VOXXI: Gang Truce in El Salvador

Gang Truce in El Salvador
W. Alejandro Sanchez
September 20, 2012
VOXXI
Originally published: http://www.voxxi.com/gang-truce-in-el-salvador/

After several months of negotiations, the Mara Salvatruchas and the Barrio 18, two powerful gangs with thousands of members in El Salvador, have agreed to a truce in their gang war. According to government statistics, whose reliability has been questioned by experts, the agreement has led to a precipitous drop of violence in the Central American nation, such as murders and kidnappings. Nevertheless, there is an ongoing concern that this fragile peace could be shattered at any time, as well as questions regarding its wider geopolitical ramifications.

The violence and the debatable peace

El Salvador is a nation that has suffered cycles of violence dating back to the civil war between the government and the Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) guerrillas. The war, which claimed around 70,000 lives, ravaged the country throughout the 1980s until the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords. Today, instead of battling insurgents attempting regime change, San Salvador has to battle yet another internal armed foe, but with different objectives and modus operandi.

In this March 26, 2012 photo, an inmate belonging to the Mara Salvatrucha or MS-13 gang stands inside the prison in Ciudad Barrios, El Salvador. (AP Photo/Luis Romero)

Gangs like the Maras originated not in Central America but rather in the United States. When Washington carried out waves of deportations in the 1980s and 1990s of undocumented individuals to their home countries, many of whom were criminals, the governments and prison systems promptly found themselves overwhelmed with hardened criminals who quickly developed a structure and a following, recruiting new members from among the nation’s impoverished youths. Gang experts identify domestic violence, poverty, and a desire for revenge and for belonging as some of the main reasons why individuals join gangs.

In recent years, the Maras and Barrio 18 reached alarming levels of influence. For example, in September 2010, the Mara 18 and Mara Salvatrucha gangs successfully carried out a 72-hour shut down of the country’s public transportation system to protest an anti-gang law. In addition, the war between the two has claimed an increasing number of non-gang victims. On June 20, 2010, 16 people were killed when gangs attacked two passenger buses by shooting at them and subsequently setting them on fire. This is just one of many documented horrific incidents resulting from increased violence among these groups.

As the violence became increasingly out of hand, a much needed intervention was initiated. Military bishop Monsignor Fabio Colindres and the Catholic Church launched a series of negotiations between the gangs which concluded in a peace agreement. Nevertheless, there are concerns as to whether it has been effective and whether it will last. In July, a grave by a hill in the municipality of Santa Tecla was found containing the bodies of five teenagers, who were apparently shot by Mara members after they refused to join them. As a way to justify their behavior, gang leaders have argued that it is impossible for them to assure that all members of their gangs will fully comply with the truce, essentially stating that there is the possibility of future violence, which isn’t sanctioned by the gang’s leadership. The gangs in El Salvador reportedly have over 50,000 members.

In this Sept. 1, 2012 photo, an inmate belonging to the Mara 18 gang gestures inside the prison in Cojutepeque, El Salvador. Six months after El Salvador brokered an historic truce between two rival gangs to curb the nation’s daunting homicide rate, officials are split over whether the truce actually works. The gangs, which also operate in Guatemala and Honduras, are seeking truce talks in those countries as well. (AP Photo/Luis Romero)

There are also conflicting statements about whether gang-related violence has truly decreased since the agreement. According to the Security and Justice Ministry, murders in the first eight months of 2012 are already down to 1,894 which means that there has been a 30 percent decrease. However, the agency also calculated that there were 335 disappearances in the first half of the year, while a legal medicine institute in the country indicated the number to be 1,279. It’s unclear why there is such a large discrepancy in the two sets of numbers.

Moreover, the country’s population is concerned that the level of compromise between the government and the Maras, which included the transfer of gang leaders to a less restrictive prison, will lead to new demands by the gangs to maintain the cease-fire.

The geopolitics of peace

The arguable success of the peace agreement between the Maras and Barrio 18 in El Salvador has garnered the interest of other regional states in order to see if similar agreements can be reached with their own domestic Mara gangs. The potential for similar peace negotiations among the Mara factions and governments in other Central American states (like Honduras and Guatemala) raises a critical issue: the leadership structure of this international gang. It is generally believed that each national faction operates independently, but it is unclear to what extent there is some kind of supranational leadership structure that oversees each national faction. A couple of important questions regarding this development would be: To what extent did the Maras of El Salvador consult with the factions of Honduras and Nicaragua before the peace negotiations began? And what does this agreement say of how this particular gang is internationally structured?

Furthermore, over the past few months, there has been a plethora of news reports regarding the expanding influence of the Zetas, a major Mexican drug cartel. Concerns over possible alliances with the Maras in countries likeGuatemala have become an increasing threat. Nevertheless, analysts have called into question the strength of these inter-organization criminal alliances, as they usually are for “a defined purpose and for a defined time.” It is unclear whether the Zetas have a foothold in El Salvador; the local police have declared that they are investigating reports of the Zetas recruiting local gang members. Therefore, it is debatable how the gang peace processes in El Salvador, and others around the region, will affect the potential relations between the different Mara factions and the expansion of the Zetas. Currently, there are too many variables to carry out an accurate analysis, including the question of whether the gang peace in El Salvador will last.

El Salvador could learn from Colombia

In this Sept. 1, 2012 photo, an inmate belonging to the Mara 18 gang embraces his girlfriend during visitation time for families of inmates inside the prison in Cojutepeque, El Salvador. (AP Photo/Luis Romero)

After the truce, the security news-website InsightCrime published an analysis in which it discussed what lessons the government of El Salvador could learn from the peace and demobilization processes in Colombia, particularly with the now-defunct AUC paramilitary group. However, this comparison is limited by the differences between the raisons d’etre, structure, and modus operandi of the AUC and the Central American gangs. While the AUC is an arguably successful case-study (in the loosest sense of the word given that several ex-AUC joined criminal gangs known as BACRIM), there is also a counter-case study, namely the negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC guerrillas. In 1999 the Colombian government agreed to a peace agreement with the FARC, in which they obtained control of a sizeable territory. Unfortunately, the FARC utilized the cease of hostilities and territory to regroup and to again launch major attacks against the government and security forces.

While everyone certainly wishes that the peace agreement between the Maras and Barrio 18 continues, the government in San Salvador needs to be prepared for the possibility of renewed hostilities. Considering that the membership of El Salvador’s gangs number in the thousands, it is unrealistic to assume that all members will fully comply to the peace agreement reached by the gang’s leadership. History has shown that there will most likely be smaller factions that will continue with their criminal activities.

An upheld truce between the gangs and subsequent reduction in violence would constitute a huge victory for President Mauricio Funes. While the Funes administration had little to do with jumpstarting the peace talks, the government can be credited for supporting them. At the very least, this will deviate the public’s attention from the legal crisis regarding the country’s Constitutional Chamber. Finally, as aforementioned, there is the concern regarding the growing influence of the Zetas in Central America. The peace among local gangs provides San Salvador precious time to carry out security initiatives such as improving the equipment and training of security forces, as well as social projects, like the successful reintegration of gang members and preventing further recruitment.

Read more: http://www.voxxi.com/gang-truce-in-el-salvador/#ixzz27PYsWn7P

VOXXI: The Peace talks between the Colombian Government and the FARC

The Peace talks between the Colombian Government and the FARC
W. Alejandro Sanchez
September 13, 2012
VOXXI
Originally published: http://bit.ly/S07X4W

In this photo President Juan Manuel Santos, center, announcing the signing of a preliminary agreement to launch peace talks with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, during a nationally televised speech from the presidential palace in Bogota, Tuesday, Sept. 4, 2011. Santos said the talks would begin in early October in Oslo, Norway, and would continue in Havana, Cuba. (AP Photo/Javier Casella, Colombia’s Presidential Office)

President Juan Manuel Santos’ decision to begin negotiations with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has understandably stirred a great deal of controversy as Colombia’s volatile past has made it difficult for many in the country to trust that the FARC will honor a peace agreement and ceasefire.

Historical precedent indicates that the upcoming peace talks in Norway will have a low likelihood of success. When it comes to ending a conflict that has claimed thousands of lives and affected generations, the question of integrating ex-combatants into Colombian civil society presents a particular challenge.

Shaping the negotiations

Santos was elected to the Colombian presidency riding the wave of his predecessor and one-time close ally, Alvaro Uribe. As Uribe’s minister of defense, Santos directed the administration’s pro-military stance on dealings with the country’s guerrilla groups, namely the FARC and National Liberation Army (ELN). Santos was Uribe’s chosen successor for the Colombian presidency and was expected to remain consistent on security policies.

Marco Leon Calarca, spokesman and member of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) speaks during an interview in Havana, Cuba, Friday, Sept 7, 2012. The spokesman for Colombia’s main leftist guerrilla army says President Juan Manuel Santos’ rejection of a cease-fire will not derail peace talks next month. (AP Photo/Ramon Espinosa)

Despite Uribe and Santos’ strong military response to the FARC over the past decade, the guerrilla army remains a weakened but persistent threat. Current media reports put the group’s strength currently at around 9,000 troops, down from the FARC’s 16,000 troops mobilized in the 1990s. Additionally, the FARC has also lost several leaders, including Manuel Marulanda (AKA Tirofijo), Raul Reyes, and Jorge Briceno (AKA Mono Jojoy), the last of which was eliminated under the Santos Administration in 2010.

Earlier this year, the FARC took a major step toward peace when it declared that it would not carry out anymore kidnappings, previously one of its trademark operations for decades. However, the insurgents broke their own promise after the kidnapping of a French journalist. A FARC representative, Marcos Calarca, recently claimed that the movement has already freed all its hostages, and accused other criminal organizations and the government’s security services of kidnapping and then blaming the FARC.

After months of secret deliberation, President Santos recently announced that the government and the FARC will meet for a first round of negotiations this coming October in Norway, followed by a second round in Cuba. Santos’ decision to sit down and negotiate with the FARC has brought him a great deal of criticism, most notably from his former ally, Uribe. Members of Colombia’s reserve armed forces have also expressed their concern regarding the negotiations in an open letter to Santos. On the other hand, a recent poll showed that 77 percent of Colombians were in favor of negotiations with the guerrillas. Meanwhile, to demonstrate his focus on the safety of his country while he negotiates with the FARC, Santos pledged to refuse the insurgents’ demand for a ceasefire while the negotiations take place.

The last major peace initiative has given observers reason for skepticism. Under President Andres Pastrana (1998-2002), the Colombian government brokered a ceasefire with the FARC in exchange for granting the FARC control over a significant piece of territory. The ceasefire failed to bring lasting peace to the country, but instead allowed the FARC to regroup and strengthen themselves for new attacks against the Colombian government.

Mauricio Jaramillo, left, Andres Paris, center, and Marco León Calarca, members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) during their participation in a press conference in Havana, Cuba, Tuesday, Sept 4, 2012. (AP Photo/ Ramon Espinosa)

Colombia’s history with demobilization

One particularly thorny issue bound to garner a lot of attention in the negotiations and media attention within Colombia is the potential disbandment and re-integration of the FARC members. It is highly unlikely that the Colombian government would agree to pardon all FARC members. Many, specifically the families of the groups’ victims, will likely demand the imprisonment of at least some of the 9,000 FARC troops.

Colombia has a relatively successful history with the peaceful disbandment and reintegration of insurgent movements. This can be seen starting in the late 1980s with guerrilla groups like the 19^th of April Movement (M19). More recently, the paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) demobilized as well. Unfortunately, several former AUC members, instead of rejoining civil society, created their own criminal movements tied to drug trafficking. These groups are commonly referred to as bandas criminales (BACRIM), and include groups like the Aguilas Negras. Experts on the Colombian internal conflict are looking to understand how past successes in the reintegration of ex-guerrilla organizations could guide the demobilization of the FARC.

To put demobilization attempts in a historical perspective, from 2006-2007 the Colombian police arrested 1,765 BACRIM members, 258 of which were demobilized individuals. At the time, a 2007 report by Semana stated that a government commission believed that around 2 percent of demobilized individuals joined the BACRIM.

On the other hand, Alejandro Eder, a member of the National Agency for Reintegration, more recently declared that the government already has had a decade of experience in reintegration initiatives, making the administration quite capable of dealing with demobilized FARC troops. He also stated that in the last 12 months, 14,400 demobilized insurgents have successfully integrated themselves into the legal workforce. Furthermore, the Colombian government recently passed a law that addresses the issue of demobilization of insurgents known as the Marco Juridico para la Paz.

The positive numbers provided by Eder show that reintegration initiatives have generally been successful. However, it is evident that some demobilized insurgents from the FARC, ELN or the paramilitaries, returned to a life of crime after disbanding.

Peace and FARC demobilization

There is a long way to go before a demobilization of the FARC is seriously put into consideration, as peace talks have yet to even start. As previously stated, there is a certain degree of skepticism regarding whether the current negotiations between Bogota and the guerrillas will be successful; the Colombian government itself has declared that it is “moderately optimistic” regarding their success.

Nevertheless, if the negotiations do progress, the reintegration of the FARC’s combatants will undoubtedly emerge as a central discussion topic. The aforementioned open letter by Colombia’s reserve officers states that, from their point of view, the peace process, at a minimum, must end with the full demobilization of the insurgents. Thus, the real challenge for the Colombian government will be to balance the public cry for justice against the FARC troops with the real need of peace in a country weary of war.

Read more: http://www.voxxi.com/peace-talks-colombian-farc/#ixzz26aAAyboZ

El Comercio (Peru): Promesas y Ausencias

Promesas y Ausencias
W. Alejandro Sanchez
Analyst
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
El Comercio (Peru)
September 8, 2012

VOXXI: Mexico will be listening to Obama at Democratic National Convention

Mexico will be listening to Obama at Democratic National ConventionW. Alejandro Sanchez
Research Fellow, Council on Hemispheric Affairs
VOXXI
September 4, 2012
Originally published: http://bit.ly/Q5Lcct

Mexico is listening to President Barack Obama’s expectations for a second term and his plans to improve US-Mexico relations at the Democratic National Convention in Charlotte.

When President Barack Obama delivers his speech accepting his party’s re-nomination at the Democratic National Convention, attendees and television viewers will be listening with a diversity of expectations. Mexican observers will be taking note of how much time the DNC will devote to the discussion of issues like drug trafficking and immigration during the upcoming meeting. During the recently-concluded Republican National Convention, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice pushed for a “compassionate” immigration policy, to appeal to Latino voters. While this issue is important for U.S. citizens of Mexican background, it is just one of many facing the next administration.

The DREAM and Immigration

Students in Arizona listen to news of new Obama immigration policy June 15, in which 800,000 “dreamers” could get a reprieve from deportation. (Photo Voxxi/Griselda Nevarez)

A well-known immigration-related bill is the Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors, commonly known as the DREAM Act, which, if passed, would be a major victory for the Obama administration. This piece of legislation provides legal residency status for undocumented residents who arrived to the country as minors, who graduate from U.S. high schools and have lived continuously in the country for five years. Since DREAM has yet to be passed, Obama signed an executive order earlier this year that resembles the aforementioned bill. According to research carried out by the Washington DC-basedImmigration Policy Center, most of the likely beneficiaries of DREAM are originally from Mexico and most currently reside in California. Whether similar initiatives will expand to other undocumented immigrants (based on their age group, time living in the U.S., or lack of criminal record) during a potential Obama second term, remains to be seen. Republican candidate Mitt Romney has been generally ambivalent on immigration policies.

Whether or not the immigration issue influences Latino voters’ decisions come November is debatable, though, a pro-immigration stance should help Obama gain significant votes in areas that have large Latino communities, like those of Mexican descent, such as California.

NAFTA and Free Trade

A file photo showing the President Barack Obama being welcomed by Mexico’s President Felipe Calderon. (Photo/ White House/Pete Souza)

While campaigning during the 2008 Democratic primaries, President Obama and his then-opponent Hillary Clinton had differing positions on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which the U.S. signed with Canada and Mexico. Obama seemed to hint that he was supportive of free trade agreements, but that he wanted them to be more beneficial for American farmers. This meant that he would want to renegotiate such agreements as president. Some media reports argued that Mexican workers had supported renegotiation, as it might force the Mexican government to “[reform] its repressive low-wage labor policies.”

Ultimately, the Obama administration did not revisit NAFTA. If anything, the White House has pushed for other FTAs in the Western Hemisphere, as exemplified by the ratifications of said agreements with Panama, Colombia and ongoing negotiations for the Trans Pacific Partnership (which includes Peru and Chile). Additionally, trade between the U.S. and Mexico has grown: according the U.S. Census, the U.S. exported $193 million worth of goods in 2011, and has so far exported $106 million worth of goods in 2012 (according to data available up to June). Moreover, in 2011, the U.S. president and his Mexican counterpart, Felipe Calderon, finally agreed that Mexican truckers could carry goods into the U.S., eliminating “tariffs on $2.3 billion of American goods and agricultural products as soon as the first Mexican truck obtains a permit.”

Such initiatives suggest that a second Obama term would probably mean similar free trade-initiatives to promote greater economic integration with Mexico, as opposed to revisiting NAFTA.

Security issues for Obama-EPN

An armored U.S. Embassy vehicle is checked by military personal after it was attacked by unknown assailants on the highway leading to the city of Cuernavaca, near Tres Marias, Mexico, Friday, Aug. 24, 2012. (AP Photo/Alexandre Meneghini)

The future of security relations between Washington and Mexico City presents another important issue as Enrique Peña Nieto (EPN) assumes the Mexican presidency in December. The outgoing Calderon administration had a generally good relationship (punctuated by occasional friction) with Washington as he pursued a military option to deal with the various Mexican cartels.

The new Mexican head of state has hinted that he may take a more relaxed approach when fighting the narcos and drug trafficking as compared to his predecessor, a major concern for Washington. Does this mean that Obama will continue, increase or even decrease the economic aid Washington gives Mexico City under the Merida Initiative? In 2009 the U.S. president approved a supplemental budget, which increased funding for Mexico to $1.12 billion. Then, in 2010, the White House also requested $410 million in aid to Mexico and Central America for the 2011 fiscal year, $310 million of which would be for Mexico City. The (multi) million dollar question is whether economic aid to Mexico will vary once EPN takes the presidency and begins structuring his own strategy relevant to the drug war and the cartels.

In addition there is the question of what other initiatives a second Obama administration is willing to carry out if it believes the EPN presidency is not as firm on the cartels as some Washington insiders may like. Recently there was an incident in which, according to The New York Times, the Mexican federal police allegedly shot two CIA operatives in Mexico City. While details remain sketchy, the issue calls into question the numbers of U.S. security and intelligence forces working with, or independently of, their Mexican counterparts in Mexico. Washington is certainly interested in maintaining the momentum regarding Mexico’s militaristic approach to dealing with cartels, and one can’t help but draw parallels to the U.S.’s increased military and intelligence presence in Colombia via Plan Colombia.

Obama and his Team

President Barack Obama speaks at a campaign event at Scott High School Monday, Sept. 3, 2012, in Toledo, Ohio. (AP Photo/Tony Dejak)

Should Obama be re-elected, new initiatives regarding U.S.-Mexico relations will not just fall on his shoulders but will also depend on a number of other factors. For example, a critical issue will be the new shape of the U.S. Congress after the elections. The Democrats currently only control the Senate via a slim majority; they lost their majority of the House after the 2010 mid-term elections. If Democrats strengthen control in the former, or regain control of the latter, the victory may be regarded as a green light to new White House-sponsored initiatives, particularly regarding immigration and border-control.

Finally, there is the issue of what advice the President will receive regarding the structure of U.S.-Mexico relations over the next four years. As this author discussed in a previous VOXXI article, there are two important positions that help define Washington’s policy toward Latin America: the Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere on the National Security Council; and the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs at the State Department. The former position is currently held by Ricardo Zuniga, who is known for his experience in Cuban affairs. Meanwhile, Roberta S. Jacobson holds the Assistant Secretary seat at State; she also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Canada, Mexico and NAFTA. The U.S. ambassador to Mexico holds another relevant position; that title currently falls to Ambassador Earl Anthony “Tony” Wayne, who was nominated by President Obama in June 2011. How the White House responds to the first year of EPN’s presidency will most likely be influenced in part on the recommendations of Ambassador Wayne.

Re-election will grant Obama the advantage of not having to worry about a second re-election, allowing him, hopefully, to work for more progressive and bold projects. Besides previously discussed Mexico-related initiatives, this may mean lifting more sanctions regarding the Cuban embargo, or maybe even attempting to close the detention center in Guantanamo Bay, another of his campaign promises. We may see more trade and immigration initiatives as well, particularly if the Democrats gain a bigger presence in Congress and if Latin America (and Mexico in particular), receives greater attention in the White House’s foreign policy agenda.

The crowd cheers as Vice President Joe Biden speaks at the Metro Detroit AFL-CIO Labor Day Rally, Monday, Sept. 3, 2012, in Detroit. (AP Photo/Carolyn Kaster)