Geopolityka and Geo Security

What underlies the Falklands dispute?

2012-02-10T15:55:00.003-05:00

What underlies the Falklands dispute?
Inside Story- Americas
Al Jazeera English
February 9, 2012
Available: http://aje.me/zOVYC7

Two countries and two seemingly intractable positions.

The dispute between Argentina and Britain over the Falklands or Malvinas islands is at its bitterest for three decades.

This year will mark the 30th anniversary of the war the two sides fought over the islands - a war in which more than 900 Argentinian and British soldiers were killed.

Argentina may have lost that war, but it has never given up its claim to the Malvinas, which have been under continuous British rule since 1833.

Sovereignty of the islands is even written in Argentina's constitution.

But Britain has steadfastly refused to re-open sovereignty talks, saying the people of the Falklands say there is nothing to discuss.

The Falklands are a cluster of about 770 islands in the southern Atlantic Ocean. They lie about 483 kilometres off the Argentine coast and 13,000 kilometres away from mainland UK.

Its main link to the outside world is a weekly flight from Punta Arenas in Chile. But its route includes Argentinian airspace, which the government of Cristina Kirchner, the president of Argentina, has threatened to restrict.

On Tuesday, Kirchner said she would make a formal complaint to the UN following an announcement that Britain was sending a warship to the region.

In recent weeks, her government has also attempted to internationalise the issue further, and now Argentina's cause is backed by virtually the whole of Latin America.

"Joint sovereignty is not an issue because the British will never agree to it. If there is oil around the islands maybe there can be some kind of joint venture which both sides could benefit from. This will be a step forward."

- Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, a research fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

Bubbling under the surface is the issue of resources - particularly oil. Britain is seeking to tap into an estimated vast reserve under the Falklands sea bed.

Four areas that could potentially contain oil have been identified in the waters around the Falklands. Oil companies are hoping for 8.3 billion barrels this year. That is three times the UK's reserves.

But what do the Falkland islanders themselves think about the prolonged dispute?

Barry Elsby, a member of the Falklands Legislative Assembly, had this to say:

"The UN also recognises the right for people to determine their own future and that's all we're asking for as Falkland islanders. Also, it is very difficult for us to enter into negotiations with a country who, because of their constitution, cannot agree on any settlement that gives up their claim to the Falkland Islands."

So, where is the Falklands-Malvinas dispute heading?

Joining presenter Shihab Rattansi on Inside Story Americas are: Larry Birns, the director of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, a non-profit organisation dedicated to monitoring Latin American affairs; Fernando Petrella, a former Argentinian ambassador to the UN; and Wilder Alejandro Sanchez, a research fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs.

¿Ha manejado Obama bien la economía?

2012-02-10T15:53:00.002-05:00

¿Ha manejado Obama bien la economía?
Telemundo - Washington DC
February 8, 2012
Video disponible: http://bit.ly/yqN1uA

“Batalla de Ideas” es el nuevo espacio de análisis político de Telenoticias Washington. Un segmento semanal en el que cada miércoles dos analistas políticos con puntos de vista opuestos revisarán los temas más importantes que se vienen discutiendo durante la campaña electoral que desembocará en las elecciones presidenciales del próximo mes de noviembre.

Ustedes decidirán cada semana en sus hogares quién tiene razón. En el espacio de este miércoles, Alex Sánchez e Israel Ortega nos hablan sobre el manejo de la economía por parte del presidente Barack Obama.

Updates: Meetings and stuff Feb 6-10

2012-02-08T13:58:00.003-05:00

Interviewed on Thursday February 9 about the situation in the Malvinas/Falklands for Al Jazeera English.

Attended an off-the-record meeting with Colombian Vice President Angelino Garzon on February 8, 2012.

Interviewed by Telemundo (their Washington DC station) on President Barack Obama's economic initiatives and successes so far. Will put a link to the video when it's online.

Interview: Global Insider: UNASUR Defense Agencies Search for Relevance

2012-02-08T13:35:00.004-05:00

Global Insider: UNASUR Defense Agencies Search for RelevanceBY THE EDITORS | 08 FEB 2012
ORIGINALLY PUBLISHED IN: http://bit.ly/AqPhL4

Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, Colombia, Ecuador and Uruguay recently began to share information on national defense spending as part of a Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) initiative aimed at using transparency to maintain peace in the region. In an email interview, W. Alex Sanchez, a research fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, discussed UNASUR defense cooperation.

WPR: What are the current structures in place within UNASUR for defense cooperation? W. Alex Sanchez: UNASUR’s two main defense bodies are the Defense Council and the Defense Strategic Studies Center. The center, which was created in 2009, is based in Argentina -- not surprising given that it was proposed by Argentina’s then-minister of defense, Nilda Garre -- and will have a rotating leadership. It is standard for multinational agencies to have some kind of security-related wing. For instance, the Organization of American States has the Inter-American Defense Board, the Committee on Hemispheric Security and the Inter-American Defense College, founded in 1962 and probably one of the most obscure security-related agencies on the continent. So while these two UNASUR security agencies exist, the real question is how relevant they will be in the future.

WPR: What other plans are there for defense cooperation? Sanchez: There is no shortage of bilateral defense and cooperation agreements among UNASUR’s member states. For example, Peru and Colombia have signed numerous agreements aimed at improving monitoring of their border regions deep in the Amazon to tackle transnational crime, such as drug trafficking or the crossing of FARC insurgents into other countries. Regarding UNASUR, six members -- Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay -- have agreed to share information on defense expenditures. In addition, UNASUR Secretary-General Maria Emma Mejia has announced that a white book containing information about defense budgets in the region will be published during a security seminar in Quito this May. Moreover, UNASUR’s Defense Council met in November and approved an Action Plan for 2012, which touches on issues like defense cooperation, humanitarian missions and peacekeeping operations. There is even talk of creating a South American Observatory that will monitor drug-trafficking issues in the region.

WPR: What are the barriers to expanding defense and military cooperation among UNASUR members? Sanchez: The obvious issues are security tensions and disputes among member countries. For example, Peru and Chile have a maritime-border dispute that is currently being tried at the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Additionally, situations sometimes arise that spiral out of control, like the 2008 incident in which Colombian forces attacked a FARC base in Ecuador without informing Quito first. This prompted Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to send his army to the country’s border with Colombia, declaring that he would defend Ecuador’s sovereignty. While the initiatives by the aforementioned six countries are important, it is necessary to highlight that Brazil and Venezuela have not yet agreed to share information about their defense budgets. According to a recent report by the Center for Analysis of World Arms Trade, a Russian think tank, Venezuela was the eighth-biggest importer of military technology in the world in 2010, mostly from Russia. Combine that with Chávez’s sometimes belligerent declarations and initiatives, such as the 2008 incident with Colombia, and it is obvious that more transparency is needed from that country in particular.

Humala: Chavez Clone or Washington Partner?

2012-02-06T10:19:00.003-05:00

Humala: Chavez Clone or Washington Partner?

By W. Alex Sanchez,
Foreign Policy in Focus
February 6, 2012

Originally published in: http://bit.ly/zne1mm

As per tradition in Latin American politics, election season means vicious personal attacks against individuals running for office. In Peru, the 2011 campaign season saw Ollanta Humala of the Peruvian Nationalist Party attacked for his friendship with Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez, as well as for the legacy of his brother Antauro, currently in prison for leading a failed uprising in January 2005 that left several police officers dead in the Andean town of Andahuaylas.

And yet, after half a year in power, the worst right-wing predictions about Humala’s government have yet to come true, casting doubt on his critics’ claim that Humala would be a “clone” of the eccentric Venezuelan president.

Failed Expectations?

Even now, commentaries continue to appear about whether Humala is the Peruvian version of Chávez; similar discussions abound regarding presidents Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa in Ecuador. According to the current rhetoric, as exemplified by statements from former Peruvian President Alejandro Toledo, Humala is trying to militarize his government. These accusations took root in December 2011, when Salomon Lerner resigned as prime minister and Ollanta appointed Oscar Valdés Dancuart, a retired lieutenant colonel close to the president, as his successor.

But Humala has not carried out the repressive measures that critics predicted he would. Even before he won the elections, Humala campaigned on a fairly moderate platform, promising not to change the economic model that has brought a great deal of economic growth to Peru in the last few years, and vowing not to become a new Chávez. During the campaign, Humala also asked Chávez to stop calling him a “soldado” (soldier), as he is no longer in the military.

Yet Humala has not renounced his friendship with Chávez either. During an early January trip to Venezuela, Humala gave his Venezuelan counterpart a book with the speeches of former Peruvian military president, General Juan Velasco Alvarado. The two countries are currently in negotiations to sign a trade integration agreement. Due to his economic initiatives, Humala has been compared to Brazil’s former president Lula, who led the Portuguese-speaking nation through a decade of financial and diplomatic growth.

Interestingly, there has been no speculation that Ollanta could become like former Peruvian dictator Alberto Fujimori, who replaced key government posts before his famous “auto golpe” (self-coup) in April 1992, in which he dissolved the Peruvian congress and eventually wrote a new constitution in 1993.

The Case against the Chávez Comparison

Since taking office, Humala has neither nationalized major industries nor carried out censorship initiatives against opposition parties and the Peruvian media. Indeed, so far he has not cracked down on opposition members, allowing them to continue their attacks against the head of state. In addition, the Peruvian economy is expected to grow 5.5 percent in 2012, while tourism in the Andean country is expected to grow 12-14 percent. Far from nationalizing private industries, Humala recently traveled to Spain to court foreign investment. Nor has the Peruvian leader freed his brother Antauro from prison, despiteaccusations during the campaign that he would.

On the other hand, a December 2011 report in the Chilean daily La Tercerapointed out that Valdés’ appointment marks the first time since the Peruvian military governments of 1968-1980 that the two most important offices, those of the president and the prime minister, are occupied by military officers. Also in an important position is Adrian Villafuerte, Humala’s national advisor on security issues and a retired colonel himself.

Nevertheless, contrary to military regimes past, Humala was democratically chosen in elections that have been internationally recognized as free and fair. Moreover, it is only expected that, as president, he would appoint capable individuals that he knows and trusts. The majority of Peruvian ministry positions remain in the hands of civilians. In any case, rather than behaving like a dictator-in-the-making, Humala enjoys a 54.5-percent approval rating after six months in office.

Insurgent Movements

There is yet another difference between Humala and Chávez that is often overlooked. Supposedly a revolutionary socialist, Chávez has often been accused of supporting the Colombian guerrilla FARC movement, though whether in a material or moral capacity is a subject of some dispute. But contrary to the Venezuelan leader’s alleged pro-FARC stance, the Peruvian government continues to see the Colombian insurgent group as a security threat. Recently, Peruvian Admiral Jose Cueto Aservi stated that his naval forces will ensure that the Colombian insurgents do not enter Peruvian territory.

Moreover, Humala has not been accused of being a sympathizer, much less a supporter, of Peru’s Maoist insurgent group, the Shining Path. As president, Humala has maintained a tough government policy against the insurgent group.In August 2011, he publicly demanded a victory date from his generals against the Shining Path.

Humala’s government has also prevented a new organization called theMovement for Amnesty and Fundamental Rights (MOVADEF) from becoming a legitimate political party because of its ties to the Shining Path. The Peruvian Times reports that Peruvian lawmakers, pushed by Ollanta’s cabinet of ministers, are expected to approve “a bill that would prevent political movements with links to insurgents and other violent groups from becoming registered political parties and participating in local and national elections.” Bowing to government and civil society pressure, MOVADEF recently declared that it will stop attempting to become a political party. Meanwhile, Humala’s Education Minister, Patricia Salas, has declared that new school textbooks will explicitly explain how Shining Path and the MRTA are terrorist organizations. It seems clear that Humala will hardly be an apologist or supporter of radical violent movements, whether at home or abroad.

The Conga Protests

A critical situation is currently developing in Cajamarca, a region in northern Peru where local inhabitants are protesting against a proposed $4-8 billion mining project. The local population believes that the mine will pollute local water sources, which are critical for both human consumption and irrigation projects. After major protests in late 2011, the project was suspended in December.

For Humala, the Conga project poses a dilemma. On the one hand, if Humala openly supports the local population, he could potentially scare international investors, which the country’s political opposition would quickly capitalize on. Opposition politicians have already attacked Humala on the Conga issue, charging that the protests there and social unrest elsewhere in the country are examples of Humala’s lack of leadership skills.

On the other hand, by siding with the investors, the president risks alienating the local population, a move that could cost him dearly in future polls, referenda, and elections (although it is important to mention that Peru’s constitution does not permit direct presidential re-election). In November 2011, Humala tried to appease both groups by declaring in a speech that the Conga mine was “important” to Peru but that he also supported local communities.

Humala and Washington in 2012

Recent U.S. administrations have faced an increasingly complicated relationship with Latin America, particularly due to the rise of anti-Washington governments in the region. Currently the United States enjoys strong relations with only a handful of Latin American states, like Mexico, Colombia, and Chile. Washington also maintains generally good relations with the governments of Brazil and Argentina, as well as smaller countries like Panama, with whom, along with Colombia, the United States recently ratified controversial free-trade agreements. Meanwhile, “Pink Tide” leaders like Chávez, Morales, and Correa have had increasingly tense diplomatic relations with Washington ever since they came to power. In one of the most recent incidents, the United States expelledLivia Acosta Noguera, a Venezuelan consular official in Miami, for her alleged ties to planned cyber attacks against the U.S. government.

However, these tensions have yet to materialize with Peru. In July 2011, Humalatraveled to Washington as president-elect and met with both President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to assure them that he would not become another Chávez. In January 2012, Washington donated $2.3 million in military hardware to the Peruvian government to fight terrorism and drug trafficking in Peru’s troublesome Apurimac and Ene River valley. The U.S. ambassador to Perú, Rose Likins, was present at the ceremony in which equipment like night vision goggles, sensors, and mine detectors were given to the Peruvian security forces. Leaving aside questions about the wisdom of a militarized drug war, the fact that Humala maintains military relations with Washington half a year into his presidency is in stark contrast to the rapid deterioration of U.S.-Venezuelan relations after Chávez came to power.

In general, the Obama administration has taken the correct diplomatic course when it comes to relations with Humala, and vice versa. Neither government has attempted to antagonize the other. Consequently, relations remain generally as good as they were with previous Peruvian governments. When it comes to U.S. interests in Latin America, Peru is probably on the second tier when it comes to importance, after countries like Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil (unsurprisingly, there was no mention of Peru or the Andes in Obama’s 2012 State of the Union address). Nonetheless, Lima has generally been a close Washington ally, even during the Fujimori dictatorship, and Washington should avoid diplomatically aggressive measures that might push Humala closer to Venezuela.

recommended citation:

W. Alex Sanchez, "Humala: Chavez Clone or Washington Partner?" (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, February 6, 2012)

Updates: Meetings from Thurs. Feb 2 and Friday Feb 3

2012-02-04T13:52:00.003-05:00

Interviewed by HispanTV about the "no-fly" lists on February 3, 2012

Attended the meeting of Think Tank Leaders with the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, Jose Miguel Insulza
February 2, 2012

Place: Washington, DC
Credit: Patricia Leiva/OAS
Source: OAS Flickr account http://bit.ly/zTGxUx

Journal:Brazil's Grand Design for Combining Global South Solidarity and National Interests: A Discussion of Peacekeeping Operations in Haiti and Timor

2012-02-01T11:26:00.011-05:00

Globalizations

Brazil's Grand Design for Combining Global South Solidarity and National Interests: A Discussion of Peacekeeping Operations in Haiti and Timor

W. Alejandro Sánchez Nieto
Special Issue: Global South to the Rescue: Emerging Humanitarian Superpowers and Globalizing Rescue Industries
Volume 9, Issue 1, 2012
pages 161-178
Available Online: http://bit.ly/wj1bTI

The link above will take you to the Taylor & Francis where you can register/purchase the article. Please contact me if you would like a .pdf version if you're an academic/researcher etc. wilder.a.sanchez at gmail.com

Abstract:
This study analyzes how Brazil has assumed visible leadership of peacekeeping operations in order to increase its international status, with the ever-present goal of attaining a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, but also with the larger aim of cultivating forms of political-economic, cultural, and military globalization in which the Lusophone giant can articulate new forms of transnational influence. Brazil's role in MINUSTAH (the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti) and in peacekeeping interventions in Timor have become cornerstones of Brazilian nationalism, which is evolving into a particular, global South framed ‘Brazilian exceptionalism’. I will argue that these operations are seen by Brazilian policymakers as win–win scenarios: Brazil increases its international peacekeeping credentials while these fragile states obtain internal security, a first step towards development. But is this what is actually happening? I will conclude by addressing how peacekeeping in Haiti and Timor fit into Brazil's grand design for long-term global extension.

Este estudio analiza la manera como Brasil ha asumido un evidente liderazgo en las operaciones de mantenimiento de paz, para incrementar su estatus internacional con el objetivo omnipresente de obtener una silla en el Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas, y además con una meta mayor de cultivar formas de política económica, cultural y globalización militar, en la que el gigante lusófono puede articular nuevas formas de influencia transnacional. El papel de Brasil en MINUSTAH (la Misión de Estabilización de las Naciones Unidas en Haití) y en las intervenciones de paz en Timor, se han convertido en pilares de nacionalismo brasileño, que está evolucionando a una ‘particularidad brasileña’ del sur global. Yo sostendré que los políticos brasileños ven estas operaciones como escenarios de mutuo beneficio: Brasil aumenta sus credenciales de mantenimiento de paz, mientras estos estados frágiles obtienen seguridad interna, un primer paso hacia el desarrollo. Pero en realidad, ¿qué es lo que está sucediendo? Yo concluiré, abordando el tema de cómo el mantenimiento de paz en Haití y Timor, encaja dentro del gran diseño del Brasil hacia una extensión global a largo plazo.

My Two Cents on Blogs /Mis Dos Centavos sobre los Blogs

2012-01-22T23:12:00.005-05:00

I’ve noticed that the way I use this blog and other researchers use theirs is somewhat different. I usually repost new articles that I’ve published elsewhere (i.e. websites or journals) or outlets where I’ve been interviewed/quoted. Sometimes I put brief blog posts, but not often, as I write such pieces for other places (like Latin American Thought) and republish them here. I don’t have a “blog roll” nor an option to subscribe for some e-newsletter nor do I update this blog daily with brief analyses like others do or reposting links of analyses that I find interesting; I use my Twitter account for that. I figured I might as well just write this and see if I get any feedback on that.
PS. I have an account on Delicious and I used to have an extension on my blog to show articles I had run across that I bookmarked, but whoever owns Delicious now got rid of that option.
January 22, 2012

He notado que la forma como uso este blog y como lo usan otros analistas es un poco diferente. Usualmente pongo nuevos articulos que he publicado en otros lugares o donde he sido citado/entrevistado. A veces pongo pequenos comentarios tipo blog pero no a menudo ya que publico este tipo de articulos en otros lugares (como Latin American Thought) y luego los republico aqui. No tengo un “blog roll” o una opcion para suscribirse a algun tipo de e-boletin; tampoco pongo pequenos analises/comentarios como lo hacen otros o reposteo links de analyses que pienso que son interesantes; para eso uso mi cuenta en Twitter. Pense en escribir estas ideas aqui y ver si recibo algun comentario.
PS. Tambien tengo una cuenta en Delicious conectada a mi blog donde marcaba articulos que me interesan pero quiensea que es dueno de Delicious ahora borro esa opcion.
Enero 22, 2012

Entrevista : TeleSur

2012-01-19T21:47:00.004-05:00

January 19, 2012

I was interviewed today in Telesur about the future of U.S. - Latin America relations should Obama get re-elected or a Republican candidate wins. I'll put the link when the show is aired.

Enero 19, 2012

Fui entrevistado hoy para Telesur sobre el futuro de las relaciones entre EEUU y Latino America si Obama es re-elegido o si un candidato gana las proximas elecciones presidenciales. Pondre el link cuando salga al aire.

BEYOND 2012

2012-01-16T15:01:00.007-05:00

BEYOND 2012
16 January 2012
Southern Pulse
Available: http://www.southernpulse.com/beyond-2012

The Internet in Brazil: E-Progress and E-Censorship in Latin America’s Poster Child

2012-01-12T15:31:00.010-05:00

The Internet in Brazil: E-Progress and E-Censorship in Latin America’s Poster Child
This analysis was prepared by COHA Research Fellow W. Alex Sanchez
January 12, 2012
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
Originally published in http://bit.ly/wrOMim

This inquiry focuses on the internet in Brazil; it is meant to continue and expand upon an article previously published by the author that discusses the role of the internet in Latin America, particularly how it affects Brazil, which can be accessed by clicking here.

Internet usage spreads in Brazil as the number of users increase and domestic e-businesses appear like Meliuz and Peixe Urbano

Cyber security remains a concern, particularly due to recent hacker-attacks by groups associated with Lulzec and cyber crimes committed by groups like the Brazilian Primeiro Comando da Capital

E-freedom of expression in Brazil remains a concern as a particularly controversial bill regarding e-censorship is being reviewed by the Brazilian congress

As a rising star on the global stage and as the current financial model that many other Latin American states wish to emulate, Brazil is viewed as the poster child for regional development. With that said, one aspect of Brazil’s extraordinary pace of growth that has not been widely discussed is how widespread internet usage is in the Portuguese-speaking giant. The internet is the passageway to the future and its importance in Brazil’s overall development, whether it be for general communication purposes or business transactions, hence it is important to understand where this global tool stands in Latin America’s largest nation.

The Internet in terms of Numbers

A June 2011 article in the Financial Times explains that “[i]n 2001 there were around 47m internet users in the BRIC[S – namely Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa] economies, now there are 759m; the number of users has grown 16 times in 10 years. However, the penetration of internet usage in the [BRICs] countries still only sits at 31 per cent which is paltry compared to the US at 77 per cent.” There are a number of different computations that provide varying statistics of how many internet users Brazil currently has. According to one source, Brazil in 2010 officially had 67 million internet users though experts argued that the number was probably closer to 73 million. According to the Brazilian Telecommunications Association (Telebrasil), 22.4 million new users were registered in 2010 in the country.[1] On the other hand, a December 2011 article by the Polish News Bulletin, while reporting that the Polish eSky.pl airline ticket broker has expanded to Brazil, explained that “during the last three years, the share of Brazilians with access to the Internet increased from 27 to 48 percent, with the number of Internet users in the country reaching 78 million.”[2] The data supplied by Telebrasil also explains that smartphone users in Brazil have surged 130 percent in the past 12 months since the country launched a National Broadband Internet Plan in 2011 to provide affordable broadband service to all Brazilians by 2014.[3]

To put internet usage in a proper context, as the website InternetWorldStats.com explains: “Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world, the sixth most populous, and the seventh country in Internet usage.”[4] Also, the International Monetary Fund recently projected that Brazil will be the fifth largest economy by 2015; while Brasilia proclaimed that this will occur sooner than that.[5] It’s natural to assume that the economic and population growth (Brazil had a population of almost 195 million in 2010 according to World Bank data), means that the number of internet users will grow rapidly in the coming years.

E-businesses

Regarding e-businesses, there is a website called Peixe Urbano a Brazilian version of Groupon, in which subscribers receive via e-mail offers for stores and other services. Other e-businesses include Meliuz, which provides offers for a variety of services, and e-closet.com.br, which sells a wide array of women’s clothing. Also, Netflix, a popular video rental e-business in the U.S. has entered the Latin American market, including Brazil’s. Daily Variety reveals that the Portuguese-version of Netflix began operating in September 2011 with a monthly fee of $9, and the company has struck content deals with Globo, a major domestic TV station.[6]

Regarding e-shopping in Brazil, it appears to be a growing trend. Ana Santi, who has a popular blog called Born in Brazil[7] explains that “’shopping is a fundamental part of the Brazilian culture […]In São Paulo, their beach is the shopping malls,” meaning that there is a cultural factor of why e-businesses have yet to take off.[8] Nevertheless, an International Herald Tribune article on the internet in Brazil explains that “the good news for e-retailing is that a large portion of those sales are coming from Brazilians younger than 30. Sixty percent of the country’s population is younger than 29. And, of course, younger Brazilians are the most Internet-savvy sector, spending an average of nine hours a day on Web-related activities.”[9] In an interview with the author, Natalia Hermont, who works as New Business Director in the aforementioned Meliuz, a growing Brazilian e-business, explained that “everything leads us to believe that e-business will grow. Not only because of the better access to the internet, but also analyzing some national internet rankings we are able to see that online shopping is no longer considered a novelty, it has now become a habit.” In other words, we will most likely see a rise of online purchasing in the coming years, which would reflect a cultural shift as new generations become more accustomed to carrying out transactions in the virtual world.

The problem of E-Piracy

In mid-December 2011, Apple launched iTunes stores in 15 Latin American states, including Brazil, with the goal that Taiwanese manufacturer Foxconn will soon produce iPods, iPads and iPhones in Brazil, and which will, hopefully, put a dent in the piracy practiced in that country. “For 15 years there have been immeasurable losses to pirated CDs, and for 10 years to piracy carried out on the Internet,” said Paulo Rosa, president of the Brazilian Association of Record Producers, to a recent AP report. Indeed, another issue regarding internet-related businesses booming in Brazil, is not to change the culture so people get used to shopping online, but that they also choose not to download illegal content such as movies and music. The aforementioned AP report interviewed an 18-yeard old law student in Sao Paulo who declared that “Brazilians have been downloading music for free for so many years, it’s part of the culture. Nobody expects to pay for music […] I’ve been getting my music for free off the Internet for a decade, and I’m not going to stop.”[10]

Thus, it would seem that as Brazilian culture changes as it resorts to the internet for online shopping, a change will also be needed regarding digital piracy. A problem is that the Brazilian legal system has not made it a priority to crack down on illegal piracy. Article 184 of the Brazilian Penal Code states that any act of copyright infringement is a crime; nevertheless there is what is known as the Princípio da insignificância (principle of insignificance), which essentially states that some crimes are given priority as compared to others in which no major harm is done (i.e. the damage of robbing a bank as compared to downloaded the latest hit song). There is also the problem that Brazil, like many other states, does not have the human resources nor technology to track down users that download illegal content, particularly when compared to major cyber crimes. Considering that developed states like the U.S. and Europe have only had limited success at stopping illegal downloading, it’s likely that, in the short run, Brazilian users will turn to e-businesses for shopping for items such as clothes, before they stop downloading copyrighted music files.

Social Media

Brazil has the second-highest number of Twitter users, surpassed only by the U.S. Moreover, the country has a growing number of Facebook users as well, but a social media website known as Orkut remains the prevalent popular social networking tool, though Facebook is quickly catching up. On September 20, 2011, the website comScore.com released a comprehensive report entitled “The Rise of Social Networking in Latin America,”[11] which discusses what websites and other outlets have the most subscribers and are most popular among Latinos. Regarding social media in Brazil, the report explains that Orkut has up to 35.7 million subscribers, as compared to Facebook’s 24.5 million.

Twitter has also attracted a growing number of Brazilian users, particularly as sports personalities and other celebrities use it to interact with their fans. For example, Brazilian soccer star Ronaldo (born Ronaldo Luis Nazario de Lima – @ClaroRonaldo) boasts over two and a half million followers. Also, in a somewhat entertaining incident, Twitter saw the face-off of two Brazilian celebrities: in late 2010, Brazilian soccer sensation Neymar (@njr92 – who has close to three million followers), tweeted to Brazilian billionaire Eike Batista: “you have to work a lot to reach my level.” The Brazilian tycoon and president of the EBX Group tweeted back (@eikebatista – with over half a million followers), “my friend, what you win in one month pays for the fuel for one of my 27 private jets.”[12]

Finally, the internet has allowed for mini-celebrities to gain significant popularity. For example Brazilian comedian Rafinha Bastos has almost 4 million Twitter followers (@RafinhaBastos). In statements to the International Herald Tribute, Bastos explained that “’the Internet is my home […] I’m a creature and creation of the Internet, and I’m very proud of that. The Internet made it possible for me to construct my career the way I wanted to.”[13]

Cyber-Security

In August 2010, the Brazilian army created a cyber-defense wing known as the Centro de Defesa Cibernética do Exército (Army’s Center for Cybernetic Security), with General José Carlos dos Santos as commander. The center currently has between twenty and thirty personnel. In an interview with Revista Época, a Brazilian magazine, General Santos explained that the hiring of hackers to work for the Center “is a possibility.” The Brazilian military officer went on to say that “we have ways to recruit by showing our work and giving the perspective of a challenging and interesting career.” He also said that beginning 2012, it will be mandatory for young Brazilian military officers to learn about information technology, and this will also be applied in the training of sergeants.

Certainly, the proliferation of cyber crimes will make domestic e-security initiatives like the CDCE even more important in the coming years as Brazil increasingly realizes it is not safe from such online threats. In June 2011, Brazil had several government websites hacked, “and private sector websites knocked offline and their Army personnel database was hacked with information posted online.” It seems that a Brazilian hacking group, allegedly associated with the international hacker association LulzSec, was responsible. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that Brazilian e-businesses are taking the appropriate measures to prevent cyber attacks. As explained to the author, the aforementioned Meliuz New Business Director explained, “we work with Site Blindado and they are always running security tests on our website to prevent any hacking attacks.”

E-Restrictions and Censorship

A final aspect that will continue to grow in importance in the coming years, as internet usage spreads in Brazil, has to do with e-censorship and freedom of expression. An April 2010 article in the website of the Committee to Protect Journalists, CPJ Internet Advocacy Coordinator’s Danny O’Brien reported that “Google says it received over 50 percent more requests from Brazilian authorities for content to be removed than those of the next highest country, Germany. Brazil also beat out second-place United States in personal data requests, despite having only 72 million Internet users in 2008 compared to the 230 million in the States.” Another report explained that Google stated that the Brazilian government made 263 requests that content be removed from one of the company’s web services in the second half of 2010, more than any other nation. Google complied with 76 per cent of the Brazilian requests, meaning more than 12,300 items online.[14] The CPJ article adds that “besides more than 200 Orkut removal orders, Brazilian government demands have been met by also taking down more Gmail accounts and more Blogger sites than any other country. Brazil is also in the top 10 for government-mandated takedowns of YouTube and Web search items.”[15]

Brazilian government officials state that these personal data requests had to do with operations to crack down on criminal groups, like those involved in child pornography. Nevertheless, there is concern that this is only part of the picture, meaning that the Brazilian government is using legitimate operations to crack down on criminals as an excuse to limit freedom of expression. The aforementioned CPJ article reports that

“As CPJ reported in Attacks on the Press in 2009, one congressman, Edmar Moreira, filed more than 44 suits against at least 38 journalists. Lower court judges routinely interpret Brazilian law in ways that restrict press freedom. On the Internet, courts have ordered Web sites to remove stories on judicial corruption, business dealings, and other matters of public interest.”[16]

Similar concerns have been raised by the infamous PL 84/99 bill (also known as the Azeredo Law), currently under review by the Brazilian Committee on Science and Technology. This measure is known for being particularly harsh, since its passage could allow courts to apply criminal penalties to activities like file sharing, peer-to-peer communications, and the fair use of copyrighted works. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and sites like YouTube and Flickr could become liable for unlawful content posted by their users. In addition, ISPs, email service providers, and other Internet intermediaries would be obligated to collect and retain users’ personal data for extended periods of time. A November 2011 article in Global Voices Advocacy explains how Brazilian scholars, civil society leaders, and advocates for digital rights have spoken out against the bill, arguing that the law would interfere with citizens’ rights, including freedom of expression and privacy and the attempts to restrict the openness of the internet in Brazil.[17]The Washington DC-based Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) has also come out to critique the bill.[18]In an interview with the author, Ellery Biddle, an associate at the CDT, explained that

“there is a fair amount of opposition to the Azeredo bill in civil society, and also in the public sector and in Congress. But the bill also has many supporters, who argue that its passage is imperative to fighting the distribution of malicious code and child pornography, and curbing fraud and the theft of financial information online. These are very legitimate aims, but Brazil already has strong laws in its criminal code that address fraud, theft, and child pornography, which are as applicable online as they are offline.”

Another organization, the Rio-based Sexuality Policy Watch (SPW) recently published a chapter entitled “Internet regulation and sexual politics in Brazil” in a major report called EroTICs: Sexuality and the Internet – an exploratory research, which was funded by the Ford Foundation.[19] In the chapter on Brazil, the SPW researchers discussed internet regulation and “also scanned perceptions about internet regulation among feminist and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) rights activists.”[20]Like other centers that promote freedom of speech and opinion, the SPW chapter was highly critical of the PL 84/99 law.

It is noteworthy to highlight that besides the Azeredo law another bill, which could be reviewed before it by the Brazilian government is the Marco Civil da Internet (Civil Rights Framework for the Internet). The website of the Centro de Tecnologia e Sociedade (CTS) at Fundacao Getulio Vargas in Rio (FGV) states that the Marco Civil is “an initiative from the Brazilian Ministry of Justice, in partnership with the [CTS/FGV], to develop a collaborative process in which all the actors from Brazilian society could identify together the rights and responsibilities that should guide the use of the Internet in Brazil.”[21]Biddle explains that it is a “strong piece of civil legislation that would serve as an Internet user’s bill of rights. Establishing clear rights and protections for Internet users, the law (which would be among the first of its kind internationally) would set a powerful example for other countries in the region and around the world.”

The Virtual World and Real Violence

In mid-December 2011, a popular Brazilian blogger known as “el Mosquito” (real name Alexander Hamilton) was found dead in his apartment. Authorities have ruled his death a “suicide by hanging,” though family and supporters want an in-depth investigation as he had received several threats to his safety. An article in Global Voices explains that

“Mosquito became famous – as well as a victim of political harassment – in his state, after reporting a rape case in Florianópolis, capital of Santa Catarina, which involved the son of a director (Sergio Sirotsky) of RBS, a leading media company linked to RedeGlobo in the region, and a 13 year-old girl, in June 2010. The media, in general, sought to hush up the case.”[22]

The truth behind Mosquito’s death is not yet clear, however it is important not to blow his death out of proportion and begin comparing the physical safety of Brazilian bloggers with what’s going on, for example, in Mexico. Regarding the internal war in Mexico, the violence has taken over the virtual world as the Zetas, one of the country’s most notorious drug cartels, have murdered a number of bloggers, like “el Rascatripas,” for posting information about operations carried out by this criminal group.

Certainly there are several violent organizations in Brazil, like the PCC. Nevertheless comparing internet-related violence in Brazil and Mexico at this stage is a stretch; though Mosquito’s death deserves a full investigation as well as the threats that other Brazilian bloggers have received in order to avoid violence from spreading into the virtual world.

At the Forefront of the E-Future

In November 2011, during a meeting of communication ministers, Brazil’s Paulo Bernardo declared his government’s intention to create “a ring of South American fiber optic networks encompassing the entire continent.”[23] This “South American solution,” he added, would lower the costs of internet and mobile access across the region, benefiting consumers and ISPs alike.[24] Such statements and calls to action are fairly ambitious, and they go hand in hand with other bold initiatives, like the creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the latest attempt at regional integration without the U.S. as a member. Nevertheless, it’s clear that ranging from e-crimes to e-censorship, there are issues that the Brazilian government, like any other nation, will have to successfully deal with at home in order for consistency in their international stand on related issues.

References for this article can be found here.

Additional Resources
Sexuality Policy Watch. “Internet regulation and sexual politics in Brazil” chapter in: EroTICs: Sexuality and the Internet – an exploratory research. P. 19

http://www.genderit.org/sites/default/upload/erotics_finalresearch_apcwnsp.pdf#brazil

Sexuality Policy Watch. http://www.sxpolitics.org

Center for Democracy and Technology.http://cdt.org/

Centro de Tecnologia e Sociedade (CTS) atFundacao Getulio Vargas in Rio. http://direitorio.fgv.br/cts/

Global Voices’ Brazil pages.http://globalvoicesonline.org/-/world/latin-america/brazil/

Recommended book: Richard Stiennon.Surviving Cyber War.Government Institutes (June 16, 2010)http://amzn.to/zXaRHN (Amazon)

EEUU continua su politica intervencionista

2012-01-10T10:17:00.004-05:00

Personal interview: EEUU continue su politica

(US-Venezuela relations)

HispanTV, en espanol

December 31, 2011

Placing CELAC in the proper Latin American Context

2012-01-05T19:12:00.003-05:00

Placing CELAC in the proper Latin American Context
By: W. Alex Sanchez
January 5, 2011
Journal of Foreign Relations
Originally published in: http://bit.ly/AbBKA9

The creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC – Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños) has attracted a fair amount of international attention, both by the international media and by Latin Americanist researchers and academics.

For example, Mark Weisbrot, co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, argued in a Journal of Foreign Relations article that “CELAC will continue to advance… positive changes [such as recent successful financial policies], including regional economic integration, co-ordination around foreign policy, and conflict resolution.” Meanwhile, my own organization, the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA), recently took a more cautious stance on CELAC’s future, arguing that “if CELAC wants to productively implement policies to solve major regional issues and eventually be a major player in the making of Latin American and Caribbean policy, it must first work on its fundamental structure.”

The Organization of American States
Promoting regional integration among Latin American and Caribbean states is an important step, and deliberately not inviting Canada and the U.S. to join demonstrates that the region wishes to continue its separation from Washington’s historical clout. The only agency that involves all hemispheric states (except Cuba, which chose not to return after the lifting of its 47-year old suspension in June 2009), the Organization of American States (OAS), has been perceived for a long time as Washington’s watchdog for the continent and has little real power.

Nevertheless, some OAS agencies, such as the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and the more decentralized Inter-American Court of Human Rights, are important entities that have carried out key initiatives in their specific realms.

Moreover, the OAS has a few security wings, like the Committee on Hemispheric Security (CHS) and the semi-autonomous Inter-American Defense College (IADC) that carry out important work. For example this past March 2011, I was invited to attend a three-day seminar in Washington DC co-sponsored by the CHS and the IADC, entitled the “Seminar on Disarmament and Nonproliferation.” During my time at the conference, I had the pleasure to engage extensively with several OAS and IADC staff, and it seemed clear to me that both agencies employ plenty of intelligent and highly qualified individuals. Hence, the OAS, its delegates, charters and branches, as well as its qualified staff and future potential employees, should not be easily discarded by the assumption that CELAC will be able to quickly take over all of the more silent initiatives that the OAS and its agencies carry out.

In comes CELAC
Regarding CELAC, it is important to remember that it, perhaps problematically, joins a plethora of other regional organizations in Latin America, each with its own niche. We will have to see if CELAC can work in harmony with these organizations and groups, despite their apparent differences and overlaps. Besides CELAC, the OAS and its agencies, other Latin American and Caribbean organizations include:

• Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR )
• Parlamento del MERCOSUR – MERCOSUR’s Parliament
• Comunidad Andina – Andean Community of Nations (CAN)
• Parlamento Andino – Andean Parliament
• Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América – Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA)
• Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
• Asociación de Estados del Caribe – Association of Caribbean States (ACS/AEC)
• Parlamento Centroamericano – Central American Parliament (PARLACEN)
• Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana – Central American Integration System (SICA)

There are plenty of other Latin American and Caribbean integration agencies, including more focused entities such as multinational trade associations and development banks. There is even a Latin American anti-nuclear watchdog, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Organismo para la Proscripción de las Armas Nucleares en la América Latina y el Caribe – OPANAL), created after the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco. It’s in this agency-prone region that CELAC comes in.

A quick list of CELAC’s issues

Reports of CELAC’s creation have been quick to highlight the variety of issues that this organization will face. For example, a recent article in the Washington Times brings up three immediate political challenges confronting the new agency:

“First, will leaders such as [Venezuela's] Mr. [Hugo] Chávez and Bolivia’s Evo Morales, who used the summit to lambaste U.S. military bases in Latin America, ‘hijack’ CELAC for anti-Americanism? Second, will the bloc, which voted to hold its third summit in 2013 in Cuba, act as a ‘legitimizer’ for the Castro regime and a bullhorn for the Argentine government in its territorial claims in the British Falkland Islands? Third, will CELAC seek to ‘dilute external pressures for democracy’ and act as a cover for government infringement on individual liberties?”

Other issues regarding CELAC include finances. Currently Washington pays for most of the OAS’s annual budget, hence, as neither the U.S. nor Canada are members of this new agency, will we see regional powerhouses like Brazil, Venezuela and Mexico volunteering to pay more to get this new agency jumpstarted? And if this happens, could the organization be unfairly influenced by a troika of richer countries, as compared to the OAS, which currently is only influenced by one?

My Two Centavos
Personally, I think CELAC’s biggest challenge will be proving that it can promote regional integration, even if it means making some of the existing agencies irrelevant.

To compare what’s going in Latin America right now to other regions, before the European Union existed as we know it, the European Community absorbed another agency, the Western European Union (WEU), slowly taking over its duties until the WEU formally ceased to exist on June 30, 2011. Could CELAC, like the EU, absorb the Andean Community, MERCOSUR and CARICOM, or would CELAC become some kind of umbrella organization for all these different regional blocs and specialized agencies like OPANAL?

There are plenty of scenarios, both idealistic and realistic, for CELAC’s future. With that said, Latin American governments are very cautious and protective of their sovereignty, and smaller blocs like MERCOSUR, CARICOM and the Andean Community have had limited and varying degrees of success regarding integration. I remain skeptical that CELAC will be able to reshuffle the way Latin American and Caribbean governments see international organizations and their own national sovereignty, anytime soon.

Operaciones Militares y de Paz por Ejércitos Latinoamericanos: Entre ser un Buen Samaritano y el Interés Nacional

2012-01-02T14:20:00.005-05:00

Operaciones Militares y de Paz por Ejércitos Latinoamericanos: Entre ser un Buen Samaritano y el Interés Nacional
Por Alex Sánchez, Analista en el Consejo de Asuntos Hemisféricos (COHA)
Enero 2, 2012
Washington DC
Versión en ingles publicada en la página web del COHA – Enero 22, 2010 (http://www.coha.org/peacekeeping-and-military-operations/ )

Un reporte de la agencia de noticias de seguridad española Infodefensa.com publicado el 14 de diciembre 2009, menciona que Colombia está dispuesta a enviar a Afganistán un batallón compuesto por miembros de las fuerzas especiales y de la fuerza aérea. La participación de Colombia está siendo patrocinada por España para entrenar fuerzas locales afganas de seguridad y ayudar a las fuerzas de la coalición actualmente en operaciones. Esta iniciativa expone un tema relativamente desconocido, es decir, operaciones de paz y otras operaciones militares en el extranjero, en las que unidades de las fuerzas armadas de los estados de América Latina participan o pueden participar en un futuro próximo. Si bien es encomiable que los gobiernos regionales deseen enviar tropas para ayudar a estabilizar países distantes, así como cooperar en la lucha contra el terrorismo, como puede ser la intención de Colombia, usualmente también hay otros motivos más altruistas que apoyan este tipo de operaciones.

Operaciones de Paz 101: MINSUTAH y el futuro
En el caso de Bogotá, la participación en Afganistán traería un beneficio político importante en el fortalecimiento de las relaciones de seguridad con Washington, Colombia sería el único país latinoamericano con tropas desplegadas en Afganistán. Los colombianos deben ser conscientes que el gobierno de Álvaro Uribe está ansioso por atraer decisivamente el apoyo de Washington en vista de las futuras negociaciones para el tratado de libre comercio entre los dos países. Mientras tanto Brasil, la potencia regional, es el líder de la controversial Misión de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas en Haití (MINUSTAH). La decisión de Brasilia de jugar un rol tan destacado en Haití es probablemente una calculada decisión para avanzar su influencia diplomática en la región y no tanto un acto de buen samaritano. Probablemente Brasil usará su trabajo en la MINUSTAH (ahora mucho mas importante por el devastador terremoto que azotó a Haití el 12 de enero) para mostrarse como un poder mundial en crecimiento y para demostrar que merece un asiento permanente en el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU. Sin embargo, los controversiales eventos alrededor de la creación de la MINUSTAH, como la expulsión forzada del Presidente Constitucional Jean-Bertrand Aristide en el 2004, han manchado considerablemente las buenas intenciones de Lula y sus iniciativas.
El terrible terremoto que virtualmente destruyó gran parte de Haití, país que ahora se ha vuelto un Estado fallido devastado, es el último desafío para una misión de mantenimiento de la paz que continuamente ha estado rodeada de momentos embarazosos y reveladores. La MINUSTAH probablemente tendrá que asumir responsabilidades adicionales – algunas de ellas serán controversiales como en el pasado cercano – para poder mantener a la población haitiana bajo control y llevar a cabo operaciones de ayuda.

Esto presupone que las fuerzas de seguridad haitianas estarán en condiciones de eficacia para reafirmarse como una fuerza viable, necesaria para reconstruir al país, algo que no han logrado hacer en el pasado. Por ende, los ojos del mundo están en el liderazgo de la MINUSTAH. Se necesita con urgencia una temporada exitosa en el manejo de la situación sobre el terreno para ayudar, al menos parcialmente, a olvidar tanto sus polémicos antecedentes como su sesgo anti-Aristide y su tendencia a la violencia.
Desde la Republica Democrática del Congo a las fronteras de Israel, Irak y Afganistán, los militares latinoamericanos han participado en operaciones en el extranjero desde hace décadas. Casi siempre han actuado bajo la bandera de la ONU, o en relación con Afganistán e Irak, como parte de una coalición de fuerzas internacionales. No es sorprendente que en Latinoamérica (al igual que en otras partes del mundo) la falta de guerras entre Estados, por décadas, significa que las fuerzas militares tienen que buscar nuevas razones para existir. Las misiones de paz y la coalición de tipo arreglos militares se basan en sentimientos de “Buen Samaritano” y una fuerte dosis de real politik.

MINUSTAH: Idealismo se une con Intereses Nacionales
La historia de la Misión de la ONU en Haití ha sido polémica desde sus inicios. La caída del Presidente Jean-Bertrand Aristide en el 2004, aparentemente planeada por EEUU, Canadá y Francia, junto con el entonces Secretario General de la ONU Kofi Annan, llevó al poder a un discutible gobierno del Primer Ministro interino, Gerard Latortue. Como parte de la intervención de la comunidad internacional, la ONU en vez de trabajar para restablercer el orden constitucional en Haití, actuó como una fuerza militar que apoyó el nuevo orden político preocupante en la isla.

La Misión de las Naciones Unidas, dominada por Brasil, está formada por fuerzas de paz internacionales, en su mayoría procedentes de países de América como Perú, Chile, Uruguay y Argentina, así como de otras fuerzas militares de fuera de la región como China, India y Jordania. En una entrevista del autor con Michael J. Snell, coronel canadiense retirado, que ahora trabaja en el Centro Pearson para las Misiones de Paz en Canadá, explicó que “desde el comienzo hubo una sensación muy clara de que los latinos controlarían la misión. MINUSTAH iba a ser una misión latina, ejemplificada por una iniciativa chilena para entrenar a la policía haitiana en el Centro de Operaciones de Paz en Santiago.” Un punto que se debe mencionar es que históricamente la intervención extranjera en Haití por lo general llegó de Washington, como por ejemplo el envio de soldados a la isla en 1994 por la administración Clinton para monitorear el retorno al poder de Aristide, que había sido derrocado por los militares en 1991. El interés de América Latina en tener una participación mayor en las operaciones de paz en Haití solo comenzó alrededor del año 2000 cuando Washington y Europa centraron su atención en los Balcanes y de ahí el Medio Oriente y Asia Central.
Las razones del interés brasileño en estar a la cabeza de la MINUSTAH caen en dos categorías.

1. Idealismo: El gobierno brasileño quiere promover la paz mundial y ve a Haití como un buen lugar para empezar.

2. Pragmatismo: Brasilia quiere consolidar su status como un poder mundial en crecimiento y ve a la misión de la ONU en Haití como una oportunidad para cimentar su posición. Además, mientras el país sigue ejerciendo presión para obtener un sitio permanente en el consejo de seguridad de la ONU, considera también que el estar al mando de una misión de la ONU es una manera prudente para cimentar su nombre. Snell explica que “parece claro que Haití se ha convertido en parte del nacionalismo brasileño; que ha sido utilizada, a falta de mejor palabra, para mostrar a Brasil como un poder mundial en crecimiento.”

Trabajando al costado de Brasil como segundo al mando de la MINUSTAH, Chile también ha tenido su cuota de problemas. El mas notable fue el de nombrar al General Eduardo Aldunate como segundo al mando de la MINUSTAH. Aldunate, quien asistió a la Escuela de las Américas/WHINSEC, ha sido cuestionado por lo menos de ser consciente (sino participante) de abusos de derechos humanos cuando era un oficial de inteligencia en el periodo de la dictadura del General Augusto Pinochet. Snell, quien nunca ha conocido a Aldunate, manifiesta que “no está claro porqué algunos funcionarios son elegidos para una misión determinada, a veces uno se desliza a través de grietas o en ocasiones un Estado miembro lleva a cabo negociaciones a puerta cerrada para que alguien sea elegido”. El oficial retirado eligió utilizar como ejemplo el extraño caso de un Teniente General retirado de la India, Dewan Prem Chad, quien fue elegido, cuando tenia 76 años, como jefe de la misión de la ONU en Namibia en 1989 aun cuando su edad era claramente un factor en contra para ser seleccionado.

MINUSTAH: Viejos y Nuevos Desafíos después del Terremoto del 2010
Haití es la nación mas pobre del hemisferio, una triste distinción para una nación que fue la segunda república del continente en conseguir su independencia después de Estados Unidos. Algunos apoyarían a la MINUSTAH argumentando que la misión trató de poner orden en el país en conflicto. Por ejemplo, en setiembre de 2008, la MINUSTAH distribuyó alimentos y agua a los haitianos que quedaron varados a raiz de la tormenta tropical Hanna. Adicionalmente, un reporte de enero de 2010 por la Caribbean Media Corporation dice que la misión de la ONU iba a asumir algunas responsabilidades de seguridad en la isla para las próximas elecciones legislativas del 28 de febrero, aunque es dudoso que éstas se lleven a cabo en vista del terremoto.

Refiriéndose al rol de Brasil en la MINUSTAH, el Presidente brasileño Lula ha declarado lo siguiente: “Pienso que nuestra presencia en Haití puede ser comparada con un partido de futbol. En el 2004, estábamos en el primer tiempo. Ahora, estamos comenzando el segundo tiempo del juego. El primero fue complicado, teníamos que conocer al adversario poco a poco, organizando una defensa sólida, sin permitir algún gol y no dejando ningún objetivo por conseguir. En el segundo tiempo, es hora que tomemos la iniciativa y la táctica del juego es fortalecer nuestra presencia solidaria más y más” (Agencia Brasileña de noticias Estado, Mayo 29, 2008)

La analogía sugiere que en los ojos del líder brasileño, la misión de la ONU en Haití no terminará hasta que el metafórico “partido” haya terminado. Sin embargo, las declaraciones de Lula no explican porque Brasil esta “jugando” este “partido.”
Existen opiniones opuestas acerca de si las autoridades haitianas y las fuerzas policiales locales están listas para funcionar sin la MINUSTAH. En junio del 2009, Gilda Motta Santos Neves, jefe de la oficina de la ONU en Itamaraty (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores brasileño) expresó que “el compromiso brasileño es a largo plazo. No existe ningún calendario fijado porque la situación se debe evaluar a la par de lo que suceda con los temas de desarrollo y seguridad. El desarrollo es lo único que puede mantener la seguridad a largo plazo”. Ciertamente, el terremoto se traduce en el sentido de que la MINSUTAH tendrá que permanecer en Haití tal vez incluso más de lo previsto inicialmente. Michael J. Snell comentó al autor que los operativos de la MINUSTAH “están enfrentando desafíos que ninguna otra misión de la ONU ha tenido que enfrentar. No pueden rotar a las tropas y no está claro aún qué responsabilidades adicionales tendrán que tomar en este momento las nuevas tropas que lleguen”

En el presente, la MINSUTAH muestra dos ejemplos de lo difícil que es controlar al país sin la ayuda necesaria de la policía local. En abril de 2008 la protesta en varios vecindarios contra el costo de vida, terminó en los barrios populares de Les Cayes, con los cascos azules disparando e hiriendo seriamente a tres personas luego de que los protestantes lanzaran piedras a los soldados de la ONU. Los protestantes cubrieron el área con llantas en llamas y armazones de carros, haciendo imposible que tropas oficiales entren al área afectada. Las protestas por la falta de alimentos y precios altos son comunes y probablemente aumentarán en vista del impacto del terremoto de enero en todos los aspectos de vida de la isla. Numerosos países y organizaciones donantes envían suministros pero no está claro si todas las aéreas afectadas han recibido la ayuda.

Adicionalmente, el terremoto ha causado que una prisión en Puerto Príncipe colapsara, permitiendo que varios prisioneros escapen. Considerando que la policía haitiana ya tiene grandes problemas y deberes, a lo que se suma la falta de material humano, ya que sus miembros están en operaciones de socorro y protegiendo a sus propias familias, es claro que los cascos azules tendrán que adquirir, incluso, mayores actividades de policías que antes.

Como se mencionó antes, ademas de Brasil, varios países Latinoamericanos son parte de la MINUSTAH, entre ellos Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Perú y Uruguay. El mandato de la MINUSTAH fue renovado en octubre del 2009 por un año más y sus contingentes representan alrededor de 9,000 soldados de los cuales aproximadamente 2,000 están siendo utilizados para conformar misiones de policías no muy bien definidas.

Operaciones de la ONU en el Presente

Un número de países Latino Americanos están involucrados en diversas operaciones de la ONU por todo el mundo. Por ejemplo Colombia ha desplegado al “Batallón Colombia” al Medio Oriente. Algo que se debe mencionar es la diferencia entre una misión de operaciones de paz, que incluye tropas regulares que realmente llevan a cabo misiones de patrullaje, entre otras, y el despliegue de observadores militares, que no necesariamente trabajan bajo la bandera de la ONU. La siguiente sección no pretende proporcionar una lista completa de todas las misiones de paz en las que países latinos han participado ya sea para la ONU o como observadores militares, pero más bien sirve para dar una idea sobre los países de la región que están envueltos en este tipo de operaciones:

Uruguay: En octubre 2008, tropas rebeldes de la República Democrática del Congo usaron fuego de artillería para atacar a 300 cascos azules del Uruguay, la India y personal civil de la ONU en una base en Rutshuru. Un mes antes del incidente, se celebró una ceremonia en Kinshasa, capital del Congo, para felicitar a los cascos azules por su trabajo en el país. Entre los asistentes a la ceremonia estuvo Ross Stewart Mountain, un Representante Especial del Secretario General de la ONU en el Congo, quien habló del trabajo de las tropas de paz uruguayas en diferentes crisis, en localidades como Bunia, Bukavu y Kinshasa entre otros. Uruguay aporta anualmente alrededor de 1,300 soldados a la misión de la ONU en el Congo, cuyo total es de más de 20,000 efectivos, es la operación de paz más grande del mundo. Uruguay sirve como un ejemplo de una fuerza militar que está intentando re-inventarse. Al no tener problemas de seguridad externa (no están en cuestión, guerras con sus vecinos Brasil y Argentina) y con una generación nueva de oficiales que buscan separarse de la época en que una junta militar dictatorial gobernó al país; las Fuerzas Armadas uruguayas consideran las operaciones de paz como una forma de transformarse en una institución relevante en su país.

Perú: Las Fuerzas Armadas del país andino han servido en varias misiones de la ONU, según el website de las Fuerzas Armadas peruanas, las tropas del país han servido en el Sahara Occidental (1991-1992), Sierra Leona (2000), Chipre (2002-2006), Burundi (2004-2006) y Sudan (2005-2006) entre otros. Perú usualmente envía un número pequeño de tropas a las misiones africanas, incluyendo 3 a Costa de Marfil y 17 a Sudán. En el 2008, Perú recibió la distinción de tener a uno de sus oficiales el Almirante Mario Cesar Sanchez Debemardi (quien ya había servido como monitor militar en la misión de la ONU en Namibia, UNTAG, entre 1989-1990) como jefe de la misión de la ONU en Chipre (UNFICYP). Mientras tanto, un nuevo contingente de tropas peruanas, denominado “Compañía Perú,” incluyendo 204 soldados y oficiales, salió de Lima hacia Haití en junio del 2009.

Argentina: Unidades Argentinas han servido en la misión de la ONU en Chipre desde 1993. De acuerdo a reportes, expertos forenses argentinos han trabajado como parte de un equipo de la isla para identificar los restos de chipriotas griegos desaparecidos desde la invasión turca a la isla en 1974 así como para identificar chipriotas turcos que han permanecido desaparecidos desde la década de los sesenta. Las tropas de paz argentinas también han servido en misiones de la ONU en Sudán, Costa de Marfil, Cambodia, Sahara Occidental, entre otros.

Colombia: Aparte de la preparación por el posible despliegue de sus tropas para operar en Afganistán como miembro de una coalición militar, Bogotá también ha enviado tropas para formar parte de la MINUSTAH. Además de las tropas colombianas, también forman parte de la agencia independiente denominada Fuerza de Observadores Multinacionales (MOF) que se desplegaron a la frontera entre Israel y Egipto después que ambos países firmaran un tratado de paz en 1979. El MOF cuenta con alrededor de 2,000 soldados procedentes de 11 países.

AP

El Salvador: Otro país involucrado en operaciones de paz, aunque en una menor escala es El Salvador. En junio del 2008 San Salvador envió 52 cascos azules para ayudar a la misión de la ONU en el Líbano y en febrero del 2009 envió a cinco policías de la Policía Civil Nacional a Haití. Por otro lado el país centroamericano desplegó tropas a Irak para ayudar a su aliado, Estados Unidos.

Iniciativas de Paz y Entrenamiento
Lo Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA), ha participado en una serie de iniciativas de paz, ejemplificadas por el entrenamiento de fuerzas de paz uruguayas y argentinas que iban a ser destinadas a misiones para combatir el tráfico de seres humanos. Según reportes, este tipo de ejercicios de paz también se han realizado con países como Perú, Bolivia, Ecuador y Honduras.

Adicionalmente, varios países latinoamericanos se han unido para crear ALCOPAZ – Asociación Latinoamericana de Centros de Entrenamientos para Operaciones de Paz - con sede en Rio de Janeiro. Debe observarse que ALCOPAZ es una organización nueva y queda por ver cómo va a trabajar con la plétora de organizaciones regionales nuevas que hay en el hemisferio, desde la OEA con su brazo militar, la Junta Interamericana de Defensa, hasta organizaciones regionales como UNASUR y su Consejo de Defensa.
Hasta ahora, el rol que la Asociación ha tenido en respuesta al terremoto en Haití no es evidente. Hablando de la estructura de ALCOPAZ, Michael J. Snell observó que “a los canadienses nos gusta unir diferentes organizaciones y agencias para promover la cooperación interinstitucional, es confuso para nosotros ver cuantas organizaciones hay en latinoamérica y por que no están mas interconectadas”.

Presencia Latina en Irak y Afganistán
El posible viaje de tropas colombianas a Afganistán es un notable evento por un número de razones. Como ya se mencionó, España esta sirviendo como un tipo de sponsor de la misión colombiana. De acuerdo a Infodefensa.com, Colombia ha manifestado que enviará entre 80 y 200 soldados al país de Asia Central. En agosto 2009 la vice presidente española Maria Teresa Fernandez de la Vega declaró que España sería el sponsor de la unidad colombiana para servir en la Fuerza de Asistencia de Seguridad Internacional en Afganistán. La misión de las tropas latinas será entrenar al ejército afgano y llevar a cabo operaciones de remoción de minas y operaciones anti-narcóticos. Respecto a la posibilidad de que las tropas desplegadas podrían estar involucradas en el combate contra los insurgentes talibanes, el Ministro de Defensa colombiano Gabriel Silva Lujan informó al público que “debido a que (las tropas colombianas) estarán en una zona de combate, sería difícil que no tengan que combatir en algún momento”.

Algo que debe ser mencionado, es que enviar tropas latinas a coaliciones militares no solo embarca a Colombia. Países como El Salvador, la Republica Dominicana, Nicaragua y otros de la región han desplegado tropas a Irak luego de que EEUU invadió el país en el 2003. El Salvador envió 380 soldados a la región, pero desde entonces gradualmente ha reducido su número. En Agosto del 2008, 200 soldados fueron enviados a Irak para reemplazar a los 280 que ya estaban allí. En Febrero del 2009 el país centroamericano retiró a sus últimas tropas del país. Las fuerzas salvadoreñas fueron las últimas fuerzas latinas en Irak. El ex presidente Salvadoreño Tony Saca fue el encargado de enviar tropas, ya que era un amigo cercano de la administración de George W. Bush y quería mantenerse en buenos términos.

Al igual que El Salvador, Colombia es un país cercano a Washington en Latino América. Por ende, el enviar tropas a Afganistán puede ser visto como una forma para que Bogotá mantenga sus relaciones estrechas con Washington.

Una Historia de Operaciones de Paz y Operaciones Militares
Algo que debe ser mencionado es que los países latinoamericanos han incrementado su rol en operaciones de paz y militares en los últimos años. Sin embargo estos países tienen una larga historia de tomar parte en este tipo de operaciones. Por ejemplo el rol de fuerzas latinas en operaciones militares tiene como uno de sus orígenes el rol de Brasil con los Aliados en la Segunda Guerra Mundial. La Fuerza Expedicionaria Brasileña compuesta de 25,000 soldados luchó en Italia y en el sector del Océano Atlántico Sur. Además el ejército de Colombia envió a cuatro de sus batallones para la Guerra de Corea entre 1951-1954. La fuerza perdió 146 soldados de más de 4,000 que fueron enviados allí. Los colombianos lucharon como parte de las unidades de Estados Unidos, principalmente como ayuda para compensar en la 7ª División de Infantería.

Uno de los ejemplos más antiguos de una participación importante de un país latino en una misión de paz de la ONU fue el “Batallón Perú” enviado por el ejército peruano, bajo el gobierno del General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975) a la frontera entre Israel y Egipto. El batallón estuvo involucrado en operaciones de paz, asociadas con la Guerra del Yom Kippur de 1973 y dejó la región en 1974. En una entrevista con COHA, un coronel retirado peruano que formó parte del batallón, declaró que el ejército “buscaba oficiales en forma, solteros, que hablaran ingles y que tuvieran una hoja profesional sin problemas”. El oficial mencionó que “todos querían ir a este tipo de misiones a pesar de los peligros, había un limite de 20 tenientes para el batallón y más de 100 postularon.” El oficial explico que la razón para enviar tropas al Medio Oriente se basó en que, en ese tiempo el Perú era miembro del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU y por ende era cuestión de orgullo nacional que Lima enviara tropas. “El Presidente Velasco estaba muy orgulloso de que íbamos a ir. Antes de viajar, él se reunió con el batallón y marchamos en frente de él” finalizó el oficial.

Operaciones Militares y Operaciones de Paz para todo momento
La base humana para las operaciones de paz de la ONU se origina en países del Tercer Mundo, mientras que los países más industrializados proporcionan recursos financieros y logísticos. Para países como Uruguay y Brasil, ésta es una manera de incrementar su status y su imagen internacional. Ya que las guerras entre países no son una opción para gobiernos como Montevideo, las Fuerzas Armadas del país, por razones pragmáticas, se han centrado en operaciones de paz. Mientras que Brasilia, con Lula y sus sucesores, consideran que el trabajo que realizan en las operaciones de paz ayuda a cimentar el status de Brasil como un nuevo poder global en crecimiento, especialmente porque Brasilia quiere una silla permanente en el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU. Sin embargo, hay peligro de que en este afán, Brasil se comprometa en misiones de paz controversiales como la MINUSTAH. Los eventos que llevaron a la creación de la misión de la ONU a Haití, además de reportes de abusos por parte de los cascos azules, podrían poner el buen nombre de Brasil en problemas al igual que poner en problemas sus ambiciosos planes diplomáticos.

El uso brasileño de la ONU y el rol que tiene en Haití, encaminados a que Brasilia gane prestigio internacional, es comprensible. Lo mismo pasa con Colombia que planea en enviar tropas a Afganistán y países centroamericanos que se han involucrado en Irak, más que nada para victorias políticas con relación a Washington. Aun, si por un lado, cosas buenas saldrán de estas operaciones, está claro que estos viajes al servicio de operaciones de paz y operaciones militares representan el futuro de las Fuerzas Armadas latinoamericanas y serán parte de su futura razón para existir, particularmente si las guerras entre Estados en Latinoamérica continúan siendo, afortunadamente, escasas.

Para más información visitar
Latin American Association of Training Centres for Peace ALCOPAZ. http://www.alcopaz.org/es_index.htm

Argentine Centre for Joint Training for Peace Operations. http://www.caecopaz.mil.ar/index1.html

Peruvian Centre for Joint Training for Peace Operations
http://www.ccffaa.mil.pe/cecopaz/cecopaz.htm

Pearson Peacekeeping Centre
http://www.peaceoperations.org/

Peruvian Armed Forces in UN Peace Operations.
http://www.ccffaa.mil.pe/cecopaz/misiones.htm

Global Peace Operations Initiative
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoi/

The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress. Serafino, Nina. Congressional Research Service. June 11, 2009.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32773.pdf

Please accept this article as a free contribution from this author, but if re-posting, please afford authorial and institutional attribution. Exclusive rights can be negotiated.

The Internet and Latin America: The Rise of the Virtual World and Emerging Cyber Security Issues

2011-12-24T15:03:00.002-05:00

The Internet and Latin America: The Rise of the Virtual World and Emerging Cyber Security Issues
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
December 23, 2011
Originally published in: http://bit.ly/s4MVuZ

Throughout the world, many regions have embraced the internet as a vital communication and business tool, and Latin America has been no exception. While demonstrably the expansion of internet usage has not rivaled that of the United States, Europe, or some Asian states like South Korea and Japan, the growth of the internet in the region continues at a steady tempo. Additionally, we are witnessing a rise in the importance of cyber security as cases of hacking and other cybercrimes proliferate.

Growth of the Internet in Numbers

In terms of numbers, the level of internet use in Latin America is certainly not as widespread as it has been in Europe or other highly developed regions, given constraints such as adverse economic indicators, poverty levels, and even geography, but the number of internet users in Latin America has grown over the past decade. Currently, the countries with the most internet users among Spanish-speaking countries in Latin America are Chile, Argentina and Venezuela.[1] According to a June 2011 report by AMPARO,[2] a project managed by the Latin American and Caribbean internet Addresses Registry (LACNIC), there are currently over 200 million users in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Throughout the region, there has been a pronounced surge not only in the number of homes with internet connection, but also in internet cafes. In an interview with COHA, a Peace Corps volunteer currently deployed in Honduras explained that, “in big cities, there are always a handful of places where you can get wifi. Also, virtually all mid sized towns have internet cafes, even some well-to-do small ones.” In addition, a September 13, 2010 article in Advertising Age quoted a poll by Nielsen’s “Emerging Digital Trends Report,” which explains that three in ten internet users from around the globe access the net from their phones. This behavior is most prominent in the Asia-Pacific region, where 71 percent of internet users have logged on from their phones in the last 30 days. This statistic is followed by 68 percent in Middle East-Africa-Pakistan (MEAP), 46 percent in Latin America, 37 percent in Europe, and 34 percent in North America.[3] Moreover, a recent study by Vision Mobile, reported by the Colombian daily El Tiempo, explained that Latin America is one of the regions that uses the least number of smart phones.[4] The report explains that the average in Latin America of smart phone-usage is 17 percent, compared to 27 percent, which is the global average, which means that there is ample opportunity for this technology to expand in this region.

It’s clear that internet usage will only continue to grow in the coming years as international telecommunication companies move in to capitalize on the relatively virgin Latin American market. In 2008, the Swedish-controlled international telecoms investor Millicom International Cellular S.A. launched 3G services in Guatemala, Honduras, Bolivia, Paraguay, El Salvador, and Colombia. According to a report by M2 Telecomworldwire, “Millicom said that it is providing the full portfolio of 3G services including high speed mobile broadband, internet access for mobile customers via laptop, TV on mobile handsets, music and video downloads and video calling.”[5]

Nevertheless, in some countries, some time will have to pass before they can reach the level of internet-connectivity that European and Asian states enjoy. The aforementioned Peace Corps member based in Honduras explained to COHA that:

Internet access in rural areas like where I live is confined mostly to offices. The only place that has internet where I live is at the alcaldia [the major’s office]. In any case the internet is mind-blowingly slow. Also, there are 4-5 people that have USB modems, which is how many people connect to the internet.

In another example of how telecommunications like phone and internet services have become a critical component of doing business in Latin America, the world’s richest man is Mexican national Carlos Slim, who owns América Móvil, Latin America’s largest mobile telecoms company. His empire now spans 200 companies in the construction, retail, tobacco, and media industries, and he gained further prominence in 2010 when he took over The New York Times; his fortune is estimated to be more than USD 63 billion by Forbes magazine.[6] América Móvil’s Mexican Telcel unit accounts for 70 percent of Mexico’s cell phone service and the Prodigy Infinitum is Mexico’s largest internet service provider.[7]

Latinos y la Web

The favorite sites for Latinos on the World Wide Web include social media sites like Facebook and Twitter, and communication programs like Hotmail and Skype. In an interview with COHA, a high school teacher in Jalisco, Mexico, explained that most of her students have Facebook profiles, and she even knows some primary school students who also have accounts on that website. There are also domestic spin-off versions of such sites; for example, Brazil has a popular social website known as Orkut. Other websites that are often visited include YouTube and national news and entertainment sites like Peru.com in Peru or major TV station websites like Televisa and TV Azteca in Mexico.

Twitter has also attracted a number of Latino users; particularly as sports personalities and other celebrities use it to interact with their fans. For example, Brazilian soccer star Ronaldo (born Ronaldo Luis Nazario de Lima – @ClaroRonaldo) currently has over 2.5 million followers. Meanwhile, Roberto Gomez Bolanos, a famous Mexican comedy actor popularly known as Chespirito, has over two million followers (@chespiritorgb). Also recently, a Mexican soccer team, Los Jaguares, replaced the names of the players on their jerseys with their Twitter handles.[8]

Moreover, various heads of state have created Twitter accounts to better communicate with their citizens. Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez is an avid Twitter user (@chavezcandanga ), as well as Presidents Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia (@JuanManSantos) and Ollanta Humala of Peru (@Ollanta_HumalaT). Certainly, there is the issue of whether the heads of state themselves regularly manage their Twitter accounts or if it is their press teams who are called upon to maintain them. Nevertheless, President Chávez boasts over two million followers, while the Colombian leader can brag about almost 500 thousand followers.

Some regional governments are even trying to use social media for health research. A July 16 article in New Scientist reports that thanks to software created by the Brazilian National Institute of Science and Technology, Brazilian researchers are using Twitter to track the appearance and spread of dengue diseases in the Portuguese-speaking country.[9] The article, explains that:

Dengue outbreaks occur every year in Brazil, but exactly where varies every season. It can take weeks for medical notifications to be centrally analyzed, creating a headache for health authorities planning where to concentrate resources. Using Twitter messages could mean a much faster response.[10]

Then again, there are some utilities brought about by the internet that have not yet caught on in Latin America. For example, e-purchasing is only slowly beginning to gain a foothold in the region as compared to similar e-businesses in the U.S. and Europe like eBay or Groupon. Some attempts at e-businesses have penetrated Latin America, but with limited success; there’s a Peruvian e-business known as iQuiero, (www.iquiero.com) where users can buy anything from washing machines to cake and bottles of whiskey and have it delivered to their homes, but its delivery area is limited (for example, for food delivery, you can only order if you’re in the country’s capital, Lima). Regarding Mexico, there’s a website called Mercado Libre (http://www.mercadolibre.com.mx/) which is essentially a Mexican version of eBay, where individuals as well as stores can sell products at reduced prices. Although other regional countries have yet to join the wave of online business, this does not preclude the potential for the growth of this sector in the coming years.

Brazil and the Internet

A June 2011 article in the Financial Times explains that “[i]n 2001 there were around 47m internet users in the BRIC[S – namely Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa] economies, now there are 759m; the number of users has grown 16 times in 10 years. However, the penetration of internet usage in the [BRICs] countries still only sits at 31 per cent which is paltry compared to the US at 77 per cent.”[11] Brazil officially had 67 million internet users in 2010, though experts argued that the number was probably closer to 73 million.[12] Brazil also has the second-highest number of Twitter users, surpassed only by the U.S. The country has a growing number of Facebook users as well, but the social media website known as Orkut remains a popular social networking site. In addition, regarding e-businesses, there is a website called Peixe Urbano (http://peixeurbano.com/) which a sort of Brazilian version of Groupon, in which subscribers receive via e-mail offers for stores and other services.

The Rise of Hacking and other Cyber Crimes

Naturally, criminals regard the rise of the virtual world in Latin America as another plane to which they can expand their sphere of operations. Nevertheless, it is hard to determine which country is most affected by issues like cyber fraud, the infection of individual computers with malicious code and other issues, since it is often not reported when it occurs to individual users. One recent report in the Mexican daily Noroeste.com argues that Mexico suffers the most cybercrimes in Latin America.[13] Nevertheless, the aforementioned AMPARO report, citing data provided by Symantec (a security software company) stated that Brazil, Mexico and Argentina make up the top three regional countries that suffered the most cyber attacks in 2009 and 2010.

Possibly having an even greater impact, hacking government web pages has become a growing problem due to the nationalistic persuasion of some of the hackers. For instance, Peruvian and Chilean hackers have a history of taking control of each other’s government websites, particularly before and after sporting events. In 2007, the Peruvian hacker group known as RootGroup attacked the websites of the Chilean Soccer Association, the Chilean Office for National Emergencies, and the National Council for Culture and Arts.[14] Later, in 2009, amidst tensions between the two countries over a spy case, Chilean hackers took control of the official website of the Peruvian government (http://www.peru.gob.pe/), posting nationalistic insults and the Chilean national anthem.[15] More recently, in August 2011, Anonymous and Colombian hackers attacked the websites of the Colombian Ministry of Interior, the official government portal, and the now defunct intelligence apparatus, the Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS – Administrative Department for Security). The two associations declared that the attack, called “Operación Defensa” (Defense Operation), was to protest the Colombian government’s censorship.[16] Also, in June of this year, Brazil had several government websites hacked, “and private sector websites knocked offline and their Army personnel database was hacked with information posted online.”[17] It seems that a Brazilian hacking group, associated with the international hacker association LulzSec, was responsible.

A critical issue here comes down to who exactly is carrying out these cyber crimes. Are they just lone operations carried out by small groups of hackers that take control of a particular website for nationalistic purposes? And what about stealing bank information and other financially damaging crimes? Currently there is a major internet virus called SAPZ in Peru, which steals the user’s personal data, including their bank account information.[18]

Arguably when these crimes reach a certain level of complexity and goals, they are no longer just hacker groups looking for a quick profit, but they may be working for even bigger organizations. A July report by Southern Pulse, an online defense news and analysis website, explains that:

[G]roups including [the Mexican drug cartel] La Familia and Brazil’s PCC [Primeiro Comando da Capital – First Command of the Capital, a Brazilian criminal organization] have acquired black market hackers who can assist with committing crimes that bring in cash. Even MS-13 [an international criminal gang centered in Central America], not often considered a computer-savvy group, is said to have been involved in various low-level malware schemes in Central America for stealing bank identification information and manufacturing fake credit cards.[19]

Moreover, the war in Mexico against drug cartels has reached the virtual world. A popular blog, known as “Blog del Narco” (Narco’s blog – http://www.milcincuenta.com/), reports on the most recent attacks carried out by Mexican criminal organizations. The Zetas, one of Mexico’s most powerful cartels, have had several deadly run-ins with members of the virtual world. In early November the decapitated body of a male was placed by a Christopher Columbus monument in Nuevo Laredo. The person was later identified as “el Rascatripas,” the moderator of an anonymous internet forum; it’s believed that he was murdered by the Zetas.[20] This cartel also has had a confrontation with Anonymous, as the hacker group posted a video online threatening the cartel with retribution if they did not release one of its kidnapped members.[21] Apparently the Zetas released the member and Anonymous did not carry out their threat.

A similar development is occurring in Guatemala. According to the daily elPeriodico, a number of blogs have appeared that identify alleged members of the Mara Salvatruchas; like Justicia Final (http://justiciafinal.blogspot.com/) and La Calaca de la Muerte (http://lacalacadelamuerte.blogspot.com/). The report goes on to speculate that the blogs are maintained by rival gangs, since only Mara 13 members are mentioned.

Finally, there also have been legal disputes regarding the content of the internet in Latin America. For example, the Argentine entertainer Virginia da Cunha brought a lawsuit against Google and Yahoo! Argentina, alleging that the two search engines damaged her “moral character” by displaying her name and photos of her when users carried out sex-related searches. A lower court originally ruled in favor of the Argentine in 2009, and ordered “the companies to pay damages and remove all sites containing sexual, erotic and pornographic content that contained the name or image of Ms. Da Cunha from its results.”[22] Nevertheless, in August 2010, a higher appeals court overturned that decision, stating that “the 2-to-1 appeals court ruling […] said the firms could be held liable for defamation only if they were made aware of clearly illegal content and were negligent in removing it.[23]

Cyber-Security

One issue about these rising cyber crimes is that regional states have been slow in prosecuting the culprits. Regional police forces lack the kind of ‘cyber police’ needed to fight crime in this kind of environment. In an interview to BNamericas, Stu Bradley, director of the fraud department and financial crimes of the U.S. software company SAS, explained that hackers from China and Russia are focusing more of their operations in Latin America due to the underdeveloped practices employed to combat this type of crime.[24] He also explained that “one of the difficulties in Latin America is that there aren’t many organizations that combat [cyber]fraud.”[25]

One exception to the rule is Brazil. In August 2010, the Brazilian army created a cyber-defense wing known as the Centro de Defesa Cibernética do Exército (Army’s Center for Cybernetic Security), with General José Carlos dos Santos as commander.[26] The center currently has twenty officers working there, but it aims to have thirty by year’s end. In an interview with Revista Época, a Brazilian magazine, General Santos explained that the hiring of hackers to work for the Center “is a possibility.”[27] The Brazilian military officer went on to say that “we have ways to recruit by showing our work and giving the perspective of a challenging and interesting career.”[28] He also said that beginning 2012, it will be mandatory for young Brazilian military officers to learn about information technology, and this will also be applied in the training of sergeants.[29]

E-Challenges are Real Challenges

The aforementioned July 2011 analysis on cyber crimes in Latin America that was published by Southern Pulse explains that “the cyber domain is adding new complexity to the serious criminal threat facing Latin America at a time when the region is under pressure to focus on the more physical security threats such as high murder rates and illicit trafficking.”[30] In that sense, cyber crimes comprise the latest security issue that Latin American law enforcement agencies will have a problem coping with, as the region is already filled with more tangible security threats like narco-terrorism, the spread of the Mexican cartels, and other types of violence. It is doubtful that regional police and military forces will have the budget, personnel, or technology to give crimes in the virtual world the same priority as those in the physical world, though the Brazilian CDCE center is an initiation that should be repeated elsewhere. Certainly, one option would be for Latin American governments and major businesses, such as banks, to outsource their virtual security needs to international software companies. But this could be a costly decision, and it would be better if governments delve into their nation’s youth pool for future e-defense specialists, like the Brazilian army appears to intend to do.

While not as widespread as in other parts of the world, the internet has a strong presence in Latin America, and this will only continue to grow as most of the region enjoys an economic boost and the younger generations grow more and more accustomed to having access to laptops, iPhones, and simply being part of the globalized virtual world. It is not just natural, but also a priority, that cyber-security initiatives should maintain the same pace as the quickly spreading virtual world in Latin America.

Give War a Chance Revisited – The Price to Pay: The Military and Terrorism in Peru

2011-12-12T13:53:00.004-05:00

Defense Studies

Give War a Chance Revisited – The Price to Pay: The Military and Terrorism in Peru

W. Alejandro Sanchez Nieto
pages 517-540
Volume 11, Issue 3, 2011
http://bit.ly/sbMJo4

This article aims to discuss Edward Luttwak’s 1999 piece “Give War a Chance” and how it relates to the internal armed conflict in Perú against two terrorist groups, the MRTA and Shining Path. In his article, Luttwak essentially advocates a military solution to conflicts, downplaying the need and desire for cease-fires and international intervention. Questions addressed here include: After decades of war and between 30,000-70,000 thousand deaths, has a military solution brought peace to Perú? Was negotiation and/or mediation ever a possibility? This research argues that a military solution for intra-state conflicts can be successful, but other factors need to be taken into account as well.

The link above will take you to the Taylor & Francis where you can register/purchase the article. Please contact me if you would like a .pdf version if you're an academic/researcher etc. wilder.a.sanchez at gmail.com

Interview: US Attorney General questioned over gun-walking scandal

2011-12-11T09:38:00.001-05:00

Personal Interview
PressTV
December 9, 2011
Link http://www.presstv.ir/detail/214631.html - Video available here

US Attorney General Eric Holder was in the line of fire Thursday on Capitol Hill. Congressional lawmakers investigating Operation Fast and Furious questioned Holder about the Justice Department's handling of the so-called gun-walking scandal.

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms allowed more than 2,000 guns to cross into Mexico. The idea was to take down a drug cartel. Instead, weapons showed up at crime scenes in Mexico and Arizona...including at the murder scene of Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry last December.

Holder said his department is dedicated to getting answers about the controversial program.

Operation Fast and Furious started in 2009 and allowed illegally purchased firearms to be taken from gun stores in Arizona across the Mexican border to drug cartels. The intent of the operation was to monitor the flow of weapons to their ultimate destination.

Council on Hemispheric Affairs Alejandro Sanchez Nieto says the Justice Department is responsible for giving guns to Mexican criminal organizations which are more powerful than what Mexican security forces have.

The weapons AK47 Russian rifles and these are actually sign more powerful than police have and what police use are pistols and revolvers type of guns. Some experts say the US is responsible for giving guns to drug cartels which are more powerful than what Mexican police use.

In Mexico, the case has drawn nationwide attention. Top officials have long stressed that U.S. weapons are fueling the country's drug war.

Attorney General Eric Holder suggested that weapons lost during the "Fast and Furious" gunrunning operation will continue to show up at crime scenes in the U.S. and Mexico "for years to come."

Assessing Kaliningrad's Geostrategic Role: The Russian Periphery and A Baltic Concern

2011-11-23T10:37:00.003-05:00

Journal of Baltic Studies

Assessing Kaliningrad's Geostrategic Role: The Russian Periphery and A Baltic Concern

W. Alejandro Sanchez Nieto
Volume 42, Issue 4, 2011
pages 465-489
http://bit.ly/rFJubf

Abstract
This paper discusses the geopolitical and geosecurity importance of the Russian oblast of Kaliningrad. In particular, the paper discusses the Moscow–Kaliningrad center–periphery relationship and how it contrasts with the oblast's place within the Baltic region, where it is regarded as a security issue by some states. This can be contrasted with how the Baltic region falls in NATO's security priorities. Thus, the goal is to address the ‘uses’ of Kaliningrad in the Russian-Greater Baltic and Russian-Washington/NATO relations.

The link above will take you to the Taylor & Francis where you can register/purchase the article. Please contact me if you would like a .pdf version if you're an academic/researcher etc. wilder.a.sanchez at gmail.com

The “Frozen” Southeast: How the Moldova-Transnistria Question has Become a European Geo-Security Issue

2011-11-22T14:28:00.003-05:00

The Journal of Slavic Military Studies

The “Frozen” Southeast: How the Moldova-Transnistria Question has Become a European Geo-Security Issue

W. Alejandro Sanchez
Volume 22, Issue 2, 2009
pages 153-176
http://bit.ly/urxzWs

Abstract
The Republic of Transnistria is a separatist region of the Southeastern European state of Moldova. While not much has changed in this “frozen conflict” since a 1992 short-lived war, the eastwards expansion of the European Union and NATO are slowly bringing Moldova to the attention of Western policymakers. The cornerstone of the separatist cause is the Russian Federation, which serves as Transnistrias protector. Given the 2008 summer in war in Georgia, another so-called “frozen conflict,” it is necessary to evaluate how a Russia-backed separatist region in Moldova, accussed of human rights violations and weapons trafficking, fits into the wider discussion of European geosecurity and NATO/West-Russian relations for the immediate future.

The link above will take you to the Taylor & Francis where you can register/purchase the article. Please contact me if you would like a .pdf version if you're an academic/researcher etc. wilder.a.sanchez at gmail.com

The Olympic Challenge: Russia's Strategy for the Establishment of Security in the North Caucasus before 2014

2011-11-16T13:34:00.005-05:00

The Journal of Slavic Military Studies

The Olympic Challenge: Russia's Strategy for the Establishment of Security in the North Caucasus before 2014

W. Alejandro Sánchez Nieto
Volume 24, Issue 4, 2011
pages 582-604
http://bit.ly/sQKytc

Abstract
This article discusses the ongoing security situation in the Russian North Caucasus, with a particular focus on the upcoming Winter 2014 Olympics in the resort of Sochi. The aim is to discuss groups that could be a source of potential problems, including non-violent groups like the Circassians, which have an issue with the Olympics taking place in their ancestral homeland, and violent rebel organizations like the one led by Doku Umarov. Finally, we will discuss what initiatives Moscow is expected to carry out over the next three years, as well as providing some policy suggestions.

The link above will take you to the Taylor & Francis where you can register/purchase the article. Please contact me if you would like a .pdf version if you're an academic/researcher etc. wilder.a.sanchez at gmail.com

The Unlikely Success: Latin America and Nuclear Weapons

2011-11-15T22:38:00.005-05:00

The Unlikely Success: Latin America and Nuclear Weapons
by Alex Sanchez
Research Fellow
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
Blog Post - November 16, 2011

The website of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) provides a list of nuclear countries: the United States, Russia, France, China, United Kingdom, India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea; (1) with a combined total inventory of 20,500 nuclear weapons. In addition, Iran is suspected of having an active nuclear weapons program. But an often overlooked fact is that none of these countries are in Latin America (the US’s location in the Western Hemisphere notwithstanding). Is there anything that the world, particularly states that possess nuclear weapons, can learn from the Latin American nuclear experience?

A Brief Nuclear History in Latin America
A global grassroots movement launched in 2007, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons explains that:

“Today there are nuclear-weapon-free zones [NWFZs] in Latin America and the Caribbean, the southern Pacific, Southeast Asia, Central Asia and Africa. More than 50 per cent of the Earth’s surface today comprises such zones […] States that belong to a nuclear-weapon-free zone are prohibited from producing, testing, stockpiling or acquiring nuclear weapons, and they cannot have nuclear weapons deployed in their territories.” (2)

Although Latin America does not currently possess any nuclear weapons, the region does have a short-lived history of issues regarding them. Examples of this range from the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the nuclear weapons programs in Brazil and Argentina in the 1970s and 1980s (when both states had military governments), and the creation, in 1967, of the Tratado para la Proscripcion de las Armas Nucleares en la America Latina y el Caribe, (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, commonly known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco). The treaty includes the creation of a nuclear watchdog agency known as OPANAL (Organismo para la Proscripcion de las Armas Nucleares en la America Latina y el Caribe - Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean). According to its website, OPANAL’s duties include convoking “regular and special general conferences and [consulting] meetings related to the established purposes, means, and procedures of the Treaty. OPANAL also supervises the adherence to the Control System and the obligations stemming from the Treaty […].” (3) Nowadays, Latin America takes pride in being nuclear weapons-free, despite continuing tensions between regional states, like ongoing border disputes or security tensions, which is traditionally a reason to jumpstart a nuclear weapons program (like in Israel or between India and Pakistan).
Nevertheless, it is important to stress that the Cuban missile crisis was not the only nuclear incident in the region. In the 1970s, two South American military powers, Argentina and Brazil, carried out secret nuclear weapons programs, creating fears of a possible war. A major reason for this was that the two neighboring states have a long standing rivalry (including the Cisplatine War in the 1820s); though nowadays this rivalry is, thankfully, mostly exemplified in soccer matches. In 1975, Brazilian leaders hastened their nuclear research by maintaining a two track program, one for civilian uses and a military one, as West Germany provided Brasilia with enrichment technology. At the time, it was predicted that Brazil could have nuclear weapons by the year 2000 (it managed to enrich uranium in 1987 but not to weapons-grade level).(4)

The Falklands War, which occurred in 1982, between Argentina and the United Kingdom prompted the fall of the ruling military junta in Buenos Aires and the return to democracy, which helped quicken the pace towards cancelling that country’s nuclear weapons program. Meanwhile, Brasilia returned to civilian rule in 1985 and the nuclear weapons program was also eventually cancelled. The two governments, now under civilian control, have significantly improved relations with each other to foster nuclear cooperation and confidence building, thus decreasing security tensions, distrust and the interest in nuclear weapons.

More recently, Venezuela, under the leadership of Hugo Chavez, has declared its interest of possibly pursuing a nuclear energy program to deal with the country’s energy demands, which are heavily dependent on the water flow in the Guri dam.(5) Nonetheless, there has been some controversy about Chavez’s intentions, as Washington and Caracas have suffered tense relations over the past decade. There are also rumors that Iran, an international pariah state with a controversial nuclear program, may be lending Caracas a hand with its nuclear quest, which could, according to some conservative analysts, culminate in nuclear weaponry. (6)

It is worth stating that ‘‘nuclear-weapon-free zones have sought to establish norms against the acquisition of nuclear weapons without even attempting to establish supporting sanctions or rewards.’’” (7) In Latin America’s case, there isn’t much to prevent regional states from developing nuclear weapons if they choose to do so, as OPANAL does not have the power to apply sanctions. One may pose the question as to why other Latin America countries, besides Brazil and Argentina, have not attempted to develop a similar nuclear weapons program.

Nuclear Cooperation

Even though Latin American states haven’t had a nuclear weapons program in decades, nuclear cooperation does exist. The best example is the creation of the ABACC (Agencia Brasileno-Argentina de Contabilidad y Control de Materiales Nucleares - Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials ), which is responsible for overseeing a cooperation agreement initiated in 1991, in which Buenos Aires and Brasilia agreed to commit to using nuclear energy for solely peaceful purposes. In that year, Argentina, Brazil, the ABACC, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) signed the Quadripartite Agreement, specifying procedures for IAEA and ABACC for the monitoring and verification of Argentine and Brazilian nuclear installations. (8) Nevertheless, it is worth stating that neither country has signed the additional protocol by the IEAE which gives the international watchdog the right to access information and visit nuclear sites. (9)

A 2009 commentary by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a think tank headquartered in Washington DC, puts the nuclear relations between Brasilia and Buenos Aires into perspective:

“Argentina and Brazil are seen as having been successful in turning their nuclear competition into cooperation through mutual confidence. This approach is often considered as a model for other regions where potential nuclear proliferation risks may be perceived. However, it is not yet certain that both countries will become competent partners by taking advantage of their joint strengths. Certain obstacles could endanger this process. Bureaucratic resistance, as well as possible asymmetries of interests and views -especially those related to the possibility of sharing proprietary technology - could upset the internal balance of the agreement and, therefore, its long-term sustainability.” (10)

Indeed, while the current levels of nuclear cooperation between Brazil and Argentina are positive, it is important to understand that they are not fault-proof and there is the possibility that cooperation could take a turn for the worst. For example, should inter-state disputes arise, or if military governments appear again, then a worst case scenario could be that nuclear weapons programs could be revisited.

In addition Venezuela has had plans for creating its own nuclear energy program with support from Iran. Some analysts have gone as far as arguing that Iranian mining companies currently operating in Venezuela may be trying to find uranium to use in Iran’s nuclear projects. (11) In interviews between the author of this essay and several Latin America military officials, (12) the consensus was that regional governments did not have a problem with Caracas looking to produce nuclear energy, but greater transparency is necessary to maintain inter-state confidence.

Not Nuclear but still Tension-prone
At this point it is important to note that, even though Latin American states have not fully developed nuclear weapons programs, it does not mean that Latin America is a peaceful region by any means. Besides insurgent groups, there are still tensions between several Latin American states, and there is an ongoing concern that isolated incidents could eventually lead to an inter-state war. Some recent incidents include:
• In 2008, Colombia and Venezuela almost went to war when the Colombian military entered Ecuadorian territory to attack a base of the Colombian insurgent movement FARC (Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces) where several high-level leaders were camped. Venezuelan President Chavez deployed his military to the border with Colombia, ready to declare war on Bogota to protect Ecuador’s sovereignty; but, fortunately, tensions dissolved.

• In late 2010, Nicaraguan troops diverted the course of a river and entered Costa Rican territory, alleging that it was theirs.

Regarding confidence building, Tariq Rauf, Head of the Verification and Security Policy Co-ordination at the IAEA, explains that “the key element in this process approach is the identification of the transformation of ideas and beliefs about the threat posed by neighbouring states. […] [W]hy leaders come to feel comfortable with new, less stark conceptions of threat remain unclear.” (13) In Latin America, confidence building improves relations among states, which is critical as issues such as border disputes exist. For example, Peru and Chile recently went to the International Court of Justice in The Hague to solve a maritime border issue. In addition, Bolivia demands a land corridor to access the Pacific Ocean via Chile (as La Paz lost its coastal territories to Santiago in the 19th century War of the Pacific). Chile and Argentina still have an unsettled border dispute and there are occasional negative feelings from Buenos Aires towards Santiago, since during the Falklands War the Chilean government provided London with vital intelligence information. Furthermore, Colombia and Venezuela still have an unresolved border dispute over the Gulf of Venezuela; and there is one also between Colombia and Nicaragua over San Andres Island.

Moreover, even though inter-state conflicts in Latin America are rare, they remain a source for concern. Arguably, the last major war in Latin America was between Paraguay and Bolivia from 1932-1935 (dubbed the Chaco War). More recent inter-state warfare has been relatively brief. For example, Peru had an ephemeral war with Ecuador in 1941, as well as non-declared wars in 1981 and 1995. In addition, Honduras and El Salvador had what is known as the Soccer War in 1969. Finally there was the Falklands War in 1982 between Argentina and the United Kingdom, in which, for the first time, a nuclear submarine was in combat action. Nevertheless, as the previous paragraph explains, there are still occasional incidents and other reasons for tensions that could end up in war.

When analyzing the historical tensions between India and Pakistan, Rauf explains that “given the entrenched differences between [them] over Jammu and Kashmir, and a history of three conventional wars and continuing hostilities in the Indian-administered part of Kashmir, the development of nuclear weapons as well as ballistic missiles by the two countries has heightened international concerns about peace and stability in that region.” (14) Regarding Latin America, the region has undergone an arms race in recent years, (15) but even that, combined with inter-state tensions and occasional incidents are still not enough to make regional states desire nuclear weapons as a means of self-defense. Pakistan and India should learn from Latin America about (nuclear) arm races, inter-state tensions and effective confidence building.

What can the World Learn from the Latinos?
There is no such thing as a one-size-fits-all model for improving interstate relations and achieving non-proliferation; this is particularly relevant for nuclear security relations between global powers like the US and Russia, which operate on a level of their own due to the amount of WMDs they possess. However, lessons can be learned by moderate nuclear powers like the UK, France, Israel, Pakistan and India, as well as countries that may have or seem to be working towards acquiring such weapons, like Iran.

The cases of Argentina and Brazil regarding nuclear cooperation shows that it is possible for states to allow their nuclear energy programs to be supervised by some type of supranational organism (in this case the ABACC is a bi-national one, not an international agency like the IAEA). If we analyze the situation in Latin America vis-à-vis Europe, while it’s true that Argentina and Brazil do not possess nuclear weapons, unlike the British and French, if some kind of bi-national nuclear energy command can be achieved in South America, then it could occur between these two European powers. This would set a huge precedent towards nuclear confidence around the globe. A nuclear military relationship between Paris and London presents the most promising possibility at promoting nuclear cooperation and integration. There have been already some promising initial steps that this could happen as in March 2010, Paris offered to forces with London’s nuclear submarine fleet. (16)

In addition, the lack of nuclear weapons programs in Latin America, in spite of ongoing tensions is an important case study. For example, regarding India and Pakistan, their violent history over the past decades, including state-sponsored terrorism in each other’s country, has created a culture of mistrust and a continuous quest for more devastating weaponry so each military can feel they have a successful nuclear deterrent. In Latin America, the 1960’s to 1980’s saw a number of military governments come to power, and distrust was a key factor that brought about the nuclear weapons programs in Brazil and Argentina. Today, despite tensions and occasional incidents, the situation in the region is one of generally acceptable inter-state trust.

Another example of this regional inter-state confidence is the planned nuclear-powered submarine that Brazil is currently constructing with French aid. (17) When it becomes operational, the submarine will arguably be the most advanced and deadly naval weapon in any Latin America naval arsenal. Nevertheless, regional states have not displayed concerns about this new development. This is not simply because the Brazilian government has stated that it wants the submarine for naval protection (as it recently discovered underwater oil reserves in its sea). There are several confidence building mechanisms at play here, like the creation of UNASUR (Union de Naciones Sudamericanas – South American Nations Union), a South American political bloc, regular multi-national military exercises, as well as initiatives like economic integration and good diplomatic relations; all of these factors help make the Brazilian submarine not a concern for regional militaries. In talks with this essay’s author, military officials explained that the positive relations between the Brazilian government and the governments and militaries of other states are currently excellent, (18) which acts as a great confidence booster and decreases suspicions, that could include Brasilia using a nuclear-powered submarine against a militarily-weak neighbor like Uruguay.

Conclusions
Nuclear proliferation is a worldwide security problem, but these nuclear weapons are localized, thankfully, in less than a handful of states and there are a several NWFZs, including Latin America and the Caribbean. This positive development has not occurred just due to the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, but because of the decision by the signatories to adhere to it for decades. In spite of tensions, like ongoing inter-state border disputes and occasional incidents, which include short-lived wars and an ongoing arms race, regional governments do not feel the desire to pursue an active nuclear weapons program to achieve nuclear deterrence. Furthermore, Brazil, a regional military power, is building a nuclear-powered submarine which, if it’s ever commissioned, will be the most powerful submarine in the Western Hemisphere that does not belong to the U.S. or, arguably, Canada, however this is not a major source of concern.

From Latin America’s success, nuclear states can learn that confidence building mechanisms and a sense of trust are critical for non-proliferation to succeed, as are the cases of Brazil and Argentina in the 1970’s to 1990’s.These tactics are currently working to prevent inter-state wars in Latin America, but it takes time to successfully implement them. The Pakistan-India situation, as well as Israel’s security issues, are two areas that can profit from learning about Latin America’s nuclear success, as they too are volatile hotspots. In addition, nuclear cooperation can unite countries, like Brazil and Argentina; this could be a lesson for France and the United Kingdom that no longer seeing each other as a security threat and can decide to further decrease their weapons of mass destruction by creating a bi-national nuclear command. While far from being a peaceful area, as demonstrated by ongoing asymmetric violence and occasional inter-state flare ups, Latin America is one of the lesser well-known, but more important, success stories of nuclear non-proliferation.

Please accept this article as a free contribution from this author, but if re-posting, please afford authorial and institutional attribution. Exclusive rights can be negotiated.

References

1 Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Federation of American Scientists,<http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html>
2 “Nuclear Weapons around the World,” International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons,<http://www.icanw.org/geography#zones>
3 “What is OPANAL?” Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
(OPANAL), < http://www.opanal.org/opanal/about/about-i.htm >
4 “Country profiles: Argentina & Brazil,” Disarmament and Peace Education, Global Security Institute, February 2002 <http://www.gsinstitute.org/dpe/countries/argentina_brazil.html>
5 Nathan Crooks, “Venezuela’s Guri Dam reduces capacity, El Universal Says,” Bloomberg, March 23, 2011,<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-23/venezuela-s-guri-dam-reduces-capacity-el-universal-says.html>
6 Tucker Reals, “WSJ: Iran, Venezuela Share a nuclear dream,” World Watch, CBS News, December 15, 2009. <http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-5980756-503543.html>
7 Maria Rost Rublee, “Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness,” International Studies Review 10/3 ( September 2008), P. 429. Quoting Ronald B. Mitchell, “International Control of Nuclear Proliferation: Beyond Carrots and Sticks,” The Nonproliferation Review,5/1 (1997), P.40–52.
8 Jessica Lasky-Fink, “Brazil, Argentina Pursue Nuclear Cooperation,” Arms Control Association, April 2008,<http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_04/BrazilArgentina>
9 Jessica Lasky-Fink, “Brazil, Argentina Pursue Nuclear Cooperation,” Arms Control Association, April 2008,<http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_04/BrazilArgentina>
10 Irma Arguello, “Brazil and Argentina’s Nuclear Cooperation,” Proliferation Analysis, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 8, 2009, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2009/01/08/brazil-and-argentina-s-nuclear-cooperation/5cm>
11 “Venezuela seeking Uranium with Iran’s help,” Associated Press, September 26, 2009, < http://www.foxnews.com/world/2009/09/26/venezuela-seeking-uranium-irans-help/ >
12 Interviews during the “Seminar on Disarmament and Nonproliferation,” Committee on Hemispheric Security and the Inter-American Defense College, Washington DC, March 28 - 30, 2011. Venezuela Panel.
13 Tariq Rauf, “Confidence-building and security-building measures in the nuclear area with relevance for South Asia,” Contemporary South Asia, 14/2 (June, 2005), P. 179.
14 Tariq Rauf, “Confidence-building and security-building measures in the nuclear area with relevance for South Asia,” Contemporary South Asia, 14/2 (June, 2005), P. 176.
15 Alex Sanchez, “South America and Its Likelihood of a Season of Splendid Little Wars: An Analysis of Arms Races and Regional Geopolitics,” Report, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, October 8, 2009,<http://www.coha.org/south-america-and-its-likelihood-of-a-season-of-splendid-little-wars-an-analysis-of-arms-races-and-regional-geopolitics/>
16 Julian Borger and Richard Norton-Taylor, “France offers to join forces with UK’s nuclear submarine fleet,” The Guardian (UK), March 19, 2010, < http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/mar/19/france-britain-shared-nuclear-deterrent >. Also see: Robert Wall, “Anglo-French nuclear cooperation in the offing?” Ares: A Defense Technology Blog, October 8, 2010 < http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog:27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post:963920d3-545b-42db-9440-756965522d06 >
17 “Brazil aims to build first nuclear sub within 12 years – agency,” RIA Novosti, May 18th, 2009, <http://en.rian.ru/world/20090518/155036599.html>
18 Interviews during the “Seminar on Disarmament and Nonproliferation.,” Committee on Hemispheric Security and the Inter-American Defense College, Washington DC, March 28 - 30, 2011. Venezuela Panel

The Mottled Relationship: Iran and Latin America – A Brief Overview

2011-09-27T13:50:00.007-04:00

This analysis was prepared by special COHA contributor J.A., with additional research by COHA Research Fellow Alex Sanchez
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
September 27, 2011
Originally posted: http://www.coha.org/the-mottled-relationship-iran-and-latin-america-a-brief-overview/

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was invited to visit President Hugo Chávez on September 24, but the trip was postponed as the Venezuelan head of state recovers from cancer.
Ahmadinejad partially empties UN Hall with some of his harshest statements.
Iranian influence in Latin America is sometimes more fiction than fact.
Befriending Iran’s repressive regime is somewhat contradictory for Latin American governments that openly crow their respect for democracy and human rights. Does Brazil really mean to have a creditable relationship with one of the most disreputable players and human rights violators?
In an ironic twist, Chávez is credited for mediating with the Iranian government to free two American hikers
The attacks against Israeli centers in Argentina in 1992 and 1994 continue to be a source of tension, but in Buenos Aires, business comes first.

The Islamic Republic of Iran and Latin America have been fostering closer relationships for more than a decade, working towards building cohesive diplomatic relations and strengthening economic agreements. These ties began with Cuba’s championing of the 1979 Iranian revolution, and today those connections also extend to Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and the ever-controversial Venezuela, with these amplified ties being sedulously cultivated by Tehran. Due to Iran’s internal politics, such as its controversial nuclear program, its contemptible human rights record, and its often tense, if not minatory, relations with the U.S., initiatives between Tehran and the Western Hemispheric states have come under heavy critique. As a result, there is speculation and differing interpretations over the existing level of influence that Iran currently enjoys in several nations of Latin America.

A Brief Overview
Ironically, as relations with the U.S. and European countries have deteriorated, Iran’s relations with the Global South have, if anything, noticeably progressed. Perhaps as a direct result of the U.S. placing Iran within the ‘axis of evil’, the Persian state began pursuing relationships with African governments and, within the last decade, an increasing number of Latin American countries, as a strategy to counteract U.S.-backed ostracism and efforts to diplomatically isolate Tehran. The apparent reasons for these alliances are:

(a) to gain economic advantage as well as much-needed relief and collegiality to cope with the consequences of U.S.- imposed sanctions;

(b) to counterbalance the geopolitical effect of U.S. policy in both the Muslim World and Latin America;

(d) to gain recognition in an increasingly prominent part of the Western Hemisphere, and in Washington’s sphere of influence, in order to achieve political prestige in the international community. This also helps, in part, divert the attention among the Iranian people, particularly in the aftermath of the 2009 Iranian election fraud that prompted massive repression of the dissenting democratic opposition.

The most pertinent questions, however, remain to be answered: Has the long term impact of these increasingly intimate relationships, such as the one between Caracas and Tehran, been fully analyzed? Are the initiatives and maneuverings carried out by some Latin American governments solely due to their impetuousness and lack of long-term goals? Notwithstanding the immediate economic advantage of gaining new markets, the long-term political ramifications and disadvantages of doing business with what the free world considers a horrendously corrupt regime places the Latin American region into a precarious situation. Latin America’s good will initiatives and human resources could be more wisely expended in dealing with nations that do not carry out egregious abuses towards its own citizens.

Case Study: Argentina
In March 1992, the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires was the subject of a bomb attack. It has been established that a pickup truck loaded with explosives, and driven by a suicide bomber, smashed into the front of the embassy, killing thirty-three and wounding as many as 242 persons. In July 1994, the Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA; Argentine Israelite Mutual Association) building in Buenos Aires was the target of an attack that killed eighty-five people, while scores more were injured.

The violent Islamist militant organization Hezbollah has been regarded as the culprit behind these attacks, but there have been rumors that the Iranian government, including some members of the current administration in Tehran, may have been more directly involved. The Persian state has repeatedly declared its innocence regarding its involvement in both attacks. In July 2011, Iran’s Foreign Ministry stated that “the Islamic Republic of Iran, as one of the major victims of terrorism, condemns all acts of terror, including the 1994 AMIA bombing, and offers sympathy with the families of the victims of the explosion […] Iran’s Foreign Ministry expresses regret that 17 years on from the occurrence of this crime, the truth behind it has not been revealed yet and the identities of its real perpetrators are still shrouded in mystery.”[i] Furthermore, an article published by Press TV (a semi-official Iranian news agency) in July argues that, “under intense political pressure from the United States and the Israeli regime, Argentina formally accused Iran of carrying out the attack on the Jewish community.”[ii] Most independent observers, however, dismiss this rhetoric merely as tactical method to confuse the subject.

Tensions between Iran and Argentina took a new twist in early June 2011, when Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi visited Bolivia. General Vahidi is wanted by Argentina for allegedly masterminding the 1994 bombing.[iii] Buenos Aires asked La Paz to apprehend the Iranian official, but he returned to Tehran before any decision by the Bolivian government could be made.[iv] As Iran continues to promote its influence in Latin America, the controversy over the Argentine bombings will continue to be a sore point for the foreseeable future. The Argentine-Persian relationship, or lack thereof, presents a fascinating case study of a state trying to improve relations with another while at the same time attempting to overcome a violent recent past that includes state-sponsored terrorism.

Trade and Investments
During recent years, Iran has expanded its economic cooperation with many Latin American states, entering into substantial trade agreements with Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru, Brazil and, somewhat surprisingly, Argentina. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) stated in a report issued in December 2009 that Brazil is Iran’s largest trade partner in Latin America. Last year, Iran’s state radio announced that bilateral trade with Brazil had increased to more than USD 2 billion in 2009-10, an increase from USD 500 million in 2005, and was forecast to reach USD 10 billion in the next 5 years.[v]

Argentina is Iran’s second largest trading partner in the region, despite the fact that Buenos Aires has accused Tehran of the 1992 and 1994 bombings. Trade relations remained at marginal rates throughout the 1990s, but commercial activity never ceased entirely, and by 2008 bilateral trade had soared to USD 1.2 billion, dramatically overshadowing the 2007 figure of USD 30 million.

In addition, relations between Iran and Venezuela are a mixed bag of actual achievement and diplomatic rhetoric. According to the IMF report, and in spite of highly cordial political and diplomatic relations, bilateral trade between Venezuela and Iran did not advance in the same way as it did for other Latin American countries. For example, while Brazilian and Argentine trade with Iran has increased by 88 percent and 96 percent since 2007 respectively, Venezuela’s trade increased by only 31 percent in the same period. Following the increase in trade with Brazil and Argentina, Venezuela became Iran’s fifth largest trade partner in the region.

Moreover, Iran has pursued deeper trade and diplomatic relationships with Bolivia as well. Trade and energy agreements between La Paz and Tehran, signed in September 2007, confirmed the increasingly friendly nature of ties between the two countries. Iran’s involvement in the Bolivian economy extends to investment in and technological support for industrial projects such as dairy factories, agriculture, mining, and hydroelectric dam construction. Additionally, in July 2009, Tehran agreed to provide USD 280 million in low-interest loans to La Paz.[vi] Finally, Peru is also a growing importer of Iranian products, as is Ecuador. The expansion of trade ties follows an overall regional trade ‘offensive’ by Iran in recent years. IMF data analyzed by the Latin Business Chronicle indicates that Iran-Latin American trade skyrocketed by 209 percent in 2008, totaling a robust USD 2.9 billion.[vii] What this data tells us is that there is certainly a potential for trade to grow between Iran and several Western Hemisphere states, however Iran’s trade numbers are dwarfed by the region’s other trade partners, like the U.S., China and Europe.

Geopolitical Interests
To Washington’s increasing concern, the Brazilian Deputy Foreign Minister Maria Louisa met with her Iranian counterpart, Ali Ahani, in Brazil in early August 2011.[viii] The Brazilian official described Iran as one of “the important partners of Brazil” and an “influential” country. Louisa noted that Tehran and Brasilia would attempt to increase the level of mutual ties “considering the developments of the two countries in different fields.” The Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, for his part, hailed “the friendly and good relations” between both states and said that the governments of Iran and Brazil are eager to expand ties. Given the grim status quo between Washington and Tehran, at some point in the near future, the White House is bound press the issue, and Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff may have to choose whether her government will pursue closer relations with Washington, or with Tehran.

According to the Iranian International Newspaper Ettelaat, Iran has nearly doubled the number of embassies and cultural centers it maintains in Latin America. The number of embassies increased from six in 2005 to ten in 2010, and Tehran is building cultural centers in seventeen Latin American countries.[ix] Additionally, Iran has successfully negotiated no-visa agreements with Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Bolivia. It can also be argued that although relations have been strained with Argentina since the terrorist bombings, the continued trade between the two countries is a signal that geopolitical interests have gradually taken precedence over efforts to apprehend the perpetrators of the attacks. Argentina’s reaction to the visit of Defense Minister Vahidi to Bolivia does point out that Buenos Aires has not forgotten Iran’s alleged role, but that ultimately other initiatives have taken priority.

Nevertheless, if we consider Iran’s repressive regime, its brutal crackdown on dissenting voters, and the continued suppression of what most nations, particularly in the West, consider a wholly organic and legitimate uprising, it is difficult to comprehend the continued warming of relations with its Latin American partners. Nations are certainly free to pursue close relations with any states they wish, but it is baffling, considering the Iranian government’s repressive record when it comes to its own population, that Latin American governments, many of which repeatedly publicly proclaim their respect for human rights, want to befriend a thoroughly toxic nation like Iran. So what could be the reasons why Latin American countries continue to welcome the Iranian government’s overtures? Simply put, Latin American nations want an alternative to what some regional players see, at times, as U.S. imperialism. This is exemplified by the Chávez and Ahmadinejad pact signed in 2007 to formulate an “Axis of Unity”, particularly against the U. S.

In order for Iran to gain the geopolitical strength that its revolutionary leaders so fervently aspire to obtain, the country continues to play its U.S- as-an-imperial power card as aggressively as possible. It also plays a powerful role in pushing its Latin American partners into recognizing Palestine as a counterbalancing force against U.S. and Israeli influence. When it comes to assessing geopolitical gains, the common denominator between Latin America and Iran is economic advancement, rather than the counterbalancing of geopolitical power. Venezuela’s President Chávez is the exception to this rule, as, even though Venezuelan-Iranian economic relations are fairly robust, a major factor for this close rapprochement is that Chavez and the Iranian government are fairly ideologically aligned (at least regarding their views on Washington).

Support for Iran’s Nuclear Program
Venezuela, Cuba, and Syria were the only three countries that supported Iran’s nuclear energy program when the UN voted on it in 2006. However, there is little doubt that support has been increasing throughout Latin America due to Iran’s diligent pursuit of such backing. Now Bolivia and Brazil are also offering their measured support for Tehran’s civilian nuclear program. In addition, the ever-vociferous Venezuelan leader has officially stated that Iran has a legitimate right to its nuclear program and that Venezuela supports Tehran’s quest for peaceful nuclear technology.[x]

The Future of the Iran-Latin America Alliance
Chávez’s present personal medical issues, and the recent U.S.-imposed sanctions on Venezuelan oil company PDVSA[xi] (Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. – Venezuelan Petroleum S.A) for dealings with Iran, could serve to weaken the Venezuelan-Iranian nexus.[xii] This is because Venezuela’s current ideological views – particularly its foreign policy – ultimately derive from Chávez, and it is unclear what a post-Chávez Venezuela would look like. Would his political party maintain its unity and continue Chávez’s ideology, or would another course be taken? In addition, the Venezuelan military has declared its support for Chávez to the point that some organizations are concerned as to what would happen if another political party were to win the upcoming presidential election. What this means for Tehran is that its closest ally in Latin America is not Venezuela but rather its leader, and it is difficult to foresee how diplomatic ties would be affected by a transition of leadership.

Late September 2011 saw an interesting development, as the Iranian government recognized mediation initiatives by Chávez to free two American hikers held in an Iranian prison since 2009.[xiii] According to statements by the Venezuelan Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Temir Porras, the Venezuelan government agreed to help Shane Bauer and Josh Fattal after receiving a request for help from the hiker’s friends. It has also been reported that Noam Chomsky signed a letter asking for Chávez’s help.[xiv]

Although various news sources have reported an increase in the establishment of Iranian embassies in Latin America, a Latin daily source indicates that, at least in the case of Nicaragua, such plans have failed to come to fruition. This is particularly interesting as there had been rumors circulating that Iran’s embassy in Managua is, or was supposed to be, some kind of massive intelligence hub involving an unusually large number of staff, which, by default, would put U.S. interests in the region at risk.[xv] In reality, the Iranian Embassy in the Central American country may be nothing more than somewhat large.

In mid-June, an Iranian analyst published a piece in the Iranian newspaper Jaam-e Jam entitled “Failure of the United States to break relations between Iran and Brazil.” The analyst explains that Iran’s initiatives in Latin America “change the quiet backyard of the United States to a dangerous backyard for that country, because the expansion of Iran’s economic and political relations with the countries of that region is indicative of the failure of U.S. efforts to impose sanctions and threats on Iran.”[xvi] The analyst also discusses how relations between Tehran and Latin America affect Israel:

Changing the United States’ quiet backyard to a dangerous backyard has also created major concerns for Tel Aviv, in addition to Washington. Such worries have intensified to the point that Shimon Peres, the head of the Zionist regime, left for a visit to Latin America, which is considered the first official visit of this sort to Latin America in the course of several decades, only a few days before the visit of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.[xvii]

The bottom line seems to be that Latin America sees Iran’s involvement in the region in terms of economic interests. Additionally, it may allow the region to gain a foothold in the Muslim world, with the secondary benefit (at least possibly in Venezuela’s case) of reducing U.S. influence in the region. Meanwhile, as interpreted by the aforementioned Jaam-e Jam analysis, Tehran sees its rapprochement with Latin America mostly in terms of its impact on Washington and Tel Aviv.

Finally, it is interesting to observe that Brazil, Latin America’s powerhouse and a nation that is currently attempting to obtain a permanent seat on the United Nation Security Council, has also increased the pace of diplomatic ties with Iran. Brasilia has gone on record to declare its support for Tehran’s civilian – albeit controversial – nuclear program. It may soon become apparent to Itamaraty diplomats that they will have to choose between Washington and Tehran as their primary overseas partner.

Conclusion
In the interest of creating a just and prosperous hemispheric community, it is important for regional nations to continuously evaluate the scope and breadth of the burgeoning economic aid pacts and political gains being devised between Latin American countries and Iran. This survey must also include a gauging of the inherent merits of these gains and an evaluation of whether they are more fictive than real. A closer examination of the Islamic Republic of Iran depicts an undemocratic governing body heavily burdened by religious dogma, underdeveloped financial standards, institutional corruption and self-imposed non-transparency, a legal system hardly worthy of the name, the absence of any civil liberties, and atrocious human rights violations.

Iran’s current leadership can hardly be described as providing a suitable alternative to traditional U.S. domination and a sphere of influence. Even if counterbalancing U.S. power in Latin America can become more than a fantasy, and grow into a viable plan to amplify the resonance of democracy in the region, the advantages derived from an arrangement with Iran must be weighed against the costs of introducing another form of despotic influence into the democratically fledgling Latin American region.

Please accept this article as a free contribution from COHA (and reproduced here by this author), but if re-posting, please afford authorial and institutional attribution. Exclusive rights can be negotiated.

[i] BBC Monitoring Middle East – Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring July 22, 2011 Friday
Iran regrets “false” accusations over 1994 Argentina-Israeli building blast
[ii] BBC Monitoring Middle East – Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring July 22, 2011 Friday
Iran regrets “false” accusations over 1994 Argentina-Israeli building blast
[iii] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-13612569
[iv] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/bolivia/8550445/Iran-defence-minister-forced-to-leave-Bolivia-over-1994-Argentina-bombing.html
[v] “Brazil is Iran’s Most Important Trading Partner, Followed by Argentina.” Santiago Times, December 7, 2009 http://www.santiagotimes.cl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=17784:iran-triples-latin-american-trade-to-us29-billion&catid=48:other&Itemid=122
[vi] “Iran Approves $280 Million Loans For Bolivia,” Associated Press, July 29, 2009
[vii] Brazil is Iran’s Most Important Trading Partner, Followed by Argentina,” Santiago Times, December 7, 2009 http://www.santiagotimes.cl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=17784:iran-triples-latin-american-trade-to-us29-billion&catid=48:other&Itemid=122
[viii] “Iran, Brazil discuss expansion ties.” Press TV. August 10, 2011. Available
[ix] http://www.ettelaat.com/index2.asp?code=endisplay&fname=/ettelaat/etbupload/data/2011/08/08-10/40.htm&title=Iran,%20Brazil%20discuss%20expansion%20of%20ties
[x] “Venezuela’s Chavez Backs Iran In Nuclear Dispute, Warns Against U.S. Attack,” International Herald Tribune, April 15, 2007; Iran’s President to Visit Bolivia, Venezuela,” VOA News, September 24, 2007
[xi] http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/24/us-iran-usa-sanctions-idUSTRE74N47R20110524
[xii] http://www.latindailyfinancialnews.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10620%3Airanas-failed-latin-america-outreach&catid=225%3Aopinion&Itemid=720&lang=en
[xiii] “Iran confirma mediacion del Presidente Chavez para liberacion de dos estadounidenses.” Noticias24.com. September 22, 2011 Available < http://www.noticias24.com/actualidad/noticia/325309/iran-confirma-mediacion-de-presidente-chavez-para-liberacion-de-dos-estadounidenses/ >
[xiv] Cooler, Walter. “PICKET: Freed American hikers thank Hugo Chavez, Noam Chomsky, Cindy Sheehan; raise suspicion about purpose of trip.” Washington Times. Blog. September 25, 2011. Available < http://www.washingtontimes.com/blog/watercooler/2011/sep/25/picket-freed-american-hikers-thank-hugo-chavez-noa/ >
[xv] O’Connor, Anne-Marie & Sheridan, Mary Beth. “Iran’s rumored Nicaraguan ‘Mega Embassy’ sets off alarms in the U.S.” Washington Post. World. July 13, 2009. Available < http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/12/AR2009071202337.html >
[xvi] BBC Monitoring Middle East – Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring June 19, 2011 Sunday. Iran’s Latin America ties “sounded alarm bell” for US, Israel – analyst
[xvii] BBC Monitoring Middle East – Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring June 19, 2011 Sunday. Iran’s Latin America ties “sounded alarm bell” for US, Israel – analyst

The Proliferation of Small Arms in the Northern Andean Countries

2011-09-19T19:28:00.005-04:00

The Proliferation of Small Arms in the Northern Andean Countries

by Alex Sanchez
Research Fellow
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
Blog Post - September 19, 2011

Disclaimer: Like with the Philippines post, this is an excerpt of a piece I did on small wears in the Northern Andes some time ago that never got published. I apologize if any of the info is too dated, but the analysis is still pretty relevant I think.

South America’s northern Andean region (Peru, Colombia, Venezuela & Ecuador) continues to be a flea-market for the trafficking of small arms. In an egregious non-sequitur, the lack of inter-state warfare in the hemisphere for the last several decades has failed to stop the various South American militaries from upgrading their military power, particularly in recent years. In addition, small weaponry, such as rifles, pistols and grenades are becoming dangerously common in much of Andean South America, especially due to the proliferation of guerilla movements, and criminal organizations. Common street criminality is also on the rise in major cities like Lima, as criminals have access to light arms to carry out their illicit activities, prompting citizens to acquire guns to protect themselves and their families. The proliferation of small arms from the “grassroots” level to major arm purchases by a country’s security forces, is an important factor that needs to be taken into account to understand the current micro and macro geo-security landscape of Andean South America.

Inter- vs. Intra- state warfare

As aforementioned, an important aspect to mention about the contemporary security landscape of South America is that, aside from the Falklands conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom in 1982, the region has not witnessed an inter-state warfare for decades. Even though tensions still exist, and often countries have been on the verge confrontation (like between Peru’s Juan Velasco Alvarado and Chile’s Augusto Pinochet in the 1960s and 1970s, or tensions between Venezuela and Colombia in 1987), bellicose face-offs have been relatively rare. Peru and Ecuador had a number of non-declared borders wars in 1981 and 1995; however both were very localized and short-lived. Other short lived conflicts include the 1969 war between Honduras and El Salvador (known as the 100 Hours War or the Soccer War), and the Falklands War between Argentina and the United Kingdom in 1982.Nevertheless, today South America is in a new arms race: Venezuela is buying staggering amounts of weaponry from Russia and China, Peru is upgrading its air fleet and purchasing frigates from Italy (Lupo class), and Chile has acquired Leopard tanks and American F-16 fighter jets. Not to mention Brazil’s plans for a nuclear-powered submarine.

However it is the different levels of intra-state strife and crime that is the dominating security factor in Andean South America, due in large measure to the threats posed by the Colombian guerrilla body, the FARC, and Peru’s resurgent Shining Path. Other sources of internal instability, which are linked to the proliferation of small weapons, are drug cartels and multinational and local criminal gangs.

Light Weaponry Distributors and Buyers
A number of countries have become the exporters of light weaponry to South America, particularly the Andean nations:

Russia
Moscow is regaining its international status in the Western Hemisphere as a major arms dealer. Concerning light weaponry, the sale that has made attracted the most coverage was Caracas’ decision to build, in Venezuelan territory, a Kalashnikov rifle factory, in addition to a plant to produce the AK-103’s ammo. The goal is to have the company operational by 2009-2010 and capable of producing up to 30,000 automatic rifles per year. Colombian policymakers have, at times, expressed apprehension that some of these Kalashnikovs may unintentionally (or even intentionally), end up in the hands of the Colombian FARC rebels.

Belgium/Argentina
The Fusil Automatique Léger (Light Automatic Rifle – FAL) is the standard weapon used by a number of military forces, like for example Peru. The FAL is a 7.62mm NATO self-loading, selective fire rifle produced by the Belgian armaments manufacturer Fabrique Nationale de Herstal (FN). The Argentine Armed Forces officially adopted the FN FAL in 1955. The FALs were produced by the Argentine state-owned manufacturing industry FM (Fabricaciones Militares) at the Fabrica Militar de Armas Portatiles "Domingo Matheu" (FMAP "DM") in Fray Luis Beltrán, located north of Rosario.

Argentina’s possession of the Belgian FAL license becomes relevant today because of Venezuela’s purchases of different types of rifles, including the AK rifle factory, to be set up in the latter country. On December 14, 2005 the Associated Press ran a story by Fabiola Sanchez, which explained that Caracas was considering sending its 30,000 FAL rifles to Argentina for repair. According to the article, the plan would be to give the restored FALs to the Venezuelan army reserve, while the new AK assault rifles would be given to active troops.

United Kingdom
London is not a major exporter of small arms to South America. According to the Annual Report on Strategic Export Control, published by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, the British government has sold limited quantities of light weapons to Andean nations. The 2006 report mentions that Peru purchased gun silencers; Ecuador obtained pistols as well as technology relating to the use of pistols; and Venezuela purchased heavy machine guns and components for general purpose machine guns. The report for the first quarter of 2007 mentions that Colombia acquired heavy machine guns and other equipment for a total value of one million pounds. In all cases, the official reports do not provide major specifications about the weaponry or components that were purchased.

The U.S.
American small arms in the northern Andes are a mix of both legal and illegal trade. It is relatively easy to find American-made pistols in a number of black markets in downtown Lima for example. The key, yet unclear, issue is the number of legally sold small arms to regional countries, particularly Colombia. Much has been written regarding the amount of economic and high-tech weaponry sold by Washington to Bogota, like the UH-60L Black Hawk helicopters; however it is unclear the level of trade regarding small arms, like assault rifles and pistols that may have been purchased for the Colombian army, some of which may have even found their way to right-wing, military supported, paramilitary groups. Nevertheless, a few months ago there was a bizarre, and embarrassing, incident, in which guns landed in the hands of Mexican cartels via a gun-trafficking operation dubbed “Fast and Furious” by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF).

The operation was designed to build big criminal cases against violent Mexican drug cartels and the people who provided them with Ak 47s and other high powered weapons. But instead, ATF agents in some cases lost track of the weapons under surveillance and they later turned up at crime scenes on both sides of the Southwest border, including the December 2010 death of U.S. Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry.

Illegal Producers of Small Arms
Weaponry, like small arms, can also be obtained from illegal manufacturers that make copies of rifles and ammo, some of which are highly accurate in appearance and performance. This is a particularly profitable and booming business as criminals (not to mention terrorists) will want to acquire such weapons to carry out their attacks or other criminal activities, while citizens will purchase these guns for protection, leading to the proliferation of illegally-produced small arms. For example, in late November 2007, the Peruvian police arrested a family (a mother and her two sons) in their house in the district of Lince, Lima and accused them of illegally manufacturing guns and ammo. In the course of the raid, police officers came upon thousands of different magazines of ammo, including the infamous “dum dum” bullets. The commander of the VII police region, General Octavio Salazar Miranda, declared that “we do not know if [the guns and ammo] were going to go to the hands of terrorists, drug cartels or to the Colombian FARC guerrillas.”

Attempts at stopping small arms proliferation
A significant event occurred in July 2007, during a celebration of International Gun Destruction Day, when almost 14,000 small arms were destroyed in Colombia. A July 19 article by the Inter Press Service quotes Ambassador Claudia Blum as saying that the weapons destroyed in the July celebration did not come from the armed forces. “There were 13,778 weapons destroyed, which included machine guns, handguns, rifles and mortars," she said. “Out of these, the vast majority -77 percent- were confiscated from criminal organizations and illegally armed groups throughout the national territory. The rest were legally owned weapons turned in by private citizens committed to security and nonviolent coexistence,” the ambassador concluded.

The report “Violencia, Crimen y Trafico Ilegal de Armas en Colombia,” published by the United Nations’ Oficina contra la Droga y el Delito explains that small arms found during raids on insurgent movements and criminal cartels had originated from a variety of sources, including: Belgium, France, Spain, Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, China and North Korea. The report’s sources explain that none of these governments authorized the sales or validated that the ultimate destination of the weapons would be Colombian insurgent movements.

Meanwhile, reports in June 2007 show that the Ecuadorian government has taken steps to control the illegal possession of weapons, in order to boost the safety of its citizenry. Ecuador’s Interior Minister Gustavo Larrea has declared that, “illegally bearing arms is a crime carrying a sentence of up to five years in jail.” The crackdown on illegal weapons came after as many as six minors were killed in Guayaquil during the first half of the year as a result of gun fights. This prompted Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa to launch his “Ecuador Without Weapons” program.

The Incan Weapons Market
The case of Peru is a good example of how the trafficking of small arms can spread throughout different levels of a country’s government, security forces and civil society. For years there have been reports of trafficking mafias in that country’s military and police. This illicit practice is carried out by both retired and active duty officers. For example, the 1990s deal by former Peruvian intelligence chief Vladimiro Montesinos-FARC deal over AK rifles (known as “Operation Siberia”) had as main middle man a retired army lieutenant, Jose Aybar Cancho.

In April 2007, an article published on the webpage of the Colombian Air Force highlighted the link between weapons sales from Peru to the FARC. The article explained that in September 2006, Peruvian authorities detained a group of Peruvian weapons traffickers and a load of contraband which included: 25 thousand magazines and five surface-to-air rockets that belonged to the Peruvian armed forces. The article went on to explain that the individuals who were detained for allegedly belonging to this group included Peruvian lower rank army officers, who had easy access to military ammo warehouses.

Investigations were made public in May 2007 that showed that there was a group of arms traffickers that moved weaponry and ammo from Peru to Colombia, via Ecuador. A report pinpointed Luis Pijo Angulo, a retired Peruvian police lieutenant, as the head of the group. Regarding the multiple illegal arms dealers with ties to the country’s military and police forces, the vice-president of the Defense Committee of the Peruvian Congress, David Waisman (also a former defense minister), said “I very much doubt that the high leadership [of the military]does not know about this [the illegal arms trafficking]. I suspect everyone right now as we are talking about very large quantities [of weaponry and ammo].”

The proliferation of small arms in Peru is shown by its blooming black market which makes small arms readily available to citizens. Any individual that visits street markets like Tacora or Las Malvinas in Lima can purchase with ease a Glock for $390 (including two clips of ammo), or a Browning for $400. There is no set price for these weapons; they are sold at whatever the merchant decides. A June 5, 2005 article in La República quotes a Peruvian small arms merchant saying “aquí el precio lo ponemos según la cara de pavo” (“the price [on weapons] is based on the [prospective] buyer’s appearance). Other weaponry (new and used) that can also be easily purchased in such markets include the Brazilian Taurus or the Italian Beretta.

What (and who) is killing people?
The strategies used in guerrilla warfare consist mostly of ambushes and hit-and-run attacks, which greatly diminish the relevancy of jet fighters or frigates, used for conventional warfare. Examples of attacks that have effectively utilized light weaponry include, for example, a November 2005 attack in Bogota – a hand grenade was thrown in a shop in the neighborhood of Fontibon, in Bogota’s northwest. The explosion killed 3 people, including two children.

In Brazil, a gun fight between rival gangs in June 2006, wounded six children by stray bullets, while eleven more were wounded due to shrapnel. The attack occurred in Rio de Janerio, in the Henrique Foreis school located in a shantytown. A September 9, 2006 Associated Press article by Harold Olmos explained that: “with their labyrinthine webs of narrow alleys, favelas offer easy hideouts to traffickers, and the slums' misery makes it easy to recruit young people into the narcotics trade. A study by the non-governmental group Viva Rio says the city has about 5,000 armed children soldiers in the battle for control of lucrative drug-dealing spots.”

Finally, the rise in criminal violence in Peru, particularly in major cities like Lima, has prompted civilians to purchase small arms in order to protect themselves and their homes, which could easily result in deadly accidents, aside from planned assaults.

A catastrophe could be in the making as Venezuela goes on with the scheduled plan of an AK factory, unless production was under vigorous control. This would almost certainly end up on the black market, or even legally, which could provoke more accidents if children come across ill-stored weapons in their homes.

The Grim Future
As South America becomes more involved in an arms race, there is no reason not to expect that an increase in violence will not follow. Inter-state warfare still remains unlikely; however intra-state warfare as well as widespread acts of ad hoc violence are every-day events in the region. Nations like Colombia and Ecuador have taken some steps to quell the spread of light arms to insurgent groups, as well as to criminal organizations and gangs, but much more needs to be done.

South America may not have witnessed an inter-state ware since the 1995 Peru – Ecuador border dispute; however, a day seldom passes without some new report of deaths or injuries as a result of small arms. The lack of conventional warfare does not mean that South America, the northern Andean region in particular, can be considered an entirely safe zone. Violence occurs using other types of weaponry, not necessarily tanks or fighter planes, but AK rifles, hand grenades and pistols. The future looks very grim for the northern Andean countries as small arms claims the lives of scores of their citizens on a weekly basis. The reality of the northern Andes is that the region is involved in a silent, never-ending cycle of internal violence, a human catastrophe going on before the world’s eyes.

A complete history and analysis of the AK rifle can be found in Larry Kahaner’s “AK-47: The Weapon That Changed the Face of War.” (Wiley; 1 edition – October 20, 2006)

Please accept this article as a free contribution from this author, but if re-posting, please afford authorial and institutional attribution. Exclusive rights can be negotiated.

The Philippines and the Spratly Islands

2011-09-14T22:14:00.009-04:00

The Philippines and the Spratly Islands
by Alex Sanchez
Research Fellow
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
Blog Post - September 14, 2011

Disclaimer: this isn’t a traditional blog post but rather excerpts from a personal piece that never got published regarding The Philippines and the Spratly islands. In the article I discussed Manila’s claim to the Spratlys, internal security in the country, the status of its military, as well relations with the U.S. and China. My original piece never got published so figured I might as well repackage some of it and post it here, the topic is certainly fascinating. I apologize if any of the info is dated.

An archipelago located in the South China Sea known as the Spratly Islands essentially consists of a group of islets and reefs, incapable of sustaining human life. A number of factors have made the Spratlys geo-strategically important in the past decades vis-à-vis regional affairs: geographical location, the nation that controls them would control a sizable area of the sea around them, and possible underwater oil deposits. Up to six nations have laid claims to these islands.

The Philippines’ control of part of the Spratly Islands is an interesting case of a militarily weak (at least when compared to several of its neighbors) and politically unstable nation laying a claim on a territory that provokes conflict with a major power, namely the People's Republic of China (PRC). Furthermore, in view of its, unfortunately, history of military coups as well as deadly domestic insurgent groups, it is debatable for how long can Manila maintain its control of part of the Spratlys without external aid (namely from the US). Due to the continued US-PRC struggle for influence in the region, the Philippines’ foreign policy ( closely linked to the reality of its domestic politics) and its claim to the Spratlys are relevant to the future of the South China Sea.

The Spratly Islands in Perspective – Philippine Interests
Manila’s interests in the Spratly Islands go hand in hand with what makes them so coveted. The islands should actually be defined as “islets” because of their miniature size. The biggest islands can, at most, hold a building or two. Located in the Southwestern and Southern parts of the South China Sea, the Spratly Islands have around 120 formations that go from islands, isles, shoals, banks, atolls, cays and reefs, with elevations from two to six meters and cover an area of approximately 180,000 kilometers. The islands have no natural resources to hold life and there is no native population to them.

Motivated by security concerns and economic interests, littoral states began in the late 1960s to make overlapping sovereignty claims to South China Sea islands, a process that has effectively led to the de facto military partition of the Spratly Islands archipelago. Apart from The Philippines, the other countries that have laid claims to the Spratlys are: the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of China/Taiwan (ROC), Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei, with Indonesia being an interested party.

The importance of the islands has been well documented; there are three major factors to the Spratlys that make them desirable:

. Location: the Spratly Islands are located in the South China Sea, a route used by transport ships (most of them coming from the Malacca Strait) as well as military vessels from different nations. Any nation that possesses the islands (all or some of them) would have an important advantage on terms of intelligence regarding the movement of vessels, as well as aircraft, on that particularly area. Writing in 1977, Selig Harrison stated that “the sea lane running between the Paracels and Spratlys is used by oil tankers moving form the Persian Gulf to Japan as well as by warships en route from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific.” (Harrison, Pp. 191)

. Extended Sovereignty: under international sea conventions the control of an island by any state also gives the island’s owner the sovereign control of a number of miles around the island. This is a major reason why the Spratly Islands have been labeled as islands, instead of islets; in order to be sure that the maritime sovereignty associated with an island will be maintained. Under the Law of the Sea Convention, “any state holding valid legal title to sovereignty over an island is permitted to establish a 12-nautical mile territorial sea and a 200—nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around the island” (Joyner, Pp. 195 &198).

. Resources. The South China Sea attracted international attention during the 1970s when geological studies first suggested the existence of substantial reserves of petroleum and natural deposits beneath its sea-bed.Experts say that, at least for the time being, the possibility of finding oil is the least relevant of the main reasons for controlling the Spratlys.

The Neighborhood Factor - Geopolitics
Christopher Joyner clearly defines the geopolitical and geo-security importance of the Spratlys by explaining that:

“Lying between Vietnam to the west and the Philippines to the east, the Spratlys offer a potential staging location for blocking ships traversing the South China Sea. Aircraft, including helicopters, based in the Spratlys could fly within closer range of the Malacca and Sunda Straits, vital choke-points through which shipping in the South China Sea must pass to enter the Indian Ocean. A military presence in the Spratlys, such as an airfield, could effectively be used to stop all shipping in the South China Sea if armed conflict were to break out in mainland Asia”

(Joyner, P. 205).

The PRC would like to control the islands to safely carry out maritime operations. It would also help create a defense line around its south maritime borders. As early as 1975 the Chinese media had claimed the importance of the South China Sea, which is “an important junction for navigation and an important maritime gateway from China’s mainland and nearby islands.”(Peking Review, quoted in Harrison, Pp. 191)

It is important for other states to prevent the PRC from achieving control over the Spratlys – with Vietnam and Taiwan perhaps being at the top of the ladder when it comes to regional actors. While the Spratlys are not particularly geographically close to Taiwan, it is not in Taipei’s interest to see the PRC gain too much maritime power and free reign, as this could be the first step of an encirclement of Taiwan, should the PRC also gain influence over the Philippine Sea.

Similarly, relations between Vietnam and PRC have had several tense moments. In 1974 the two countries (at the time South Vietnam, before the NVA gained control of the country) clashed over the Paracel Islands, with China resulting victorious. On February 8 1987, Chinese and Vietnamese warships opened fire on each other in the area. On March 14 of that same year, a more serious confrontation occurred off Union Reef, as each navy lost a vessel and 120 Vietnamese sailors drowned. Even more serious was the violent clash between China and Vietnam in March 1988. On October 2007, even if it was not a military clash, diplomatic relations were strained as China began promoting tourism to the Paracels as if they are Chinese territory, infuriating Vietnam. In return, Hanoi appointed a “Chairman” to rule the Paracels in April 2009. In response to these events, Taiwan reiterated its sovereignty over the Paracels on June 2009, angering Hanoi.

The Philippines’ Claim to the Spratlys

On May 17, 1951, Filipino President Elpidio Quirino claimed his country’s rights to the Spratly Islands, some of which are in Philippines’ territorial waters. In 1957 a Filipino named Tomas Cloma claimed that he had discovered the Spratly Islands and claimed them for himself, not for his country. In 1971 Manila officially claimed part of the Spratly Islands based on the “explorer” Cloma’s discovery and occupation. Manila argued that the Spratly did not belong to anyone, hence they could be claimed. Such a declaration clashed with Beijing’s arguments that Chinese fishermen had visited, even colonized, the islands centuries ago. In April 1972, Manila laid claim to eight of the islands, the largest being Pag-asa. The islands were designated to be part of Palawan Province, with its own local government. In February 2009, Philippine lawmakers passed a bill to part of the Spratlys, both the Kalayaan islands where Philippine troops are stationed, as well as Scarborough Shoal, also claimed by China.

In an interview with the author, a Philippine professor explained that there has been a “consistent claim” since the time of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos over the Kalaayan. Considering that the claimed islands are already domestically accepted as part of Palawan Province, and in one of the islands there is a presence of Philippine marines, Manila claim to the islands is seen as a feat accompli.

Unfortunately for The Philippines, its internal security is far from ideal, so its military cannot fully focus on protecting its maritime borders, including in disputed areas like the Spratlys. Almost immediately after independence in 1946, insurgent movements begun, including the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its New People’s Army (NPA) sprung again. These groups continue their struggle today, at the same time that new insurgent movements have appeared.

The NPA currently has around 5.000 troops, down from 25,000 in 1986. It seems there is little intention by either the Communist leadership or the government to resort to mediation or dialogue. In 2007 the NPA began carrying out attacks against international mining companies. By early 2008, Manila was confident that it could carry out a final offensive, for which it was planning to recruit up to 3,000 new troops. Nevertheless a decisive victory continues to elude the military; in March 2009, the NPA had vowed to continue operations in Panay Island thanks to an increase in fighters. Since beginning their insurgency in 1969, the NPA has been blamed for over 40,000 deaths.

Likewise, there is still concern about the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Peace talks to expand a Muslim autonomous region collapsed in August 2008. In a 2007 confrontation 14 Philippine marines were killed by the Moro rebels, 10 of which were beheaded. On early June 2009, the military announced that it had killed 30 rebels and captured a Moro separatist camp on Mindanao island. Regardless of military accomplishments, Then-President Arroyo (unlike her dealings with the NPA or Abu Sayyaf) has pushed for renewed mediation with the MILF. The Moro rebels have a reported strength of 11,500 armed men.

Another Philippine insurgent organization is the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) which has been under US scrutiny for its alleged ties with other religiously-extremist groups in Southeast Asia like Jemaah Islamiyah, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka as well as Al-Qaeda. On January 2009, Philippine Lt. Gen. Nelson Allaga argued that reports on a possible buildup of ASG’s forces after heavy losses last year were superficial, “basically, their numbers have been reduced, they're not so much of a threat […].” In spite of arguably fewer members, ASG’s operations have continued to have effective results – in early June 2009 up to seven Philippine soldiers died fighting ASG rebels in Indanan in the southern Sulu province. Abu Sayyaf’s maritime operations have also become a source of concern, particularly due to the heavy maritime traffic that goes through the South China Sea.

In September 2007, the Philippine military filed a complaint of alleged MILF support for Abu Sayyaf when the latter insurgent movement clashed with troops in Basilan, where two soldiers died.

In April 2009, Philippine Defense Minister Gilberto Teodoro said that the 80,000-strong Army needed an additional 12 battalions (6,000 troops) to deal with the country’s insurgent groups. It is not surprising that the Philippine armed forces do not have the resources to focus on external threats, much less militarily expanding Philippine sovereignty to the Spratly Islands if they require even more troops to establish peace at home.

The Philippines, the People’s Republic of China and the Spratly Incidents
Manila’s relations with China have been historically mixed. The Chinese tend to look with contempt to other races, including South Asians like the Filipinos. At the same time, Filipinos see unassimilated Chinese who live in the Philippines as strangers; they are often the focal point of racism and discrimination.

A number of incidents have brought the Philippines close to a confrontation with the PRC over the Spratlys and the South China Sea in general. As far back ias the Marcos government, Manila has attempted to create an ASEAN coalition to restrain Chinese ambitions in the South China Sea. In mid-late 1994, Beijing constructed a military observation post on Mischief Reef, a Philippine island 135 miles off the Palawan and inside the Philippines’ 200-exclusive economic zone. Manila learned about the construction only in February 1995 and then took a series of measures as a reprisal. Once Manila discovered their existence, Beijing claimed that these were shelters for fishermen. Manila argued that the structures resembled guard towers, including a satellite dish. Manila also sent vessels and aircraft that escorted photographers to Mischief Reef show the supposedly new ‘threat’ to Philippine territory, and provoked minor confrontations with Chinese ships. The Philippine military destroyed buoys set up by the Chinese in the contested area in order to deny any claim by Beijing that part, if not all, of the Spratly Islands belong to it.

(Clinton statement @ 00:38)

In 1996 diplomatic tensions ceased as the two countries signed a code of conduct, only for the issue to be once again revived in 1997 when Chinese warships were spotted around Mischief Reef and the Philippine-held Kota Island, also in the Spratlys. “Beijing’s apparent policy of seizing territory while avoiding actual conflict reinforced the Philippine view that China posed a long-term security challenge” (Cruz de Castro. China, the Philippines, and US influence in Asia. Pp. 2.) In spite of this, Beijing and Manila have attempted to improve security relations by a number of high profile visits, including Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian’s 2002 visit to Manila. In 2004, the Philippine Defense Secretary and his Chinese counterpart signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation.

Conclusions
As Joyner explains,

“the South China has become a patchwork of conflicting national claims, most recently driven by geo-political considerations over development of potential hydrocarbon resources [...] The intractable and contentious nature of jurisdictional disputes over the Spratlys have prompted claimant states to take efforts to enforce their claims by stationing a permanent military presence in the archipelago.”

The Spratly Islands dispute could be catalogued as a “frozen dispute,” paraphrasing the “frozen conflict” term for unsolved conflicts in the post-Soviet world (like the breakaway region of Transnistria in Moldova in Southeastern Europe). It is unlikely that the Spratly dispute will be resolved in the coming years, even if the competitors chose to go to some international tribunal like the International Court of Justice or seek a third party mediator to determine the fate of the islands. The fact that the PRC is one of the competitors, however, raises the importance of the Spratlys. The increasing strength and technology of China’s military, along with a foreign policy which is seeking to project more of Beijing’s power abroad, makes the Spratly dispute of importance. Should Beijing gain control of the islands (as a whole or even a major fraction), it will have access to possible deep-water resources and control of the maritime area. Controlling the Spratlys would also mean for Beijing a type of 'forward' presence (as difficult as it may be to built anything on these rocks and tiny reefs, though it has occurred in the recent and not so distant past) in the South China Sea, which would most likely be seen as a security threat to Taiwan and US interests in South Asia. From this point of view, a Washington-Manila friendship is important to the US due to the Philippines’ geostrategical location.

As a relatively militarily weak state in an important geopolitical region, the Philippines is not able to stand as a fully neutral player in the geopolitical game going on around it. Because of its internal domestic affairs, Washington will have a continuous interest in war against Abu Sayyaf and any other extremist group which could be tied to Al Qaeda and the global Washington-labeled and spearheaded 'War on Terror.' At the same time, the Philippines are an important Washington ally as, along with Taiwan and Japan, help create a 'sanitary corridor' to oversee Chinese military operations and expansion.

The geographical position of the Spratly Islands make them important for the ongoing Asian 'expansion game.' Maritime trade going through the area as well as their practical use for naval bases are the two major reasons that make this group of islets and reefs relevant to events going on around them. The possibility of deepwater oil reserves, generally overlooked, may become a pressing reason for their control as oil needs of claimant states increase in the coming years and depleting reserves force them to look for new sources. There is already the case of Russian laying claim to chunks of the underwater Arctic, possibly to carry out oil drilling in the future.

Six nations claim the islands to different degrees, from partial control of specific islands (the Philippines) to full control (China, Vietnam). The domestic reality of each of the participant countries in this dispute, also varies. Manila has been successful so far at keeping control of the islands that it lays claim to, however without upgrading the armed forces’ equipment, it is doubtful if the country will be able to maintain control in the long term when necessity for resources and influence pushes the other stronger disputing countries to the Spratlys. Resolution of the Philippines’ numerous internal issues would naturally be a positive development for its foreign policy, not to mention for the Philippine population in general. It is difficult to be an influential player in the neighborhood if one’s home is a mess.

Cruz de Castro, Renato. (2005). Philippine Defense Policy in the 21st Century: Autonomous Defense or Back to the Alliance. Pacific Affairs. 78(3):403-422
Cruz de Castro, Renato. (2007). China, the Philippines and US influence in Asia. Asian Outlook. 2. July.
Cruz de Castro, Renato. (1999). Adjusting to the Post-US Bases Era: The Ordeal of the Philippine Military’s Modernization Program. Armed Forces & Society. 26(1):119-0138.
Joyner, Christopher., (1998). ‘The Spratly Islands Dispute: Rethinking the Interplay of Law, Diplomacy and Geo-politics in the South China Sea’ The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law. 13(2):193-236.
Harrison, Selig. (1977). China, Oil and Asia: Conflict Ahead? New York: Columbia University Press

Please accept this article as a free contribution from this author, but if re-posting, please afford authorial and institutional attribution. Exclusive rights can be negotiated.

Analysis: Latin America and the Zombie Factor

2011-09-13T18:01:00.009-04:00

Latin America and the Zombie FactorBy: W. Alex Sanchez
Research Fellow
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
September 13, 2011
Originally published in: http://www.coha.org/14117/

- Crossover analyses between fictive works such as zombie films and TV series like Game of Thrones continue with the publication of major works like Theories of International Politics and Zombies.

- Most zombie-films and books deal with disasters appearing in the U.S. or Europe (with the book World War Z, being one of the few exceptions), but Latin America remains virgin territory for these kinds of analyses.

- Given the plethora of issues currently affecting the region, ranging from deficient health systems to a variety of narco-insurgent organizations, how would Latin America fare when the undead appears in that region?

The publication of Theories of International Politics and Zombies by Daniel Drezner,[1] a highly regarded professor at Tufts University, is the first of what could become a long line of crossovers between academic research and fictional situations involving zombies. Surprisingly well-received, Drezner’s innovative public policy study discusses the repercussions of a zombie horde in international affairs; in his work, the author discusses how conservatives, idealists, realists and constructivists would combat masses of the undead attacking their countries. Drezner paraphrases former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s idea of being prepared for the known unknowns and the unknown unknowns. According to the former official, known unknowns are security threats (i.e. terrorist attacks) that are likely to occur, but it is difficult to predict when they will happen; while unknown unknowns are security threats that we don’t actually know exist until they appear, for example an alien invasion or, for the sake of our argument, a zombie epidemic.

Besides Drezner, other scholars have begun to apply international relations theories to fictive situations and scenarios. Another example is offered by Stephen Saideman, a professor at McGill University in Canada, who has blogged about applying the basics of IR theory to the HBO fictional series Game of Thrones.[2] This TV show, based on books by George R.R. Martin, has become so popular that a recent article published by Foreign Policy[3] featured the situations and characters of the series, while combing them with IR realpolitik theory.

While Drezner employs a theoretical approach to the “zombie threat,” this analysis will consider the fictional scenario of what would happen if zombies appeared specifically in Latin America. For the sake of argument here we will focus on zombies as they appear in the films by George Romero, such as Dawn of the Dead, or as depicted in the critically acclaimed book, World War Z: An Oral History of the Zombie War. This article is not meant to be a mockery of the region’s reality, but rather a creative tool to analyze how effective governmental and societal responses would be in the case of a fictional zombie epidemic. This analysis is useful to both highlight the problems that Latin America currently faces, and also to make the assessment if the region is ready to handle a global infectious disease and consequent security threats. So, how would Latin America fare when a horde of the undead appears in that region?

The Scenario: Patient 0 / The Epidemic Appears
When a zombie epidemic appears in Latin America, an obvious first issue would be figuring how it started; theories would include pollutants via the water or food supply, or a disease only recently discovered in the Amazon due to deforestation or even due to a government experiment gone wrong. For the sake of argument we will assume that Latin American zombies are the same as to be found in Hollywood movies, in which the undead are desperate for sustenance, which is only placated by eating non-infected flesh, which results after biting humans and infecting them; it only takes one zombie to create an army of the undead. Typically, the zombie “condition” comes about after a highly infectious virus is spread through contact with saliva or by biting your victim; once infected, the sick person severely suffers from high fever and shaking fits; eventually the virus kills its victims and re-animates the dead corpse within hours.[4]

As the virus begins to spread, it is likely that regional governments and civil society will probably assume that it is the outbreak of some known illness like dengue, cholera or mad cow disease. A reason for this assumption is that there have been several outbreaks in recent years of diseases with zombie-like symptoms in Latin America. For example, Mexico’s swine flu outbreak in 2009 killed almost 200 people and hospitalized almost 2,000 more. The situation deteriorated so quickly that by April of that year schools across the nation closed for over a week to prevent spreading the disease among young children, and even general public gatherings were promptly limited.[5] The epidemic gave health officials fears that it could go global as swine flu appeared across the border in Texas and California.

More recently, in 2011, United Nations peacekeepers from Nepal inadvertently started a cholera outbreak in Haiti, which, by August 2011, had killed over 3,500 people. A March 2011 report by the BBC highlighted the variety of estimates of how many Haitians currently are, and could possibly become, infected, with numbers ranging from 400,000 to a possible 779,000 by November of 2011.[6] A July 2011 article in the Los Angeles Times published “the [Haitian] Health Ministry reported more than 1,000 new cholera cases a day last month [June].”[7] The Haitian epidemic was exacerbated by the country’s barely-functioning health system, particularly after the January 2010 earthquake, which killed tens of thousands. Cholera, another possibility in the range of similar diseases, is a well known killer in Latin America. Peru suffered an outbreak of this disease in 1991, the result of inadequate management of human waste flowing into rivers that led to Lima, and a lack of both education and the amenities for proper personal hygiene.[8] Thousands of individuals were infected with cholera, and hundreds died. The speed at which these diseases managed to spread can be compared to the rapid pace at which the zombie infection spreads in films. For example, in 28 Days Later, the zombie-like infection spreads quickly, sometimes just by touching someone or something that has been infected. In one scene, a character gets infected when a drop of blood of an infected bird falls on his eye.

Another theory would be that the zombie outbreak in Latin America might appear due to some type of massive radiation in the environment, maybe attributed to an accidental radioactive spill. Unfortunately, there has already been at least one radioactive incident in the region. In September 1987 individuals in Goiania, Brazil, while looking for scrap metal, went into an abandoned clinic (the Instituto Goiano de Radioterapia) when the security guard wasn’t present, and took a container that had 93 grams of highly radioactive cesium chloride.[9] The radiation killed four individuals and another 245 suffered from various degrees of radioactive contamination, 20 of which had signs of radiation sickness, before the situation was brought under control. The Goiania incident can be compared with the film Return of the Living Dead II (1988), which centers around a couple of cemetery workers opening a sealed military barrel with one of the undead in it; the two workers become sick and, due to other incidents, the epidemic quickly spreads.

Government Emergency System
As the zombie infection spreads and the hordes of the undead appear, Latin American governments will have to protect their population and prevent the disease from spreading. In the film Resident Evil: Apocalypse (2004), the “evil” Umbrella Corporation builds a wall around the fictitious Raccoon City where the zombie outbreak first started; Umbrella’s wall fully isolates the city, leaving non-infected civilians trapped in the city with the zombies. Latin American governments would not necessarily go to such extremes to isolate the epidemic, but one positive factor is that the region has at least some experience with major evacuations.

For example, during the eruption of the Puyehue volcano in the southern part of Chile in June 2011, the government evacuated as many as 3,500 victims from the affected region.[10] Peru faced similar situations in the southern part of the country, like the Ubinas volcano eruption in March/April 2006.[11] Thousands of civilians were forced to evacuate as local water sources were polluted and livestock died due to ash fall. Both countries suffered earthquakes in recent years: southern Peru experienced an 8.0 in the Richter scale on August 15, 2007 and northern Chile experienced an 8.8 in the Richter scale on February 27, 2010, which once again put local government emergency systems to the test.

A critical factor in order to protect civilians as they flee zombie areas will be how well regional governments can communicate with their population and carry out organized evacuations. In zombie movies that deal with the initial spread of the undead, we can see how governments try to inform their citizens of what actions to carry out. For example, in the 2004 film Dawn of the Dead and in the film Shaun of the Dead characters listen to TV broadcasts where the news presenters advise the population on what to do in view of the growing zombie threat.

Hopefully, the experience Latin American governments have gained from dealing with natural disasters will provide them and their populations with the necessary aid when the undead appear.There are at least some promising signs regarding this issue, as when Peru suffered a strong earthquake in August 2007, radio stations and even live TV shows continued on air with their programs, informing the population of what to do. Thus, if zombies appear, it seems likely that news stations would continue to operate according to their abilities, as portrayed in the previously mentioned films.

Emergency response systems and evacuation plans, out of necessity and reality, would be different in the Caribbean islands, as a major source of concern occurs every summer in the shape of the hurricane season. Cuba’s generally well-organized civil society is regarded as having one of the best emergency warning systems, including shelters in various neighborhoods[12]. Nevertheless, other islands like Grenada and Dominica, do not appear to have well-articulated systems in place to shelter or evacuate citizens and tourists in case of a natural disaster emergency. After Hurricane Tomas hit the island of Saint Lucia in late 2010, Prime Minister Stephenson King declared a state of emergency, as bridges were swept away and over a dozen were killed; the official stated that it had been the worst natural disaster in the history of the island, particularly in the south. Meanwhile, in Jamaica, a child died and “roads [were] blocked or made impassable, bridges collapsed and persons [were] trapped by the rising waters” when a freak storm hit the island in September 2010.

The Caribbean has a regional organization in charge for such events, namely the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Emergency ( www.cdema.org ) and there have been several declarations from high level officials regarding making disaster preparation a priority, including by the Assistant Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS), Albert Randim of Suriname. In addition, international powers like the U.S. and the European Union have donated funds to Caribbean states in for supporting disaster preparedness and the reconstruction of infrastructure caused by major natural disasters. Nevertheless, much still needs to be done in that region. Furthermore, the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti showed that this country, despite repeated natural onslaughts, lacks the necessary means to reach remote areas affected by a major natural disaster to provide first aid while restoring order. There have been a few references to zombies appearing in islands; for example in the film Land of the Dead, survivors manage to get into a yacht and flee in search of deserted islands, hoping that they will be infection-free. In addition, the premise of the 2011 zombie video game Dead Island is a group of people trying to survive a zombie infestation with very few means to evacuate a fictional island off the coast of Papua New Guinea. Hopefully by the time zombies appear, Caribbean states will have developed better emergency evacuation methods, though not enough resources are devoted to these issues in several states.

Finally, it is important to mention the new comedy entitled Juan de los Muertos (Juan of the Dead – 2011), which centers around zombies appearing in modern day Cuba. The film narrates that the Cuban government reports to its citizens that the zombie violence are actually being caused by dissidents paid by the U.S. government; which has as subtle message that even during a major security issue , governments like the one in Havana might spin the situation using standard ideological rhetoric. The film does not necessarily deal with Cubans trying to flee the zombie-infested island, but how their society adapts to it, and even profit (like the main character’s business of killing zombies for other people).

The Role of Militaries in a Period of Crises
When the zombie hordes appear throughout Latin America, regional security forces, like the police and military, and even paramilitaries groups, may have to step in to battle the undead and keep them from infecting widening circles of civilians. It is common in several zombie films that security forces appear to save the main characters and help to restore order (like in the film Shaun of the Dead– 2004); in addition, the book World War Z imagines how the world, especially powerhouses like the U.S. and China (where the zombie epidemic started) would deploy their militaries to deal with the zombie uprising.

The Latin American militaries have a history of taking control of their governments if they perceive a national security threat. As the zombie epidemic spreads, it is difficult to predict how Latin American militaries would behave vis-à-vis the constitutional order so their countries are not effortlessly overrun by zombies. On the one hand, military leaders could be expected to remain subservient to the civilian leadership, while on the other, some officers may see it as their duty, or at least in their own self-interest, to take control of the government and organize a defense campaign against the zombies. The recently deceased former Uruguayan dictator Juan Maria Bordaberry, is an example of this phenomenon, as he was widely regarded as a puppet president at the mercy of his country’s military when he held power in 1972-1976.[13] A scenario of how civil-military relations in Latin America would be shaped when zombies appear would be the 2007 film 28 Weeks Later, in which a post-epidemic (not a zombie related case) London is under military control, as attempts are made to repopulate the city with civilians. A Bordaberry-28 Weeks Later scenario in which a civilian government, at least in principle, exists, but operations regarding zombies fall under full military control, would be a likely possibility.

In June 2011, Howard Wiarda, a Rusk Professor of International Relations at the University of Georgia and a senior associate in residence with the Americas Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) wrote a report entitled “Constitutional Coups? Military Interventions in Latin America.”[14] In his extensive analysis, Wiarda explained that

“in Latin America, while one constitutional article may proclaim, that the armed forces are ‘nonpolitical, non-deliberative, and totally subservient to civilian authority,’ another will say they have a special responsibility, even an ‘obligation,’ to intervene under certain circumstances: if the country is attacked, if internal order is upset, or if the political system is gridlocked.”[15]

He also argued that his “working hypothesis was that the Latin American constitutions elevate the armed forces into almost a fourth branch of government, with special obligations and responsibilities.”[16] Certainly, in times of extreme danger, like internal civil wars, Latin American militaries obtained power over their country’s internal security. Peru’s military during the 1980s at the height of its internal civil war versus Shining Path and the MRTA (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru), or the military regimes as seen in South America in the 1960s to 1980s that carried out repressive operations against leftist violent and non-violent groups, are examples of the appearance of these de facto rightwing regimes during times of extreme national unrest. It can be assumed that when zombies appear regional militaries will see this situation as an extreme security crisis and will want a greater role in the decision-making process of how to deal with the undead. In the film Return of the Living Dead II (1988), an army colonel orders the destruction of 20 square blocks of Louisville, Kentucky by a nuclear artillery shell, killing zombies and non-infected civilians alike, seemingly without consulting with any civilian leaders. Meanwhile, in the British 2011 film World of Dead: The Zombie Diaries (2011), British troops summarily execute civilians to prevent the zombie infestation from spreading; but there is no mention of them answering to any kind of civilian leadership.

Order Breaks / Each Person for Themselves

In several Hollywood films, zombies ultimately take over the globe as governments and militaries prove unable to control the living dead hordes. Should zombies appear tomorrow in Latin America, the undead will have to battle not only traditional security forces and also a plethora of well-armed, violent-prone movements, such as narco-insurgent groups like Peru’s Shining Path and Colombia’s FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) and ELN (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional), and, arguably, the Paraguayan People’s Army (Ejercito Popular Paraguayo – EPP). Adding to the list of violent criminal elements are the ever-expanding Mexican cartels, such as Sinaloa, the Zetas, the Familia Michoacana and the Gulf Cartel, which are presently spreading their influence and operations into Central America (particularly Guatemala). There are also international gangs such as the Mara Salvatruchas. Further down south, the Brazilian favelas were home to lawless criminal groups, like the infamous Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC- First Command of the Capital). Furthermore, besides these major criminal organizations, low-level crime is widespread throughout the region, particularly in major cities like Caracas, Mexico City and Lima. In films like Resident Evil II, 28 Days Later, and the TV series The Walking Dead, we see the appearance of gangs (sometimes made of former military or police units), who band together to protect themselves from zombies in small patches of land. Latin America already has a somewhat similar structure, with Mexico’s case being the most extreme as some may argue that the Cartels have divided the country into a narco-feudalist state.

In addition, Latin America’s various violent organizations have proven to be well-organized and well-equipped, with a multitude of means for acquiring weapons. For example, Shining Path and the EPP typically pick up guns from ambushed government security forces. In addition, black markets are common in Latin America; therefore, the illegal purchase of weapons is widespread. For example, a June 2011 article in the Peruvian daily Peru.21 explained how a person can easily buy a revolver illegally for roughly 300 soles (about $110) in a black market to be found in downtown Lima.[17]

The Zombie Diaries
2006

While this situation does not help regional forces combat crime in the pre-zombie world, it would help to keep people alive when the living dead appear. In movies like the zombie comedy Shaun of the Dead(2004), a constant problem for zombie survivors was trying to find weapons with which they can protect themselves. In the AMC TV series The Walking Dead, a group of survivors launch a daring operation to go to zombie-infested Atlanta to retrieve a bag full of shotguns and ammo, as they barely had any in their camp. Survivors in zombie movies usually run out of ammunition fairly quickly or simply do not have enough weapons, so they have to resort to baseball bats or axes for protection. A lack of weapons or ammo would not be too much of a problem in a zombie-infested Latin America; for example in June 2011, Mexican soldiers found a buried cache of weapons apparently stockpiled by a drug cartel, probably the Zetas, which included 154 rifles and shotguns and more than 92,000 rounds of ammunition in an underground chamber by the city of Monclova in northern Mexico.[18] The cache also included four mortar shells, two rocket-propelled grenades, dozens of assault rifles, sniper rifles and two bows.

It is conceivable that as survivors try to flee zombie-infested areas, they might decide to reinforce vehicles around them. To adequately protect themselves, they can refer to similar Hollywood and real life examples for inspiration: Mexican cartels are fabricating their own armored vehicles, like the infamous “monster” trucks that transport Cartel members on their way to attacks.[19] These vehicles are similar to armored cars that survivors in zombie movies build to escape the undead, like the armored buses that appear in Resident Evil: Afterlife, 2010, and Dawn of the Dead, 2004.

Photo: An armored 2011 Ford F-Series pickup discovered by authorities in Jalisco state, Mexico. Credit: PickupTrucks.com

The Culture of Death
Usually, at some point in zombie movies, the main characters have some moral dilemma regarding shooting one of the undead who used to be a living person, perhaps someone they even knew. For example, in Shaun of the Dead the main character struggled to shoot his recently deceased mother, who dies from a bite and eventually comes back as a zombie. Another example occurs in Resident Evil: Apocalypse, where a main character has difficulty shooting her policeman friend who has just turned into one of the living dead. On the other hand, Dr. Brendan Riley of Columbia College Chicago, explains in Generation Zombie that in Romero’s Dawn of the Dead, the heroes eagerly dispatch the zombies infesting the mall they’ve commandeered, as they show no remorse for these killings, since they understand the zombies to be non-people, showing empathy only in moments of pause.[20] The Columbia College professor explains that in said film a scientist on television describes the zombies as: “These creatures are nothing but pure, motorized instinct. We must not be lulled by the concept that these are our family members or our friends. They are not. They will not respond to such emotions.” Regarding this issue, a quick overview of the recent history of violence demonstrate that the value of life in Latin America and Caribbean has decreased to the point that the region could deal, fairly easily (generally speaking) with the psychological and moral ramifications of a zombie apocalypse.

Unfortunately, there is a surplus of current examples showing that the value of life has generally decreased in this violence-prone region: teenage hit-women have appeared in Mexico,[21] and in 2010, Mexican security forces arrested a 14-year-old teenager known as Edgar Jimenez Lugo (aka El Ponchis), allegedly a major ring-leader for a cartel. He admitted to beheading several individuals, whether they were members of rival gangs or not. “When we don’t find the rivals, we kill innocent people, maybe a construction worker or a taxi driver,” he stated to the media.[22] That criminal organizations recruit child-soldiers to swell up their ranks is, unfortunately, not a new development to Latin America or, for that matter, for other global conflicts. However, even in the pre-zombie world, it seemed particularly alarming the rate at which this is occurring in Mexico. After capturing a 13-year-old girl that was a member of the Zetas Cartel, a local Mexican police officer stated to the media that “we are noticing that cartels are recruiting younger members, we have detained underage individuals in Veracruz and Zacatecas, and they continue to appear.”[23] In the TV series The Walking Dead, children are not used as fighters against the zombies; however it would seem that when zombies appear in Latin America children would readily be given weapons, just like anyone else.

Furthermore, the culture of death and general disregard for human life is not necessarily unique to Mexico. In Brazil, children as young as 11 are known to have become killers during gang battles in the favelas.[24] Also in Peru, large groups of street children called “piranhas” attack and rob random people in the streets, often with senseless cruelty.[25] Regarding Central America, the expansion of Mexican drug cartels to the region brought greater levels of violence. This resulted in an increase of violent crimes, like the May 2011 massacre of 27 people in a Guatemalan cattle ranch.[26] The Central American wars and dictatorships in South America, like in Augusto Pinochet’s repressive regime in Chile, the high levels of violence in Latin America’s recent past, combined with ongoing drug-related violence, seem to show that there would not be major psychological issues (broadly speaking) regarding shooting the living dead in that region.

The role of Religion
In an interview with COHA, a high school teacher from Jalisco highlighted the widespread and growing popularity of a culture to the Santa Muerte (Holy Death). The revered image is a hooded skeleton accompanied by a globe and a scythe; its growing popularity is seen as a consequence of the narco-culture taking over the country, as the Holy Death protects from danger, but does not discriminate against the good or the evil-doers because it does not have eyes.[27] Such particular beliefs, which combine religion with violence, might become even more popular once the zombies begin appearing in the region.

The issue of the Santa Muerte brings up the topic of religion in Latin America whenthe undead appear. At this point it is necessary to state the origins of the zombie myth originate in Haiti, where the belief in them is part of local voodoo tradition (see Kyle Bishop’s article Raising the Dead for a more in-depth analysis of Haiti’s zombie-voodoo history). Hollywood has a somewhat basic way of inserting religion into some of its films. For example in the 2004 film Resident Evil: Apocalypse, a scene shows some survivors hiding in a church, in which a priest has tied up his sister, who has already become a flesh-eating zombie, and protects her. Meanwhile, George Romero’s “films are not about ‘punishment for sin.’ Romero’s universe is certainly not a Christian one (the occasional religious references are always negative). Rather, we have an accidental universe, an unholy mess.”[28] These movies portray a zombie uprising in an American scenario, and not Latin America’s religious reality, which is mostly Catholic and has a prominent role in everyday life. How would religion (not just Catholicism but also other religions present in the region like Islam and Judaism) affect the behavior of the Latin American population vis-à-vis the appearance of zombies? We will leave this question open.

Miscellaneous Issues
In addition to the aforementioned topics, should zombies appear in Latin America, there are a number of other issues which would come into play.
For example how would the U.S. government and military act if a zombie infection appeared south of its borders? The U.S. had a long history of military intervention in Latin America (i.e. Haiti, Dominican Republic and Panama) as well as covert operations (i.e. Nicaragua and Guatemala). Nevertheless, most of those operations occurred during the Cold War, and if the zombies appeared tomorrow, Washington would find itself overspread due to its military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. A critical factor regarding the U.S.’ actions towards a zombie-infected Latin America would be heavily contingent on what political party is in power in the White House, as this will influence the country’s interventionist or isolationist tendencies. Riley explains that “Return of the Living Dead (1985) explores both conspiracy theory and culture clash with its clearly-delineated groups of straight-laced kids and punks, and its malevolent military who deploys a nuclear weapon to cover up its own illegal testing.”[29] Hence, in spite of whether Democrats or Republicans are in control of the White House, the U.S. government will probably continue to view Latin America as its zone of interest, so some type of intervention will be likely.

Moreover, still on the topic of international support, a critical issue for dealing with the zombie hordes will be level of cooperation between Latin states when the undead appear. In the 2011 film World of the Dead: The Zombie Diaries, British soldiers and civilians try to reach the coast, where ships will take the survivors to mainland Europe, where the infection is not widespread. But this resembles more of a humanitarian operation rather than a multinational military operation, and this occurs in a very integrated Europe. Historically, Latin American nations have been very protective of their national sovereignty and do not appreciate foreign militaries within their borders. An example of this attitude occurred during a 2008 incident when Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez proclaimed that if Bolivian President Evo Morales was removed from power due to major protests at the time, he would send his Bolivarian army to reinstitute his Andean friend to presidency. Needless to say, this statement that was not well received by the Bolivian military. It is debatable whether a major international security threat like the zombie factor would force Latin American governments to reconsider their historical differences and tensions with other states. For example, when the undead appear in Arica, would Santiago ask Lima to deploy its military to fight the zombie horde in that disputed region (as Chile and Peru had a war in the 19th century, dubbed the War of the Pacific, in which Chile gained that territory)? Besides the books World War Z, and Drezner’s Theory of International Politics and Zombies, not much has been written about international cooperation in face of the zombie threat (besides the aforementioned World of the Dead reference). The historical tensions and border disputes, as well as ongoing integration initiatives in Latin America add an unclear variable of how well the region could unite in the face of a common, transnational enemy.

Finally, there is the question of the effects of the zombie violence on local populations. Understandably, when the zombie violence becomes widespread, there will probably be major levels of forced migration, as families escape the violence and infection. For better or worse, Latin American states are already used to this. For example, as a result of the 1980s war in the Andes between Peruvian government forces and the MRTA and Shining Path, thousands of Peruvians became internally displaced people (IDP) when they fled to major coastal cities, particularly Lima. In addition, Colombia has the second highest rate of IDPs in the world due to its decades-old civil war against the FARC, ELN and drug-cartels. Likewise, Mexico is experiencing population movements within its borders as citizens flee from cities consumed in major cartel-related violence in the northern part of the country, and move to safer areas in the center and south. When zombies appear, it is only logical that people would migrate to safer zones. A similar situation happened in the 2005 film Land of the Dead, where survivors of the zombie apocalypse managed to concentrate in a few cities, with fences around them to keep the undead away.

Conclusions
It is important to stress that we have analyzed Latin America as a whole, with general examples from different countries to give an idea of what could happen when zombie hordes appear. Analysts and specialists from each Latin American and Caribbean country can give a more in-depth analysis explaining how their own nation would fare in case of a zombie uprising, providing facts and issues not covered in this analysis. If anything, this would be an interesting and amusing hypothetical exercise.
Our analysis of what would happen in the case of a zombie epidemic in Latin America highlights a few realities of the situation in the region. For example, healthcare systems across the region as well as pollution incidents make the region ripe for a zombie outbreak and governments would be unprepared to evacuate civilians from zombie-infested areas as the epidemic spreads. Furthermore, the historical propensity for interventions (i.e. coups) means that Latin American militaries would likely step in if there should be a zombie-created national security crisis. Finally, if governments and militaries fail to control a zombie horde, the widespread availability of weapons and the very existence of so many criminal groups, combined with a decreased value of life would mean, ironically enough, that the inhabitants facing a zombie-apocalypse in Latin America might actually have a fighting chance at survival.

This author would like to thank the following people for their help with this article:
Dr. Brendan Riley, professor at Columbia College Chicago, popularly known for his class “Zombies in Popular Media,” which has been featured in several news articles.
The hordes of COHA research associates whose feedback made this article interesting and engaging.

Endgame for Brazil’s role in MINUSTAH?

2011-08-29T17:58:00.005-04:00

This analysis was prepared by COHA Research Fellow Alex Sanchez
Report - Council on Hemispheric Affairs
Original post http://bit.ly/nPtQSc
August 29, 2011

Brazil’s leadership in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) may be coming to its end. The newly-appointed defense minister, Celso Amorin (most recently he served as foreign affairs minister from 2003 to 2011) recently declared to the Brazilian media that he “supports the withdrawal of Brazilian troops from Haiti.”[1] Should this happen, it would be a major departure from the status quo, and would greatly affect MINUSTAH’s operations, as well as jolt Brazil’s role as the Caribbean’s major arbiter of security. Furthermore, Brasilia’s quest for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has been partially based on its role in MINUSTAH as an example of its readiness for a UN seat, which may now be called into question.

Brazil’s role in Haiti
Brasilia racked up a huge leadership role in MINUSTAH, which had as its mission to aid the transitional government that gained control of Haiti (via the UNSC’s resolution 1542) after President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was ousted in early 2004. The mission was controversial at the time and drew heavy criticism from its inception as it was regarded as a type of colonial government by the UN in the wake of Aristide’s abrupt forced departure from power, following major national protests and violence. At the time, there were persistent accusations that the U.S., Canada and France had a role in the Haitian head of state’s ouster.

Brazil has provided the military commanders for MINUSTAH along with a significant number of its forces over the past seven years. Brasilia has reportedly deployed 1,266 army and navy troops to MINUSTAH,[2] but, in the aftermath of the massive January 2010 earthquake that struck Haiti, the Brazilian Congress approved a request to send 1,300 additional troops to the Caribbean country to help with relief operations.[3]
In January 2006, there was a bizarre incident in which MINUSTAH’s commander, Lieutenant General Urano Teixeira da Matta, committed suicide while in his hotel room in Port-au-Prince. In cables published by Wikileaks, Dominican President Leonel Fernandez told State Department Assistant Secretary Patrick Duddy that he suspected that Teixeira had been assassinated by a paramilitary group, possibly led by Guy Philippe, a renowned Haitian cutpurse and rebel leader with a good deal of political clout.[4] MINUSTAH’s current commander is Major General Luiz Eduardo Ramos Pereira, also from Brazil.[5]

According to MINUSTAH’s official website, the mission’s current strength (as of June 30, 2011) totals 12,261 uniformed personnel, not including volunteers as well as international and local civilian personnel. Since its inception, the mission has suffered 164 fatalities, 66 of which were military personnel. Twenty UN Brazilian soldiers were killed in the January 2010 earthquake.[6]

Brazil Inside and Out
Dilma Rousseff’s first year as president of Brazil has been far from ideal as a number of senior and high-profile members of her cabinet have resigned. The list includes: Agriculture Minister Wagner Rossi, Defense Minister Nelson Jobim, Transportation Minister Alfredo Nascimento, as well as President Rousseff’s chief of staff, Antonio Palocci.[7] Should the Brazilian head of state decide to maintain her troops in Haiti despite the defense minister’s opinion to the contrary, this may put Rousseff at odds with other key members of her cabinet, as well as with the military’s leadership. Furthermore, a recent letter to the Brazilian President was signed by a number of legislators, like Markus Sokol of the PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores – Worker’s Party) National Directorate, representatives of the CUT (Central Única dos Trabalhadores – Unified Worker’s Central) and the MST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra – Landless Workers’ Movement) , as well as others. The open letter states: “we must end Brazil’s participation in a military operation that is repudiated by the vast majority of the Haitian people … this occupation has only deepened the plight of the people and has denied them their sovereignty.”[8]

It is worth noting that some influential Brazilians do support a continued presence in Haiti. Geraldo Cavagnari, member of the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Campinas (Unicamp) has declared that “the troops should stay put because there is no risk, and there are many things in play.”[9] The other “many things” most likely include Brazil’s hardly concealed quest for a permanent UNSC seat.

Another factor that may influence the future role of Brazil in Haiti may be budgetary issues. An August 15, 2011 article entitled “Bye Bye MINUSTAH” published by the Canada Haiti Action Network,[10] explains that since 2004, Brazil’s taxpayers have spent over R$ 1 billion on MINUSTAH. Last year alone, maintenance of the Brazilian troops in Haiti cost R$ 426 million: R$ 140 million for annual costs and other expenditures, plus R$ 286 million for humanitarian aid sent after the 2010 earthquake. The analysis goes on to argue that in principle, the UN should reimburse these expenses, but in recent years the reimbursements have amounted to only 16% of the payments made by the Brazilian government. The article finally adds that, in addition, the salaries of Brazil’s MINUSTAH troops have, in fact, exceeded R$ 41 million per year, but these costs are excluded from Brazil’s expenses on the mission because these individuals would be entitled to their pay even if they were in Brazil. The Portuguese-speaking nation is currently enjoying an economic boom, but this will most likely not last, in part because the Brazilian currency, the real, is showing signs of being overvalued. If a period of economic austerity appears, the Brazilian government may be forced to rethink some of its peacekeeping operations and other major military commitments.
An official interviewed by the author, who wished to remain anonymous, explained that Brazil as well as several other states have desired to leave Haiti for some time and they argue that there is already some kind of, at least superficial, political stability in the Caribbean state. It would seem that the recent Haitian presidential elections, as dubious and controversial as they were, may serve as part of Brazil’s “exit strategy” for leaving MINUSTAH.

An Unsuccessful Departure?
Brazil’s military has been involved in Haiti since 2004 but, unfortunately, few positive developments have stemmed from Brazil’s limited interactions in the small Caribbean nation. MINUSTAH operations managed to pacify most violent neighborhoods, like Cite Soleil in 2005, but they also were responsible for carrying out human rights abuses that have been well- documented, which gained further criticism of the UN operation.

A critical moment occurred on January 12, 2010, when a 7.0 magnitude earthquake destroyed most infrastructure in Port- au-Prince as well as other Haitian towns across the country. A recent report by the U.S. Agency for International Development, obtained by the Miami Herald, states that between 46,190 and 86,961 people died and less than 66,625 quake victims are living in hundreds of camps scattered around the capital.[11] In the aftermath of the disaster, dozens of international governments agencies and relief organizations have poured into the country to help with search operations and to take care of the thousands of Haitians that were left homeless and with very little food and shelter. MINUSTAH was not spared of some of these losses. This was particularly the case as the mission’s headquarters in Haiti collapsed killing several UN employees;[12] however the body did continue to carry out relief operations. A February 2010 UN report praised MINUSTAH’s emergency response, explaining that “MINUSTAH, despite its own losses, acted as a crucial first responder, opening the major arterial road from the Port-au-Prince airport to the town centre, re-establishing communications and opening its medical facilities to victims.”[13] The Security Reform Resource Centre adds that:

“In the months following the earthquake, MINUSTAH made significant contributions providing logistical and administrative support to relief efforts. MINUSTAH supplied security assistance for humanitarian operations, operational support to the Haitian National Police (HNP), provided technical advice and support to state institutions at the sub-national level, assisted in repairing the damage to critical infrastructure of the judiciary, and coordinated a large-scale public information campaign.”[14]

In any case, the praise MINUSTAH received for its operations in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake proved to be short-lived. In October 2010, MINUSTAH troops apparently introduced a cholera epidemic in Haiti by dumping fecal matter into the country’s rivers. Over 5,000 individuals have died due to the cholera outbreak and thousands more are infected. A March 2011 report by the BBC highlights the variety of estimates of how many Haitians currently are, and could possibly become, infected, with numbers ranging from 400,000 to a possible 779,000 by November of this year.[15] A July 2011 article in the Los Angeles Times reported that “the [Haitian] Health Ministry reported more than 1,000 new cholera cases a day last month [June].”[16] There were several protests against MINUSTAH when the local population realized how the epidemic started.[17] It is important to clarify that it seems that UN peacekeepers from Nepal most likely started the cholera epidemic, not personnel coming from Brazil.

Furthermore, it is necessary to note that a possible Brazilian withdrawal from MINUSTAH is just an option for the moment, and it would take time for the minister Amorin’s proposal to become an official government-sanctioned plan, if it does at all. Even more time would be needed to arrange the logistics for the Brazilian troops to actually leave Haiti; hence any Brazilian departure will not likely occur anytime soon.

MINUSTAH without Brazil?
Should Brasilia decide to pull all of its troops from the Caribbean nation, the future of MINUSTAH may be called into question. Can the mission survive without the major donor of its troops, and the one with the most zeal to do so? Possibly yes, but the UN will face several new problems, like finding replacement troops from other nations to make up for the departure of the Brazilians. In addition, if Brazil does depart, other states that supply troops to MINUSTAH, may decide to leave the operation as well. As previously mentioned, some states, besides Haiti, may already be looking for an exit strategy to leave that country. In an extreme scenario, MINUSTAH may end up with a reduced force and a more limited ability to carry out its operations.

A final critical factor that may affect MINUSTAH’s future will be the Haitian government, which now has a new president, if highly problematic, former singer Michel Martelly. As part of his campaign promises, the new head of state has declared his interest in reforming the controversial Haitian army to help improve internal security. The country’s military was disbanded in 1995 by President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, after he was deposed in a coup and then restored to power with the help of U.N. forces.[18] Historically the Haitian army has been known for its violent acts and lack of political neutrality, particularly under the Duvalier dictatorships. An April 2011 article in the Washington Post quotes Martelly as saying that “the new armed forces wouldn’t be known for brutality, as their predecessors were.”[19] The Haitian leader may be looking to replace MINUSTAH, which it cannot control, with local security forces sworn to comply with his orders.

If Brazil leaves, what role should the US play?
A 2008 State Department document made public by Wikileaks, explains that “the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti is an indispensable tool in realizing core USG [U.S. government] policy interests in [that country].”[20] The disclosed report then adds “paying one-quarter of MINUSTAH’s budget through our DPKO [department of peace keeping operations] assessment, the U.S. reaps the security and stabilization benefits of a 9,000-person international military and civilian stabilization mission in the hemisphere’s most troubled country. […] in the current context of our military commitments elsewhere, the U.S. alone could not replace this mission.” With military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and, for the time being, in Libya, embarking on a series of new military challenges, even if it’s under an UN-peacekeeping mantle, may prove too costly for Washington and particularly the Barack Obama administration, which will have to face re-elections in 2012.

MINUSTAH has been controversial since its origins, and a more visible U.S. involvement in Haiti would be cumbersome and would add to a long list of lamentable military involvement in that country. U.S.-Haitian relations have been historically problematic, as they mostly revolve around American military operations in that island, including from 1914-1934, in 1994 and, most recently, in 2004 when Aristide was ousted. It is necessary to note that Washington did deploy the carrier USS Carl Vinson [21] along with the USNS Comfort and thousands of military personnel[22] to provide help in the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake.

Deploying American troops in Haitian territory is a questionable practice, and it’s highly unlikely that it will happen; nevertheless it would be helpful for Washington’s national interests to continue working with the UN and the Haitian government so that the Caribbean nation avoids becoming a failed state.

Regarding Brazil, one can see the reasons for leaving the mission, including its unpopularity, lack of major successes and financial costs. With that said, it is illogical to think that any departure would occur quickly. If Brasilia does decide to leave MINUSTAH, at the very least it should have a responsible exchange of power and responsibilities to other UN personnel or Haitian security forces. As a recommendation, we can observe that while most of Brazilian military personnel will ultimately leave Haiti, some senior officers should stay in a consultancy basis, particularly in order to keep training the Haitian police. In spite of MINUSTAH’s controversial origins, we cannot forget Haiti’s internal problems (some of which were collectively caused by foreign powers); the international community hopefully should leave the country in better shape than when it entered it.

Alex Sanchez, a COHA research fellow, recently published an article discussing Brazil’s UN ambitions and its role in MINUSTAH: W. Alex Sanchez, “An Easy Way to Improve U.S.-Latin American Relations” (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, July 28, 2011). Available: http://bit.ly/qXB41y. In addition, an article that discusses Brazil’s role in MINUSTAH and the UN mission in East Timor will appear in an upcoming issue of the journal Globalizations. His personal blog can be found by clicking here.

[1] De Carvalho, Jailton. “Novo ministro da Defesa, Celso Amorim e a favor da volta de tropas brasileiras do Haiti.” O Globo. August 8, 2011. Available <http://oglobo.globo.com/pais/mat/2011/08/07/novo-ministro-da-defesa-celso-amorim-a-favor-da-volta-de-tropas-brasileiras-do-haiti-925080565.asp >
[2] “Eleven Brazil soldiers killed in Haiti quake, many missing.” Reuters. January 13, 2011. Available <http://www.stabroeknews.com/2010/news/world/01/13/eleven-brazil-soldiers-killed-in-haiti-quake-many-missing/ >
[3] “Brazil oks doubling its Haiti force to 2,600, troops.” Reuters. January 25, 2010. Available <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/25/idUSN25183943 >
[4] >Wikileaks: DR President believes Brazilian MINUSTAH commander assassinated, suspects cover up.” Mediahacker.org Wikileaks. January, 18, 2011. Available <http://www.mediahacker.org/2011/01/wikileaks-dr-president-believes-brazilian-minustah-commander-assassinated-suspects-cover-up/ >
[5] “Secretary-General appoints Major General Luiz Eduardo Ramos Pereira of Brazil as force commander of United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti.” UN.org SG/A/1287. March 25, 2011. Available < http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2011/sga1287.doc.htm >
[6] MINUSTAH official website. <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/memoriam.shtml >
[7] Lima, Mario Sergio and Ragir, Alexander. “Rousseff sees fourth Brazil minister resign on allegations.” Bloomberg Businessweek. August 18, 2011. Available <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-08-18/rousseff-sees-fourth-brazil-minister-resign-on-allegations.html > Also see “Brazil corruption: President loses fourth minister.” BBC – Latin America & Caribbean. August 17, 2011. Available < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-14569168 >
[8] Weisbrot, Mark. “Brazilian Defense Minister Amorim supports withdrawal of troops from Haiti – but when?”Center for Economic and Policy Research (originally published in Folha de Sao Paulo – Brazil, August 17, 2011). Available < http://www.cepr.net/index.php/op-eds-&-columns/op-eds-&-columns/defense-minister-amorim-supports-withdrawal-of-troops-from-haiti-but-when >
[9] Chery, Dady. “Brazilian discuss Haiti and MINUSTAH: The case for leaving.” Canada Haiti Action Network. August 15, 2011. Available < http://www.canadahaitiaction.ca/content/brazilians-discuss-haiti-and-minustah-case-leaving >
[10] Chery, Dady. “Brazilian discuss Haiti and MINUSTAH: The case for leaving.” Canada Haiti Action Network. August 15, 2011. Available < http://www.canadahaitiaction.ca/content/brazilians-discuss-haiti-and-minustah-case-leaving >
[11] Charles, Jacqueline. “A new report disputes the number of Haiti dead and displaced from the 2010 earthquake.” Miami Herald. May 31, 2011. Available <http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/05/31/2244322/a-new-report-disputes-the-number.html >
[12] MacFarquhar, Neil. “UN workers struggle as co-workers are unaccounted for.” New York Times. Americas. January 13, 2010.Available <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/14/world/americas/14nations.html >
[13] “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti.” UN Security Council. S/2010/200. February 22, 2010. P. 2. Available <http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Haiti%20S2010%20200.pdf >
[14] McManamen, Keith. “UN to revise mandate in earthquake aftermath.” Security Sector Reform Resource Centre. May 20, 2010. Available <http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/2010/05/20/un-to-revise-minustah-mandate-in-earthquake-aftermath/ >
[15] Roberts, Michelle. “Haiti cholera ‘far worse than expected,’ experts fear.” BBC. March 15, 2011. Available < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-12744929 >
[16] Gaestel, Amy. “Haiti again caught in cholera’s grip.” Los Angeles Times. July 24, 2011. Available <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-haiti-cholera-20110724,0,4930249.story>
[17]“Protests in Haiti against MINUSTAH for cholera.” Diario Libre. November 16, 2010. Available <http://www.diariolibre.com/noticias_det.php?id=268501 >
[18] Fox, Ben. “Would-be soldiers hope for revival of Haitian army.” Washington Post. March 9, 2011. Available < http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/09/AR2011030902957.html >
[19] Sheridan, Mary Beth. “Haitian President-elect Martelly pledges to speed up post-earthquake recovery.” Washington Post. April 20, 2011. Available <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/haitian-president-elect-martelly-pledges-to-speed-up-post-earthquake-recovery/2011/04/20/AFj2lKEE_story.html >
[20] “Secret: Why we need continuing MINUSTAH presence in Haiti.” Undisclosed document by Wikileaks. Berndpulch.org. August 22, 2011. Available <http://berndpulch.org/2011/08/22/secret-why-we-need-continuing-minustah-presence-in-haiti/ >
[21] “Massive US ship nears Haiti to join relief effort.” AFP. January 15, 2010. Available <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i2OoezeOmcN_BD3hRwMa1w0qAPtw >
[22] Pessin, Al. “US maries join relief effort in Haiti, Hospital ship to arrive Wednesdday.” Voice of America. January 19, 2010. Available <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/US-Marines-Join-Relief-Effort-in-Haiti-Hospital-Ship-to-Arrive-Wednesday-82090202.html >

On the rumors that Libya’s Gaddafi may flee to Venezuela

2011-08-26T13:55:00.016-04:00

On the rumors that Libya’s Gaddafi may flee to Venezuela

W. Alejandro Sanchez
Research Fellow
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
Blog Post - August 26, 2011

In recent months, governments across the world as well as the international media have pondered about Mohamad Gaddafi’s future as leader of Libya, following a 42 year dictatorship. Now that the rebel forces control virtually all of the country, including most of Tripoli, the country’s capital, the rebels' objective has switched from overthrowing Gaddafi to finding him. As the capital of the North African state has fallen, the current location of the former (arguably) Libyan head of state, as well as of other high profile members of his cabinet and family, like his brother-in-law Abdullah al-Senussi (the country’s intelligence chief) and sons, is a question that has yet to be answered. The Libyan rebels have offered a $1.6 million reward for finding Gaddafi, dead or alive.

One aspect that has remained constant is the support by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez for Gaddafi. As several governments continue to recognize the rebels’ main political entity, the Transitional National Council (TNC), as the country’s legitimate government, Chavez has stated that Caracas will not establish relations with the TNC and will continue to recognize Gaddafi as Libya’s ruler.

Venezuela as a hiding spot?

As the Libyan leader’s whereabouts are currently unknown, in August 20 a Libyan rebel source in Benghazi said that a Venezuelan plane landed on the island of Djerba to evacuate members of Gaddafi's family. When these rumors appeared, an article in the UK newspaper the Daily Mail mused that “maybe President Chavez would still be willing to let him [Gaddafi] retire to Caracas, but getting there won’t be easy,” due to NATO’s no-fly zone over the country, rebel control of most of the country and a NATO fleet in the Mediterranean. In any case, Gaddafi eventually went on television and stated that “I want to show that I'm in Tripoli and not in Venezuela […] do not believe the channels belonging to stray dogs."

The main issue is not whether Venezuela may be an possible “safe haven” for Gaddafi to flee to if he realizes his time as Libya’s ruler is over. The point to be made here is “why” is the South American nation of Venezuela, presently under the rule of Hugo Chavez, a former army officer, coup-plotter and admirer of Simon Bolivar (a 19th century Latin American hero), is so often referred to as a possible refuge for the (former) Libyan ruler.

A recent blog post by James Bostworth for the Christian Science Monitor explains the reasons why Gaddafi may not go to Venezuela. I figure I might as well just repost his arguments here:

1. “Transportation. In order to get to any of these countries in the Western Hemisphere, Qaddafi would need to arrange a direct flight and avoid flying over any territory where ICC [International Criminal Court] warrants might come into play. This obstacle can be overcome, but it's a transportation hassle.

2. Surrender. If Qaddafi comes to the Americas, he is essentially giving up the fight. Logistics are challenging in getting to this hemisphere, but they are much harder and potentially impossible if he wants to lead a rebel or insurgent movement to regain power from this side of the world. Coming to Cuba, Venezuela, or Nicaragua means he gives up the fight and admits he will never again lead Libya, which goes against his personality.

3. Change. While this is less true for Cuba (though anything is possible), the prospect for a government change in Nicaragua or Venezuela should concern an exile-seeking dictator. As certain as Ortega and Chavez are that they will win reelection in the coming months, there is always the possibility that they will lose in this election cycle or the next. Qaddafi, who ruled for four decades, doesn't want to fly into exile only to have to change countries again as soon as the leadership changes.”

He does give a reason why Gaddafi may go to Venezuela though:

1. “Qaddafi is not logical. Even though basic logic says Qaddafi should not do something doesn't mean he won't do it. It's that uncertainty in his actions that has kept people guessing for so many years. So while he may understand the reasons he should not show up in Cuba, Venezuela, or Nicaragua, he may decide to do so on a whim.”

I would add that Gaddafi may be persuaded to do so. After all, most of his family, including several of his sons and daughter and the intelligence chief, have yet to be captured; they are most likely hiding with Gaddafi himself. Hence any of them (or all of them), could convince the (former) Libyan leader that it is in their best interest to go to Venezuela (maybe arguing that they can plan Gaddafi’s comeback from Caracas).

The Gaddafi-Chavez friendship
In an article for the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA), I discussed Chavez’s friendship with Gaddafi and the leaders of other states that are generally regarded by the international community as pariah or problematic states, like Belarus, Iran and Zimbabwe. However, it seems that the friendship of the two leaders has taken a whole new dimension in view of the ongoing civil war in the Maghrebain state. Chavez has maintained a strong relationship with Gaddafi both personally and at the inter-governmental level for over a decade, and has made numerous diplomatic visits to his counterpart in Tripoli. In 2004, Libya awarded Chavez with its annual Gaddafi International Human Rights Prize for resisting imperialism. In addition, Gaddafi named a new soccer stadium near the city of Benghazi (now the headquarters of the rebels) after Chavez in 2006. In return, the Venezuelan leader presented Gaddafi with a replica of the sword of South American independence hero Simon Bolivar following the 2009 Africa-South America Summit.

The British daily The Guardian recently published an article by Mike Gonzalez entitled “How can Latin America's 'revolutionary' leaders support Gaddafi?” In his analysis, Gonzalez discusses Latin leaders like Chavez, Cuba’s Fidel Castro and Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega and how they approach Communist/Socialist ideologies and relations with both the West (i.e. the U.S. and Europe)and pariah states like Libya.

In another article in El Universal (August 24) the author explains that:

"Chávez stubbornly accused NATO and the United States of waging a war to grab the Libyan oil and he lamented that European banks had frozen the accounts of Libya's international reserves. On Sunday, August 21, in the midst of the battle for Tripoli, the Venezuelan president lambasted again NATO shelling. However, he did not made reference to Gaddafi's potential asylum while the fight for the Libyan capital city escalated and looked final."

(Chavez sends letter of support to Gaddafi (in spanish)

If Gaddafi does go to Caracas… what then?

Let us imagine for a moment that Gaddafi (and probably some of his relatives and closest allies) end up in Caracas and Chavez offers them asylum. What would occur then? For the record, there are examples of how the Venezuelan government under Chavez of has offered asylum/a safe haven to individuals that were sought by the justice systems of other countries. For example, Vladimiro Montesinos, intelligence chief under former Peruvian dictator Alberto Fujimori, hid for eight months in Venezuela (Chavez denied knowing where he was) until the government eventually captured him and extradited him back to Lima. More recently,

“Venezuela’s handover of a senior member of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is on hold after the man requested asylum. Guillermo Torres Cueter, also known as “Julian Conrado” was captured in May in southwestern Venezuela and the government of President Hugo Chavez said that it cannot extradite the FARC leader until his asylum request is reviewed.”

Should Gaddafi end up in Venezuela, and Chavez refuse to extradite him back to Libya or the ICC, this would isolate the Venezuelan government even more regionally. I doubt international organizations like the Organization of American States, UNASUR or the United Nations would seriously suspend Venezuela’s membership over this, but Chavez will hardly be making any new friends. In addition, such an action would give cannon fodder to anti-Chavez policymakers in the U.S. who tend to portray Venezuela under Chavez as some regional security threat (hinting that the country may be developing a nuclear arms program with Iran, its arms purchases from Russia, close ties with China etc). Chavez will still have his oil to maintain some international relevance and avoid full isolation, but he cannot continue to rely on that forever.

Peru: the Coca Erradication program and ongoing civil-military and security issues

2011-08-24T13:36:00.015-04:00

Peru: the Coca Erradication program and ongoing civil-military and security issues

W. Alejandro Sanchez
Research Fellow
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
Blog Post - August 24, 2011

Some days ago, Peru made headlines when the newly elected government with former military officer Ollanta Humala as president ordered the suspension of a coca eradication program. In a surprise move, the government suspended the CORAH project (Proyecto Especial de Control y Reduccion de Cultivos Ilegales de Coca en el Alto Huallaga ). At the time Prime minister Salomon Lerner Ghitis and minister of interior Oscar Valdes stated that the measure was temporary, while the U.S. expressed concern about this new development:

U.S. Ambassador Rose M. Likins told reporters as she left the National Assembly building in Lima that she was awaiting an explanation of the government's reasons for the suspension of the manual eradication program, which began in January in the Upper Huallaga Valley region. The U.S. has spent $10 million on the effort this year.

Then, on August 21, President Humala declared that the eradication program will continue after all.

It is important to mention that the suspension of the coca eradication program was the one located in the Huallaga valley. Coca eradication operations in the VRAE (Apurimac Ene River Valley) are minimal as there is not enough security due to criminal groups operating in that area. The VRAE valley is where the last remnants of the Peruvian narco-terrorist group, Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), are located.

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime annual report issued in June, Peru ranks a close second to Colombia among the world's leading coca and cocaine producers. [Peru’s] Huallaga Valley is not the country's chief coca growing region. That distinction belongs to the area known as VRAE […] an area so lawless that the eradication programs are thought to be impractical from a security standpoint.

This statement is sort of paradoxical, since as Colombia is the world’s foremost coca producer, then it should also be the major cocaine producer. One explanation to this reality is that Colombian authorities seize 40% of cocaine production compared to Peru’s only 10%. Then again, considering that it is impossible to know exactly how much cocaine is produced in either country by the plethora of illegal cocaine labs that exist, there is always the chance that these estimates could be grossly wrong.

Peruvian government officials went on to explain that Lima was not permanently suspending the eradication program, but rather wanted to take some kind “time off” to analyze the success of the operations so far and then start anew. Several government supporters went on the Peruvian media to explain their reasons for supporting the temporary suspension. As previously mentioned, President Humala has gone on record to say that the eradication programs will continue. The Peruvian Premier Salomon Lerner explained that the pause was meant “para asignar los instrumentos necesarios para el exito de las intervenciones,” (to assign the necessary instruments for the success of the operations)

In spite of what could have been the fate of the program, which is a major priority for Washington, the real story here is understanding the relations between President Humala and his military, which will shape future military and police operations regarding coca eradication and other anti-drug trafficking operations. There has already been some drama regarding the president’s relationship with his military. Humala has named General Benigno Cabrera as the head of the Region Militar del Centro (Center military region), which has caused some controversy as Cabrera was Humala’s boss when the now president was a captain in the Peruvian army in 1992 when they both were stationed in a counterinsurgency base.

Furthermore, President Humala has clashed with the current military leadership in the VRAE, when he stated that he is willing to give more funds and other resources to the security operations there, but he wants to see more results. He also seems to want a radical change in operations in that violent area. For his part, the Peruvian drugs czar, Ricardo Soberon, ambitiously declared to the media that he aimed to be rid of drug trafficking in the VRAE valley in five years.

Politics and coca eradication initiatives aside, clashes continue between Peru’s security forces and narco-groups, including Shining Path, in Peru’s Amazon and highlands. Some days ago, members of Peru’s anti-drugs police unit were attacked by criminals in the Andean region of Huanuco. The police unit did not have enough weapons and ammo and the criminals managed to steal half a ton of cocaine that the police were transporting. Unfortunately, it is not just the police that lacks equipment to carry out their duties. An august 14 article in Peru.com reported that soldiers in the VRAE were eating food rations that had already expired, due to a fraudulent deal between the military and the company that manufactured them. In addition, a Shining Path member was arrested in Bolivia this past July, which shows new attempts by the narco-terrorist group to strengthen its numbers.

La seguridad en el internet y Latino America

2011-08-23T22:44:00.005-04:00

La seguridad en el internet y Latino America

Alex Sanchez

Agosto 23, 2011
Analista de Seguridad Internacional, Consejo de Asuntos Hemisfericos ( www.coha.org )

A mediados de Agosto, la famosa organización de hackers conocida como Anonymous atacó a varias páginas web de los ministerios de Defensa y Educación de Colombia, asi como la pagina web del Senado de ese pais Sudamericano. Dias después, la policia colombiana detuvo a un estudiante de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia, acusado de ser parte del grupo Anonymous que atacó dichas paginas, al igual que las cuentas en Facebook del Presidente Juan Manuel Santos y la cuenta en Twitter del ex-presidente Alvaro Uribe .

Este crimen se suma a una larga lista, que sigue creciendo, de actividades ilegales en el mundo cibertrónico en Latino America. En noviembre del 2007, hackers peruanos tomaron control del website oficial del gobierno chileno , poniendo mensajes nacionalistas además de la bandera peruana. Un incidente similar ocurrió en noviembre del 2009, cuando, esta vez, hackers chilenos, entraron al website official del gobierno peruano, poniendo mensajes en defensa de Santiago con respecto a un caso de espionaje que habia ocurrido entre los dos paises. Mas recientemente, aparte del incidente en Colombia, en junio pasado varios websites del gobierno y del sector privado brasileño además de otros websites de Peru y Chile tambien fueron hackeados. Grupos internacionales de hackers como LulzSec y Anonymous han sido identificados como los perpetradores de estos ataques ciberneticos. Aparte de ataques a websites de gobiernos, el tipo de ciber-crimenes está en alza en la region, ya existen reportes de cómo los criminales han entrado a la base de datos de varios bancos para robar la informacion de los clientes. Un reporte del 2009 explica que Argentina es uno de los diez países con mayores niveles de pirateria , incluyendo el uso ilegal de software.

Desafortunadamente, como escribe Southern Pulse, un website norteamericano de analisis de noticias de seguridad en Julio pasado, muchos paises de Latino America aun no tienen la capacidad, incluyendo el personal necesario, para llevar a cabo un análisis forense digital para identificar a los perpetradores de estos ciber crimenes . Brasil es una de las pocas excepciones a en esta situación. En el 2010 el ejército brasileño creó el Centro de Defensa Cibernetica del Ejercito, con el General Jose Carlos do Santos como jefe. En una entrevista a la revista Epoca, el general explica que el centro tiene 20 militares pero espera tener 30 para fines de año, además el gobierno ha donado fondos para comenzar a entrenar a mas especialistas y mejorar la infraestructura del centro.

A pesar que el número de usuarios de centros de datos y el comercio electronico en Latino America no es parecido al número en Estados Unidos y Europa, el internet es muy popular en Latino America y seguirá creciendo en los próximos años. En el 2009, un estudio de varios paises Latino Americanos deduce que el número de usuarios en la region llegará a 160 millones en los próximos 5 años . Alrededor del 87% entra al internet mediante computadoras, mientras que 22% usan o computadoras o laptops, y solo el 3% usa otros aparatos electronicos. Vale aclarar que estas cifras son debatibles, ya que un artículo en Advertising Age en Setiembre del 2010 menciona que 37% de los usuarios de Latino America usan sus telefonos para entrar al internet (Klassen, Amy. “What’s a phone good for around the world?” Advertising Age. September 13, 2010.)

En los últimos años, varios especialistas americanos han escrito articulos sobre la expansión del internet en Latino America. Algunos de ellos incluyen: “Bridging Latin America’s Digital Divide: Government policies and Internet Access” (Tawner & Hawkins, J&MC Quarterly, 80/3), “The Reality of Virtual Reality: The Internet and Gender Equality Advocacy in Latin America” (Friedman, Latin American Politics & Society, 47/3), “Cosmopolitan Aspirations: New Media, Citizenship Education and Youth in Latin America” (Blasco & Krause, Citizenship Studies, 10/4) y “Diverse Spatialities of the Latin American and Caribbean internet” (Warf, Journal of Latin America Geography, 8/2).

Una de las razones de la atención de los especialistas respecto al mundo virtual de Latino America y el Caribe es que aun son una selva virgen, con una gran población aun no conectada y con muchas posibilidades. Por ejemplo un reciente artículo en el magazine Americano The Atlantic, habla de cómo el internet puede ayudar a crear trabajos en la región . Los websites de comunicación social masiva como Facebok y Twitter son particularmente populares y hasta líderes de estado como Santos en Colombia y Hugo Chavez en Venezuela los utilizan para comunicarse con sus ciudadanos y el resto del mundo. Entre la poblacion juvenil, programas para chatear como ICQ, MSN o Skype son muy populares también.

Latino America está entrando al mundo digital, sin embargo, los incidentes en los últimos años muestran que la seguridad cibernetica déjà mucho que desear.Varios paises de esta region, desafortunadamente, no tienen mayores recursos que puedan destinar para este esfuerzo .Sin embargo, es claro que el crecimiento del internet en America Latina y el Caribe va a continuar, entonces en algun momento mas gobiernos regionales, siguiendo el ejemplo antes mencionado de Brasil, van a tener que comenzar a monitorear y cuidar el mundo virtual tanto como el real.

Please accept this article as a free contribution from this author, but if re-posting, please afford authorial and institutional attribution. Exclusive rights can be negotiated.

Bulgaria’s Todor Zhivkov: Man, “Papa,” Dictator, Communist?

2011-08-20T14:10:00.036-04:00

Bulgaria’s Todor Zhivkov: Man, “Papa,” Dictator, Communist?

W. Alejandro Sanchez
Research Fellow
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
Blog Post - August 20, 2011

*Additional Bulgaria-related article by the author: A Drop in the Ocean: A Discussion of Bulgaria’s NATO Membership and Black Sea Geopolitics. European Security. December 2008. (Vol.17, No. 4). http://bit.ly/a5cjY2

Todor Zhivkov was Bulgaria’s ruler for over three decades, making him the longest serving ruler of the Warsaw Pact. Zhivkov’s importance in the greater Cold War game is sometimes not valued enough as he secured the Soviet Union’s southern flank from potential threats. Even though he was not a die-hard Communist, his relationship and faithfulness to Moscow was close enough that Washington never took interest in that country, labeling it as the Soviet Union’s 16th republic. There is little that can be seen as Todor’s legacy to Bulgaria; he was a harsh ruler, without a clear political ideology, and was more interested in his own power and position than in the ideology war around him. Todor Zhivkov was Moscow’s dark but faithful knight in the Balkans, and that’s how he may end up being remembered

"[Zhivkov] served the Soviet Union more ardently than the Soviet leaders themselves did."
Georgi Ivanov Markov -Bulgarian dissident who was assassinated in London by agents of the Bulgarian secret police assisted by the KGB (September 11, 1978).

Todor Zhivkov was the ruler of Bulgaria, serving as First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party, from March 4, 1954 until he was ousted by the party on November 10, 1989. He was the longest serving leader of any of the Eastern bloc nations during the Cold War. I aim to make a profile of Todor, analyzing his actions as leader, “papa” in Todor’s opinion, of Bulgaria and putting him in the proper context of the Cold War and the East vs. West ideological struggle. Was Todor really a Communist? Or simply a greedy man who followed Moscow’s wishes in order to stay in power? It would be unwise to simply label Todor as a member of the “dictator’s club” that Moscow kept in power for decades, like for example Nicolae Ceacescu of Romania, without doing a profile of Todor’s intentions and motivations. He certainly was a dictator and oppressor, he ruled Bulgaria with an iron fist, much to Moscow’s liking, however at the same time he managed to create a cult around himself that gave him a degree of popularity. Indeed, many Bulgarians still refer to him as the “papa” of Bulgaria (a term that has been adopted by other iron-fist leaders, like Saparmurat Niyazov calling him “Turkmenbashi” of Turkmenistan”).

Coming to Power and Staying in Power
In 1951, Zhivkov became a full member of the Politburo, and was made first secretary of the Bulgarian Central Committee, the youngest of any of the Eastern bloc leaders. For the first two years of Zhivkov's tenure as first secretary, the Stalinist Vulko Chervenkov remained the country's real leader, but the latter was forced out of power in 1956 in the wave of Eastern European “destalinization” that followed Nikita Khrushchev's denunciation of Joseph Stalin.

Zhivkov is one of those characters that emerged in the Cold War, a time when the fate of the globe was played like a gigantic chess game, and his place in history can be described as a pawn. But he was an astute pawn. I argue that his goal in life was not to advance and consolidate Communism or Socialism, but to consolidate his power and status in Bulgaria. He was astute in the sense that he knew the global game that was been played around him and was aware of what he had to do to please his masters in Moscow. He was not a Communist at heart, but would pretend to be one in order to stay in power. Given Bulgaria’s strategic location in southeastern Europe, any attempt by Zhivkov to draw away from Communism and Moscow’s wishes would have most likely earned him a bullet in his head; therefore the most logical option was for him not be too ambitious or daring regarding the geopolitical game.

Within Bulgaria Todor’s actions differed from other dictators around him. He had a dictatorial-type of government for most of his time, as he oppressed his people, had dissidents murdered (or who simply disappeared), while his decisions as a ruler hardly ever were for the benefit of the Bulgarian population. In 1986, when a meltdown occurred at the nuclear plant in Chernobyl, Ukraine, Zhivkov did not inform his countrymen in order to avoid chaos that could hurt his rule. The difference between him and others like Ceaucescu (who was summarily trialed and executed in Christmas 1989, a month after Zhivkov himself was sacked from power) is that he managed to create a cult around him in his native Bulgaria, which assured him that he had the support of at least part of the local population. Even today there are die-hard Communists in Bulgaria that see Zhivkov as a good leader and call him, as the whole country was forced to do at one point, by the nickname that he chose for himself: “papa.”

Todor Zhivkov’s place in Cold War history is that of an astute, Moscow-controlled pawn. He was not a visionary, nor an idealist, much less a Communist. Zhivkov wanted power, and he obtained it, at the cost and suffering of the people of Bulgaria.

I. Background: Todor as “papa” and dictator

Dissidence
Zhivkov, following the pattern of oppressive rulers the Balkans have seen for centuries, was not in any way tolerant to dissidence. He was also known for sending potential rivals as well as critics of his government to jail, or at the very least getting out of their positions of power. One of these critics was Boris Taskov, who was purged from the politburo and from his post as minister of trade during the spring of 1959 (1). Another example is what happened with Vulko Chervenkov (kown as “Little Stalin”) who had ruled Bulgaria as first secretary of the party before Zhivkov came to power. During the plenum of the Bulgarian central committee on November 28-29 of 1958, Zhivkov expelled Chervenkov, essentially his mentor, from the politburo, the central committee, and his government post as deputy premier (2).

The most famous murder attributed to the Bulgarian government was that of Georgi Markov, a BBC World Service journalist and Bulgarian dissident who in 1978 was murdered in London by being injected with ricin from the tip of an umbrella.

Coups
One event that probably helped Zhivkov’s decision to violently clash on dissidents was an attempted coup d’etat against him in 1965 when disgruntled military officers and Party members attempted to overthrow Zhivkov. This was the first ever such occurrence in a communist state. It is true that there had been over occasions where there were uprisings against Communist governments prior to 1965, most notably the Hungarian uprising of 1956, however what made the Bulgarian attempt different is that it was not a popular movement, but that it came from within the Communist party and the military. It can be argued that Khrushchev’s fall from Soviet power in 1964, greatly shocked Zhivkov and political opponents saw this as the best time to strike. According to Stefan Svirdlev, a colonel in the state security who defected in 1971, between 1965 and 1971 there were no less six coup attempts aimed at the forcible overthrow of the Bulgarian first secretary (3).

The 1965 attempt, known as the “April conspiracy,” had General Ivan Todorov-Gorunia as leader, who later killed himself to avoid arrest. He was joined by the commander and deputy commander of the Genov detachment, Tsolo Krustev and Major General Tsviatko Anev. Among the others who were brought to trial were two active-duty major generals. According to the official version of the case, the conspirators sympathized with Maoism and wished to impose a Chinese ideology in Bulgaria (4). Unofficially, rumors flew that they did not like Zhivkov’s sub-ordinance to the Soviet Union, or simply were angry about the favoritism Zhivkov had for other partisan veterans, particularly those of his own Chavdar brigade (5). In an interview with the author, Vladimir Stoinov, ex member of the BCP and deputy-major of the municipality of the Bulgarian town of Elin Pelin, mentioned that according to his memory, even a tank brigade from Sofia was involved in the coup attempt (6).

Following the 1965 coup attempt was the crash of a Bulgarian Airlines flight on November 1966. The crash killed 82 people including the Bulgarian opera singer Katya Popova. However, what made news was that among the dead was also the Bulgarian Ambassador to East Germany and the former head of the Bulgarian army’s general staff, Ivan Buchvarov. The ambassador had been for a long time on Zhivkov’s black list for being involved, even though it is not clear to what extent, in the 1965 coup attempt by Todorov. While officially the crash was blamed on bad weather, it would be very much like Zhivkov to sacrifice the lives of over 80 individuals just to kill one potential adversary (7).

Even the cultural life of Bulgaria was affected by Todor Zhivkov. In 1963 he charged writers who supported cultural liberalization as being guilty of formalism, pessimism, decadence and infatuation with Western forms alien to Bulgarian national traditions, demanding that they adhere to socialist realism and a strong infusion of partinost (party spirit) into cultural life (8). The magazine Literaturni novini (Literary News) was closed down and liberals were removed from the editorial staffs of other publications. Zhivkov also installed Georgi Dzhagarov as head of the Writer’s Union and in 1971 was promoted to deputy chairmanship of the State Council, effectively becoming Zhivkov’s viceroy in Bulgarian literature life (9). The critic Lazar Tsvetkov was jailed for circulating the works of Russian dissidents while Blgada Dimitrova, a great Bulgarian writer, suffered a campaign of denunciation in 1982 when her novel Litso (Face) offended the party leadership with its depiction of cynicism and hypocrisy among the elite (10).

Finally it is necessary to mention the existence of prisoner camps in Bulgaria, following the model of Hitler’s concentration camps and the Russian gulags. The most infamous of these camps was located in Belene, a city close the Danube River, where a major TVO, which translated from Bulgarian means labor training communities, was built and operated for most of Zhivkov’s rule. The camp opened in 1949 but closed in 1953. It was reopened in 1956 via Protocol “B” due to the Hungarian uprising and with a recently appointed Zhivkov probably still alarmed that his control could crumble like in Hungary. The individuals sent to Belene and later to Lovech were mostly political dissidents, opposition leaders and in some cases actual criminals. For the government, these 500-600 individuals were “hopeless” as there was no way that they could be freed because of their beliefs, so simply disappeared in these camps, as they were worked to death. Camp survivors reported that they were not given meat in their meals, just vegetables and 700 grams of bread. The meals were given only once in the evening while washing was done in the polluted Osam river which was close to the camp. The detainees had to use old soldier’s clothes filled with parasites; the ex prisoner Neno Hristov from Izvorovo village explained that: “I’ve never seen before sores on people’s bodies full with worms. The only thing one could do about it was to ask a friend to pee in the sores on our backs... there was no other way. (11)”

Out of the 1500 inmates that were in such camps at one time or another, around 155 died. Interestingly, there were never any written orders given at these camps, simply oral commands from one officer to another, so there is no paper trail that can be used to put on trial the officers who ran these camps and the government officials who ordered their existence (12).

The Economy
Unlike many other communist leaders, Zhivkov proved himself a fairly acceptable handler of the economy. In 1956, Bulgaria was still an agrarian country, where the rural economy still outweighed the industrial sector. A 1957 edict of the Executive Council on one of the Sofia districts designated the specific locations where domestic animals and poultry could be bred. As Rossitza Guentcheva writes, the average Bulgarian citizen in the 1950s was most likely to be disturbed by the mooing of cows than anything else (13). The 1960s, with the country already under Zhivkov rule, saw an aggressive push for industrialization. Among the decisions carried out by Zhivkov for the “better of the people,” was building compact buildings where people would live, with a flat being 75 square meters big, as dictated by the Council of Ministers (who did not live in such flats) (14).

Minorities
What occurred in Bulgaria under Todor was a state-backed program to ethnically homogenize the nation, very much like Ceausescu was doing in next-door Romania vis-à-vis the ethnic Hungarians of Transylvania. The 1971constitution -- Zhivkov’s Constitution -- spoke of “citizens of non-Bulgarian extraction” (Art. 45 (7)), while in 1977 the BCP proclaimed that Bulgaria already was ‘almost of a single ethnic type and was nearing complete homogeneity’. The term “unified Bulgarian nation” appeared in the official press in 1973. In 1977 the Communist Party daily Rabotnichesko Delo, defined Bulgaria as “almost completely of one ethnic type and moving toward complete national homogeneity.” In 1979, party leader Todor Zhivkov claimed that “the Bulgarian national question has been solved definitively and categorically by the population itself.”

In reality, Bulgaria is a very cosmopolitan country, where its citizens include not only ethnic Bulgarians by a grand diversity of different ethnic groups. During Todor’s time, one ethic group that was particularly targeted with repressive means were the Turks. There has always been an unstable relationship between the Bulgarians and the Turks as the latter were the former’s masters for close to 500 years during the Ottoman Empire. When the communists came to power in Bulgaria, a large number of ethnic Turks sought to migrate to Turkey, as their schools were nationalized and their farmlands were confiscated (15). The Bulgarian government demanded in August 1950 that Turkey accept 250,000 Turks over three months time. After many discussions the Turkish government eventually accepted and almost 155,000 Turks migrated to Turkey over a two-year period (16). Bulgaria began a campaign of forced assimilation of ethnic Turks, which included name changes, prohibition of Islamic religious customs, the closing of mosques, and the banning of Turkish music and traditional clothing as well as the use of the language in public. (The practice of using force on minorities to adopt Bulgarian names had been carried out against the Pomaks [Slavic Muslims] between 1972 and 1974 and against Turkish-speaking Roma between 1981 and 1983) (17).

In 1984 there was a radical change of strategy regarding the minorities: the Bulgarian government excluded the term “Turk” from official discourse, and replaced it by “Muslim Bulgarian citizens” or “Bulgarians with restored [Bulgarian] names,” implying that the so-called “Turks” were “Bulgarians” in origin. New history books were written to avoid the term “Turks”. During the mid 1970s most Turkish schools were closed and Turkish language newspapers and journals were terminated. In 1984 the Zhivkov government forced the Bulgarian Turkish minority to adopt Slavic names. Vladimir Stoinov explains how the Elin Pelin municipality received the order ( by word to mouth, nothing written) that if a Turk changed his name, they had immediately to find him work , a place to live and money if necessary (18). When news of the Bulgarian actions reached Turkey in early 1985, there was agitation in the Turkish media and public protests throughout the country. Bulgarian authorities attempted to deflect accusations made from Turkey by pointing to Turkish treatment of its Kurdish minority (19).

It is generally and accepted that minorities like ethnic Turks, Gypsies and Pomaks were not represented in the Bulgarian government in accordance with their number in the general population. For example, in the 1981 central committee there were 3 Jews, 1 Turk, 1 Pomak and no Gypsies (20). It would take the eventual ouster of Bulgaria’s president Todor Zhivkov in November 1989 and legislation the following year before minority groups would be allowed to restore their names and to practice their faith and customs freely (21).

II. Todor in the Cold War
Bulgaria was important for Moscow during the Cold War. Its geopolitical position made it imperative to have a very Moscow-friendly government in place as the Balkan peninsula had at the time two NATO countries, Greece and Turkey. At the same time Romania’s Nicolae Ceasescu was more of a self-centered dictator than a Moscow-ally, which made him unreliable. Moreover, Yugoslavia had broken away from Moscow’s grip, which made it a security issue. Given such a geopolitical reality, it was necessary to keep Bulgaria as very pro-Moscow to protect the Warsaw Pact’s southern flank.

Pawn of Moscow
In his memoirs, former U.S. ambassador to Bulgaria Raymond Garthoff explained that “Ambassador Basovsky, as the Soviet representative in Bulgaria […] had great influence [and] event acted virtually as an adjunct member of the Bulgarian leadership. He even appeared in public along with members of the Bulgarian politburo flanking Zhivkov on the reviewing stand for parades. (22)” During the 1968 Prague Spring uprising, Bulgarian troops take part in Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia to quell the rebellion. During most of Zhivkov’s rule, Bulgaria’s lack of independence was seen by the West as an example that this country was essentially the sixteenth Soviet republic (23).

An important factor to mention is how Soviet leaders continuously sought to restrain Zhivkov from some of his desires to industrialize (for example, an industry utilizing petroleum products, the raw materials for which Bulgaria obtained largely from the USSR at below-world-market prices) (24). Such small differences between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union did exist however they were never openly mentioned, hence the relationship, in the eyes of the rest of the world, continued to be that of a major power dealing with a close satellite. An additional aspect that cemented this union was the historical relationship between Russia and Bulgaria, with the latter regarding the former as their “Slavic big brother,” which can be traced as far back as the Crimean War ( a war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire) and the liberation of Bulgaria in 1878 from Ottoman rule.

In general terms though, Zhivkov was Moscow’s preferred friend, particularly during the Khrushchev era. After coming to power, Khrushchev adopted an aggressive policy to “de-Stalinize” the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, namely getting rid of anything and anyone that had to do with the Stalin era. The Bulgarian leader Chervenkov was one of these leaders who simply had to be removed in Khrushchev’s time. In May of 1962 Khrushchev and a high-ranking Soviet delegation visited Bulgaria, with the Soviet leader praising Zhivkov and the “normalization” in Bulgarian party life that had taken under his leadership. It was clear that Zhivkov had become Khrushchev’s chosen instrument to rule Bulgarian, for the Soviet leader praised several times as well as stressing their “warm personal relationship (25).” In 1978, the Varna-Illichevsk ferry opened this was an important event as it permitted the movement of Soviet military forces to Bulgarian soil without having to go through Romania (26).

With the advent of perestroika in the Soviet Union, the first cracks began to appear in the thirty-five-year regime of Bulgaria's former dictator Todor Zhivkov. After 1985, opposition groups began to form, despite the still-powerful and repressive government. At the behest of the Soviet Union, Zhivkov initiated reforms in 1987, but these measures were half-hearted and largely ineffective. There are some plausible theories that the Soviet Union encouraged Zhivkov's ouster as the Soviets had become increasingly unhappy with the pseudo-reforms undertaken by Zhivkov during his last four years in power, and it is possible that they instigated or supported BCP attempts to remove the dictator. While the Soviet Union almost certainly did not bear full responsibility for the overthrow, President Gorbachev could not have been displeased with the fall of the Bulgarian leader (27).

Bulgaria in the Cold War
During the Cold War, Bulgaria was part of Moscow’s sphere of influence, particularly when it came to foreign policy. Bulgarian support for Third World national liberation movements included financial backing, paramilitary training and sanctuary for members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization as well as several radical African movements (28). At a personal level, Todor Zhivkov was friends with leaders like Fidel Castro, Muammar al-Qaddafi and Yasser Arafat.

We also have to discuss relations with Turkey, Bulgaria’s southern neighbor as well as Sofia’s relationship with other Balkan countries. Sofia’s Balkan policy was also another issue that sometimes put the country at odds with the Soviet Union. Relations with Greece had been particularly tense after the Hellenic country joined NATO and agreed to have American missile bases on its soil. To tense relations even more, the Greek government was upset that Bulgaria allowed its territory to be used as a refuge by leftist opponents of the Greek regime (29). Only in 1964 did relations improve, when the Bulgarian foreign minister visited Athens to sign different agreements, including one in which Bulgaria agreed to pay Greece $7 million in reparations for World war II. The 1967 Greek military coup did not change much relations between both governments, but relations did improve when the military regime in Athens fell and Andreas Papandreou won the Greek elections in 1981 (30).

Relations with Romania were generally good because of the personal friendship between the two dictators, Zhivkov and Ceausescu. In the late 1970s, both leaders began the tradition of an annual exchange of visits and agreed to take joint projects along like development along the Danube (31). An interesting historical fact is that when Ceausescu, with the support of Bulgaria, called for developing a Balkan “nuclear-free zone,” the Turkish government rejected the proposal as it remained firmly committed to NATO.

Regarding Turkey, as previously mentioned, the issues of Bulgaria’s Turkish minority was the main obstacle preventing normal relations between both countries (not to mention that Turkey was a NATO member like Greece). Relations improved after a 1969 agreement where Turkish Bulgarians where allowed to emigrate; between 80 and 90 thousand individuals, about 10% of Bulgaria’s Turkish minority, left the country (32). In December 1975, Turkey and Bulgaria signed a Declaration of Principles of Good-Neighborliness and Cooperation, which included pledges of nonaggression and respect for their common frontier, assurances similar to the ones Bulgaria had given Greece a few months earlier (33). Following the Turkish military coup in September 1980, the Soviet media attacked the regime as being repressive and all too willing to collaborate with the United States; yet state-to-state relations remained generally normal and Turkish-Soviet trade increased. Turkish-Bulgarian relations were also business as usual; when Turkey was under military rule, there were mutual visits betweenr Zhivkov and his Turkish counterpart, General Kenan Evren (34). It is important to note that although Bulgarian foreign policy under the communists reflected that of the Soviet Union, such was not necessarily the case during Gorbachev’s rule, especially regarding bilateral ties with Turkey. Even as early as December 1984, months before Gorbachev came to power, Turkish-Bulgarian relations were deteriorating as a result of the Bulgarian government’s treatment of its Turkish population (35).

Finally, relations between Sofia and Belgrade were at odds during the 1960s and 1970s, coming from several declarations by Zhivkov about the historical Bulgarian character of Macedonia and denying the existence of a separate Macedonian nationality (36). Both Zhivkov and Tito were stuck in a war of words over this issue, however not even Tito’s death improve the situation. In August 1983, the Bulgarian press suggested that only in the Bulgarian Pirin region do Macedonians enjoy genuine freedom (37). The controversy never took a higher dimension than just a word of words between the authoritarian leaders of the two countries. For Bulgarians, as John Bell argues, emphasis on the Macedonian question promoted patriotism and diverted national feeling away from resentment for Zhivkov and the government being subjugated to the USSR (38). In addition, since Moscow was at odds with Belgrade because of Tito’s breaking away of the Warsaw Pact, it is not difficult to believe that policymakers in Moscow saw with happy eyes tensions between its satellites and Yugoslavia, further isolating the latter country.

Washington connections?
Throughout the Cold War, Bulgaria was regarded by Washington as firmly in Moscow’s sphere of influence, hence there was no major attempt to improve relations between both countries. Relations had been severed by the U.S. in 1950 after the Bulgarian government had accused a U.S. diplomatic official of being a spy and contact for a Bulgarian political opponent who was executed (39). Relations were only restored in 1959 but even after their restoration, there were constant incidents that kept relations cool. In the late 1970s, for example, the Bulgarian government continuously jammed the broadcasts of Voice of America in the country (40).

In the 1970s the U.S. embassy in Sofia was a fairly small mission, with a staff numbering only some sixty-one people, of whom 26 were Americans and 35 local Bulgarians (41). In 1979 the staff of the American embassy was lowered to a class- IV (42). This is an internal way of organizing the importance of missions abroad by the State Department; a higher ranking embassy simply meant that the country was given more attention by the State Department ( for example Bucharest was a class II). Vladimir Stoinov adds that it was Todor’s daughter Ludmila who kept contacts open with Washington, but Moscow was always an obstacle. He adds that an example of this occurred when the Bulgarian politician Ognjan Doinov was taken from power because he tried to bring Bulgaria closer to Japan and West Germany (43).

In any case, relations with the U.S. as well as with the West in general reached were generally strained due of a number of issues, like for example Bulgaria’s support for the USSR’s interventions in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979. Furthermore there was the murder of dissident Maikov in London. Finally, in May 1981, Pope John Paull II was victim of an assassination attempt while he was in St. Peter’s Square. The would-be assassin was a Turkish militant named Ali Agca who stated that the Bulgarian government hired him to kill the Pope. No concrete proof ever came that proved Bulgaria’s, and by default Zhivkov’s, role in the assasination attempt, however in 1984 the U.S. Senate adopted a resolution branding Bulgaria a “terrorist nation (44). ”

III. Todor the Megomaniac or Communist
In the spring of 1956, Todor Zhivkov proclaimed the end of the personality cult but, in reality, he became a generator of an even more oppressive cult about himself. This dictatorial sort of ruler was exactly what was favored in the conditions of the socialist system and the Kremlin-imposed political and social order in the countries of Eastern Europe. Todor Zhivkov and his associates were never lacking in ideas about Bulgaria's economic development. At the numerous party congresses, they molded their ideas into resolutions but the inherent wrongness of the very foundation of the totalitarian system and the rules of the Kremlin-directed game doomed those ideas to failure, no matter how promising they might have seemed at first glance.

Zhikov was a power hungry individual. In the 1971 tenth party congress, a new constitution was approved to replace the Dimitrov constitution of 1947. Thanks to the new constitution, the Council of Ministers became a subordinate to a State Council, whose chairman became the official head of state; Zhivkov resigned his post as prime minister, the title he had held until then, to assume his new post (45). Zhikov’s ability to replace his subordinates like an expert chess player greatly helped stabilize his power to minimize new potential coups against him.

Communist ideologies
Even though Todor was Moscow’s most trusted pawn in the Balkans, it is not appropriate to call him a Communist. His decision to go into the Communist path and, as head of state, continuously follow Moscow’s wishes (either in Czechoslovakia in 1968 or Afghanistan in 1979), had more to do with him recognizing who his masters were that kept him in power than ideological respect. Any attempt to follow another course of action, like breaking away from Moscow’s influence, might have earned him a bullet in the head. Furthermore, seeing how repressive the Bulgarian government was against dissidence, one could speculate that Todor was continuously afraid of any kind of movement that could take him from power (like almost happened in 1965) and stayed with Moscow because he did not think he could survive as ruler of the country without outside help. Vladimir Stoinov mentions that he did not think Todor was a Communist or Socialist; he highlights decree 56, which allowed for private property, as an example of this (46).

The Bulgarian leader’s reluctance to follow with perestroika and glasnost during the late 1980s, as dictated by the head of the Soviet Union Mikael Gorbachev is another prove of Todor’s reluctance to follow all of Moscow’s orders. If Zhikov had been a true communist, he would have followed the orders at once as dictated by Gorbachev himself, but he only did so with great reluctance. Todor probably guessed that these processes could undermine his rule and could eventually help him losoe power –which ultimately became true.

The “Papa” Cult
John Bell writes that “despite his steadily firmer grasp on power, Zhivkov did not introduce a personality cult like those of Stalin, Chervenkov or his northern neighbor Nicolae Ceausescu (47).” Bell explains that Zhivkov, or “Bai Tosho” ( which is Bulgarian for “papa,” as he came to be widely called), cultivated a common touch that, whether natural or feigned, was in line with the country’s egalitarian tradition. In this author’s point of view, Bell’s statement is not correct. While perhaps Zhivkov was not as fancy of building statues of himself or making shrines out of places where he had been before, he slowly became regarded as the “papa” of Bulgaria. Reviewing his achievements, he argued that in 1956, when he assumed power, Bulgaria had been 'the most backward of the members of the Warsaw Pact and CMEA'. Under his rule it rose to third place in per capita income and on the eve of his fall Bulgaria was producing more in three days than in the whole of 1939. This was made possible by 'socialism' but, in Zhivkov's view, it also needed his own enlightened leadership (48).

He also placed his kids, particularly Ludmila Zhivkova and later Vladimir Zhivkov in government positions, essentially trying to make a dynasty that would maintain power. For example, Ludmila was, until her untimely death, the head of Bulgaria’s cultural policy, spending millions to buy works of art from around the world. Her husband, Ivan Slavkov, was made a boss of the state-controlled Bulgarian Television, and later President of the Bulgarian Olympic Committee. Meanwhile, Vladimir led a playboy style of life. His drinking bouts made it impossible to promote him further than the top ranks of the Komsomol. Ludmila also introduced strange ideas related to Far Eastern philosophy which were not welcomed by the Bulgarian old guard; some sources maintain that her death in 1981 was due to Soviet meddling.

IV. Conclusions
Towards the end of his reign, Zhivkov made several limited attempts to modernize Bulgaria, such as scaled down versions of glasnost and perestroika, while keeping the country under his control. However, these failed to prevent the collapse of Communism and his ultimate own ouster. In 1989, he was expelled from the Bulgarian Communist Party, and arrested in January 1990. Two years later, Zhivkov was convicted of embezzlement and sentenced to seven years in prison. However, due to his frail health, he was allowed to serve his term under house arrest. Todor Zhivkov died of pneumonia in 1998.

Todor Zhivkov’s legacy to Bulgaria and the world is fairly direct and simple. He was Moscow’s pawn in the Balkans, loyal and securely tied to the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. While Todor was not as harsh as some of his contemporary rulers (i.e. Ceaucescu in neighboring Romania), the decades he spent in power hardly ever benefited the Bulgarian people. The “papa” name, as some Bulgarians still remember him by today, may diminish in the coming decades if more information of Todor’s actions becomes more widely known and people realize that the cult was not created by the masses out of love, but imposed from above. Todor Zhivkov was a non-Communist, authoritarian and egomaniac ruler; unfortunately that might not be the way he planned to be remembered after this death.

References
Allen, Peter. “Transitions and the Global Implications in Greece, Bulgaria and France.” Reviews in Anthropology. Vol. 32. Pp. 239-52.

Anson, Jon; Todorova, Elka; Kressel, Gideon; Genov, Nikolai. Ethnicity and Politics in Bulgaria and Israel. Avebury. Aldershot. 1993.

Bell, John D. The Bulgarian Communist Party from Blagoev to Zhivkov. Hoover Institution Press. Standford, California. 1986.

Bishku, Michael B. “Turkish-Bulgarian Relations: From Conflict and Distrust to Cooperation.” Mediterranean Quarterly. 2003. Spring. 2003. Pp.77-94.

Chiodini, Steven. “Bulgaria: An Eastern European Revolution in Suspension.” Harvard International Review. Vol. 13 Issue 2. Winter 1991. Pp. 47.

Conquest, Robert. “Sofia Diary: Back to Bulgaria.” The National Review. January 24, 1994. Pp. 52-59.

Dobrinsky, Rumen. “The Transition Crisis in Bulgaria.” Cambridge Journal of Economics. Vol. 24. 2000. Pp.581-602.

Eminov, Ali. Turkish and other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria. Routledge. New York. 1997.

Ex-Communist Party in Bulgaria whitewashed and ready for the EU. Agence France Press. November 9, 2004.

Garthoff, Raymond L. A Journey Through the Cold War: A Memoir of Containment and Coexistence. Brookings Institution Press. Washington D.C. 2001.

Hristov, Hristo. "The crimes during the time of communist regin and the tryes for their investigatememnt after the 10th of november 1989.” In Bulgarian. 13.11.2004.
Available at: http://oshte.info/doc/other/025/htm

Karpat, B.H. (Editor). The Turks in Bulgaria: The History, Culture and Political Fate of a Minority. The Isis Press. Istanbul. 1990.

Lampe, John R. and Mazower, Mark (Editors). Ideologies and National Identities: The Case of Twentieth-Century Southeastern Europe. CEU Press. Budapest. 2004.

Marantz, Paul. “Prelude to Détente: Doctrinal Change under Khrushchev.” International Studies Quarterly. Vol. 19. No. 4. December, 1975. Pp. 501-28.

Mason, David S. “Glasnost, Perestroika and Eastern Europe.” International Affairs. Vol. 64. No. 3. Summer, 1988. Pp. 431-48.

Nedeva, Ivanka. “Lyudmila Zhivkova and the Paradox of Ideology and Identity in Communist Bulgaria.” East European Politics and Socities. Vol. 18 No. 2. 2004. Pp. 278-315.

Temkov, Boris. “I was a Conspirator”. In Bulgarian.
Available at: http://www.pirdop.com/index.php?con=temkov#3

Palairet, Michael. ““Lenin” and “Brezhnev”: Steel Making and the Bulgarian Economy, 1956-90.” Europe-Asia Studies. Vol. 47, No. 3. May, 1995. Pp. 493-505.

Schopflin, George. “The End of Communism in Eastern Europe.” International Affairs. Vol. 66, No. 1. January, 1990. Pp. 3-16.

Stoinov Vladimir, ex member of BCP and vice - major of Elin Pelin `s municipality. Interview with the author. November 17, 2005. Special thanks to Anita Georgieva for arranging this interview.

Todor Zhivkov: Statesman and Builder in New Bulgaria. Second Revised Edition. Pergamon Press. Oxford. 1985.

1. Bell. The Bulgarian Communist Party from Blagoev to Zhivkov. pp. 119.
2. Bell. pp. 123.
3. Bell. pp. 125.
4. Bell. pp. 126
5. Bell. Pp. 126.
6. Stoinov Interview.
7. Temkov. “I was a Conspirator”. In Bulgarian.
8. Bell. pp. 138.
9. Bell,. pp. 139
10. Bell. pp. 140
11. Hristov. "The crimes during the time of communist reign” In Bulgarian. 13.11.2004.
12. Ibid.
13. Guentcheva. Sounds and Noise in Socialist Bulgaria. Pp. 212.
14. Guentcheva. Pp. 215.
15. Bishku. “Turkish-Bulgarian Relations: From Conflict and Distrust to Cooperation.” It should be noted that with Bulgaria’s annexation of southern Dobrudja in 1940—recognized by the Soviet Union in 1947—Bulgaria acquired between 100,000 and 150,000 additional Turks. Thus the Turkish ethnic group in Bulgaria totaled about 750,000, more than 10 percent of that country’s population.
16 Ibid. A former Turkish ambassador to Bulgaria notes,“This haste could be explained by the fact that the Bulgarians were probably acting on behalf of the Soviets, who wished to ‘punish’ Turkey for its participation in the Korean War.” Turkish authorities could afford to take in only about thirty thousand immigrants to start with. They protested that the action by the Bulgarians would result in a mass expulsion and a flagrant violation of Turkey’s 1925 treaty with Bulgaria concerning the voluntary exchange of populations. Nevertheless, the Bulgarians sent Turks across the border without entry visas, and by October 1950, Turkey closed its frontier. In December the Bulgarian government accepted Turkish conditions that it wait for entry visas to be issued and that it allow illegal immigrants to be returned, but it sent Roma across the border using forged Turkish visas and refused to readmit them. Turkey was forced to close its frontier once again in November 1951; in retaliation, Bulgaria issued no more exit visas.
17. Bishku. Pp.89.
18. Stoinov. Interview.
19. Bishku, Pp. 89.
20. Bell. pp. 131. Also Stoinov Interview. Stoinov explained how there were attempts to appoint Gypsies to the local militia, however these individuals would go on robbery rampages where a Gypsy policeman would provide cover while the other Gypsies would rob stores. The Gypsies were kicked out because of this. Interestingly, when it came to housing, there was a rule to appoint one Gypsy family to live in each building with Bulgarian families.
21. Bishku, Michael B. “Until then, Turkey brought up the issue of Bulgaria’s treatment of ethnic Turks at international conferences and in its diplomatic discussions with Western and Islamic countries as well as the Soviet Union. Such moves did bring some action prior to Zhivkov’s ouster; Azeris in the Soviet Union held demonstrations of sympathy for Bulgarian Turks, while the Soviets at the urging of Turkey attempted to reconcile matters between it and Bulgaria. Prior to the Bulgarian leader’s ouster, in May 1989, he expelled some two thousand Bulgarian Turk activists and demanded that Turkey open its border; when Ozal did so, about 310,000 Turks entered Turkey until August, when Turkey reestablished visa requirements and, in effect, closed its frontier. As it was difficult to provide shelter for the masses of immigrants, Turkey desired an agreement that would regulate their numbers. By January 1990, with a changed political climate, some 130,000 of the immigrants returned to Bulgaria.
22. Garthoff, Raymond L. A Journey Through the Cold Warpp. 308.
23. Bell . pp. 142.
24. Garthoff . pp. 317
25. Bell. pp. 123.
26. Bell. pp. 143.
27. Chiodini. “Bulgaria: An Eastern European Revolution in Suspension.” Pp. 47.
28 Garthoff. Pp. 312. Also read Todor Zhivkov’s speech: Internal and Foreign Policy of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria. Speech delivered at the Tenth Session of the Seventh National Assembly Sofia, 27 April 1979. Available: Todor Zhivkov: Statesman and Builder in New Bulgaria. Second Revised Edition. Pergamon Press. Oxford. 1985. pp. 235-63.
29. Bell. pp. 144,
30. Bell. pp. 144.
31. Bell. pp. 145.
32. Bell. pp. 144..
33. Bishku. Pp. 88.
34. Bishku Pp. 88.
35. Bishku. Pp. 89.
36. Bell. pp. 145.
37. Bell. pp. 145.
38. Bell. pp. 146..
39. Garthoff. pp. 310
40. Garthoff. pp. 311.
41. Garthoff. pp. 305.
42. Garthoff. pp. 306.
43. Stoinov Interview.
44. Bell. pp. 147.
45. Bell. pp. 129.
46. Stoinov Interview. Decree 56 was passed on 01.01.1989 - the decree for the private property. There’s a following Government’s decree No36 , 28.06.1989 that says that the state manufactures become shared property.
47. Bell, John D. pp. 127.
48. Ex-Communist Party in Bulgaria whitewashed and ready for the EU. Agence France Press.

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An Amoral Relationship: Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov and the People’s Republic of China

2011-08-19T00:11:00.010-04:00

An Amoral Relationship:
Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov and the People’s Republic of China

W. Alejandro Sanchez
Research Fellow
Council on Hemispheric Affairs
Blog Post - August 19, 2011

KEY ISSUE
The government of the People’s Republic of China has increased its interest in recent years in Uzbekistan, specially the Central Asian nation’s oil and gas reserves, commodities which are highly valued by Beijing to ensure China’s continued growth in different areas in the short and long term. The relationship between both countries resembles a new-age tributary-system, where China receives goods from Uzbekistan, and, in, return Beijing has expressed growing support for Uzbek leader Islam Karimov, particularly during the aftermath of the May 2005 Andijan massacre. Through its dealings with regional nations like Uzbekistan, China has become the newest player in the Great Game for influence in Central Asia.

BACKGROUND:
The 2005 massacre in the Uzbek city of Andijan was the catalyst that brought Uzbekistan and China together. While the rest of the world, particularly the U.S., condemned the Karimov regime for the massacre of around 800 Uzbek civilians, Chinese officials were quick to welcome the Uzbek leader for a state visit to China in order to win his goodwill and gain access to his nation’s resources and market. The visit was complete with a 21-gun salute for Karimov in Tiananmen Square in Central Beijing. During the visit, Beijing said it ‘firmly’ backed his actions in crushing the anti-government demonstrators. Chinese President Hu Jintao went as far as calling Karimov an ‘old friend of the Chinese people.’ By diversifying his pool of allies, Karimov looked to Washington and Europe as means of moving away from Moscow’s sphere of influence.

In principle, Beijing’s interest in Uzbekistan can be summarized in its ventures for oil and gas, in addition to a continuous goal in gaining allies worldwide. Uzbekistan, as well as other Central Asian states (particularly Kazakhstan) have large quantities of these resources, which are seen by the Chinese government as vital to the country’s future growth. In recent years, China has led an aggressive foreign policy to secure a constant supply of oil and gas.

From a domestic point of view, Islam Karimov and his entourage want to remain in power indefinitely and for this they need the support of some world power. After the Andijan crisis other despotic states like China and the Russian Federation have publicly proclaimed support for the Uzbek government’s crackdown on insurrection. Therefore it is in Karimov’s interest to continue amicable relations with such governments so he can continue living in his luxurious lifestyle.

Furthermore, Uzbekistan is in a perpetual state of competition with the other Central Asian states to become the regional hegemonic power. In favor of Uzbekistan’s goals are a homogenous population, a strong military and a shared border with the other Central Asian nations. Therefore, from Tashkent’s point of view, becoming allies with a world power, whichever it may be, will help assert its position as a regional hegemon.

ANALYSIS
Uzbekistan has a great amount of oil and gas supply. For example the Ferghana Valley has fields that have been used for more than 90 years. There are more than 500 such small low-yield fields of 1,000-2,000 tons of crude oil a day. Overall, the country has known oil reserves of 600 million barrels.

Gas and oil are goods that China greatly needs According to the U.S. Department of Energy, China is the second-largest consumer of petroleum products in the world, importing roughly two million barrels of oil per day, half of which comes from the Middle East. . On July 19 2005, barely a month after the Andijan massacre, the Chinese oil firm Sinopec planned to invest $106 million in exploration and extraction in Uzbekistan. In May of that year, the Uzbek-state company Uzbekneftegaz signed a deal to set up a joint venture with Chinese oil company CNPC worth $600 million to explore oil fields in the western Bukhara and Kivia regions. The deal was signed when Karimov visited Beijing.

It seems that Beijing’s approaches to Tashkent are beginning to have a positive effect. In early May 2007, Uzbekistan announced plans to build a 530km gas pipeline to China with a capacity of 30
billion cubic meters a year, equivalent to half the Central Asian state's gas production.

China’s export to and import from Uzbekistan reached $70,443,000 in February 2007, and the trade in January-February reached $157,948,000. The Chinese Huawei Technologies company has agreed to provide the joint-stock Uzbektelecom company with telecommunications equipment worth $18.3 million on a leasing basis. In addition, Beijing has also announced plans to build a number of highways connecting it to Central Asia, including one from Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, to Tashkent.

Also, in the 2005 Sino-Russian military exercises (code named “Peace Mission 2005”) in Chinese Wiefang , Uzbek military officers were present. An article by Xinhua News quotes Cao Gangchuan, vice-chairman of the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) Central Committee Military Commission as saying that Uzbekistan is China's partner in Central Asia and an important member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Friendly military cooperation between China and Uzbekistan is an integral part of the bilateral relationship between the two countries.

Beijing also wants stability in the former Soviet states of Central Asia, a region globally considered as a tinderbox of extremist Islamic militancy that could spread to its own territory. Beijing has stressed the importance of maintaining stability in Central Asia through the China-backed Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The group has set up an anti-terrorism center in the Uzbek capital, Tashkent. At the same time, Beijing claims ethnic Uighur separatists are fighting for an independent Islamic state in its western region of Xinjiang, which is about 120 miles from Andijan and shares Uzbekistan's Muslim religion and Turkic language roots. In an extreme scenario, it is possible, and Chinese officials probably believe this, that Islamic insurgents from Central Asia, like the Taleban or the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), could develop ties with the Uighur and aid them in their ‘violent’ struggle for independence. The Chinese government also probably saw parallels between Karimov's position regarding Andijan and Beijings’ own bloody crackdown on antigovernment protesters in 1989.

CONCLUSIONS
The popular uprisings in recent years in Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and Ukraine, not to mention the ongoing “Arab Spring” must be a source of concern for Karimov. His oppressive rule is probably the sole thing that keeps him in power and prevents a popular uprising from overthrowing him and putting his dictatorial entourage in trail for his actions over the past two decades as rulers of the country. With China on his side, Karimov can be sure that no major action will be taken from organizations like the United Nations (since China is a permanent member of the Security Council) that can in any way threaten his rule.

Oil and gas will continue to be a cornerstone of the Sino-Uzbek relationship. However, Tashkent would be wise not to overestimate Beijing’s necessity for these two goods in order to obtain as much revenue as possible. Beijing has shown its teeth and demonstrated that it will not concede to Tashkent’s demands for greater revenue. An example of this has been the recent withdrawal of Dongsheng Petroleum Development Co Ltd, a unit of China Petroleum & Chemical Corp (Sinopec), from the Uzbekistan market due to high exploration costs. This case demonstrates that while China has great interest in Uzbekistan, the Central Asian nation should not overestimate its importance to China’s foreign policy.

The Sino-Uzbek relationship can be defined as an amoral, tributary relationship. China is not interested in Karimov’s human right record, it simply interested in its resources. It is a relationship of interests, in the purest realpolitik vision. It might not be acceptable to most individuals, particularly Uzbek citizens who have to live under the dictatorship. However, for China’s politburo and Karimov’s entourage, so far this relationship has proven to be a win-win scenario.

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An Easy Way to Improve U.S.-Latin American Relations

2011-07-28T13:21:00.003-04:00

W. Alex Sanchez, "An Easy Way to Improve U.S.-Latin American Relations" (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, July 28, 2011)
Available: http://bit.ly/qXB41y

During his attendance at a recent African Union summit, former Brazilian president Lula da Silva critiqued the structure of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC): “it isn't possible that Latin America, with its 400 million inhabitants, does not have permanent representation. Five countries decide what to do and how to do it, regardless of the rest of the humans living on this planet.”

Such statements are nothing new. The UNSC’s structure has come under heavy criticism in recent years, with repeated calls for its expansion. Countries like India, South Africa, and Brazil have become the usual suspects as possible new permanent members. And the Portuguese-speaking giant has emerged as the de facto representative for Latin America and the Caribbean to the UNSC.

If the United States backs Brazil's bid, it will gain considerable political capital in Latin America.

Brazil’s UN Qualifications

Brazil has been a rising star in Latin America and the world for several decades and boasts a number of successes that supports its quest for becoming a permanent representative to the UNSC. For starters the country has a history of involvement in UN missions: one of the first Brazilian UN deployments occurred in 1956 when Brasilia, under President Juscelino Kubitschek, sent peacekeepers to the Sinai. Brazilians have also served in the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador and the UN Mission in Angola. More recently, Brasilia took a leadership role in the UN Stabilization Mission to Haiti (MINUSTAH) to aid the transitional government that took control of Haiti after President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s ouster. Brazil has provided the military commanders for MINUSTAH along with a significant number of troops.

In addition, Brasilia has also provided personnel for the UN peace mission efforts in East Timor, which separated from Indonesia in 2002. Leading up to East Timor’s independence, Brazilian diplomat Sérgio Vieira de Mello served as the special representative of the UN secretary general and as UN transitional administrator (a sort of de facto governor) from December 1999 to May 2002. De Mello spent most of his career working for the UN instead of the Brazilian diplomatic corps and he was even thought to have been a likely candidate for the position of UN secretary general, which would have been a great honor for him and his country. He was tragically killed in the Canal Hotel bombing in Iraq on August 2003 while working as the secretary general’s special representative to Iraq.

In addition, Brazil already appears to be a de facto semi-permanent member of the UNSC, without the crucial veto power, due to the number of times it has held a temporary seat. Brasilia had a seat in 1946-1947, 1951-1953, 1954-1956, 1963-1965, and 1967-1968. Because the country had a military government from 1964 to 1985, it would not return to the UNSC until 1988-1989. Since returning to democratic rule, Brazil has had a seat almost non-stop: in 1993-1995; 1998-2000; 2004-2006; and currently in 2010 until the end of 2011. Furthermore, in another diplomatic victory, former minister José Graziano da Silvahas has been elected to be the next director general of the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization.

Besides its role in the UN, Brazil today has strong relations with different countries and regions of the world. For example, under former president Lula da Silva, Brazil became a major supporter for the creation of UNASUR (Union of South American Nations - Union de Naciones Suramericanas), a South American political bloc that has all 12 states as its members.

Regarding non-hemispheric inter-state relations, Brazil, along with Russia, China and India form the BRIC countries, regarded as rising, non-Western economic and political powerhouses. In addition, with India and South Africa, Brazil has formed a loose alliance known as IBSA; which aims to promote political and economical integration between its members. In September 2010 the three states carried out military maritime exercises in South Africa.

Furthermore, Brazil has historical ties with the Sub-Saharan Africa as well as fellow Portuguese-speaking countries. The African countries that Brazil has approached include Nigeria, Angola, and Mozambique though the agreements reached between them appear to be mostly focused around commerce and/or tourism. Only with South Africa has there been a special, more multi-dimensional relationship.

Likewise, Brazil has taken steps to promote the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP), which Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, and São Tomé and Príncipe established in 1996. Of primary importance to Brazil may be the fact that the CPLP countries, including East Timor now as an independent state, have supported Brazil’s candidacy for a UNSC permanent seat. Brazil's Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota has said that CPLP countries support each other in all their claims in international institutions like the United Nations, adding that “the idea is that we mutually support our bids. When a country from our family is a candidate for a position in an international organ, it will have our support.”

Finally, Brazil has a booming economy, with offshore oil fields recently discovered that will make the country’s maritime industry grow even more. This may actually turn out to be the decade of Brazil, as it will also host two major sporting events: the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro.

Drawbacks and Criticisms

Nevertheless, Brazil’s has drawn criticism for some of its foreign and domestic initiatives. Brazil has had a controversial role in MINUSTAH as the UN mission has been regarded as a type of colonial government by the UN in the wake of the ouster of former president Aristide. MINUSTAH troops have been accused of human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings during operations in areas like Cite Soleil while battling criminal gangs and rebels. Although Brazilian peacekeepers have not been singled out for responsibility for the violence, the country provides up to 1,300 troops to the mission, more than any other country, and a Brazilian commander has continuously led the effort. Ironically, during the 2005 riots in Cite Soleil and Bel Air, the Brazilians faced complaints that “[they] don't seem like they want to get too involved.”

In addition, Brazil’s domestic security policies have come under criticism for police crackdowns on gangs that operate in shantytowns in an effort to rid Brazil's major cities of crime in time for the FIFA World Cup in 2014 and the Olympics in 2016. Local residents also fear that when the Rio Olympics are over, “the state will take less interest in the favelas, allowing the drug trafficking gangs to re-establish control.” Furthermore, groups like Amnesty International have expressed concern “as Rio de Janeiro carries forth large scale ‘urbanization’ plans in preparation for the sporting events.” These organizations argue that Olympic projects “ranging from the Trans Carioca to the Trans Olimpica and parking, have been blamed for the planned as well as already executed forced removal of partial or entire communities.”

Finally, as strong as the Brazilian economy is today, the country’s overvalued currency will eventually lead to some kind of correction. According to Bloomberg, the valuation of the real “is prompting analysts to predict the currency will tumble 10 percent by 2013, which would make it the worst performer in the world.”

How the Rest of America Feels

In recent years, besides Brazil, countries like Mexico and Venezuela have increased their regional influence. It is debatable, however, if either of them are possible candidates to be permanent representatives to the UNSC. Regarding Mexico, the country has strong influences in Central America, and it has an expanding economy. It also has a growing role in organizations like APEC (Asia Pacific Economic cooperation) and is host to a relatively unknown but important organization: OPANAL (Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America). However, one of the concerns is that Mexico is regarded as too politically close to the United States due to close economic and security ties through Plan Merida and NAFTA. Hence Mexico would have difficulty being independent of Washington’s influence.

On the other hand, Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez has made it a foreign policy priority to distance his country from Washington, a 180 degree turn from Venezuela before Chavez, when the South American state was a reliable U.S. ally. Chavez certainly has some international support, but he has also been a divisive figure. It's not likely that Chavez could win sufficient international support for Venezuela's bid for a seat.

In general, most Latin American states have expressed their support for Brazil’s UN bid. In May 2011, President Chavez met with Brazil’s new president, Dilma Rouseff, and expressed his support for his Portuguese neighbor’s UNSC quest. Other countries like Paraguay, Uruguay, and Chile have also voiced their support. “So far Brazil's claim has gone largely uncontested, except for minor murmurings of dissent,” according to the UPI. A May/June 2011 article in Foreign Affairs adds that “many Latin American officials quietly reveal that they are not eager to see Brazil replace the United States as the hemisphere’s hegemon. As one diplomat recently put it, ‘The new imperialists have arrived, and they speak Portuguese.’” It would seem that Latin American support for Brazil to the UNSC is not simply due to good relations between regional governments and Brasilia but also due to the lack of any other regional candidate to counterbalance Brasilia’s ambition.

Regarding Washington, President Barack Obama has not carried out a concrete policy toward Latin America. He has occasionally travelled to the region, and he visited Brazil this past March. But his priorities are someplace else (i.e. the American economy and U.S. military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya). During his recent trip to Brazil, he recognized “Brazil's extraordinary rise” and he “expressed appreciation for Brazil's aspiration,” to have a permanent seat at the UNSC, nevertheless he stopped short of openly supporting Brasilia’s bid.

Improving Washington's Relations with Latin America

The United Nations Security Council is long overdue for a general restructuring, and controversial decisions like the authorization to begin a military operation in Libya (officially to protect civilians but it’s widely understood that the coalition of warships in the Mediterranean is indirectly aiding the rebels against Muammar Gaddafi) have brought about accusations that the Libya mission is just another example of how UNSC permanent members use the UN to project and protect their national interests. An expansion of the UNSC is an obvious recommendation and several of the permanent UN members have expressed support for powerhouses that aspire for a seat: Britain, for instance, supports Brazil while China and Russia support India. Nevertheless, according to several specialists, the major issue with UNSC reform is not a lack of potential models, but a lack of political will. None of the permanent members has prioritized a change the UNSC structure in the immediate future.

Regarding Brazil, the country does have most of the basic requirements, including backing by several states, to be a UNSC permanent member, making it the self-evident representative of Latin America and Caribbean. This doesn’t mean that Brazil is the perfect candidate to represent the region, but so far it is the only real option. The country should continue its version of good neighbor diplomacy and for that it might want to respect decisions by international bodies even if its government does not agree with them.

One perfect example of this is Brasilia’s challenge and rejection of a report by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, part of the Organization of American States, which had asked Brazil to stop the construction of the Belo Monte dam, as it hadn’t taken into the account the opinions and needs of local indigenous groups. The world already has too many powerhouses doing what they want, irrespective of the wishes by weaker states or international bodies. If Brazil really wants to be a representative powerhouse with a seat at the UNSC, it would help if it became the exception to the rule and actually respected decisions by the international organizations that it belongs to, instead of making claims that the OAS suggestions were “precipitated and unjustifiable.”

Finally, more open Washington support for Brazil’s UN aspirations would certainly help improve relations between the United States and Latin America. The election of Barack Obama was very well received by the Global South in general but, at least regarding the Western Hemisphere, not much has happened during his tenure. A stronger endorsement by the White House stating that Latin America does deserve a permanent member at the UNSC table would be a very important positive step in making the Washington-Latin American relationship a partnership of equals.

W. Alejandro Sánchez is a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus and a research fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs where he focuses on international security and geopolitical issues.

recommended citation:
W. Alex Sanchez, "An Easy Way to Improve U.S.-Latin American Relations" (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, July 28, 2011)

The Paraguayan People’s Army (EPP) – A New Insurgent Group with an Old Time Political Ideology?

2011-07-22T16:10:00.007-04:00

This analysis was prepared by COHA Research Fellow Alex Sanchez
Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA - www.coha.org)
http://bit.ly/nXyiUc
July 22, 2011

The Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo (Paraguayan People’s Army, or EPP) has now become a household name in Paraguay as well as among security agencies in neighboring countries. For the moment, it has focused its field of operations on kidnapping wealthy Paraguayans, only occasionally attacking Paraguay’s security forces. One of the most prominent victims of the EPP has been Fidel Zavala, who was held captive for 94 days until he was finally freed on January 17, 2010. Unfortunately, as the history of insurgent movements in general seems indicate, there is ample room for “growth” when it comes to their possible future operations. From kidnappings to murder, along with armed raids and other major attacks, this group also has been accused of kidnapping and subsequently brutally murdering Cecilia Cubas, the daughter of former Paraguayan president Raúl Cubas.

The ascent of the EPP raises a number of contentious issues, but two stand out in particular. First, what kind of counterinsurgency strategy might Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo carry out? The Paraguayan head of state is a former bishop who was criticized during the presidential campaign for his religious background, with the implication being that it might make him soft on crime. Nevertheless, Lugo has not had a problem with deploying over 2,000 troops to the northern parts of the country to crack down on the EPP. [1] This, in turn, raises a new set of problems, as Paraguayan civil society has a somewhat problematic relationship with its military, dating back to a number of recent military-backed dictatorships that were known for their human rights abuses.

The second issue has more to do with the EPP itself; it claims to have a leftist political ideology. Specifically, according to reports, the group argues that it has a Socialist/Communist ideological heritage, with inspiration coming from international and national heroes (like Che Guevara). If this is true, the EPP would be one of the first violent organizations to appear in Latin America after the end of the Cold War that pledges to have a political ideology. In the era of international Mexican cartels and widespread drug-trafficking groups, this would represent a significant development.

The EPP already presents an interesting case-study for academics, but for the Paraguayan government, it is a new security threat that will have to be faced. Paraguay today is, unfortunately, a poor, under-developed, landlocked state in dire need of development of every description. But improving the living conditions of its population is no easy task. The last thing this South American country needs is a brutal counterinsurgency war, as some of its neighbors have recently experienced.

The EPP – A Brief Synopsis

For the moment, the EPP remains a relatively obscure guerrilla movement. According to Jane’s Defense, its origins date back to 1992 when a group of trainee priests, who had been expelled from a Catholic seminary for their radical political views, established the Movimiento Monseñor Romero with the aim of plotting a socialist revolution. For the Asunción daily ABC, the EPP is a group comprised of criminal elements accused of murdering police officials and attacking police and military outposts. [2] According to that news service, the EPP was created in 2005, after the kidnapping and subsequent murder of Cecilia Cubas. By contrast, the EPP argues that it is an armed group made up of peasant communities. It denies Asunción’s accusations that it is a group of criminals or has any affiliation with any other insurgent organizations like the Colombian FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia); however, the government claims that the EPP has strong ties with the Colombian guerrillas, going as far as insisting that the Paraguayan rebels have received training in Colombian encampments.[3] It is known that at least one key FARC leader, Orley Jurado Palomino, aka Commander Santiago, has gone to Paraguay to provide training, advice and operational leadership to the insurgent group. It is also unclear if the EPP has ties with some major Brazilian drug trafficking organizations, like the First Capital Command (Primeiro Comando da Capital – PCC) and Red Command (Comando Vermelho) which are known to have a significant presence in northern Paraguay.

Between 2010 and 2011 the EPP appears to have increased the boldness of its operations. On April 21, 2010, there was a shootout between EPP members and security forces in Arroyito in the province of Concepción. One policeman and three private guards were killed, which brought about the calling of a “state of exception” and major military deployment.

In addition, Interior Minister Rafael Filizzola has accused the EPP of being the masterminds of explosions across the country. Indeed, the EPP has taken credit for a detonation that injured five people in the town of Horqueta on January 17, 2011. [4] An EPP note declared this was a retaliatory attack for the death of two EPP members at the hands of the Paraguayan police in 2010. More recently, in mid-July 2011, the EPP claimed ownership of an attack on a farm known as “La Amanda,” in as the department of Concepción, close to the border with Brazil, in which farm machinery was destroyed. [5]

Nevertheless, as a small group, the EPP still lacks two critical components: money and weapons. It has some popular support in Northern Paraguay, but it does not have a surplus of active combatants, for which financial funding and training is a necessity. One can see, however, that the EPP has increased and improved the nature of its operations. Originally, the EPP carried out bank robberies, but they proved to be dangerous and unprofitable. In November 2001, the clandestine organization carried out its first successful kidnapping, that of María Edith de Debernardi. Publicly, USD 1 million ransom was reportedly paid for her release, although rumors are that the amount was much greater. Kidnappings continued after that, like that of Cecilia Cubas; it is believed that the Cubas family paid USD 300,000 in ransom, but the EPP still killed the former president’s daughter (when her body was found, officials declared that she had been suffocated). The EPP has also been accused of being involved in drug trafficking in collaboration with Brazilian cartels. Regarding armament, the group’s modus operandi to secure weapons is to steal whatever its members can obtain from their attacks against security installations.

A 2009 analysis by David A. Spencer, professor of National Security Studies at the National Defense University in Washington D.C., explains that the EPP membership can be divided into one of four categories: “A) Full-time combatants, B) Part-time combatants or militias, C) Logistics support forces, D) Internal and External political support and propaganda).” [6] The EPP is believed to be able to muster around 60 full-time combatants and its most important members include individuals identified as Osvaldo Villalba (the group’s leader), Manuel Cristaldo, Juan Arrom and Alcides Oviedo.

A Political Ideology?
Carmen Villalba, a self-declared spokeswoman of the EPP, has stated that the group’s support comes from “el pueblo paraguayo, del sector popular, de gente que eternamente fue burlada, discriminada, pisoteada” (“the Paraguayan people, the people who eternally feel that they have been ridiculed, discriminated against and stepped on”).[7] According to reports from the field, the EPP has been influenced by Che Guevara and Régis Debray, as well as national heroes like the Mariscal Francisco Solano López. Other reports, particularly coming from media declarations by former hostage Fidel Zavala, point out that the EPP also looks up to Cuba’s Fidel Castro, Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez and Karl Marx.

Even though the EPP seems to adhere to Marxist-Leninist ideology, prominent leftists such as Luis Casabianca, leader of the Paraguayan Communist Party, have condemned the Zavala kidnapping. The Paraguayan Marxist has stated that the EPP “no es revolucionario, sino terrorista” (“is not revolutionary, rather, terrorist”). [8] It is noteworthy that Casabianca, who in the 1960s was part of the guerrilla group Frente Unido de Liberación Nacional (FULNA), which today stands apart from the EPP.
Discussions will continue to assess whether the EPP is a criminal band or a real guerrilla group with a concrete political ideology that originates out of the extreme poverty for which Paraguay is known. In his previously mentioned 2009 analysis, Spencer highlights the somewhat ironic situation in Paraguay as President Lugo was elected on a fairly populist platform, resorting to a national coalition of left-wing and non-leftwing parties.[9] His election was part of a wave of populist governments that democratically took control, at least temporarily, of most South American states over the past decade, ranging from moderates like Lula da Silva in Brazil to more ideologically-prone ones like Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia. Spencer explains that:

“Lugo’s election divided the peasant movement and support for EPP. Some wanted to form a single, unified and disciplined movement with single line of action, an option favored and pushed by the members of the EPP and their supporters. Others wanted to form a loose political coalition around the figure of Lugo, the alternative that ended up prevailing. It is this divisive political dynamic that explains EPP’s continued activity despite a leftist president in power.” [10]

The more extremist members of the EPP saw Lugo’s alliance with non-leftist, non-populist groups as a betrayal of their goals. In its communiqués, the EPP condemned the “treacherous pretend socialists” for making alliances with “pro-imperialists” and “pro-oligarchy” factions. On September 21, 2010, President Lugo allegedly received a threatening letter from the EPP, calling him a “walking cadaver” and has termed Minister of the Interior Rafael Filizzola and his wife, Congresswoman Desire Masi, as “oligarch bullies” and “money wasters.” [11]

The EPP has declared that it wants to establish a “Socialist/Communist” republic of Paraguay, and it will resort to violence to achieve this, but it is unclear what this utopian government would look like, particularly regarding its leadership. In Peru, the leaders of Shining Path and the MRTA (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru), Abimael Guzmán and Victor Polay Campos respectively, also wanted to overthrow the central government in Lima and create a new state with themselves as presidents (or executive leaders). It is unclear so far if the EPP leadership has similar plans to establish itself as the head of this illusory Socialist Paraguay.

Lugo’s Response
The future of the EPP will depend on how President Fernando Lugo, the former Catholic priest, chooses to respond. Will the president turn to a military offensive, including search-and-destroy missions against the EPP, or should its activities be allowed to continue? Will Lugo’s religious background affect his decisions? Apparently not. In January 2010, six peasant leaders were detained by the country’s security forces, who accused them of being EPP members who were involved in the 2008 Luis Alberto Lindstrom kidnapping, despite claims from human rights activists that there was no concrete evidence against them. Then, in late April 2010, the Paraguayan leader ordered a 30 day “state of exception” and the deployment of 3,300 troops from the Paraguayan army, navy and air force, as well as 300 police officers, to the northern departments of Concepción, San Pedro, Amambay, Presidente Hayes and Alto Paraguay to crack down on the insurgents. [12] Political opposition groups, as well as civil society organizations, have since condemned these events. In any case, such military operations against the EPP so far have failed to disband the insurgent group. On March 15, 2011, the highly-regarded online defense newsletter Southern Pulse reported that Asunción increased a potential reward for information that could help capture high-ranking EPP members. [13]

It is worth highlighting the need for the Paraguayan armed forces to improve the effectiveness of their counterinsurgent operations, which are affected by the preparation and readiness of military personnel. Paraguay is burdened by a small defense budget, and thus its military has to resort to relatively cheap weapon deals with Brazil and target critical hardware areas that need major affordable upgrading. One example occurred in early 2011, when Brasilia donated three used Tucano 727 planes so that the Paraguayan air force could effectively train its pilots. The transaction didn’t involve a purchase, but rather represented an exchange whereby Paraguay obtained the three aircraft, and in turn it donated four unused Xavantes and an old Boeing 707. [14] According to an early June report by online defense news agency Infodefensa.com, the Paraguayan government declared that the country will now spend USD 40 million to obtain new equipment for its military. [15] The country wants to obtain ammo, military trucks, transport planes, radars and patrol vessels. Companies like Iturri, Renault Trucks Defense, Santa Barbara Systems and EADS have been mentioned as possible solo or joint suppliers. The commander of the armed forces, General Benicio Melgarejo, has stated the country’s intention to equip an infantry battalion for the navy, including the acquisition of vessels to patrol the country’s rivers. The Paraguayan military has also acquired 450 Galil 5.56mm assault rifles from Colombia.[16]

Furthermore, the EPP will initiate a new dynamic to take into account regarding civilian-military relations in Paraguay, which already are somewhat strained under the Lugo presidency. Since coming to power, Lugo has carried out at least three major purges of the military leadership, with the latest occurring in mid-2011. According to recent reports, Lugo has replaced top leaders like the commander of the army (General Darío Cáceres), the commander of Logistics (General Waldino Acuña) as well as other regional commanders. Analysts have speculated that this move is a way for Lugo to avoid a potential “constitutionalist coup”, similar to what happened in Honduras in 2010, as he tries to reform the constitution so he can run for re-election. The last attempted military coup in Paraguay took place in 2000, when rebel troops unsuccessfully tried to overthrow then-president Luis González Macchi. It is too early to tell if this change among the top military brass will affect the security operations against the EPP.

As a final point, there is the concern that military operations would devolve into human rights violations. Paraguayan civil society has been historically wary of its military due to decades of dictatorships like that of Alfredo Stroessner (1954-1989) and his brutal crackdown on opposition groups.

Conclusions
Unfortunately for Paraguay, its security woes seem to have mounted recently. For years, the country has been rumored to have Hezbollah members operating within its territory. In addition, it has been painted as a center for numerous international crimes, ranging from drug trafficking to smuggling goods across natural borders, including expensive cars and other contraband.

So far, the EPP has proven itself to be a small but resilient and aggressive rebel group. The high profile kidnappings, bombings and occasional attacks against the country’s security forces show that it has little problem with carrying out specific and well-planned operations. While the EPP remains small and poses no major threat of an armed takeover of the capital and government, the potential exists for an increase in violence, which is the last thing that Paraguayan civil society would welcome. In any case, it remains debatable whether EPP members actually believe in the political ideology that they publicly profess. As mentioned earlier, if this is true, then the EPP would be, arguably, one of the first, if not the first ideologically-oriented insurgent organization to appear in Latin America since the end of the Cold War.
Regarding what actions Asunción is prepared to carry out regarding the EPP, it seems clear that President Lugo has not let his religious past affect his decisions so far, namely whether to use his security forces against the insurgent group. Up to now, there have been some successes against the group, like the capture of several of its members, but the EPP continues to function. There is a possibility that use of the military will result in human rights abuses, similar to events in other Latin American countries, namely Colombia and Peru. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, Paraguayan civil society has had a troubling experience with its armed forces due to military regimes that have ruled the country. Then again, if Lugo does not use his available resources to quell the EPP, the political opposition as well as the armed forces may perceive him as being weak and incapable of defending the country, thus making him a candidate for mockery.

At a time when it was believed that insurgent groups with a political ideology were a thing of the past, analysts assume that entities like drug cartels, international criminal gangs and narco-terrorist groups (like the FARC and the new version of the Peruvian Shining Path) will represent new security threats. This assumption is what makes the rise of the EPP a fascinating case from an academic point of view.
In any case, the EPP does present a potential security threat to the Paraguayan government and its society and must be dealt with adequately, both via security operations as well as by addressing its fundamental raisons d’etre (i.e. poverty, social alienation, etc). Similar suggestions have already been put forward for years in other countries (Colombia and Peru as primary examples of this); hopefully the Paraguayan government will learn from other countries’ failures and successes when it comes to seriously dealing with the EPP in a proportional and professional manner.

References

[1] Natalia Ruiz Diaz. “Paraguay: Controversy Over Troop Deployment.” IPS. http://www.soaw.org/presente/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=298&Itemid=74 (accessed July 18, 2011)

[2] “El EPP, Una organizacion criminal con solida estructura” ABC Digital. http://www.abc.com.py/nota/67550-El-EPP,-una-organizacin-criminal-con-slida-estructura/ (accessed July 19, 2011)

[3] Marta Escurra. “Paraguayan guerrillas were trained by the FARC.” Infosurhoy. http://www.infosurhoy.com/cocoon/saii/xhtml/en_GB/features/saii/features/main/2010/03/16/feature-01 (accessed July 19, 2011)

[4] “Fuerte explosion en un ataque del EPP a comisaria de Horqueta.” Paraguay.com. http://www.paraguay.com/nacionales/fuerte-explosion-en-un-ataque-del-epp-a-comisaria-de-horqueta-61032/pagina/5 (accessed July 19, 2011)

[5] “Policia investiga ataque armado en hacienda ‘La Amanda,’ de Paso Barreto.” Nanduti 1020am. http://www.nanduti.com.py/v1/noticias-mas.php?id=39868 (accessed July 19, 2011)

[6] David Spencer. “Paraguayan People’s Army: Challenging a Populist Regime.” Security Defense Studies Review. 2009. Issues 1 & 2

[7] Freddy Aguilera. “Ejercito Paraguayo del Puelo ya incursion militarment.” Ultimahora.com. http://www.ultimahora.com/home/index.php?p=nota&idNota=102273 (accessed July 18, 2011)

[8] “Lider comunista paraguayo critica acciones del Ejercito del Pueblo Paraguayo.” UPI.com http://espanol.upi.com/Politica/2009/12/25/Lder-comunista-paraguayo-critica-acciones-del-Ejrcito-del-Pueblo-Paraguayo/UPI-82421261747157/ (accessed July 19, 2011)

[9] David Spencer. “Paraguayan People’s Army: Challenging a Populist Regime.” Security Defense Studies Review. 2009. Issues 1 & 2

[10] David Spencer. “Paraguayan People’s Army: Challenging a Populist Regime:” Security Defense Studies Review. Issues 1 & 2 (2009). P. 110

[11] Marta Escurra. “Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo allegedly threatened by EPP.” Infosurhoy.com http://www.infosurhoy.com/cocoon/saii/xhtml/en_GB/features/saii/features/society/2010/09/30/feature-03 (accessed July 19, 2011)

[12] Natalia Ruiz Diaz. “Paraguay: Controversy Over Troop Deployment.” IPS. http://www.soaw.org/presente/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=298&Itemid=74 (accessed July 19, 2011)

[13] Southern Pulse – http://www.southernpulse.com/ (registration necessary)

[14] “Brazil donates Three Tucano Advanced Trainers to Paraguay.” Infodefensa.com http://www.dialogo-americas.com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/regional_news/2011/01/04/feature-ex-1777 (accessed July 18, 2011)

[15] “Paraguay invertira 40 millones de dolares para modernizer sus Fuerzas Armadas.” Infodefensa.com http://www.infodefensa.com/?noticia=paraguay-invertira-40-millones-de-dolares-para-modernizar-sus-fuerzas-armadas (accessed July 19, 2011)

[16] “Paraguay compra urgentemente a Colombia 450 fusiles de as alto Gali.” Revista Ateneadigial.es http://www.revistatenea.es/revistaatenea/revista/articulos/GestionNoticias_1495_ESP.asp (accessed July 18, 2011)