule a country for two uninterrupted decades seems to be a hallmark of Latin America’s staple democracy. In Venezuela, two parties ruled the country, taking turns being president, and excluding other parties until Hugo Chavez upset the system in 1999. In turn, Chavez and his Movimiento Quinta Republica, now renamed Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela, have ruled uninterrupted ever since.
The ongoing wave of populist governments has also brought about another new trend: the rise of popular leaders who have successfully sought re-election. Chavez and Uribe are currently the frontrunners of this development, with Bolivia’s Morales coming next, following his recent re-election by a 63% majority. The question remains: are these re-elections good for the democratic health of the country? The authors of the American Federalist Papers refer to the possibility of a tyranny of the majority, in which the voice of the minority is continuously drowned out.
Chavez seems to provide a textbook case–study of this. His power base has been the middle-lower and lower class populations of Venezuelan society who, not surprisingly, make up the majority of the country’s population. His (re)election and the success he has enjoyed in a number of referenda and general elections, with the exception of a municipal election in late 2008, show that more than 50% of Venezuelan society has supported Chavez. However, what does this mean for democracy if the other 49% or less of the country, particularly the upper middle and upper classes, have been ruled out for a decade by a government that they do not agree with? Even though still wealthy, the political minority are finding it harder to express their discontent, as Chavez has cracked down on the independent media. In late January, Caracas removed from the air the popular cable channel RCTV. If Chavez is re-elected in 2012, which is most likely the case, he will have been in power for an astounding two decades. Theoretically, it is the will of the Venezuelan people (50% +1) but is this an example of western-style democracy? The situation reveals a new twist, considering that parts of the Venezuelan youth movement, namely university students coming from the Caracas Central University, are staging protests against the regime. The upcoming legislative elections in September will be a new test of Chavez’s popularity, as well as the support of his policies and the level of popular backing that his legislative delegation in Congress is able to attract.
Chavez and Morales all have proven highly successful at the polls, but the populist system in which they operate does not necessarily foster democracy as they stress hegemonic leadership that lacks significant political opponents in elections. A healthy democracy would ideally tolerate political minorities, irrelevant of their financial capabilities, but being capable of gaining political office through which they can attain power in corruption-free elections.
Populist Leadership 101
The last two decades of presidential elections in several Latin American countries have demonstrated that populist leaders seem to be on the rise or that the concept may be becoming more comprehensive. By populism, we mean new parties made just before presidential elections and which revolve around a charismatic leader and his ideology. Peru’s Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) provides a successful contemporary example of this phenomenon; Chavez, Morales and Uribe would follow. Lula’s victory in Brazil, as well as the 2008 election of former Catholic bishop Fernando Lugo, ending of 61 years of one-party rule in Paraguay (the Colorados), and Uruguay, who elected Tabare Vazquez in 2005, also follow this pattern.
Peru seems to stand out as a particularly interesting case. Of the last four presidents, two were from ad-hoc political parties, namely, Fujimori and Alejandro Toledo Manrique (2001- 2006), with only one from a traditional party, Alan Garcia Perez, who already had ruled from 1985-1990 and was re-elected in 2006. It should be noted that Garcia is the only APRA candidate to be elected to the presidency, which hints at the fact that Garcia’s initial charisma had a lot do to with his electoral victory.
Of late, the new norm seems to be that South American voters prefer to elect candidates that do not belong to traditional parties that they view as inherently corrupt. Again, the will of the people ostensibly is being heard, but does this weaken a the fiber of democracy in view of the candidates being elected and their mantle? If an individual votes for Alejandro Toledo or an Evo Morales, it is not to support their ideology, but because they want to have an individual coming from an indigenous background in power, and in their mind that does bolster democracy. If Argentineans elected Christina de Kichner in 2007 because they believed in her platform, but does it still strengthen democracy that her husband, Nestor Kichner, who was the country’s preceding president (2003-2007), or is this some kind of nepotistic- democracy? Regarding the Venezuela experience, the question that still arises is if lower-class Venezuelans vote for Chavez because they resent and distrust traditional parties that he too despises or because of his fiery socialist commitments which includes his social projects in lower-class communities.
The Rise of the Popular Populist et al
A 2009 journal article by Francisco Panizza and Romina Miorelli entitled “Populism and Democracy in Latin America” (Ethics & International Affairs, 23.1) ,one of dozens published on such a topic, brought about by the rise of leaders like Hugo Chavez. The piece enumerates contemporary leaders that have been defined as “populist,” with Chavez and Morales at the head, following by Lula, Rafael Correa, Michelle Bachelet and Tabare Vazquez. A discussion of populism follows, combined with the different policies which such leaders have adopted and how while Chavez and Morales are considered radical, many of the others are considered moderate. Indeed, it is debatable how many of these leaders, or others following them, can be defined as populist or would feel to describe themselves in such terms. A December 2009 article in Poder360 quotes Michelle Bachelet who joked with a crowd at the Washington DC-based Brookings Institution by saying “can you imagine how much more popular I would be if I was a populist?”
At heart, the issue is whether the voice of the people in each Latin American is being heard in view of who they are. Chavez may be a populist in view of his rhetoric, his vision, and his social-inspired development projects; however, the question is: considering that the head of state’s successes at the polls in recent years seem to be razor thin, with an upper and middle class increasingly alienated, does Chavez remain the most highly regarded populist? On the other hand, Uribe’s internal leadership, particularly appealing vis-à-vis the insurgent movement FARC has allowed him to achieve a monumental degree of popular support which may be more broad than deep, even though his foreign policy is usually archly Washington-friendly and mordantly anti-Chavez. Finally, in theory, Alan Garcia was seen by many as nursing populist tendencies when he was reelected once again as president in 2006, in view that his APRA party is supposed to be moderate left. In his second term, Garcia’s external policy has centered on being particularly friendly towards the U.S. In any case, Garcia was elected instead of a retired Army officer, Ollanta Humala, a declared Hugo Chavez admirer.
Peru’s Alberto Fujimori and Beyond: Mistakes for all Seasons
The rule of Alberto Fujimori in Peru presents a worst-case scenario of what can happen to a popular head of state that has the backing of the people. In 1990 Fujimori was elected president, running largely on an “outsider” platform, capitalizing on the fact that Peruvian society had lost confidence in traditional parties that had ruled the country throughout the 1980s, namely Fernando Belaunde Terry of Accion Popular (1980-1985) and Alan Garcia Perez (1985-1990).
His eventual victory would bring a decade of dictatorship to the country, including a self-coup in April 1992 in which he shut down Congress. In spite of this, he managed to be re-elected in 1995 as the population applauded him for having defeated the two domestic terrorist groups that had waged an internal war in Peru throughout the 1980s, Shining Path and the MRTA. His approachable character, “funny” looks and apparent victory over terrorism made Peruvians turn a blind eye to major human rights abuses taking place in the country, including the creation of a military death squad, Grupo Colina, which was increasingly linked with corruption cases and massacres carried out in Barrios Altos in November 1991 and La Cantuta in July 1992. Indeed, in 1995, he was also able to win re-election by defeating Jose Perez de Cuellar, a popular two-term UN Secretary General. It was only by the late 1990s, as corruption cases mounted and economic growth came to a halt, that it became impossible for Fujimori to continue ruling in spite of his corruption and his sanctioning of major human rights violations. He was forced to flee to Japan under the pretext of attending an APEC forum. At the time, Fujimori and his C90-NM party had managed to once again revise the Peruvian constitution so he could run for a new re-election.
The voice of the Peruvian people thundered in Fujimori’s 1990 and 1995 elections, as he was both elected and then re-elected by large margins. Unfortunately, this popularity gave him a “green light” in luring him into dictatorial actions and multiple rights abuses. He conducted a self-coup in 1992 and continuously cracked down on opposition politicians and media outlets, including former President Alan Garcia, whom Fujimori forced to flee to France and Colombia in self-imposed exile.
People’s Choice vs. the “Big Picture”
A January 2010 piece in The New York Times called “A Sign of Latin America’s Fading Polarization” argued that the election of billionaire Sebastian Piñera to the Chilean presidency “appears to be less a sign of a regional move to the right than that of a pragmatic convergence of left and right agendas.” The author goes on to argue that Piñera will go on to strengthen the group of conservative leaders in the region, like Colombia’s Uribe, Peru’s Alan Garcia Perez and Mexico’s Felipe Calderon.
Nevertheless, the author does not adequately discuss whether the election of these leaders mean that the population of these countries are looking at the “big picture” of ideological tendencies being manifested throughout Latin America, or are focusing solely on domestic politics, on a country by country basis. In addition, it is important to take into account that before Alan Garcia was elected in 2005 (for a second presidential term), the previous Peruvian president, Alejandro Toledo Manrique, was even more Washington-friendly than Garcia has been. One of the reasons why the Peruvian people chose the APRA candidate in the 2005 elections was because they disagreed with Toledo’s implementation of a Washington-inspired free trade economic model.
The Voice of Democracy
While the voice of the people is being heard throughout Latin America in recent presidential balloting, it is questionable if the continuous re-election of a leader, regardless of his or her popularity, supports or harms democracy. Power can corrupt, as was the case of Fujimori’s tap wiring of political opponents, and certain questionable actions taken by Venezuela’s Chavez vis-à-vis the country’s opposition media. It should be added that it is debatable to what degree the now-departing Uribe administration has had a say in the closing of the highly regarded Cambio magazine in Colombia. Nevertheless, it would have been regarded as a reinforcement of democracy if the Colombian leader had intervened to keep the magazine in its current form as a beacon of investigative journalism, even if it carried out investigations against the government itself.
It is most likely better to have a change of the presidential guard in order to maintain a healthy democracy, though this may go against what could be a costly error of the people. Even though the rule of Colombia’s judicial body went against a popular leader, it was most likely the correct choice.
W. Alejandro Sanchez
March, 2010
The challenges posed by what could have been a possible re-election of Uribe can be compared to the electoral standing of another archly popular statesman who has a popular if contentious figure, and whose popularity that has thrown the constitutional order of his country into a conundrum-- Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. Venezuela’s conservative bloc loathes him while the new suffering poor and parts of the youth are beginning to distance themselves from him, to which could eventually bring down his government. If Chavez’ version of democracy deserves to be heard over time, he would do well to lower the sense of a outrage being felt by both his backers and defamers or else he will clash with the voice and will of the people.
Turning back the clock on Presidential re-elections
The surge of presidential elections over the past couple of decades has had a significant side-effect, the altering of constitutions to allow for the immediate re-election of incumbent presidents. Indeed, several South American countries, until relatively recently, had constitutions that barred this privilege, but a number of sitting presidents have managed to override them. In a March 2009 entry in his blog Politika, renowned Peruvian sociologist and political analyst Fernando Tuesta Soldevilla explains that “in many countries – particularly those with ‘re-electionist’ or dictatorial pasts – the principle of no re-election was installed as a constitutional norm for democracy.” Strongman rulers like Mexico’s Porfirio Diaz (re-elected seven times and in power a total of 27 years), Paraguay’s Alfredo Strossner or the Dominican Republic’s Joaquin Balaguer, all used re-election as an authorizing device to remain almost indefinitely in power.
More recently, Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori spearheaded a re-election trend in his own country via an “auto golpe (self-coup) in April 1992, through which he dissolved the Peruvian parliament and called for new legislative elections from which his party emerged as winner. This strategy allowed Fujimori to write a new constitution in 1993 and provided for an immediate re-election that ultimately led to 1995 victory at the polls. With him serving as head of state, his party, Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoria, then passed a new law, dubbed ley de interpretación auténtica, to allow Fujimori to run for a second re-election (from the government’s point of view, the first re-election under the new 1993 constitution), but accusations of massive corruption and nationwide protests put an end to the Fujimori regime. It should be added that in both the Peruvian Constitutions of 1933 and 1979, there were articles barring immediate re-election by sitting presidents. When Fujimori eventually left power, transitional president Valentín Paniagua re-instated the article barring immediate presidential re-elections Interestingly, article 142 of Peru’s 1933 Constitution states that both immediate re-election is forbidden and any public official who supports a law revoking this, directly or indirectly, will have to cease his public duties and would be barred from holding any public office. It need not be stressed that any lawmakers during Fujimori’s time lost their duties for supporting any form of electionist scheme.
Following on Fujimori’s success at changing the constitution, Carlos Saul Menem, a then popular president of Argentina, altered his country’s constitution in 1993 so he could run for re-election. The reform of the Argentine constitution was passed in 1994 and Menem was re-elected in 1995, ruling until 2000. Likewise Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1994-2002) changed Brazil’s constitution to try for re-election in 1998, which resulted in his victory. Following the success of these leaders, a new generation of Latin American presidents followed suit, re-writing their own constitutions to allow for immediate re-election, like Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and Colombia’s Alvaro Uribe. A January 2009 referendum in Bolivia was approved by more than 60% of the population, allowing the popular President Morales to revise the constitution so he could seek another term, which he won easily in December of that year. On the other hand, another popular president, Lula da Silva of Brazil, respected the two term provisions by rejecting any notion he would seek a constitutional resolution to allow him to run for a third term. He was first elected in 2002 and easily re-elected in 2006.
An example of an unsuccessful self-coup is the May 1993 attempt by Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano. A 1998 journal article by Professor Maxwell Cameron ( Third World Quarterly, 19.2) provides a comparison between Fujimori’s and Serrano’s attempts, mentioning how Serrano was not notably popular at the time of the attempted auto-golpe. Another unsuccessful referendum to change a re-election clause in a constitution came from Panama’s Ernesto Perez Balladares in 1998. Regarding Balladares’ referendum attempt, Marco Gandasegui Jr., professor at the University of Panama, wrote a journal article with a title that summarized the reasons for the president’s loss: “The 1998 Referendum in Panama: A Popular Vote against Neoliberalism” (Latin American Perspectives, 26.2). Again, a president’s popularity may determine what the people were prepared to allow him to do as opposed to what the constitution allows him to do. In such cases, the “voice of the people” was that their leaders not succeed in changing their states’ constitutions, and it was heard.
What is a healthy democracy in Latin America?
Without conducting an in-depth discussion about contemporary democratic history in Latin America, it is safe to say that since its independent history began, the region during its modern period, has been a mixed bag of successes and failures, including periods of military governments and civil wars throughout the 1960s to 1980s. There have been long periods of civilian rule in some countries, involves even these have tended to re-define what a Latin American democracy precisely means, which usually involves re-shaping the rule of law to perpetuate a government’s stay in power. For example, Mexico’s PRI party ruled the country for over seven decades. In Chile, the coalition party that was in power since the fall of the Augusto Pinochet regime in 1990 was Concertación, a union of parties that ruled the country until the recent election of Sebastian Piñera. Even though it has been a series of different leaders in power, the fact that a o party could rule a country for two uninterrupted decades seems to be a hallmark of Latin America’s staple democracy. In Venezuela, two parties ruled the country, taking turns being president, and excluding other parties until Hugo Chavez upset the system in 1999. In turn, Chavez and his Movimiento Quinta Republica, now renamed Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela, have ruled uninterrupted ever since.
The ongoing wave of populist governments has also brought about another new trend: the rise of popular leaders who have successfully sought re-election. Chavez and Uribe are currently the frontrunners of this development, with Bolivia’s Morales coming next, following his recent re-election by a 63% majority. The question remains: are these re-elections good for the democratic health of the country? The authors of the American Federalist Papers refer to the possibility of a tyranny of the majority, in which the voice of the minority is continuously drowned out.
Chavez seems to provide a textbook case–study of this. His power base has been the middle-lower and lower class populations of Venezuelan society who, not surprisingly, make up the majority of the country’s population. His (re)election and the success he has enjoyed in a number of referenda and general elections, with the exception of a municipal election in late 2008, show that more than 50% of Venezuelan society has supported Chavez. However, what does this mean for democracy if the other 49% or less of the country, particularly the upper middle and upper classes, have been ruled out for a decade by a government that they do not agree with? Even though still wealthy, the political minority are finding it harder to express their discontent, as Chavez has cracked down on the independent media. In late January, Caracas removed from the air the popular cable channel RCTV. If Chavez is re-elected in 2012, which is most likely the case, he will have been in power for an astounding two decades. Theoretically, it is the will of the Venezuelan people (50% +1) but is this an example of western-style democracy? The situation reveals a new twist, considering that parts of the Venezuelan youth movement, namely university students coming from the Caracas Central University, are staging protests against the regime. The upcoming legislative elections in September will be a new test of Chavez’s popularity, as well as the support of his policies and the level of popular backing that his legislative delegation in Congress is able to attract.
Chavez and Morales all have proven highly successful at the polls, but the populist system in which they operate does not necessarily foster democracy as they stress hegemonic leadership that lacks significant political opponents in elections. A healthy democracy would ideally tolerate political minorities, irrelevant of their financial capabilities, but being capable of gaining political office through which they can attain power in corruption-free elections.
Populist Leadership 101
The last two decades of presidential elections in several Latin American countries have demonstrated that populist leaders seem to be on the rise or that the concept may be becoming more comprehensive. By populism, we mean new parties made just before presidential elections and which revolve around a charismatic leader and his ideology. Peru’s Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) provides a successful contemporary example of this phenomenon; Chavez, Morales and Uribe would follow. Lula’s victory in Brazil, as well as the 2008 election of former Catholic bishop Fernando Lugo, ending of 61 years of one-party rule in Paraguay (the Colorados), and Uruguay, who elected Tabare Vazquez in 2005, also follow this pattern.
Peru seems to stand out as a particularly interesting case. Of the last four presidents, two were from ad-hoc political parties, namely, Fujimori and Alejandro Toledo Manrique (2001- 2006), with only one from a traditional party, Alan Garcia Perez, who already had ruled from 1985-1990 and was re-elected in 2006. It should be noted that Garcia is the only APRA candidate to be elected to the presidency, which hints at the fact that Garcia’s initial charisma had a lot do to with his electoral victory.
Of late, the new norm seems to be that South American voters prefer to elect candidates that do not belong to traditional parties that they view as inherently corrupt. Again, the will of the people ostensibly is being heard, but does this weaken a the fiber of democracy in view of the candidates being elected and their mantle? If an individual votes for Alejandro Toledo or an Evo Morales, it is not to support their ideology, but because they want to have an individual coming from an indigenous background in power, and in their mind that does bolster democracy. If Argentineans elected Christina de Kichner in 2007 because they believed in her platform, but does it still strengthen democracy that her husband, Nestor Kichner, who was the country’s preceding president (2003-2007), or is this some kind of nepotistic- democracy? Regarding the Venezuela experience, the question that still arises is if lower-class Venezuelans vote for Chavez because they resent and distrust traditional parties that he too despises or because of his fiery socialist commitments which includes his social projects in lower-class communities.
The Rise of the Popular Populist et al
A 2009 journal article by Francisco Panizza and Romina Miorelli entitled “Populism and Democracy in Latin America” (Ethics & International Affairs, 23.1) ,one of dozens published on such a topic, brought about by the rise of leaders like Hugo Chavez. The piece enumerates contemporary leaders that have been defined as “populist,” with Chavez and Morales at the head, following by Lula, Rafael Correa, Michelle Bachelet and Tabare Vazquez. A discussion of populism follows, combined with the different policies which such leaders have adopted and how while Chavez and Morales are considered radical, many of the others are considered moderate. Indeed, it is debatable how many of these leaders, or others following them, can be defined as populist or would feel to describe themselves in such terms. A December 2009 article in Poder360 quotes Michelle Bachelet who joked with a crowd at the Washington DC-based Brookings Institution by saying “can you imagine how much more popular I would be if I was a populist?”
At heart, the issue is whether the voice of the people in each Latin American is being heard in view of who they are. Chavez may be a populist in view of his rhetoric, his vision, and his social-inspired development projects; however, the question is: considering that the head of state’s successes at the polls in recent years seem to be razor thin, with an upper and middle class increasingly alienated, does Chavez remain the most highly regarded populist? On the other hand, Uribe’s internal leadership, particularly appealing vis-à-vis the insurgent movement FARC has allowed him to achieve a monumental degree of popular support which may be more broad than deep, even though his foreign policy is usually archly Washington-friendly and mordantly anti-Chavez. Finally, in theory, Alan Garcia was seen by many as nursing populist tendencies when he was reelected once again as president in 2006, in view that his APRA party is supposed to be moderate left. In his second term, Garcia’s external policy has centered on being particularly friendly towards the U.S. In any case, Garcia was elected instead of a retired Army officer, Ollanta Humala, a declared Hugo Chavez admirer.
Peru’s Alberto Fujimori and Beyond: Mistakes for all Seasons
The rule of Alberto Fujimori in Peru presents a worst-case scenario of what can happen to a popular head of state that has the backing of the people. In 1990 Fujimori was elected president, running largely on an “outsider” platform, capitalizing on the fact that Peruvian society had lost confidence in traditional parties that had ruled the country throughout the 1980s, namely Fernando Belaunde Terry of Accion Popular (1980-1985) and Alan Garcia Perez (1985-1990).
His eventual victory would bring a decade of dictatorship to the country, including a self-coup in April 1992 in which he shut down Congress. In spite of this, he managed to be re-elected in 1995 as the population applauded him for having defeated the two domestic terrorist groups that had waged an internal war in Peru throughout the 1980s, Shining Path and the MRTA. His approachable character, “funny” looks and apparent victory over terrorism made Peruvians turn a blind eye to major human rights abuses taking place in the country, including the creation of a military death squad, Grupo Colina, which was increasingly linked with corruption cases and massacres carried out in Barrios Altos in November 1991 and La Cantuta in July 1992. Indeed, in 1995, he was also able to win re-election by defeating Jose Perez de Cuellar, a popular two-term UN Secretary General. It was only by the late 1990s, as corruption cases mounted and economic growth came to a halt, that it became impossible for Fujimori to continue ruling in spite of his corruption and his sanctioning of major human rights violations. He was forced to flee to Japan under the pretext of attending an APEC forum. At the time, Fujimori and his C90-NM party had managed to once again revise the Peruvian constitution so he could run for a new re-election.
The voice of the Peruvian people thundered in Fujimori’s 1990 and 1995 elections, as he was both elected and then re-elected by large margins. Unfortunately, this popularity gave him a “green light” in luring him into dictatorial actions and multiple rights abuses. He conducted a self-coup in 1992 and continuously cracked down on opposition politicians and media outlets, including former President Alan Garcia, whom Fujimori forced to flee to France and Colombia in self-imposed exile.
People’s Choice vs. the “Big Picture”
A January 2010 piece in The New York Times called “A Sign of Latin America’s Fading Polarization” argued that the election of billionaire Sebastian Piñera to the Chilean presidency “appears to be less a sign of a regional move to the right than that of a pragmatic convergence of left and right agendas.” The author goes on to argue that Piñera will go on to strengthen the group of conservative leaders in the region, like Colombia’s Uribe, Peru’s Alan Garcia Perez and Mexico’s Felipe Calderon.
Nevertheless, the author does not adequately discuss whether the election of these leaders mean that the population of these countries are looking at the “big picture” of ideological tendencies being manifested throughout Latin America, or are focusing solely on domestic politics, on a country by country basis. In addition, it is important to take into account that before Alan Garcia was elected in 2005 (for a second presidential term), the previous Peruvian president, Alejandro Toledo Manrique, was even more Washington-friendly than Garcia has been. One of the reasons why the Peruvian people chose the APRA candidate in the 2005 elections was because they disagreed with Toledo’s implementation of a Washington-inspired free trade economic model.
The Voice of Democracy
While the voice of the people is being heard throughout Latin America in recent presidential balloting, it is questionable if the continuous re-election of a leader, regardless of his or her popularity, supports or harms democracy. Power can corrupt, as was the case of Fujimori’s tap wiring of political opponents, and certain questionable actions taken by Venezuela’s Chavez vis-à-vis the country’s opposition media. It should be added that it is debatable to what degree the now-departing Uribe administration has had a say in the closing of the highly regarded Cambio magazine in Colombia. Nevertheless, it would have been regarded as a reinforcement of democracy if the Colombian leader had intervened to keep the magazine in its current form as a beacon of investigative journalism, even if it carried out investigations against the government itself.
It is most likely better to have a change of the presidential guard in order to maintain a healthy democracy, though this may go against what could be a costly error of the people. Even though the rule of Colombia’s judicial body went against a popular leader, it was most likely the correct choice.
W. Alejandro Sanchez
March, 2010
Thursday, February 11, 2010
List of Published Journal Articles (so far!)
Rebirth of Insurgency in Peru. Small Wars and Insurgencies.14/3.
http://bit.ly/cNNVMY
A Central Asian Security Paradigm: Russia and Uzbekistan. Small Wars and Insurgencies. 18/1.
http://bit.ly/a74a6o
Cuba and Russia: Love is Better the Second Time Around. Cuban Affairs: Quarterly Electronic Journal. 2/2. April 2007.
http://www.cubanaffairsjournal.org/Content%20Archive.asp
Corsica: France’s Petite Security Problem. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. July 2008 Vol. 31 (7).
http://bit.ly/boOzu4
A War of Attrition: Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers. Small Wars & Insurgencies. 19/4 (December 2008)
http://bit.ly/cEPNIP
A Drop in the Ocean: A Discussion of Bulgaria’s NATO Membership and Black Sea Geopolitics. European Security. December 2008. (Vol.17, No. 4).
http://bit.ly/a5cjY2
Tunisia: Trading Freedom for Stability may not Last – An International Security Perspective. Defence Studies. for 19/1 issue (March 2009).
http://bit.ly/aoRySv
The “Frozen” Southeast: How the Moldova-Transnistria Question has Become
a European Geo-Security Issue. Journal of Slavic Military Studies. June 2009. 22/2
http://bit.ly/d4SBVf
http://bit.ly/cNNVMY
A Central Asian Security Paradigm: Russia and Uzbekistan. Small Wars and Insurgencies. 18/1.
http://bit.ly/a74a6o
Cuba and Russia: Love is Better the Second Time Around. Cuban Affairs: Quarterly Electronic Journal. 2/2. April 2007.
http://www.cubanaffairsjournal.org/Content%20Archive.asp
Corsica: France’s Petite Security Problem. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. July 2008 Vol. 31 (7).
http://bit.ly/boOzu4
A War of Attrition: Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers. Small Wars & Insurgencies. 19/4 (December 2008)
http://bit.ly/cEPNIP
A Drop in the Ocean: A Discussion of Bulgaria’s NATO Membership and Black Sea Geopolitics. European Security. December 2008. (Vol.17, No. 4).
http://bit.ly/a5cjY2
Tunisia: Trading Freedom for Stability may not Last – An International Security Perspective. Defence Studies. for 19/1 issue (March 2009).
http://bit.ly/aoRySv
The “Frozen” Southeast: How the Moldova-Transnistria Question has Become
a European Geo-Security Issue. Journal of Slavic Military Studies. June 2009. 22/2
http://bit.ly/d4SBVf
Wednesday, February 3, 2010
Letter to the Editor - Int'l Herald Tribune - Abkhazia and Taiwan
International Herald Tribune
Published: December 22, 2009
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/23/opinion/23iht-edletters.html?_r=3
Letters to the International Herald Tribune
Published: December 22, 2009
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/23/opinion/23iht-edletters.html?_r=3
Abkhazia and Taiwan
It seems that Abkhazia (and probably South Ossetia) is becoming the new Taiwan (“Georgian region gets 21 square kilometers of support,” news article, Dec., 17). Without drawing comparisons between the histories and raison d’être of each “state,” there are some superficial similarities that make the situation ironic. Both are recognized by only a handful of countries, usually small and by means of financial stimulus, and are protected by a military power — Russia for Abkhazia and the United States for Taiwan — without which they could not survive.
Certainly, Taiwan is regarded as a free state that is standing up to the oppressive mainland, which wants to re-annex it. Abkhazia, meanwhile, inspires a mixed bag of feelings. Some of its people see themselves as separate from Georgia and its corrupt government. However, it may never be able to fully shake off the fact that its independence came about via Russian military intervention against Tbilisi (whether justified or not).
Alex Sanchez,Washington
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