Friday, September 13, 2013

VOXXI: Guatemala plays a key role on the Syria crisis

Guatemala plays a key role on the Syria Crisis
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
September 13, 2013
Originally published: http://www.voxxi.com/guatemala-key-role-syria-crisis/

As the possibility of a military intervention by the U.S. against the Assad regime in Syria seems to have been put on hold, the Syrian civil war has entered a bizarre status quo.
The conflict within Syria continues, but the international community is generally opposed to a (U.S-led) military operation against Assad’s forces.
One of the few countries in the Western Hemisphere that has declared its support for this option is Guatemala, one of two rotating members representing Latin America and the Caribbean (the other being Argentina) at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
The Eternal U.S. Ally?
So far, the Guatemalan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Guatemalan delegation to the United Nations have made standard diplomatic statements, though they have come out in favor of sanctions and a possible military intervention spearheaded by Washington.
For example, back in July 2012, Guatemala voted in favor of a UNSC resolution that would have imposed sanctions on Syria. Moreover, an undated press release by the Guatemalan delegation to the United Nations highlights how it has voted in favor of resolutions in the UN’s General Assembly (A/66/253A, A/66/253B, A/66/176 and A/67/183) lamenting the loss of life and calling for negotiations.
The Guatemalan government took a stronger stance after August 21, following revelations that the Syrian government had utilized chemical weapons, namely sarin gas, against civilians. Some 1,500 individuals were killed in a Damascus suburb as a result of this attack.
After the alleged chemical attack took place, the Guatemalan Foreign Affairs Ministry released a statement calling for an investigation of the incident.

 Syria crisis

In traditional diplomatic parlance, the Ministry explained that: “Guatemala calls for all sides involved in the conflict in Syria to facilitate and guarantee the access of UN investigators to the area where events took place […]” More controversially, the Guatemalan government declared its support for a possible U.S. military intervention in the country.
A late August statement explains that “the government of Guatemala fully supports the call [by the U.S.] for the international community to not cross its arms in the face of these deplorable events.”
Shortly after, on September 1st, President Otto Pérez Molina expressed his support for President Obama’s intention to carry out a military operation in Syria.
According to media reports, the Guatemalan leader stated that “we [Guatemala] clearly and definitely support the decision that the U.S. President has taken so that chemical weapons will not be utilized again, which cause mass deaths. That is Guatemala’s position.”
A Brief Overview of U.S. – Guatemala Relations
Arguably, Guatemala’s stance supporting a U.S. military initiative in the UNSC stems from the country’s desire to remain on good terms with Washington.
Exemplifying this is a June 2013 meeting of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, in which Guatemalan President Perez Molina met with Secretary John Kerry.
During the high-level assembly, the Guatemalan leader expressed to the senior U.S. official his aspiration to see his Central American nation join the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Moreover, a May 2013 report by the Congressional Research Service entitled Guatemala: Political, Security, and Socio-Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations discusses U.S. aid to Guatemala.
The report explains that the Central American state received $110 millionin the Fiscal Year 2011, which decreased to an estimated $95 million in the FY2012.
The report adds that, “The Perez Molina Administration, like previous Guatemalan administration, has been pressing the United States to drop those conditions and provide increased military aid to the army.”Current U.S. military aid is centered on counternarcotics programs.
It is important to explain how a diplomatic stance regarding a military intervention in Syria is perceived through geopolitical eyes. Does the fact that Guatemala’s President Perez Molina is in favor of a U.S. military strike signify that the country remains under Washington’s sphere of influence?
Furthermore, to what extent has the Guatemalan government considered the unforeseen effects of a military strike against the Syrian government before its declarations supporting intervention?
The call to arms against the Syrian government by the Guatemalan government should be placed in a historical context. Namely, the situation in Syria can be compared to that Central American country’s own bloody civil war (1960-1966), between the government and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URGN).
The Guatemalan internal conflict was particularly violent, claiming over 200,000 lives, and became known for crimes such as the 1978 Panzos massacre. Given this recent history, a pro-military stance in Syria goes along quite well with Guatemala’s tendency to resort to violence to solve security problems.
Representing Who?
Agreeing to a military intervention is not an easy thing for any government to do. And of course, there is a difference between a country having the right to declare that an intervention is necessary and actually voting in favor one of in a forum like the UNSC, as well as participating in it.
The Guatemalan government has a right to declare that a military intervention in Syria (against the Assad regime) is necessary.
Nevertheless, it should be stressed that Guatemala’s stance in the UNSC goes against the positions vis-à-vis Syria of most of the Western Hemisphere.
Recent declarations by the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) highlight that most Western Hemisphere governments are against a new U.S.-led military operation.
One can only hope that Guatemala’s diplomatic stances in the UNSC regarding Syria has been reached after a lengthy and rational debate regarding moral obligations and national interests in Guatemala City.


Read more: http://www.voxxi.com/guatemala-key-role-syria-crisis/#ixzz2eoGUm0PO

Wednesday, September 11, 2013

Blouin Beat: Politics - Pinochet’s legacy still alive and still divisive








Pinochet's Legacy still alive and still divisive
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Blouin Beat: Politics
September 11, 2013
Originally published: http://blogs.blouinnews.com/blouinbeatpolitics/2013/09/11/pinochets-legacy-still-alive-and-still-divisive/

Wednesday, September 11, marks the 40th anniversary of the military coup in Chile that brought Army General Augusto Pinochet to power. As the violent clashes between police and protesters that flared up on the anniversary show, the general’s legacy is still a bitterly divisive one. The remains of the roughly 1,200 desaparecidos (the “disappeared”) of Pinochet’s brutal rule have yet to be found; it is estimated that some 3,100 people were murdered and over 38,000 were tortured by Pinochet’s security forces, including the infamous National Intelligence Directorate (DINA).
Yet even as the Pinochet regime carried out these repressions, it laid the groundwork (primarily by privatizing state-owned enterprises and decreasing state control over private enterprises) for making modern-day Chile a regional economic powerhouse, with flourishing industries and a generally stable economy. One of his most memorable decisions was to rely on the famous Ley de Cobre (Copper Law) which was originally established in 1958 and maintained under Pinochet’s rule. Thanks to the law, 10% of the profits of copper sales of the state-owned mining company CODELCO were used for military purchases, which aided Chile in becoming the local military big fish that it is today. During Pinochet’s rule, the country also became an exporter of goods such asfish, flour and fruits.
Pinochet still has his defenders, thanks in large part to that economic legacy. Yet an astonishing move that may signal a change of attitudes regarding how Chilean society perceives Pinochet’s rule, an association of Pinochet-era judges recently released a statement to the public asking for forgiveness for aiding the dictatorship by not protesting the detentions of prisoners. The judges’ statement declares that “the Judiciary, and the Supreme Court of that era in particular, capitulated their duty of protecting fundamental human rights and protecting the individuals that were victims of abuse by the state.” Moreover, a plethora of new studies and analyses have appeared over the years, revising Chile’s economic successes during the Pinochet era. As analyst Farid Kahhat has argued, the average 1% growth of the gross domestic product in the 1980s in Chile is not in itself remarkable, and indeed is significantly less than the economic growth under the democratic governments that followed the end of the dictatorship.
All this, however, is not to say that Chile’s political system is coming out from the shadow cast by Pinochet. After all, he and his cadres never really faced accountability: trials of military servicemen that committed human rights abuses during the dictatorship progress painfully slowly and Pinochet himself avoided actual punishment even though he was tried several times; he died a free man in 2006. And that shadow looms especially large now, in the months before the nation’s November presidential elections.  There’s a visceral connection to that era at play. The frontrunner, former President Michelle Bachelet is known for having been an opponent of Pinochet. In 1975, she and her mother were detained and tortured by the DINA in the regime’s infamous detention center, Villa Grimaldi. Another candidate, Evelyn Rose Matthei Fornet, had a better life during the dictatorship. Her father served as Minister of Health and commander of Chile’s Air Force during the Pinochet years.
At the time of this writing, it is all but certain that Bachelet will be elected for a new presidential term. A recent poll carried out the Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP) between July and August show that 44% of polled Chileans would like to see Bachelet win. The closest runner up is Matthei Forner, with a distant 12%. And the public’s sense of Bachelet’s inevitability outdoes even her popularity: 75% of that same pool of respondents believe that Bachelet will be re-elected, compared to only 6% who see Matthei pulling a major upset.
With the results of the upcoming November elections seemingly a foregone conclusion, it’s not too early to begin an assessment of Bachelet’s second-term, especially her economic ones. So far, it seems that the former president wants to carry initiatives such as hiking (or attempting to hike) public spending in order to appease citizens infuriated by the current Sebastián Piñera government, particularly the university students who have carried out occasionally violent protests since May 2011. At the international level, look for a continuation of her welcoming stance on free trade agreements. Of particular interest are the future negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, an ambitious free trade area that would unite major economies from the Asia-Pacific region with the U.S. and Latin America’s rising economic stars (of which Chile is one of the brightest). So far, statements by Bachelet’s entourage hint that she will maintain Chilean participation in the TPP negotiations.
So there is an irony here, and one worth remarking on: as rightly reviled as Pinochet was for his political repressions, his economic legacy has been cautiously embraced even by men and women of the left like Bachelet — an embrace that looks likely to tighten even as his political legacy becomes ever more toxic.

Friday, September 6, 2013

VOXXI: Does Colombia’s Juan Manuel Santos deserve a 21% popularity?


Does Colombia's Juan Manuel Santos deserve a 21% popularity?
W. Alejandro Sanchez
VOXXI
September 6, 2013
Originally published: http://www.voxxi.com/colombia-juan-manuel-santos-popularity/

A recent poll by Gallup shows that the popularity of Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos has spiraled down to an astonishing 21% approval rate, his lowest since he took office in 2010. The comprehensive poll also signals that it is not just the president himself that is unpopular, but also the policy decisions he has taken on specific issues.
The likelihood that the Colombian head of state might be re-elected in 2014 (should he decide to run again) looks grim as, in spite of some diplomatic successes, domestic issues continue to cripple his presidency. Namely, the ongoing protests by the country’s farmers have spearheaded the population’s widespread discontent with Santos’ economic policies, which include a free trade agreement (FTA) with the U.S.

The farmers’ protests

A series of protests by farmers that started in the countryside in mid-August have quickly spread throughout the country, including Bogota. The peasants and farmers demand that the government review its policies regarding subsidies and free trade agreements (i.e. with the U.S.), which affect the country’s vital agricultural sector.
Specific issues of discontent are the price of fertilizers and the lack of protection from agricultural imports, such as onions, which affect the local market prices and, in turn, hurt Colombian farmers.
Additionally, policymakers have joined peasants in critiquing the FTA between the U.S. and Colombia. In a May 10 statement in the Colombian Senate’s website, Senator Jorge Enrique Robledo of the Polo Democratico Party argued that the FTA with the U.S. has had negative effects on his nation. The article provides data regarding Colombian imports from the U.S. between June 2012 and March 2013 (including products like rice, milk, poultry and pork), revealing that the amount has increased by 70% since the FTA came into effect.
In other words, the Colombian policymaker’s article indicates that Colombia is now importing more agricultural products than it is exporting due to the FTA, significantly affecting the country’s own agricultural sector.
The peasants’ protests disrupted traffic as they took over major highways and spread throughout the country. Moreover, the peasants’ protests have gained the support of the general population, shown by protests in downtown Bogota where citizens banged pots (the ever popular cacerolazos) as recently as September 4th. Additionally, the camioneros, the truck drivers that are the cornerstone of the transportation of goods, have rallied in favor of the peasants and have protested in Medellin.
In the wake of these alarming developments, Juan Manuel Santos ordered the deployment of the Colombian Army within Bogota to quell protests. The head of state presumably felt that the military’s intervention was necessary since the police have not been able to bring the protests under control.
(Two people died and around 200 were injured during protests and acts of vandalism in Bogota in late August while an additional three protesters may have died as recently as September 5 in Cauca). Nevertheless, the internal deployment of the armed forces has never been popular, given Latin America’s history, and this move likely helped the decrease of popular support against the leader.

Some successes … but concern continues

Leaving the recent protests aside for a moment, is the South American President’s growing popularity justified? From an outsider’s perspective, the South American nation would appear to be doing fairly well, particularly when compared to neighboring Venezuela, which recently suffered major blackouts.
At a diplomatic level, the country is a member of the Pacific Alliance, the newest Latin American trade bloc that is composed of the region’s economic rising stars. Meanwhile, at the domestic level, Santos’ administration has been working to reach a historic peace agreement with the FARC guerrillas.
The government’s goal is to have a peace treaty signed before December 2013. Moreover, media reports are rumoring that the government may begin peace negotiations with Colombia’s other insurgent movement, the ELN.
But the aforementioned successes have not aided the perception of Juan Manuel Santos’ presidency by the Colombian population, best exemplified by the farmers’ protests. The most recent Gallup poll demonstrates that Colombians are also concerned about a variety of issues (besides agriculture). For example, there is a rising unease regarding citizen security, which increased from 73% (a similar poll was taking in June) to 84%. Additionally, concerns about the way the economy is being handled went up from 49% to 71%.
Moreover, the Colombian-FARC negotiations are moving ahead at a snail’s pace, with few advances in the discussions’ five-point plan. In late-August, the two sides took “a break,” as Juan Manuel Santos ordered his negotiations team to return from Havana, Cuba (where the discussions are taking place). Given popular discontent with his administration, a peace agreement could save the Santos presidency, but the current situation signals that it is highly unlikely that a treaty can be reached before the end of the year.
In an August 30 tweet in the Colombian president’s official Twitter account, Juan Manuel Santos (or whoever tweets for him) posted, “We will work to create a national pact for the agricultural sector and rural development.” If Santos still plans to announce a re-election bid for the upcoming 2014 elections, the first goal is to achieve some successful agreement with the agricultural sector.


Read more: http://www.voxxi.com/colombia-juan-manuel-santos-popularity/#ixzz2e8gdBeIA

Wednesday, September 4, 2013

VOXXI: One (Small) Step Closer to Justice: The 1989 Jesuits Massacre in El Salvador


One (Small) Step Closer to Justice: The 1989 Jesuits Massacre in El SalvadorW. Alejandro
VOXXI
September 4, 2013
Originally published: http://www.voxxi.com/1989-jesuits-massacre-el-salvador/
On August 27, a federal court in Boston sentenced Inocente Orlando Montano, a retired Army Colonel of El Salvador, to serve 21-months in prison for immigration fraud (he provided false information in his visa application forms about having received military training). After his sentence is completed, he could be extradited to Spain to be trialed for participating in a 1989 massacre committed during El Salvador’s bloody civil war. Should Montano’s extradition and pending trial be successful, it would signify a huge success in ensuring accountability and delivering justice for crimes committed during that conflict.

A background of murder

Around 75,000 people died during El Salvador’s 12-year internal conflict (1980 – 1992), which pitted the Salvadoran government against left-wing guerrillas, namely the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). The war coincided with other internal conflicts with in Central America, as part of the proxy wars Washington and Moscow carried out during the Cold War.
The conflict in El Salvador became notorious for its high-profile killings and massacres, such as the 1980 assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero and the murders of 800 peasants by the Salvadoran Army in December 1981, known as the El Mozote Massacre. However a 1993 immunity law protects servicemen from being brought to justice for human right violations committed during this period.
Montano is implicated in another infamous atrocity of El Salvador’s internal conflict: the murder of six Jesuit priests, a housekeeper and her daughter in the University of Central America (UCA) in San Salvador. (click here for a comprehensive summary of the incident). On the night of November 16, 1989, a Salvadoran Army patrol entered the University’s campus and killed the aforementioned civilians. The operation was part of a counter offensive that the Salvadoran military launched to regain momentum in the civil war, after FMLN fighters had launched an offensive on November 11 in San Salvador (the country’s capital).
The military’s objective was to blame the FMLN for the murder of the priests and women. The soldiers of the Atlacatl Batallion that took part in the murder of the priests utilized an “AK-47 rifle that had belonged to the FMLN”; writing on a cardboard FMLN propaganda like “FMLN executed those who informed on it [...] Victory or death, FMLN.” The website of the School of the Americas Watch (SOAW) has a list of 19 officers that are linked to this atrocity and which includes Inocente Orlando Montano; an Army colonel and Deputy Minister of Public Safety in El Salvador at the time of the Jesuits Massacre.
Justice (via Madrid) at last?
In August 2011, Montano was arrested for immigration fraud and was sentenced to 21 months two years later. This opportunity is being seized by the Spanish government to have him extradited to Spain to be put on trial for the Jesuits Massacre, in which five of the priests killed were Spanish citizens.
In 2011 a Spanish court indicted Montano, as well as another 19 military officers, with having taken part in the operation. (Two officers were convicted in a Salvadoran court of participating in the crime but they were eventually freed thanks to the aforementioned 1993 amnesty law). In May 2012, the Salvadoran Supreme Court of Justice denied the extradition of 13 out of the 20 officers, but Montano was not one of them.
There is renewed optimism among survivors of the Salvadoran civil war and human rights organizations that Montano’s arrest and sentence in Boston as well as a possible extradition to Spain would bring some long delayed justice. For example, after the Boston court dictated its sentence, the Center for Justice Accountability (CJA), a major NGO in California that has done extensive research on the massacre of the Jesuits, released a statement in which it stated that Montanos’ “sentence is an extraordinarily important step forward for the relatives of the victims of the massacre and sends a message to human rights abusers that they cannot seek safe haven in the U.S. and avoid accountability for their actions.”
Meanwhile, Almudena Bernabéu, the Spanish lawyer that represents the families of the Spanish Jesuits, declared to the Spanish daily El País that she hopes that President Obama “will fulfil the obligation of the U.S. to extradite Colonel Montano to Spain,” after his sentence is complete.
A successful extradition of Montano to Spain and trial for the Jesuits Massacre would mean that, at a snail’s  pace, more individuals that carried out major human rights abuses during the Central American wars will finally pay for the abuses of power and human rights that were committed in this dark period of the region’s history.